Ryan Teschner

Ryan Teschner spoke 28 times across 1 day of testimony.

  1. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Thank you, Professor Baker. Good morning, Mr. Commissioner. Bonjour. I have spent over a decade focused intensely on police/government relations, first as a lawyer, then as lead counsel to Judge Morden for the G20 review, and then now, a front row seat as executive director and chief of staff to Canada’s largest municipal police services board. And so I have some reflections. I approach this as a discussion of principle, and there are three that I think animate the approach to effective, appropriate, well-balanced police/government relations in Canada. The first is an acceptance that we must keep politics out of policing. Law enforcement decisions, in their core fashion, should not be made or directed by those in elected office. Police officers have common-law authority independent of government and must undertake their core law enforcement functions separate from government direction in order to maintain the rule of law. But we have to be careful no to lean too heavily into creating a bubble of immunity that prevents governance and oversight of police in terms of their plans, actions or inactions, or otherwise impedes the flow of information essential for governance and oversight to function. The second principle is that we need governance and oversight in some form. Policing requires, in my view, some form of independent governance that is forward looking, that is perspective, and that embeds due respect for community norms. We need this to maintain the public approval required for democratic community policing systems to function. It helps ensure that the public’s accepted values and norms, as many of the other panelists have mentioned in their intros, guide the delivery of policing. And it puts in place the policy infrastructure that sets the rules and limits within which specific law enforcement decisions will be made and actions taken. We also need independent oversight after the fact, accountability processes that examine decisions or acts once they have already occurred and help us learn from them. Third principle is that we need an intermediary who mediates and sometimes arbitrates interests. There must be a way to, without government being the decision maker improperly, translate public values and expectations into a framework within which policing services will be delivered. Someone must balance competing interests of different constituencies, a diverse public, police leadership, elected officials, oversight actors, interest groups, but ultimately make the policy decisions, set the priorities and objectives from which police actions flow. There are a few other key points I’m sure I’ll expand on today. One is that the ability of independent governance and oversight bodies to function and fulfill their important statutory mandate requires a healthy information exchange and that that is not the same as impermissible direction of the police. The second is the need to balance the concepts of independence and accountability in a way that avoids political interference but avoids political shirking of responsibility. And the third is that community connection that the boards and commissions across this country provide help ensure that a community needs and their expectations as they evolve are matched, that there is a feedback loop, so that policing evolves alongside. And very quickly, I'll put this by way of analogy. I look at the role of police boards and commissions the way that I look at building a house. You have an architect and you have a general contractor. Police boards are the architects. They have a vision, they develop the blueprints, they set the plan. Police chiefs and police services are the general contractors. They are the experts. They come in and they mobilise the trades, the resources, the equipment, the tools in order to bring that plan to life. Each have an important role. But for anyone who has built a home, renovated a home you know that you have to respect the roles of each in order for the system to function properly. And I look forward to expanding on that more today. Thank you.


  2. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Thank you. Judge Morden, in his report, used a constitutional law analogy and talked about the importance of no longer seeing this idea of policy and operations as watertight compartments. I would certainly agree with that. I would also say that we have to stop seeing it as “versus” and start seeing it as “and”. There’s a symbiotic relationship between the policies that are set, the priorities and objectives that are set by a police board, or in the case of other police organizations in Canada, by the government, and the way in which the operations are carried out by our law enforcement actors. Judge Morden also provided, I think, some very important thresholds that we should keep in mind. Not every instance of police action will merit the application of a board’s governance and oversight function in the circumstance. And Judge Morden coined the term “critical points”. These were the threshold at which a police board or commission should become engaged, because the policing operation that is being contemplated or unfolding, the event is organizationally significant. It’s not focused on one detachment or one division. It brings into play the entire police service and the command of the police service. Judge Epstein, in her report, Missing and Missed, expanded on Judge Morden’s critical point definition and said that it should also include major operations that could have an impact on the police service’s reputation. Again, classically a role that a board of directors would become engaged in. And also operations that are likely to have an impact on the police service’s relationship with marginalized communities. But when I look at Ontario’s Police Services Act, which I actually think is a pretty decent structure that requires, perhaps, some interpretative improvement, I’m less concerned about section 31(4) that talks about the board's role and the board's limits, and actually think a lot can be gleaned from section 41(1)(a), which speaks about the role of chiefs. And it says that it's the duty: "...of a chief of police...[to administer] the police force and [oversee] its operation in accordance with the objectives, priorities and policies established by the board..." So the board does have a role in providing direction, and governments, where there are no boards, have a role in providing direction. They do set the priorities and objectives. And Judge Morden said not just in general with respect to an annual business plan for the police service, but in the context of a critical point. When a particular event is being planned or unfolded, it's the board's role to establish, in consultation with the chief, what are the priorities for the policing of this event? What are the objectives that the police service should be seeking to fulfill? And what policy infrastructure is going to be put in place in order to carry out those functions? Once the board defines those priorities, objectives, and policies, the police service does its work. It develops the operational plans required to carry out that mission and achieve the identified objectives. I would argue, though, that the board's role is not over them. The board should stay engaged in the life of the operation. It should review what has been put in place by the chief, not for the technical elements, for which it really doesn't have the expertise, but to confirm that the plans are consistent with the priorities, objectives, and policies, and importantly, that the board is satisfied that adequate and effective policing will be delivered in the municipality or jurisdiction for which it is legally, that is, the board is legally responsible. And of course, the board should ask questions about the plan. Was anything else considered? Why are you confident that this plan will work? If Plan A doesn't work, what is your Plan B? These are all kicking the tires that boards should do. So let's talk about this policy and operations distinction. Judge Morden in his report said that: "Apart from being impossible to apply in its own terms, this statement does not represent what the statute [that is, the Ontario Police Services Act] provides." (As read) Not only is it not meaningful, in my view, it's the culprit for decades of misunderstanding of the police board role, and in some sense, the reason that the full promise of independent civilian police governance and oversight has not been fully realised. A board can develop policies, priorities, and objectives that affect operations without impermissibly directing the chief of police with respect to core law enforcement functions. And policies and directions that have no impact on a police service's operational activities are meaningless. A board, of course, does have limits, and both Professor Kempa and Professor Puddister have talked about the case in Campbell and some of those limits. I would say that there could be, perhaps, a gloss put on the Campbell case. Really, where boards should step back and not direct police is with respect to the discretionary law enforcement power that police possess in our system. Whether that's a determination about who to investigate, how to conduct the investigation, who to arrest or not arrest, what search warrant to carry out, or what to do on the ground in the context of public order maintenance in a protest, these are discretionary law enforcement decisions that are within the full view and protected sphere of police independence, if you will. But the infrastructure in which its carried out, the priorities, the objectives, the policies, that is the role of the board. And so I think in approaching it this way, rather than an either/or, we can start to appreciate the symbiotic relationship that should exist between these two functions. Now, Dr., or Professor Puddister talked about this in the context of policies, and she mentioned one that I just want to illustrate through an example. A disproportionate impact on use of force against particular populations. In Toronto, the Toronto Police Services Board put in place a race-based data collection analysis and public reporting policy that is lengthy, is dense, and is detailed. It's not just high-level, it talks about what the priorities and objectives are in that particular space. And it compels the chief of police and the service, through him, to put in place action plans to identify the results of the analysis, the disproportionality, where it's found. Many would say, in the past or even today, that's an impermissible intervention in day-to-day operations. You're telling the chief that they have to develop plans to address a specific issue, and you're creating the infrastructure in which that occurs? And the answer is, absolutely. That's the role of the board. And the Toronto Board has taken this role in the context of artificial intelligence, body-worn cameras, things that traditionally have been seen as the domain, the sole domain of the police service. But that infrastructure in which it's carried out is absolutely the domain of the Board, in consultation with the operational leader that has the expertise, to express how these things are going to impact the way they do their job in an effort to try and find a place that makes sense.


  3. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I’m batting first on this one, I guess. Let me again pay homage to a great mentor of mine and somebody who I think made a significant contribution to this space, and that is Judge John Morden. In his report on the G20, he talked about a consultation protocol that should exist between boards and chiefs of police. And I’ll substitute “boards” for “government entities” or “Ministers” where there isn’t, currently at least, a proper governance board. That information exchange was the first element of Morden’s consultation protocol. Without access to all relevant information, the ability to ask specific questions about the operation and the plans, details that are contemplated, ongoing or completed operations, independent police governance bodies cannot fulfil their statutory function. A board can’t ask a chief questions, or turn its mind to articulating priorities, objectives, or policies about things of which it’s unaware of; you don’t know what you don’t know. And so the concern about a board not asking questions out of a misplaced fear that it will be accused of treading on operational matters, this is, I believe, as Professor Kempa put it, a timidity that has become dangerous to a board fulfilling its statutory mandate. It’s created escape hatches through which the policy maker; that is the board, and the policy implementer; that is the chief have each avoided responsibility. And so the burden, in my view, is on the chief to take initiative in ensuring that the board is probably informed about matters; past, present, or future, that fall under the purview of the board’s responsibilities. And once he or she does so, that kicks in this consultation protocol beginning with the information exchange. An information exchange, by the way, that is reciprocal in that the board should be consulting with the chief on areas that it’s considering. Judge Epstein more recently doubled down on this information exchange and said that only after a full appreciation of contemplated or completed operations occurs, will the Board be able to truly deliver on its statutory mandate to ensure adequate and effective policing. The only informational no-go zones, in my view, is information that a police chief if prohibited from providing to a board as a result of a specific statutory prohibition; so an example to that would be information about an ongoing wiretap operation, because that’s prohibited under the Criminal Code, or where otherwise prohibited by common law; so an example there would be informer privilege; or, thirdly, where they’re precluded from doing so as a result of a specific court order. Otherwise -- and I know some may consider this controversial -- boards have, and should have, full access to all information, and that includes, for example, information about intelligence that a chief of police believes is important in helping define the plans for a specific event. And so as Judge Epstein said, the answer to a concern about whether giving access to information could be seen as direction is not to foreclose boards from making non-binding recommendations, expressing opinions, or gaining access to that information, but reminding boards that when they’re getting this information, they should be anchoring it to their priority, objective setting, and policy-making functions to their mandate. We also need to remember that board members and chiefs of police are adults; if a chief of police believes that the way in which a board is engaging in a conversation goes too far, and gets into the direction of police discretion, they should say so. And there are mechanisms in law and in certain statutes that if saying so isn’t enough, that decision can be reviewed. But the board has a role to play; we cannot say that as a matter of law boards are statutorily responsible and liable for ensuring adequate and effective policing, and on the flip side say that they’re not entitled to a whole bunch of information about how policing is going to unfold in the jurisdiction for which they’re responsible. Now, in terms of elected officials, my argument here would be that elected officials should not be reaching in to police leaders in order to understand what’s unfolding, what the plans are, because it puts both the police leadership and the elected official in a potential precarious position. A board or commission is the conduit so that we can maintain both a real and perceived independence of that core police discretionary function. And at least where a statutory police governance exists, it is the board’s role to ensure adequate and effective policing, not elected officials. It’s the board’s role. And so that’s where the elected officials can come. And then it’s up to the board to keep those officials up to date on areas of concern, listen to their concerns, and help translate those concerns through their governance function to the Chief of Police. In terms of what kinds of reports or information police should routinely provide to public authorities about their plans and activities relating to protests, I would say that the model that we adopted in Toronto for the Freedom Convoy is a good one. This was clearly a critical point, to use Judge Morden’s term, and the Chief came to the Board and said, “We have something unfolding and I want to make sure that you’re fully briefed.” And the Board’s Institutional Report, at page 13, outlines the various types of information that the Chief and his team provided in that briefing. The key context for the major event and operation, including known intelligence that’s animating the operational planning. Suggested priorities and objectives for the Board to consider. The command-and-control approach that was going to be taken, especially if other police services from outside the jurisdiction were going to be involved, a lesson learned from the G20. Confirmation that the Board’s existing policies and legal authorities in place provided an adequate framework for the policing of the Freedom Convoy. A discussion about whether the Service required any specific Board approval associated with its planned operations. A discussion about the adequacy of the Service’s resources for handling both the major event and whether there was a need for other services to participate and lend support, and what the legal infrastructure was going to look like for that. Of course, all the adequacy of general policing services, so that while that event was happening, the Board’s statutory role to ensure adequate and effective policing generally in the city can’t be forgotten. And so business continuity was discussed. And then importantly, public and stake holder communications before, during, and after the operation. All of these areas of information were put on the table by the Chief and his team, were discussed by the Board, gave them an opportunity to ask questions, and ultimately to determine whether they were satisfied that the plan that was in place would ensure adequate and effective policing in Toronto.


  4. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Just very quickly, I do think that this is a circumstance in which even though they don’t have constitutional status, municipalities can teach the rest of the country, perhaps, a lesson. Where there are governance gaps when it comes to independent civilian governance, they should be filled. The management board for -- the management advisory board for the RCMP was mentioned today, and while I think that’s an important step along the transition, and I know that the more recent mandate letter to the Minister of Public Safety asks for enhancements in this area, I don’t see any real barrier, statutory, legislatively, legally, or otherwise, as to why the RCMP cannot one day have a truly independent civilian governance and oversight body. And I would say the same for the others that Christian mentioned here. The reality is that those boards are the intermediary if they do their job effectively, and it gives real definition to some of the principles that we've been talking about today. And so I would just urge the decision makers and perhaps you, Mr. Commissioner, to give some consideration to that.


  5. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Yeah, just a brief point. I do think that the police service and police board sector would benefit from a little bit more rigidity in terms of the structure. Flexible but structured. And so I'm aware, for example, that the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police is working on template MOU or agreements so that where boards need to seek assistance from other boards for a particular operation on the basis of a chief's recommendation, there is already a framework agreement that's in place that boards and police services would be aware of. It would address things like cost-sharing; training, if there any issues; command and control considerations, so those things are clarified; insurance matters, if those things come up. And so having some of this on the ready that everybody's familiar with and understands means that the to-ing and fro-ing that can sometimes happen during the life of an event has already been resolved. And so I think that there's an opportunity there, perhaps even to take that around the country.


  6. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Okay. Thank you. I'll just amplify some of the recommendations. First, Commissioner, I would say that harmonizing the approach to police governance through legislation and otherwise does not necessarily need to upset the constitutional order. And so there's an ability to make recommendations, to bring to bear some of what was discussed today in terms of best practice. For example, the statutory roles and functions of police boards and commissions being made more clear; the definition of police independence that piggybacks off what happened in the case of Campbell, and I would suggest with my suggested modification, narrowing it more to the exercise of police discretion and the law enforcement function; a legislative definition of critical point with the attendant information exchange obligations; mandatory training requirements for exercising the governance function and for chiefs and command officers to receive mandatory training on engaging with their governance bodies; and then the Chief mentioned mechanisms to protect from a security of tenure perspective, if you will, board members in certain circumstances. Secondly, I would just say again, ensuring through legislation and other tools the ability of local police boards and services to seek assistance nimbly and in real time without compromising their ability to remain the police service of jurisdiction; template agreements, MOUs and the like established in advance, so that some of the legal issues can be thoughtfully worked through and not necessarily dealt with on the spur of the moment. I've talked about, as many have, a fully independent civilian governance and oversight body for the RCMP, so I won't repeat that. And then I would say two things from my front row seat living within the world of police governance every day. All of these recommendations are great in theory, but you have to set boards and Commissions up for success. And I would say there are two ways that you could potentially do that. One is, I am not aware of another government function where the tall order that boards and commissions need to fulfill are not fundamentally and adequately supported by professional civil staff that supports those boards and commissions. And I think resources and a consistency of approach needs to be brought to bear to ensure that part-time board members who are doing other things and may not necessarily have the expertise within the public service or otherwise are supported by independent civil servants. And the second would be to establish tripartite partnerships, municipal, provincial, federal, with the mandate to establish regional centres of excellence for police governance across Canada that can again bring some consistency to the approach that boards and commissions take, allowing them to still manage local issues, but on things like critical points, information sharing, consultation protocols with chief, approaches to certain policies, so there's a consistency of best practice approach. Those would be my recommendations.


  7. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would just come back, Mr. Commissioner, to my suggestion that you add on to the Campbell definition, or clarify it, in terms of the exercise of law enforcement discretion. And so what happens on the ground during a protest in a variety of ways, whether it’s what tactics to use; when to mobilize your POU; when to negotiate; when to cease negotiations; whether the circumstances don’t, in the view of the person on the ground, allow for negotiations, even though that may be the policy, because of safety risks or otherwise. These are all exercises of law enforcement discretion that should be protected once the operation is being carried out. And to use an administrative law analogy, the board should not fetter that discretion. They can, again, set the stage for it, set the context for it, identify the priorities and objectives, put in place policies, kick the tires of the plan, ask that certain things be reconsidered, but when the operation is underway, as Professor Kempa said, who’d be in -- who’s investigated; who’s to be arrested or charged; whether someone should be arrested or charged; the number of officers to be deployed for specific tasks on the ground; the timeframe for those actions, that is all the exercise of that law enforcement discretion.


  8. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)



  9. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would ---


  10. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would argue that that would be an odd direction ---


  11. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    --- from the board. Police officers are -- have that independent authority, and are required by law to enforce the law based on the exercise of their discretion. They are the experts in knowing what tools to use and when. And so a general direction to enforce the law, I think is, as Judge Morton put it, one of those policies that actually are meaningless. That should be the starting point in any event. But when to enforce it; how to enforce it; what tools in the law enforcement toolbox to use, that is the discretion that we need to ensure police officers can exercise. Again, based on a plan, with priorities, objectives, and policies staked out in advance.


  12. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Sorry, just wanted to -- off something that Christian said about integrated command structure, and I know Commission Counsel have asked questions about the deployment of resources to different areas depending on what might be emerging. I think it’s important to be mindful of the governance structure that exists. In law, the police services board of, in this case, Toronto, is legally responsible for the adequate and effective policing in Toronto. If assistance needs to come from other police services, it is vital, as Judge Morden laid out in the G20 report, for the Board to understand what the command structure is so that, yes, you can have an integrated command structure, but who ultimately has command and control and control of that event? And so through the MOU process that I suggested happen, these kinds of things should be worked out and should be clear so there’s never any doubt operationally and never any doubt from a governance perspective as to who has command and control, even though he might have multiple units involved at the same time.


  13. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would ---


  14. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Yeah, I would just agree that we have to come back to the statutory function and role of the board. The board is responsible to ensure adequate and effective policing. If through the information exchange with the Chief of Police it becomes clear that the police service of jurisdiction can no longer provide adequate and effective policing, then that information should be transmitted to decision makers who are considering other options that don’t exist within the world of the board or the chief of police, and that would be an informational input that hopefully they would consider in arriving at their decision. But that information should be, again, because it’s a political decision made by elected officials as to whether or not to declare the emergency, that transmittal of information should come through the Board. But importantly, the operational understanding would be conveyed to the Board by the chief.


  15. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would suggest that it would be far better for both the chief of police of the day, and for the elected official of the day not to do that, but rather, to use the infrastructure and the framework that is set out. The board has that responsibility. The board is the chief’s employer. The board should be informed by the chief about what’s happening operationally, and then the board can engage with elected officials to have those conversations; and bring things back. That’s not to say that, with respect to matters that are unfolding in a particular ward or a particular riding, there won’t be conversations with the police officer who runs a division and the local elected official about what’s happening within that particular pocket of the city, but when it comes to the overarching board duty to ensure adequate and effective policing, and when elected officials are getting interested and engaged because they’re considering other options, there is a conduit here, and so we should use it.


  16. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Sorry ---


  17. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    If I could, I would just say certainly the SIU's jurisdiction is, as limited as the statute says that it is, it's a criminal law jurisdiction. There are other players on the landscape that we have to also take into consideration. Of course, boards, which we have been talking about, which have a unique ability, actually, almost an unlimited ability in some respects to review a number of issues, both with respect to complaints that are being brought forward because they have a statutory mandate to review the administration of the complaint system by the chief, and particular issues that relate to their policies or the implementation of their policies. A capacity, though, that requires, again back to my recommendation, professional resources to actually have some oxygen. These are all great things in theory, but as a practitioner, I can tell you that not all boards across this country are in a position, in fact, very few, very, very few would be in a position to actually carry these things out. And so if we're serious about them, then we need to appropriately invest in them.


  18. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Thank you, Professor Stacey. My perspective is going to be a bit more local in nature, because at the end of the day, in responding to an emergency, regardless of who makes the declaration, the policing that needs to be responsive to that emergency, generally speaking, happens locally. And so it doesn’t necessarily mean, of course, that other interests, whether they be provincial, federal, or both aren't engaged, but my message here today is that effective coordination in responding to an emergency, assessing whether or not to invoke the Act, or make a declaration requires us to really take the lessons that we should learn from cooperative federalism. And that also includes giving a zone for municipalities as appropriate through the provinces, but importantly, for police services boards municipally that have a statutory role to play when it comes to the adequacy and effectiveness of policing in that jurisdiction, which includes emergency response. And so making sure that there is a mechanism through which police boards that are most impacted can be part of that consultative process, I think is essential. I think the question that I was wrestling with in preparing for this is how can any entity determine when something engages a broader interest beyond its own, and if so, what does that mean for the different orders of government? And so I think one of the ways that this Commission, Mr. Commissioner, could be helpful is perhaps, in clarifying, you know, based on what was just said, clarifying those triggers or those thresholds and getting perhaps a little bit more granular. The approaches to escalation need to be better set out, and that doesn’t necessarily mean that they all have to be set out in legislation, but they have to be set out and they have to be understood so that we ultimately can move towards a modern, multi-agency, governance framework that defines roles, responsibilities, escalation methods, communication protocols as an emergency is unfolding and while it is unfolding, ultimately so that these responses don’t unfold in an ad hoc manner and everybody knows, to borrow an Abbott and Costello analogy, who's on first?


  19. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Thank you. People that I work with will understand me when I say that I use a Pee Wee Soccer analogy to talk about how I view emergency management sometimes. And those who are intimately familiar with it may not quite see it that way, but I think there are many, including those in government, who perhaps don’t understand that there are different responsibilities at different levels and different methods of engagement. And so to some, I think it does seem a lot like Pee Wee Soccer, where the whole team is chasing the ball and no one is respecting the position that they’re supposed to play. I think in the context of emergency management, we have to avoid two things. We have to avoid the assessment and response depending on personalities as opposed to structure and good governance, and we have to avoid what would have been known as stove pipes or silos to information sharing. I believe that we need to update, to some extent, our multijurisdictional infrastructure and approach to better align with the principles of cooperative federalism I mentioned earlier. In the context of policing specifically, there are some examples where this is done well operationally. And if you think back to the G20 Summit and to the 2010 Winter Olympics, you did have the RCMP, the provincial police of jurisdiction, at least in the case of Ontario, and municipal police services in Toronto in an integrated security unit, where there was plans that were codeveloped, codesigned, where everybody understood, more or less, of course, the Morden Report spoke to some of the gaps, but where they went in, at least among themselves, understanding who was responsible for what, and everybody understood how the information was supposed to flow. It facilitated the coordination of both the interjurisdictional planning and response to those public order events and emergencies. Of course, lots of lessons to be learned from the Morden Report, that that was the same structure that was used in the 2010 Olympics. In the context of national security, there are integrated national security enforcement teams that operate, with the RCMP being given primacy because it’s matters of national security, where you have federally led investigative teams that are comprised of the RCMP, Canada Border Services, Citizenship and Immigration, CSIS, but also provincial and municipal police services. And so even though the RCMP have primacy, interwoven within the relationship is a joint forces integrated environment where police share the operation responsibilities that flow from the national security needs and the decision-making process is structured in a more shared way. My suggestion here is that emergency management could potentially benefit from an upgrading, if you will, to its governance structure when it comes to interjurisdictional responses. And I take some of my inspiration from the U.K. Emergency Response and Recovery, a 2013 document that provides non-statutory guidance that accompanies the U.K. Civil Contingencies Act. And I think that a modernized emergency governance structure would have five key components. The first would be -- well, the premise would be that you would have an interjurisdictional coordinating group, a superstructure of sorts, that would be designed and that would operate based on five elements. The first is an understood structure and hierarchy with a sufficient role for, yes, the local level, and to President Sayer’s point, the First Nations and Indigenous Communities that are impacted by that particular emergency. Clear roles, clear responsibilities, a clear mission statement, as part of that structure. Each organization or entity would be represented and would retain their own command authority but would exercise control over their own operations in a coordinated and facilitated fashion and could rely on discussion and consensus, for the most part, and it would allow for a common operational picture, and more efficient response in deployment when you have multiple levels or orders of government involved. It would promote a full information exchange between the partners, where no local entity that is impacted is placed at a disadvantage. And of course, it would help ensure interoperability. The second is to include, yes, the formal actors I mentioned, but also informal actors. A hybrid structure that would involve outside of government actors that may be impacted, or may be able to lend a hand in terms of the development and implementation of the response. And the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone was an example where that kind of structure was used to mobilize community groups, volunteers, religious groups, all involved in the response to that particular emergency. The third, and I’m sure Cal Corley will speak about this, is the importance of joint exercises and trust building through those exercises, that this interjurisdictional coordinating group should engage in long-term planning among the partners, but also modeling, table topping, and exercise in advance of any emergency so that they understand better how to operate within that context, and so that they know what to do when you’re in the grey zone of a plan that doesn’t necessarily speak to precisely the circumstances that you’re facing. The fourth would be a transference of duties as appropriate. Emergencies generally cause people to revert to institutional lines, but that can sometimes cause fragmentation and doesn’t necessarily result in the best resource being deployed to address that particular circumstance. So looking for opportunities within the structure to properly, and with consent, redistribute duties in a way that still respect jurisdiction, but is premised on a functional or capacity approach. And the fifth is communication and the importance of the structure allowing communication to work over all phases of an emergency to ensure that the multi-agency approach with respect to communication functions well, and that it satisfies the communication needs of all of the people around the table, because those needs may be different. I would even urge exploring some kind of national communication mechanism for law enforcement agencies that balance the intragroup, the intergroup, and public communications that law enforcement often have to engage in in the context of emergency so that we minimize confusion, optimize consistency, and make sure that everybody has the ability to get a message out to the public. Thank you.


  20. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Sure. I’ll start just by piggybacking off a bit of what Cal said on the private security piece, and then I want to talk about the private sector more broadly. Cal spoke about the G8/G20 in Toronto. There was also the PanAm Games, which depended heavily on private security. I haven’t done a jurisdictional scan to see whether or not the Ontario model, where you have, within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, a private security section that’s responsible for essentially the regulation of private security in the province to ensure that applicants meet a certain standard in order to be given a license to operate as a private security person, and that there’s additional standards in terms of training, has been emulated or not. But certainly I think that provides a little bit of confidence in the security apparatus. That said, if private security is going to be engaged, and if you have the benefit of either planning for a specific event or recognizing that you’re going to need to depend on private security resources for future events writ large, you need a structure. You need a structure that allows it to seamlessly, and in a coordinated way, plug in to the other security and policing resources that are going to be deployed. You need to ensure training standards. You need to ensure lines of accountability and clarity with respect to roles, responsibilities, and command and control. These are things that can be, to Cal’s point, be put in place in advance, can be tested, can be exercised, so that you know that it works when it needs to work. And so that’s the piece that I’ll say about private security. But outside of private security of the private sector, and I think when we talk about the way in which emergencies get responded to, there can be no doubt from the comments that are made today that a myriad of stakeholders, based on the geographic location and the nature of the emergency are impacted in relation to that particular emergency. And so looking for mechanisms and ways to engage maybe on a sector basis, these representatives, both in the planning and in the actual response to an emergency, I think, is vital. The stakeholders of interest can help monitor and help crystallize the issues, can help in relation to planning, can help with respect to public communication and awareness, and can help in the recovery period that follows. These are groups like local business improvement areas, chambers of commerce, community hubs that are hubs for a variety of community organizations that serve the public, residents' associations, municipal service providers. And from the Toronto convoy experience, it includes the healthcare sector and hospitals. Hospital role was a priority in order to ensure that whatever was going to happen in the city over the course of that weekend was not going to impede the access of patients, physicians, nurses, hospital staff, or families from getting in and out of hospitals. And so I think that’s a good example that illustrates the importance of looking at the sector-based response to emergencies, the sector- based impacts, and determining an appropriate structure to engage them so again, they can be part of the planning process and can mobilize in accordance with those plans if and when the time comes.


  21. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Sure, I'll add a few thoughts. First, to agree with my colleagues, and in particular, I want to pick up on Professor Lindsay's point that we live in a federation and we have to respect the spheres of jurisdiction and the constitutional divide, but some harmonisation across the provinces, to back up Professor Lindsay's point when it comes to the approach taken to provincial declarations of emergency and the provincial approaches, I think would serve us well. And essentially, the lens that should be applied is they should plug in well to the federal sphere to the extent that that's necessary. I think they need to be designed for purpose that way. I'll also say that in addition to local governments not having the capacity, or the second option, being rendered incapable by virtue of the emergency at hand, I would add a third piece for consideration. And that is where the Federal Government's stake or interest is engaged, because there are emergencies happening across the country, and some form of coordination that can only be brought to bear by the Federal Government is required, I think unpacking that a little bit more in light of what we've seen more recently in terms of events would potentially be helpful. Of course, in addition to the provinces and the territories, to President Sayers' point, we have to also think about First Nations in that context as well. And so those are some of the points I would make there. The other thing that I will say, though, is presumably when a province or a territory or a First Nation is consulted in the context of a discussion with the Federal Government on emergencies, they should be informed by what is happening locally on the ground at a municipal level. I think making sure that provinces and territories understand that, and putting some meat on those bones, would perhaps be helpful. But related to that, municipalities are not always going to necessarily know what the threat picture looks like, and so promoting information-sharing, threat risk assessments that might be conducted by provinces, might be conducted by the Federal Government, and ensuring that municipalities impacted or likely impacted have access to that information so that they can properly and in an informed way make a determination about what their capacity actually is or isn't, I think is vital.


  22. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Sure. It's Ryan Teschner jumping in. I'm a big proponent of all things governance, Mr. Commissioner, if you couldn't tell from the last session and from this one. And so I think where we're going to mobilize local resources, we need to ensure that there's a framework in place so that everybody knows their responsibilities, their obligations, and who's in charge, and who picks up the tab, and you know, other issues that are related. And so I think certainly, what is in the Ontario legislation is an important step, and I think it comes back to something that I said earlier. Where policing is being mobilized to respond to a particular emergency, the policing response, when it's in a municipality, comes under the legal statutory responsibility of a local police services board or a commission. And that legal reality cannot be a fiction. And so whether we're talking about how private security comes into the fold and how that needs to be part of the governance web that a police board provides locally or whether we're talking about consultation, as we just did in the previous conversation where those impacts need to be assessed at a local policing level, boards and commissions need to be part of this fabric as well. So I think that’s a point not to be lost.


  23. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Yeah, and as I understand that model, it brings together all of the relevant players around one table. It still operates with respect for each of those partners’ areas of jurisdiction, but it facilitates -- we talked earlier about consensus, and we talked about consultation. You can view this as an ongoing consultative body where, both in advance of and during an emergency and thereafter through the recovery phase, you ensure that you’re tapping into the expertise, the perspectives of all of the players, ultimately trying to build a consensus, certainly ensuring full visibility with respect to one another’s actions, and operations, and perspectives, and, as I mentioned earlier, also providing some visibility with respect to a threat assessment so that where all orders are engaged -- federal, provincial, territorial, Indigenous rights holders, and, you know, through the province’s municipalities, everybody is starting to appreciate what the national picture looks like and what role they play with respect to that national picture. And so that’s what I understand these bodies to help facilitates. Now, the role that, let’s say, the federal government could take around that body may differ depending on both the nature of the emergency, the scope and magnitude, and its reach. Sometimes it might be more of a monitoring role. Sometimes it might be more of a leadership role. And I think that goes back to what we were talking about earlier. What are the escalation points? How do we better articulate when that federal government interest is actually engaged such that it has more than a monitoring role and actually can play the role of coordinator, or even sometimes decision-maker?


  24. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Were you looking for anybody?


  25. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)



  26. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    Here’s one.


  27. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I’ll say that, while I respect that exchange of information can often raise concerns about legislative impediments, privacy impediments and the like, I think we sometimes get bogged down in that more than we perhaps need to. There are constructs and mechanisms that allow for sharing of information if the willingness is there and then you put the infrastructure in place. INSET, the example I talked about earlier, is one such example. The way in which police chiefs share information with police boards is another example. The Provincial and Federal Security Advisor regime is both an example and an opportunity. I don't know, again, I haven't canvassed every province and territory across the country, but certainly Ontario has a Provincial Security Advisor. We know the federal government has a federal -- or a National Security Advisor. That might be a mechanism through which a lot of this information can be shared easily with that infrastructure already embedded and put in place. And so I think we have to look for vehicles and avenues to do it as opposed to reasons not to do it.


  28. Ryan Teschner, Executive Director and Chief of Staff (Toronto Police Services Board)

    I would tip on the side of, yes, the ultimate issue or the ultimate decision needs to be put forward. Obviously, you know, the Government doesn’t have to reveal, necessarily, to the table, all of the considerations it’s going to take back in formulating its ultimate decision, but there needs to be some transparency as to what is being considered. And in part, that’s because the underlying facts and context, exploring that is obviously important in order to identify whether there are alternatives or other options. But importantly, if the government doesn’t put on the table what invoking means, what are the specific regulations that they may put in place as a result of invoking the Act? What are the impacts of those regulations on some of the actors who are going to be impacted? I don’t know how you can have meaningful consultation in the absence of exploring those dimensions. And so from the ultimate question of whether or not to invoke, there flow impact questions that have to be part of, I would say, not consultation at a point in time, but ongoing consultation, because there’s also a decision to be made about whether to continue having the declaration in place. And so there needs to be a constant feedback loop, if you will.