Thomas Carrique

Thomas Carrique spoke 1098 times across 1 day of testimony.

  1. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Morning, sir, How are you?

    11-007-16

  2. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-007-20

  3. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, sir.

    11-007-25

  4. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would like to swear on the Bible, please. Thank you.

    11-007-28

  5. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thomas Carrique, T-H-O-M- A-S C-A-R-R-I-Q-U-E.

    11-008-04

  6. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Good morning.

    11-008-10

  7. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did, yes.

    11-008-17

  8. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did, yes.

    11-008-21

  9. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I do not.

    11-008-24

  10. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. I provided that information this morning. And as well on page 9, I think it refers to insurance and it should refer to permit. That’s the first word at the top of page 9.

    11-009-01

  11. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You’re welcome.

    11-009-06

  12. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-009-09

  13. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am aware of its contents, but I don’t believe the document on the screen has changed.

    11-009-13

  14. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it is.

    11-009-19

  15. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To the best of my knowledge, the contents are accurate.

    11-009-22

  16. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do adopt this on behalf of the OPP.

    11-009-26

  17. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. Yes, I was.

    11-010-03

  18. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, sir.

    11-010-07

  19. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that role entails having overall operational administrative responsibility for the Ontario Provincial Police. We police 330 municipalities across the province across five regions, each led by a Chief Superintendent, plus a Highway Safety Division. We also are responsible for providing various provincial services through our Investigations and Organized Crime Section, our Traffic Safety and Operational Support Section, and a variety of other specialities.

    11-010-10

  20. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, Commissioner.

    11-010-23

  21. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely. So our Field Operations was Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins. We then have Corporate Services, which was Provincial Commander Mary Silverthorn, Traffic Safety and Operational Support, Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco, and Investigations and Organized Crime, Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox.

    11-010-28

  22. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It would vary. It could be from multiple times a day, to daily, to weekly. We were in constant contact throughout the entire duration of the convoy.

    11-011-09

  23. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Supt. Mike McDonell, who leads our Corporate Communications and Strategic Management Bureau.

    11-011-15

  24. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it does.

    11-011-24

  25. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, the OPP, and ultimately I, am responsible for providing policing services in municipalities where they do not have a police service, or under contract. Once that contract and agreement has been approved by the Solicitor General, responsible for policing of navigable water ways that fall outside the jurisdiction of a municipality. Also responsible for maintaining traffic patrol on King’s Highways and providing investigative support and specialized services as directed by the Solicitor General or the Crown Attorney.

    11-011-28

  26. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. I believe we’re 330. So 328 is approximately correct.

    11-012-13

  27. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Front-line policing, we would have on a day-to-day basis approximately 3,000, and specifically if we go back to the duration of the Freedom Convoy, there were 3,000 provincial constables assigned to Field Operations.

    11-012-18

  28. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That it does. That does not include the other policing responsibilities that we have for all the other provincial services that we are mandated to provide.

    11-012-25

  29. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So we have a wide variety of special services that we provide, from aviation services, Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, which you’ve heard a significant amount about. Also, our Provincial Liaison Team, which I know you’ve also heard a lot about. There’s a wide variety of specialized services that the province relies on us to provide from a policing perspective.

    11-013-05

  30. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We are responsible for maintaining public order in the municipalities for which we police. We do not have a jurisdictional responsibility for municipalities outside of our policing responsibilities. We can, however, provide those services if requested.

    11-013-14

  31. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Our Public Order Unit is approximately 257 trained members. They are primarily assigned to a function which we referred to as our Emergency Response Team. They have 10 mandated functions all related to having a flexible emergency response across the province, one of which is the function of public order.

    11-013-21

  32. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. It’s one of five core policing responsibilities that every police service in the Province of Ontario has an obligation to fill to an adequate and effective standard.

    11-014-02

  33. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They are required to enter into an agreement, but not specifically with the OPP. That agreement could be entered into with another municipal police service. There are 10 Public Order Units across the province. OPP is one of those 10. So there were nine other police services that a municipality could enter into an agreement with.

    11-014-09

  34. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    One of those would be Ottawa Police Service, yes.

    11-014-18

  35. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Windsor does not have a Public Order Unit.

    11-014-22

  36. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We do not have a standing agreement with Windsor. Utilization of Public Order in Windsor would be assessed on a request-by-request basis.

    11-014-26

  37. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-015-04

  38. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So each region is led by a Chief Superintendent. They are then assisted by Superintendents that form part of their command team, and they oversee the operations of a variety of detachments who have Detachment Commanders. So to put it into a municipal context, the Detachment Commanders share a lot of the same responsibilities as would a municipal police chief, as it relates to communicating to a local Police Service Board, establishing community and strategic priorities, and providing day-to-day policing services. The regional Chief Superintendent oversees those operations across a variety of municipalities, and they all report up through to the Deputy Commissioner of Field Operations, Chris Harkins.

    11-015-07

  39. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So first and foremost, if there's a neighbouring detachment, that can be something that is mitigated detachment commander to detachment commander. If it's not able to be resolved at that point, it would then be escalated through the regional Command Team, and it could eventually end up into the hands of the Deputy Commissioner of Field Operations. However, if it was an emerging and emergent circumstance, those types of needs for resources would be coordinated either by our provincial Communication Centres or our provincial Operation Centres. And if it was a long, protracted event or a planned activity, we would establish what we'd call an Emergency Operations Centre, and our Emergency Management Unit would be involved in that very complex process.

    11-015-24

  40. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    An external request would normally come into my office, and then it would be assigned to the appropriate provincial command. If it was for an investigative type of request, it would go to Investigations and Organized Crime. If it was for additional uniform officers, it would go to Field Operations, public order would go to Field Support Bureau through what we call TSOS, Traffic Safety and Operational Support. That does not alleviate local municipalities reaching out directly to a detachment or to a regional commander, but formal requests for assistance should come in through my office. At this particular juncture in 2022, we had already received approximately 30 formal requests for assistance from other police services, and typically, I would receive between 220 and 230 formal requests from Municipal Services for assistance of the OPP.

    11-016-12

  41. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In a year. On an annual basis, correct.

    11-016-28

  42. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, absolutely. As you've articulated, we're a division of the Ministry of the Solicitor General. The Ministry of the Solicitor General will set strategic priorities for the OPP, provide overall administrative direction. The day-to-day administrative and operations of the OPP is my sole and exclusive responsibility.

    11-017-06

  43. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that would come in the form of we have a three-year strategic plan. So that is essentially the Solicitor General's plan that the OPP operationalizes. It's at an extremely high level that sets the priorities for the organization. There could be provincial initiatives whereby the Ministry wants to support the OPP in achieving certain operational objectives and would provide us with the necessary funding and support to do so.

    11-017-15

  44. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So there's an annual report that is submitted to the Solicitor General's office, and then as it relates to day-to-day reporting, there will be many occasions where there will be no contact between myself and the Deputy Solicitor General for days or even for weeks. If there are certain situations for which he requires a level of situational awareness, then it's my responsibility to ensure that he receives that information.

    11-017-25

  45. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-018-07

  46. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not.

    11-018-11

  47. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not.

    11-018-14

  48. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Certainly. Police service of jurisdiction relates to the police service that has a legislative responsibility under the Police Services Act to provide adequate and effective services. That police service of jurisdiction will report to a local Police Service Board who is responsible in concert with the Chief of Police in ensuring that those adequate and effective services are provided. And you've already highlighted the five core areas of responsibility that formulate adequate and effective services.

    11-018-19

  49. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They have exclusive jurisdiction within their physical bounds, but just for clarity, that does not mean that another police officer doesn't have full authorities to operate within that jurisdiction. That doesn't mean that another police service may not enter into an investigation that takes them into that jurisdiction to conduct interviews or do follow-up, but if there is an incident within that jurisdiction, that starts in that jurisdiction, that is taking place in that jurisdiction, that is the exclusive and sole responsibility of that police service of jurisdiction.

    11-019-03

  50. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-019-16

  51. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Jurisdiction relates to the legislative responsibilities under the Police Services Act; whereas, authorities relate to the authorities that a police officer has to execute their duties.

    11-019-19

  52. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-020-01

  53. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In my experience, that's usually a situation where there's been ongoing and long-term concerns over the administration of a police service and/or their ability to provide adequate and effective policing.

    11-020-04

  54. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-020-10

  55. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct. And that would normally be for an individual situation, and most commonly for a criminal investigation that is warranted.

    11-020-14

  56. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it can.

    11-020-20

  57. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be a specific event perhaps, or where the Board has concerns over its ability to provide adequate and effective service.

    11-020-23

  58. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It's a shared responsibility. In legislation, the Board has a responsibility to ensure adequate and effective policing, as does the Chief of Police.

    11-020-28

  59. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-021-07

  60. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Whatever assistance that I deem necessary, correct.

    11-021-23

  61. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Other than, as I mentioned earlier, there may be a reach out to a local detachment, but in terms of as it's prescribed in law and the formal process, these are the only ways for which we can be called upon to provide that level of assistance.

    11-022-01

  62. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not direct that it occur. If the Solicitor General's office had a concern over adequate and effective policing, the appropriate routes and legislation would be to refer that concern to OCPC.

    11-022-09

  63. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    As documented in my witness summary, we became aware of that, from the Provincial Liaison Team’s perspective, on or about the 12th of January. I believe an analyst actually became aware of it on the 10th of January. That information was then transferred to a member of the Provincial Liaison Team. And by the 12th of January the Provincial Liaison Team was starting to engage in relation to the Freedom Convoy.

    11-022-16

  64. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    As of the 13th of January, the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau was also engaged in the collection and dissemination of intelligence. And as information continued to come in, then various aspects of the organization became involved right up to us appointing a Major Critical Incident Commander, and local Incident Commanders for every region for which the Freedom Convoy would travel through.

    11-022-27

  65. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes and no. As long as the Freedom Convoy remained on King’s highways, or was travelling through municipalities for which we were the police service of jurisdiction, yes, but they’re were a number of events and activities that happened off of the King’s highways, that would have fallen into the jurisdiction of other police services, for which we worked in cooperation with those services as the convoy travelled on its way to Ottawa.

    11-023-10

  66. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The cooperation was integration in terms of responding to the convoy as it travelled through that jurisdiction, or there were moments in time where other people would congregate to show their support for the convoy; there may be a stop at a parking lot. We’ll use Vaughan Mills Mall as an example, where there were a number of protesters and vehicles that gathered in the Vaughan Mills Mall, and that would be a coordinated response between the OPP, who was looking after the traffic aspect of it, and then once that convoy, or that congregation was to form on municipal grounds, like the Vaughan Mills Mall, that’s where York Regional Police would engage as it related to what other policing provisions were required.

    11-023-20

  67. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Very, yes.

    11-024-08

  68. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I did.

    11-024-11

  69. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I did.

    11-024-14

  70. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    On occasion I would have had conversation with Supt. Morris but not specifically related to every Hendon report, or at regular intervals. The Hendon reports were very thorough, very complete, and I found them -- they provided me with the necessary information I required to have full situational awareness.

    11-024-17

  71. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it’s my understanding, and you’ve heard from Supt. Craig Abrams that Supt. Abrams was engaged with Ottawa Police Service, offering and providing some support from the Ontario Provincial Police. And I’d also made enquiries with Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins in relation to our knowledge in relation to Ottawa’s level of preparedness.

    11-025-05

  72. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    This was going to include a high degree of active participation; a large number of commercial motor vehicles and personal vehicles, as well as a commitment for longer-term activity. There was no exit plan from the protestors, and there were also demands that we knew could not be realized in the short term, if at all.

    11-025-17

  73. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it was. I was well aware that Ottawa Police were also in receipt of the Hendon reports and had been for at least a year leading up to. And in fact, on January 21st, I made an enquiry with Supt. Morris to ensure that all Police Chiefs in the province were receiving the Hendon report.

    11-025-27

  74. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The content of the Hendon reports; wanting to ensure that there were no gaps within organizations, and that the Chiefs of Police had access to what I felt was necessary and important information.

    11-026-07

  75. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To my knowledge, no.

    11-026-23

  76. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    He was fulfilling the role of Strategic Superintendent, or Strategic Commander, and his primary responsibility was to maintain relationships with Ottawa Police Service; facilitate any requests for assistance; and coordinate our deployment in terms of logistics; and be the link of communication between the OPP and the Ottawa Police Service.

    11-026-26

  77. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-027-08

  78. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it was not.

    11-027-14

  79. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    My understanding was that Ottawa Police Service had designated parking areas for the commercial motor vehicles. And that those commercial motor vehicles would be contained in these parking areas. And that they were readying shuttle buses to transport participants to allow them to engage in lawful protest. And that they would not be permitting any large commercial motor vehicles into the Parliamentary precinct.

    11-027-18

  80. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    From Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins.

    11-027-28

  81. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I certainly would have asked some additional questions to ensure that they had the adequate resources that they required. I would have asked some additional questions around the integrity of the block of Parliament and Wellington. Keeping in mind that it is not my role or responsibility to sit in judgment of an operational plan, but it would have warranted further enquiry to determine whether Ottawa required any additional assistance, then we certainly would have had those conversations.

    11-028-06

  82. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We could have amassed additional resources if were required; we could have contributed to contingency plans; and we could have just offered some advice and guidance, if it was appropriate. Being mindful that Ottawa Police Service has always been very highly regarded and respected for its ability to manage protests, lawful and otherwise. And in fact, as a Sergeant, I was deployed to Ottawa as a Member of a Public Order Unit and it experienced first-hand Ottawa's ability to not only plan for events, but to manage those events.

    11-028-19

  83. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, I wouldn't say a stay in your lane mentality. I think as a good policing partner, if we identified something that was of concern to us, that we have a responsibility to engage in conversation. Ultimately, the decision as to how the operational plan should be executed is that of the Ottawa Police, and I'm not sitting in judgment of those decisions, but we would have initiated some further conversation just to offer any additional inputs that we thought may be helpful or additional resources. And that did happen on a number of occasions throughout the Freedom Convoy where we did reach out to individual police services to make inquiries, not to provide a direction, not to sit in judgment of operational plans, but to ensure the collective success of policing across this province.

    11-029-05

  84. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not.

    11-029-22

  85. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would have asked additional questions. I wouldn't necessarily have asked for a copy of the plan. That is not my purview to be requesting operational plans from other police services. Most times, I would not even see an operational plan within the Ontario Provincial Police. There are various levels of subject matter expertise that have the autonomy, the knowledge, skills and ability to approve those plans.

    11-029-26

  86. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If we were being asked to perform an active role as an active participant in a unified or integrated command, that is a situation where the appropriate critical or major incident commander or strategic commander would want to see a copy of an operational plan, but that is not something that I would request or be provided.

    11-030-10

  87. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. The blue is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, and the green is myself, yes.

    11-030-25

  88. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-031-13

  89. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So you would have to speak to Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins specifically for his concerns, but from my perspective and my independent recollection of our conversations is the concern was around the congestion that would be experienced in the City of Ottawa by prohibiting the truck traffic to enter into the downtown core, the potential shutting down of access from the 417, and the backing up of traffic that would be related to trying to coral all of the commercial motor vehicles into designated parking areas. And you can see from my inquiry there, this is in and around what activity is anticipated to take place, in and around Parliament, and it was subsequent to that that I was advised that there would be no commercial motor vehicle traffic permitted into that area.

    11-031-17

  90. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not prior to the arrival of the convoy, no. It became evident on the 28th and 29th of January that there was an inability to contain all the commercial motor vehicles into designated parking areas and that they had permeated onto Wellington Street and into the area of the Parliament buildings. But prior to that, there was no communication relayed to me about that, no.

    11-032-08

  91. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I had not spoken to him prior that week in relation to the Freedom Convoy, no.

    11-032-18

  92. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, and I believe it was the Friday. I would have to look at the records, but prior to that, the Freedom Convoy arriving in Ottawa, I received a call from Chief Sloly asking for assistance with public order, for which I said we would facilitate, passed that request along to Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco, who also advised me that we were lending support to Parliamentary Protective Services from a public order standpoint, and I asked that the communication take place between PPS and OPS to ensure that they had the adequate Public Order Units that they required. I then followed up with Chief Sloly via a text message to ask him if he had all the necessary resources, for which he responded he did, to please keep the intel coming.

    11-032-22

  93. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I didn't have a plan, no. And as previously indicated, I would not normally be provided with an operational plan if we are asked for assistance.

    11-033-13

  94. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I'm not sure I completely understand your question. Are you asking me if the request came in concert with a defined plan as to how Public Order would be utilized?

    11-033-20

  95. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The deployment of Public Order Units also comes with a Public Order Commander and Critical Incident Commander. So those discussions in relation to plans and how those assets would be utilized would have taken place between those respective commanders, and that's not something that I would be involved in.

    11-034-01

  96. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't know that I would have an opinion in terms of whether everything was under control. I was certainly aware that there was an ongoing protest, there were a number of Public Order Units on the ground assisting Ottawa, and Ottawa was doing their best to facilitate a peaceful protest and to deal with any unlawful activity.

    11-034-15

  97. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So as previously indicated, the first form of reporting was that the trucks were not being contained, there was no ability to contain them in preidentified parking locations. And then throughout the weekend, I received situational reports in terms of the number of resources that we had assigned to Ottawa, and high-level overviews of the number of protesters.

    11-034-23

  98. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did. So the 31st, I believe, is the Monday.

    11-035-21

  99. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Right. So we’re past the weekend now. You had previously asked me about my level of knowledge as it related to activity over the weekend. So this is the first indication that there is this type of activity being reported. And I had also had the opportunity to engage in a meeting with Chief Sloly and Commissioner Lucki also on the 31st of January.

    11-035-24

  100. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, from what perspective?

    11-036-06

  101. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-036-10

  102. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so Chief Sloly provided us with an overview of the situation. And we talked about providing any resources that he may require and how this could be managed moving forward.

    11-036-12

  103. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-036-18

  104. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I had no reason not to agree with Chief Sloly. It certainly had turned into a situation that I felt Ottawa Police had not anticipated, and I do not think describing it as an occupation would be inaccurate at all.

    11-037-10

  105. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well I think the best way to answer that is to refer to the Hendon Reports, and the Hendon Reports clearly indicated that there was no exit strategy and there were discussions around a long-term presence in Ottawa. They could not, certainly, identify how long that would be. There was reference to multiple weeks, but also demands that would not be realized and committed protestors that would not be leaving unless those demands were realized.

    11-037-18

  106. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There was an indication that a request for additional resources would follow. And it did follow. I believe it’s on or about the 2nd of February where I received a formal written request from Chief Sloly for additional resources. However, we continued to provide resources in real time through having a presence in Ottawa through our Strategic Commander, Supt. Craig Abrams, as well as our Emergency Operations Center. So if you look at the deployment records of the Ontario Provincial Police, you’ll see that we’re providing resources throughout this entire period and the amount of those resources build as time goes on.

    11-038-03

  107. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So these are not my notes. This is the first time I’ve seen these notes. I would not say that I was not supportive of an injunction at the time. My advice was if seeking an injunction, we ought to make sure that we do have an operational plan that we can move to enforcement when appropriate and necessary. You do not want to be in possession of an injunction order, which implies you have a responsibility, and not have the capability and a plan to affect that injunction order.

    11-038-28

  108. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. So offering our assistance to embed into the command structure in any way that we can be of assistance, knowing that we have very experienced critical and major critical incident commanders, public order commanders, planners, PLT commanders, any way that we could assist the OPS with advancing an operational plan, that was that.

    11-039-18

  109. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-040-01

  110. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Immediately. We provided all resources, to my knowledge, that were requested when they were requested. So at no point in time am I aware of us not being able to fulfil any requests.

    11-040-05

  111. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Really, that change enabled us to make sure that we were able -- properly able to provision the logistics that were required. As increasing numbers of OPP officers were assigned to Ottawa, it meant we had to have lodging, we had to provide food, we had to provide vehicles, we had to provide radios, we had to ensure appropriate shift schedule, we had to ensure that those officers were backfilled in their home locations. Every officer that we deployed to Ottawa or elsewhere around this province, for example, January -- on the 12th of February, there were 20 simultaneous events that were responding to. That means an OPP officer out of a community for which I have policing responsibility for. So that takes a significant amount of coordination and cooperation. So Supt. Abrams was working very closely with our Emergency Operations Centre, Emergency Management Unit to make sure that all of those provisions were in place, and then also he would have had an entire command structure that he would have been managing to facilitate the deployment of OPP officers while in Ottawa.

    11-040-14

  112. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m not aware. You would have to ask them that question directly.

    11-041-19

  113. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To my knowledge, all of those requests were fulfilled.

    11-041-23

  114. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We had PLT there. I believe we saw an influx of PLT between the 2nd and the 4th of February. Inspector Beaudin, who appeared before the Commission yesterday, would be able to provide you the specifics of that. I know he, himself, at my request, attended Ottawa on or about the 4th of February. So it would be best to speak with those that were responsible for these assets to be able to get the timing of exactly when they were there, but many of these assets were already on ground, in Ottawa, ready and able to assist at this time.

    11-041-27

  115. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It had been relayed to me that PLT was not necessarily being utilised to its fullest extent, and I felt that Inspector Beaudin could provide Chief Sloly and his Command Team with some experience and guidance as it relates to Marcel's expertise, and wanted to ensure that the Chief had the availability of that subject matter expertise.

    11-042-11

  116. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would vary on the day. At a minimum, at least once a day.

    11-042-21

  117. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-042-25

  118. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not necessarily daily phone calls. If something came up, there was a question about something, or there was something that went beyond what had been reported, we may connect by phone, but there were not scheduled daily phone calls, no.

    11-043-01

  119. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not specifically without referring to any materials that you may be able to provide to me.

    11-043-10

  120. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's fair. That's fair. I can't say for certain that it was on that day. I have disclosed all of my situational updates to the Deputy Solicitor General to the Commission, so it may be contained in there. There was also the Hendon reports that were going to the Provincial Operational Security Adviser, but I can't say for certain that it was on that date during that phone that I would've provided that information.

    11-043-18

  121. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Any concerns raised by me or by him?

    11-044-02

  122. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We certainly at some point had a conversation about the potential of a protest in Windsor specific to the Ambassador Bridge, and I had shared with him that we had offered our assistance to Windsor.

    11-044-06

  123. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. And that was -- as I recall, it was not a discussion with them all collectively. I had spoke to all of them throughout the day. We had numerous events that were transpiring, and in particular, there was a planned event to take place in Toronto on Saturday, February the 5th, so we were doing our best to coordinate access to the necessary resources and provide the necessary supports to the competing and concurrent events that were taking place around the province. So I was giving the Deputy some assurance that we were lending that necessary support and we were fulfilling any requirements that had been asked of us.

    11-045-06

  124. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So there was ample resources. There was frontline resources provided. There was intelligence resources provided. I don't believe at the end of the day we ended up providing any Public Order assets to Toronto, but that evidence would best come from the hubs that we established. We had a -- we had hubs that were ensuring that the Public Order teams were deployed where they needed to be, when they needed to be, which could mean any one of the ten Public Order Units would have been deployed to any one of these locations. So that level of detail would have to be shared with you from the hub.

    11-045-20

  125. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I'm not in direct contact with Superintendent Abrams. My information is coming at this point in time from situational reps that are coming -- reports, sorry, that are coming multiple times a day which is providing me with a level of situational awareness in terms of the number of vehicles, the number of protesters, any reports of criminal activity.

    11-046-07

  126. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So ---

    11-046-24

  127. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- first, I can't say whether Chief Ramer's conversation with the Deputy was accurate based on what they knew at the time. Deputy Di Tommaso did enquire with me. Being under the understanding that Toronto Police had asked for OPP resources and they were not available, I directly enquired with Toronto Police and we sorted that miscommunication out. There were OPP resources available. We were already integrated into their Command Centre, we had a presence in their Command Centre through Intelligence, our Highway Safety Division, so we were providing resources to Toronto Police.

    11-046-26

  128. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There were OPP assets and resources available, and they were sent that weekend, yes.

    11-047-12

  129. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We had made a number of enquiries with Windsor Police offering assistance and resources, and we were advised that that assistance was not required. If it was required, that a request would be made. The Chief of Windsor seemed confident that they were able to handle the anticipated activities with the resources they had available to them.

    11-047-17

  130. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry. What are you drawing my attention to?

    11-048-05

  131. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not without having had the opportunity read the entire string. I can only see a small portion of the email, so I would have to ask your indulgence to be able to ---

    11-048-09

  132. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- review the entire thing.

    11-048-14

  133. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It would be most helpful if you went to the top of the string.

    11-048-18

  134. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-048-22

  135. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Please, if you don’t mind stopping there, I’d like to -- can you go back up? Okay. Thank you. Stop there, please. This is the part that has my response. (SHORT PAUSE)

    11-048-26

  136. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, yes. I do recall this email.

    11-049-04

  137. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you for your indulgence while I familiarized myself with it.

    11-049-07

  138. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes, I believe I did speak to Chief Sloly later that day to relay concerns over moving forward with positive action as it related to Public Order that had been relayed to me.

    11-049-13

  139. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Concerns were around not having a sufficient plan in place as it was relayed by my team, so whether a plan was in place and had not been clearly communicated and not having fully exhausted the opportunities through PLT.

    11-049-19

  140. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If I recall correctly, he thanked me for sharing it with him and he was -- he was going to review those concerns and next steps.

    11-049-26

  141. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I would not have raised those concerns with the Deputy Solicitor-General.

    11-050-03

  142. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I had had numerous conversations with the Deputy Solicitor-General and I shared for -- with him concerns as they came forward and how we had mitigated those concerns, so concerns had been shared that we were not in receipt of a clearly-communicated plan and that we were working towards ensuring that we did have a clearly- communicated operational plan. Certainly there were concepts of operation, but we required a plan to move forward and facilitating all requests for assistance. At one point in time I had made him aware that there were numerous changes within the command structure that was challenging the development of a plan and moving forward with a plan. At one point in time I made him aware that I had the -- concerns had been expressed to me over the under- utilization of both RCMP and OPP resources that had not been tasked and were not being utilized and could have been leveraged. And at one particular time I made him aware of a situation where there was some conflict that emerged on a call with the Chiefs of Police that I believe Superintendent Morris has already provided evidence on, so at each interval I made him aware of those situations and also made him aware of what we were doing to address them in a cooperative manner.

    11-050-09

  143. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You’d have to ask the Deputy Solicitor-General whether he was concerned or not. My perception was that I had provided him with the information for his situational awareness and what we were doing to provide assistance. And at this point in time, we were doing our best to assist Ottawa Police. That’s our role. This is an extremely stressful, dynamic situation for the Ottawa Police, and our role is to provide the necessary assistance. And that’s what we were really focused on.

    11-051-09

  144. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s the way I would have interpreted that, yes.

    11-052-09

  145. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s a difficult question to answer as to whether I had confidence in the OPS at the time. I was certainly aware of the challenges that they were experiencing and I did feel with the support that we were providing that there was an opportunity to develop and execute a plan that would bring upon a resolution to this. And ultimately, that’s what happened. And I think it’s important not to lose sight of the fact that this whole situation was resolved while preserving life, without any serious injury, and with preventing any serious damage to critical infrastructure. A significant impact on quality of life to the residents, the local residents, impact on local economy, but a resolution through providing the necessary assistance was eventually the outcome of this.

    11-052-14

  146. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Certainly to my recollection, at no time did -- do I recall her or I ever having any conversation the Emergency Measures Act. At one point in time, I did ask her if that afforded the Government of Canada to actually provide that type of direction and actually appoint RCMP or OPP to take over policing because I certainly was not familiar with any federal legislation that would allow that to happen.

    11-053-04

  147. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say whether I was surprised to see whether there was reference to invoking the Act. That certainly would not have been the focus of my attention. It was more around the confidence that the -- there was an indication that the government had lost confidence in the OPS. That is something that, you know, obviously would be of great concern not only to me as a policing leader, but should be something that the Police Services Board would have been engaged in. And I was aware through conversation with Commissioner Lucki that there had been some dialogue taking place, the details of which I was not privy to, but there were conversations taking place between the City of Ottawa and members of the federal government.

    11-053-15

  148. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Did I share her concern with the OPP?

    11-054-06

  149. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If the request came as defined in the Police Services Act, it would not have been something that I would have been reluctant to take over. It would have been a responsibility. And as you've clearly articulated the responsibilities in the Police Service Act, it would have been one that would have required an assessment of me, but we would have absolutely been willing to move forward and fulfil our responsibilities, and that would have included working with resources within the Ottawa Police Service to succeed.

    11-054-15

  150. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that had been requested from the Deputy Solicitor General's office to my office. It had been -- also been provided in an email, and this I know became a point of contention for the Ottawa Police. And that is in relation to an obligation that I have to take administrative account for the number of officers that are providing services. If I am planning on seeking financial reimbursement, that needs to be approved by the Solicitor General. So there was an interest in the number of resources that we were providing from a financial accountability standpoint, and to ensure that we were assisting. That 1501 is an administrative number. That is derived at looking at approximately, I believe it was 135 to 150 offices a day over a 10-day period is where our analysts came up with that number. So at no point in time at that -- on that date would we have had 1500 officers in Ottawa at 1 time.

    11-055-08

  151. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah.

    11-055-27

  152. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.

    11-056-03

  153. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    He and I did have a conversation about that directly, yes.

    11-056-07

  154. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I certainly explained how the number was derived at and that it was, in my opinion, not having spoken to the Minister's office, it certainly would not have been done without any ill intent, and that it was important for he and I to remain focussed on operations and not engage in any political conversations that could detract us and distract us from the operations.

    11-056-11

  155. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I felt the conversation was positive. I didn't feel that it had any adverse effect on our operational relationship, but it was clear that he was disappointed that that number had been shared publicly, and that caused him concern, and that he anticipated that causing him additional pressure, which was fair.

    11-056-20

  156. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was my information at the time, yes.

    11-057-09

  157. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And this is -- we've had the experience where the 1501 was released publicly. This was not for public consumption. There was great concern over OPS being provided the number of resources that they required, so this was providing the Deputy Solicitor General with a level of situation awareness. Should he receive similar information from his federal counterpart over the same concern that the RCMP had expressed, that this had been corrected.

    11-057-12

  158. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, can you repeat that?

    11-057-23

  159. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so and I don't believe I said to fend off questions. To provide him with an appropriate and professional level of situational awareness. There had been concerns relayed to him over RCMP officers allegedly sitting around, not being provided direction. We had received same information from some of our officers, and the Deputy Solicitor General, I wanted to assure him that there was similar information, that we had had more officers there than Ottawa; however, that that had been corrected and balanced. So should he have to explain that, enter into a conversation with regards to that, that that situation had been resolved.

    11-058-01

  160. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it does.

    11-058-15

  161. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So my level of awareness on that was very specific to feelings from PLT, Provincial Liaison Team, that that would have damaged the reputation and progress that they felt they were making.

    11-058-18

  162. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-058-27

  163. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-059-03

  164. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I would say it is.

    11-059-18

  165. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, and I also recall having a follow-up discussion with Chief Sloly on this as well.

    11-059-21

  166. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I shared the concerns that were relayed by my team, and it was the next day that we had the Integrated Planning Team that had arrived or had started to make their way to Ottawa to assist with more thorough planning.

    11-059-25

  167. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I accepted the advice of my team. I didn't personally have enough in-depth knowledge of what was going on the -- on on the ground to have a personal concern, but certainly accepted the concerns and advice of my team, and ensured that I relayed that to Chief Sloly, who I believe -- as a result, and maybe as a result of other inputs that he received. That action did not move forward.

    11-060-05

  168. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know that I can too much more to what’s in the text conversation. If you scroll back up to his question of me, he is asking if it’s: “…appropriate to suggest that all officers in Ottawa be advised that jerry cans (whether filled with diesel or water) ought to be investigated and potentially seized.” He’s asking a question and I’ve answered that question to say that a Crown opinion was been sought and there are protestors walking around with diesel cans filled with water, which made it very challenging for the officers on the ground to proceed with that enforcement. Not all of the jerry cans actually contained fuel.

    11-061-03

  169. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know that I would take it as a suggestion. He’s asking me if it’s appropriate, and I’ve responded, I think, accordingly.

    11-061-21

  170. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    M’hm.

    11-062-04

  171. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I felt it was important that Craig share that with his deputy, and in turn, with me. although it was important information to have, this did not impact, in any way, shape, or form, the resources that were facilitated to Ottawa Police. There was very clear direction provided to Chief Supt. Carson Pardy that whatever resources were requested to perform permanent functions or identified functions, that we would provide them to the best of our ability. But there was all sorts of public communication taking place over the number of officers, what was required, had been provided. So I did see this as important to have, but not impactful in terms of how we would continue to assist Ottawa Police, not a big enough concern for me that it was something that I would even bother following up on with Chief Sloly. It had no material impact on our planning process and the assistance provided.

    11-062-08

  172. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t believe I ever discussed this with Chief Sloly.

    11-062-28

  173. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If it was to impact my assessment on resources required or ability to provide them, I would have. I had previously discussed with him concerns over the underutilization of our resources, which you identified in the text messages between myself and the Deputy Solicitor General, which he had not been aware of and he addressed. But I did not feel that this was something that warranted the Chief’s attention.

    11-063-03

  174. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t recall that being a call with all three of us. No, I do not. But if it’s the call that I think you’re referencing, I think it may be cited that there was discussion around twice the number of resources, if you could take me to that document. But if I am recalling correctly, I certainly did share with the Deputy Solicitor General that this information had been relayed to me, and I assured him that it would not impact the resources we were providing to Ottawa. But I do not recall a three-way conversation where this was discussed.

    11-063-16

  175. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-064-05

  176. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it did not.

    11-064-09

  177. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In my experience, it is unusual. Normally a request of this nature would come from the police chief of jurisdiction to me to be facilitated.

    11-064-17

  178. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think that’s a question to ask of the Mayor. I do not.

    11-064-22

  179. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did, yes.

    11-064-27

  180. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think it would be fair to say that it would cause me to question the number. But the number really becomes irrelevant in the absence of having a plan to define the number. And as you’ll see in my witness summary, the eventual plan not only was not far off the 1,800, it actually exceeded the 1,800. So the number really becomes a red herring. We require a plan to define the number of resources required, what are the expertise of those resource, what date are they required on, how long are they required for. Those are all details that get sorted out. So whether it’s twice what they think they need, which may be out of context. Maybe they needed half of that on one day, but for sustainability, they were going to need twice that. This is all noise, as far as I’m concerned. We needed to get a fully developed plan so we could provide Ottawa with the assistance that they needed, which exceeded the 1,800.

    11-065-05

  181. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know that that’s a fair assessment. It’s much more detailed and complicated than that. Right away, as you heard from Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy, he was identified to lead a planning team that was sent to Ottawa to assist Ottawa. We assembled what I felt were the foremost subject matter experts required to assist Ottawa in the development of the plan. I had a conversation with Chief Sloly to obtain a contact for them to get his agreement with the team coming. And I did indicate to him that they were going to be there to test and verify the plan. These are a lot of resources to be sending, you know. On any given day, on any given day, this is more than the number of Ontario Provincial Police officers that are on duty. 1,800 officers on any one day would be equivalent to one of the largest municipal police services in this province. This needed to be planned out and that we would be there to test and verify the plan, but to facilitate the necessary subject matter expertise and the resources required to execute the plan.

    11-065-26

  182. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You know, I can give you a general overview as to whether it was that specific conversation or a compilation of conversations, but it was our overall strategy to facilitate this request. One, I had a concern that this request was made in the public, that it was made politically, that by Ottawa -- the City of Ottawa indicating they needed 1,800 officers to resolve this matter, that showed that Ottawa Police was overwhelmed and how did that impact our ability to ensure that we had the appropriate level of police resources to respond to concurrent, multi-jurisdictional events that were happening across this province, to let him know how we were intending to respond to it by sending a Chief Superintendent that could work peer to peer with Chief Sloly on the development of the plan and the necessary resources to develop a fully-informed plan.

    11-067-06

  183. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It is the same concern and the Deputy Solicitor-General and I had that same conversation. As you will recall, those numbers were never shared with the intent of them being made publicly available. It was a financial account for the number of resources that we were providing and to give assurance that we were providing the necessary support to Ottawa Police. That information was never shared with the intent of that being communicated publicly.

    11-068-01

  184. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think that question is best answered by the Deputy Solicitor-General, but my interpretation of it is they were not directing me to provide 1,800 officers, or I think it was 1,700 officers and 100 civilian, is what the request was actually for. But they were going to refer it to me for my assessment, which is consistent with the Police Services Act. As you recall, when you walked us through section 9 of the Police Services Act, any requests for assistance is to be assessed by me.

    11-068-19

  185. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, as -- yes, you’re correct. As we discussed earlier, normally that request would come directly to me. So at this point in time, I’m responding to a request that has been made public and is yet to be received by me. The request was directed to the Premier and to the Solicitor-General, so I wanted some assurance that that request would be passed over to me, which I was the appropriate recipient of that request. It should have been sent to me initially.

    11-069-07

  186. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t speak to the length of time that it took to formally respond to the request, but I think you have already heard in great detail from Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy what transpired after we were in receipt of the letter or the information as it related to the 1,800 members required. On the 7th, Carson Pardy was assigned the task of leading the Integrated Planning Team. On the 8th of February, he was briefed by myself and Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, and then he immediately made his way to Ottawa and commenced his relationship with Ottawa and the rest of the subject matter experts in contributing to the development of a plan and the assigning of resources.

    11-069-24

  187. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that was my idea as it related to the request that I was furnished to respond to. 1,800 officers -- or 1,700, sorry, and 100 civilian staff, if that was what was going to be required, the Ontario Provincial Police did not have that capacity to fulfil that request on its own. It would take integration, cooperation from across the province and perhaps outside of Ontario, which it did. There were more than 20 police services that ended up contributing to the final operation. And knowing the status of the operation as it was, the reported ongoing challenges with moving forward, I felt it was mot appropriate to support the Ottawa Police with providing the foremost subject matter experts to ensure that a plan was built that could satisfy the requirements that they were facing.

    11-070-13

  188. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-071-07

  189. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I did.

    11-071-10

  190. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. I think we covered this a few moments ago. So we did have a conversation where we talked about the manner in which the request was received and also that I would be sending Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy, if he was in agreement, to establish an Integrated Planning Team. It’s been referred to as a planning team, a planning cell, a planning group, various forms of description before this Commission, all essentially meaning the same, and that we would assemble the foremost experts. And I previously highlighted for you that included in that conversation was my responsibility to ensure that we had tested the plan and that we verified it and that we provided the appropriate level of expertise to that plan and the right number of resources.

    11-071-13

  191. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, Commissioner.

    11-072-02

  192. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you. My apologies, Commissioner.

    11-072-06

  193. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely.

    11-072-15

  194. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely. So there were ongoing meetings taking place with chiefs across the Province of Ontario. There were federal partners engaged in those meetings as well. Resource requirements were discussed there. There were various forms of communication sent out to policing partners. Our Emergency operation Centre was actively identifying resources across the province that could be deployed. And I'm sure you will have heard in his evidence from Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy the great efforts that were undertaken to provide resources, and the evidence will show that the number of OPP officers steadily increased from that point forward.

    11-072-18

  195. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So a Commissioner's Command Team is comprised of what we would call our provincial commanders and myself. So that is Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco, Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox, and Provincial Commander Mary Silverthorn.

    11-073-08

  196. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's not completely accurate. So not sending 1,800, so 1,700 officers and 100 civilian, could not be done without a plan, but that did not prohibit us from continuing to support Ottawa with frontline police resources, with PLT, and with Public Order.

    11-073-28

  197. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That support continued throughout.

    11-074-06

  198. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, the sheer number of the resources that were being asked for that would likely end up being required, and as I have identified, were required and then some, and the challenges that were being reported with developing and advancing the plan. And we had had subject matter experts in Ottawa previously, we had offered their expertise and support, but not to the development of a plan that was ready to be executed.

    11-074-13

  199. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-074-28

  200. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I certainly wouldn't use the word "worthy" to describe the process that was necessary, but I can sympathise with why somebody may feel that way. We've advised that we're sending a group of subject matter experts. There has been various intervals along the way where we've asked that a certain number of our subject matter experts be consulted and their advice considered. And Chief Sloly and I had a very open and transparent conversation where I did indicate that we would be required to test and evaluate the strength of the plan. So I can certainly see why that might be described that way.

    11-075-13

  201. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-075-27

  202. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did see something similar to this at some point in time, yes. I can't say that it was precisely this, but at some point in time, through the process, I had seen a table that identified what resources were anticipated being required or were required at that time, yes.

    11-076-07

  203. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not in totality, no. However, during this period, one thing that was clearly communicated was any requests for frontline resources we would facilitate, and I think you will find that during this period all requests for frontline uniform assistance was provided. The number again becomes a red herring. We need to know, for example, a thousand general duty officers, specifically what dates are they need for, what shifts are they going to be working, where are they going to be staying? These things all have to be coordinated. It's not as easy as just pulling together a thousand police officers and sending them off. Every officer, as I have articulated earlier, every officer sent to Ottawa was an officer out of the local community. We don't have a warehouse of police officers where I can pull them off the shelf one at a time. They are being pulled out of a front seat of police cars and our communities across this entire province.

    11-076-16

  204. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say what he felt I meant by that, but I don't ever recall sharing with Deputy Solicitor General Di Tommaso that I felt under enormous political pressure. At no time was I under any political pressure in relation to this. There was a lot of political or public pressure being felt I think by every police leader, but at no point in time was I under any political pressure. I would suggest it would be worthy of asking Deputy Di Tommaso further on that. He may have been referring to staffing pressures. So at this moment in time, I only had 3,000 frontline police constables available to us to fulfill all of our responsibilities in 330 municipalities. I was running at an Operational availability of only 73 percent. So to amass this amount of resources is a significant Operational pressure, but at no point in time would I have ever communicated, nor did I ever feel as though I was being put under political pressure.

    11-077-11

  205. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No. No. At no point in time would I have ever communicated that I, myself, was under enormous pressure.

    11-078-02

  206. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Operational pressures, Operationally stretched, absolutely. With a 73-percent Operational availability, I'm down almost a thousand police officers on the frontline for various reasons, this puts an organisation under enormous operational pressure, which is completely different than political pressure.

    11-078-07

  207. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Is this working?

    11-079-06

  208. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We're good now? Okay. Thank you.

    11-079-10

  209. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Commissioner Lucki herself would not be on that distribution list, but numerous members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are on that distribution list.

    11-079-14

  210. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    As it relates to the City of Windsor, we have no jurisdiction. We police through municipal policing responsibilities in and around the City of Windsor.

    11-079-24

  211. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, not as it relates to frontline uniform patrol, no.

    11-080-02

  212. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That level of detail isn't something that I could provide you with. That would be more appropriately asked of Superintendent Morris, who's previously attended, or those that were assigned taskings related to the intelligence. Where there is intelligence that requires further information, a lot of times, there'll be taskings that come out of that, but that's not a level of detail that I would be privy to.

    11-080-19

  213. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was aware of the pending blockade, and I had communicated with Chief Mizuno to determine whether they required any additional assistance, and we were connected at an operational level, and at that time, we were not required.

    11-081-14

  214. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Was not required. No, sir.

    11-081-21

  215. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, could you go back up to the top? Yeah, so this is -- this looks as though it's some notes that I've transcribed. We were not formally asked for any assistance as it relates to public order. We may have been providing some frontline resources and we may have had some quick response teams available in the area through west region, but we had not formally been asked to provide any assistance as it relates to integrated command or having a Public Order Unit on ground.

    11-082-07

  216. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, there was not. I don't -- this obviously is something that I've pulled together in the form of constructing some sort of note, but it doesn't look as though I sent it anywhere or did anything with it, so I'm not sure specifically what that would be in relation to, but there was no formal request from Windsor for any assistance. There had been going -- ongoing communication with Windsor. In particular, there was a call leading up to the 7th, a conference call, where the Chief of Police indicated that they had all the resources they required.

    11-082-21

  217. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And that they would obviously be monitoring it. This being a roll -- potential rolling blockade as opposed to a large convoy making its way to a designated and identified area.

    11-083-04

  218. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-083-12

  219. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, other than the situational update that's been provided here. So this is obvious that these two pieces of information are the same, so what I’ve likely done has been pulling information constructed into an email format, then being able to pull it out and provide the necessary update. So I can’t say for certain, but reviewing the information I would say that this was requests at a local level for instance. So as I described earlier, sometimes those requests can go from Detachment Commander into a Detachment Commander. Sometimes they can come in at a Regional Command level. And sometimes they will come in formally to me. I did not have a formal request for assistance and I had inquired with the Chief of Windsor if there was anything that they -- she had needed from me additionally.

    11-083-26

  220. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I hope that clarifies that.

    11-084-14

  221. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. So there will be requests on a day-to-day basis that will come in at a detachment level that I may or may not be aware of, at a Regional Command level that I may or may not be aware of. In most cases where it’s requests for specialized services, the police service of jurisdiction will be asked to send a formal request. And I don’t have any recollection, nor any record, of a formal request.

    11-084-22

  222. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not exactly. There was not a blockage at the Bluewater Bridge. There were -- there was a blockade on Highway 402 which was some distance from the Blue Water Bridge, approximately 30 to 40 kilometres out from the bridge.

    11-085-06

  223. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That did, yes.

    11-085-13

  224. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was eventually resolved through PLT. Actually, my belief is the EMCPA, so the Emergency Measures and Civil Protection Act, that was invoked by the province that provided police with some additional tools as it related to being able to seize vehicles, seize commercial motor vehicle permits, to be able to seize vehicle permits, those tools assisted us in being able to resolve that. There was a lot of very expensive farm equipment that was part of that blockade that was legitimately required for operational farms, so I believe the risk of those pieces of equipment of being seized by the police and them seeing the action that had been taking place around the province enabled our PLT to resolve that particular issue.

    11-085-16

  225. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-086-05

  226. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If I wasn’t there, I couldn’t say. I’m sorry.

    11-086-10

  227. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say it is an accurate or inaccurate representation. Had there been a request for Public Order resources, that would have been examined through what we call the Public Order hub, and they would have determined what was available to be deployed or not. But we certainly were able to amass the resources required later that week and you’ll note that there were over 400 police officers that attended to assist Windsor. But not being party to that conversation, I don’t think I can accurately comment on the contents of it or the accuracy of it.

    11-086-20

  228. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say at what point in time I would have had conversations with the Deputy Solicitor-General over the need to prioritize. I can tell you that I did have open conversations with the Deputy Solicitor- General over how we prioritized operationally our resources. And once the blockade had occurred in Windsor and we had been asked for formal assistance, there was a request for 100 OPP officers and 100 RCMP officers that came into our possession a very similar way as the Ottawa request. It was forwarded directly to the Province as opposed to me. And it had come in only, I believe, hours after I had already spoken with the Chief of Windsor and offered support and was advised that there was no additional assistance required. And certainly throughout that entire period, I made my decisions known to the Deputy Solicitor-General when appropriate, that when it was time to deploy Public Order to Windsor, that we did not have a defined plan in Ottawa yet. Therefore, we did not know exactly how many resources were required. That the Ambassador Bridge in Windsor was something that we felt we could clear up in two to four days. Ottawa would be five to 10 days at least once a plan was established. We also had concurrent events happening in Toronto at Queen’s Park. We had attempts being planned to put blockades at the Peace Bridge in Niagara. We still said -- had Highway 402 on the go. We had plans emerging to attempt to block the bridge in Cornwall. We had things happening in Nippagon. So it was a priority to resolve Windsor. First, we had the resources available, ready. We had a plan ready to go. And there was an enormous, enormous national financial impact on the closure of that bridge totalling $700 million a day in my understanding of two-way trade.

    11-087-07

  229. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not merely the financial impact, but economic security is something that needs to be taken into consideration when you look at the totality of national security and quality of life in our communities. If $700 million a day in trade is not able to take place, what is the -- what are the ramifications of that? I would suggest that perhaps factories start shutting down, people start losing employment. People may start to lose their homes, et cetera. That’s a significant economic that affects quality of life in community and in those conditions can affect crime in community, so it is something that needs to be considered in and amongst all of the other factors that we need to weigh as it relates to public safety, quality of life in community and the bigger picture of national security. This is -- I don’t know if it is the most active or relied upon. CBSA would be in a better position to share that. But this is a significant international crossing which is a concern, obviously.

    11-088-13

  230. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    One of many factors. How many officers were required, the existence of a plan, how long it would take, proximity to other events that were going on. We also had plans that we were for the Peace Bridge, so by having Public Order assets in Windsor, we can quickly pivot between the Ambassador Bridge and the Peace Bridge. We can pivot over to the Blue Water Bridge. That’s a big difference from being in Ottawa. Make no mistake about it, I believe that it was by intent and design that we had activities happening at the furthest points from each other in southern Ontario. It is not circumstance that we had an occupation in the City of Ottawa and we had a blockage at the Ambassador Bridge at the exact same time. That was intentionally designed to challenge the capacity of our police, so that had to be very strategically and methodically managed to ensure that when we took action, it just didn’t disperse a problem and make it so it was unmanageable. This was a -- this had to be surgical, this had to be strategic, had to be well thought out and it had to be planned.

    11-089-08

  231. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am aware that there was conversations. I’m aware that those conversations resulted in a letter. I’m not privy to the details of those conversations.

    11-090-06

  232. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It is not the typical way, nor the preferred way that police resources would be requested. In particular, when just hours earlier I had spoken to the Chief of Windsor, had offered additional assistance, I was advised it was not required at that time. And then an independent request came in seeking additional resources, which caused me to then follow up and ask again and confirm that that request was in fact the request being made on behalf of the Windsor Police Service.

    11-090-12

  233. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was under the impression and understanding that as a result of having further conversations subsequent to my conversation with her, that those resources were now being requested and would now be required. But I would suggest it would be most appropriate to ask her that question directly.

    11-090-25

  234. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    She did not, no.

    11-091-08

  235. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. And she said the request was subsequently being made as a result of having further conversations with the Mayor, and she was now asking me for my assistance.

    11-091-11

  236. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know what Stellantis is. I can’t say I have any knowledge of Stellantis. I would be interested in my response, whether I followed up to find out what Stellantis is, but I don’t have a recollection of what it is without looking at what my response was.

    11-091-24

  237. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m guessing that’s perhaps a company or something otherwise. I’ve obviously done some follow up to say that there’s no direct mention of Stellantis being intentionally targeted. But I can’t tell you today what Stellantis is. I’m sorry.

    11-092-03

  238. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would absolutely sound accurate. Yes. Thank you.

    11-092-12

  239. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can only estimate that it was significant to international relations. But that would be me surmising that.

    11-092-18

  240. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So again, similar to the situation with Ottawa’s request, there were more officers provided than were requested. And there was some confusion. One of the conversations that I did have with the Chief from Windsor at the time was what it a request for 100 each, totalling 100, or was it 100 in total, because they went independently -- that request went independently as well. But again, we ended up deploying over 400 officers to Windsor. Again, showing that the plan drives the number, the number doesn’t drive the plan.

    11-092-24

  241. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So like Ottawa, we did have officers deployed to Windsor. And as you pointed out to me, we obviously had officers deployed assisting Windsor leading up to the blockade. So those would have been frontline officers we would have been assisting with traffic management. We very likely would have even had a quick response team in the area. But we would not be deploying public order and taking positive action in the absence of a plan. It would be wholly irresponsible to do so, not only operationally, but ethically as well. There are many factors that need to be articulated and described in a plan to ensure the rights of those that may be lawfully protesting to ensure the safety of officers, the safety of community, the sustainability of a plan. I can’t overemphasis, you simply cannot just send an arbitrary number of officers to a location to deal with something so complex.

    11-093-10

  242. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. Yes, she was.

    11-094-01

  243. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In conversation with Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins and I, we identified Supt. Earley to be the Commander in that particular event, and he was the one that had the conversations with her, assigning her that role and responsibility. Then she built her Critical Incident Command team out from there. And Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins was also the one to have communication and direct contact with a Deputy from Windsor, subsequent to my conversation with the Chief to say that we would be assisting and we would be sending whatever was required.

    11-094-05

  244. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So it’s absolutely true that law enforcement could not clear both at the same time. I don’t think it’s fair to try to separate them in terms of assessment and/or necessarily in terms of risk. We have to separate them in terms of prioritizing where we can take action first, based on the level of risk and the amount of resources available. I think for an accurate description of what was happening at the time, you truly need to go to the Hendon Report of February the 7th. And in that report, in the Hendon Report, the assessment is, taking into the consideration of the totality of all the events around the province and the country, that it posed a possible threat to national security. That was clearly defined in the Hendon Report. So it is impossible to separate all of these events and say, “I’m going to deal with this one in isolation, and when I’m done this one, I’m then going to move to the next.” It couldn’t be managed that way. And if you look at the evolving increase in police resources in Ottawa at the time, during that same time period, the 12th to the 14th of February, I think you will find that the number of OPP resources in Ottawa almost doubled during that time period. So it wasn't as if attention was taken away from any one particular event, this all had to be managed as a multi-jurisdictional event happening concurrently, all connected to each other. And whether there is evidence to prove that they were connected, that is irrelevant at this stage. This is about a strategy that ensures we can mitigate the risks that were before us as a province and as a country, and that needed to be done in a strategic way.

    11-095-03

  245. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Potential threats.

    11-096-07

  246. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, you may want to go to the 19th of February, which I believe there is similar language around that. And with your indulgence, Commissioner, I think it is important to talk about the terminology. When we say "potential threat" the term "threat" in a Strategic Intelligence report is to indicate something could happen. This is not about establishing a threshold as defined in the CSIS Act under section 2, and not even defining the threshold of reasonable grounds to pursue charges as terrorist activity. This is talking from a strategic level what are the risks that need to be taken into consideration when making decisions and developing plans? So the word "potential" is almost immaterial. It's like saying "there's a threat of rain today." Does it change the situation when you say "there's a potential threat of rain today"? I would suggest to you it does not. What is required is further analysis of that threat, and Hendon POIB did have those conversations with the appropriate security partners, CSIS, as well as INSET, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, to see if that potential threat rose to the point that would warrant them enacting their mandates for the items that they're responsible for. And in the -- as we know, is in the CSIS Act, it says "the security of Canada." It doesn't actually say national security. Public Safety Canada goes to a much broader context when describing national security, and one of the items in national security, if you look at the national security strategy and how it's described by Public Safety Canada, actually includes impact to economy, activities at critical infrastructures, international border crossings. So as you can see, it's a very complex situation that requires detailed analysis.

    11-096-12

  247. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I'm not aware of who contacted who, but I certainly was assured that those conversations took place. And I think Superintendent Morris did a very eloquent job of explaining the intention of the Hendon reports. He is the foremost subject matter expert in this province as it relates to Intelligence. And I would've hoped that he would've described to the Commission that those reports were for strategic purposes, for decision-making and planning, and those references to possible threats to national security, I would suggest to any police leader, ought to be taken extremely seriously.

    11-097-23

  248. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-098-09

  249. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do agree with that. I do agree with that. And that's a very important part and piece, is that when you move from Strategic Intelligence into Operational and Tactical Intelligence, and establishing thresholds for mandates and thresholds for charges, that further analysis needs to be done to determine whether it's credible and whether that threat actually came to fruition.

    11-098-12

  250. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would say that economic security forms a part of that from a strategic thinking standpoint. Again, I don't want any confusion over a threat to the security of Canada as it relates to the CSIS Act. We're talking about a strategic approach to overall national security. Transportation, critical infrastructure, border crossings, economic security, all of those things, cybersecurity, all of those components encompass a multi-faceted approach to national security, and are identified by Public Safety Canada as being important to national security.

    11-098-24

  251. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely not. Never.

    11-099-11

  252. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In part. I think I provided a very detailed description into all of the factors that needed to be considered and how that was identified as an Operational priority, not at the expense or at the cost of other Operations that were maintained, and enhanced simultaneously while we were dealing with Windsor.

    11-099-15

  253. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No. No, I would not. What I would say is that Ottawa may, may have been cleared sooner had we not had to deal with the blockades in Windsor, had we not had to deal with the protest in Toronto, the blockage on the 402, the blockage at Cornwall, and the attempts to block the Peace Bridge in Niagara. That may have allowed Ottawa to be cleared sooner if there was a plan in place ready to go. The plan, to my understanding, was not in place and was not ready to go on February the 12th. It's not until February the 13th that there is a plan in place agreed upon by all the stakeholders that is a safe and viable plan to proceed with, and we were done in Windsor with positive action at that point, we were in a maintenance phase, and all roads were opened up I believe on February the 14th. So I don't think that that is a fair assessment as you have proposed to me.

    11-099-27

  254. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be fair to say. And just for a point of clarity, I can't say that specifically Tom Carrique went from Windsor to Ottawa. What I can say is I know that there were some Public Order assets that when done in Windsor were able to reposition to Ottawa. But I can't commit to you that level of detail that specific people moved from Windsor to Ottawa.

    11-100-17

  255. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay, thank you.

    11-101-01

  256. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I don't know what that would refer to being in removal mode. So we don't commence Operations in Windsor as it relates to Public Order activity until the 12th of February, I believe, without having that information in front of me, but from my recollection I believe it is the 12th of February.

    11-101-09

  257. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So we were certainly planning for that as we were in Ottawa, but that does not alleviate the responsibilities of trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution. And I think you will have been provided information as it relates to negotiations that were attempted through PLT including a letter from the Solicitor General. So there were ongoing efforts to deescalate this before we would ever move to enforcement. But you need to be building that plan while those activities are ongoing. You ought not to wait until all opportunities to deescalate have exhausted themselves and then turn your mind to an operational plan to utilize public order, if that is eventually going to be required. All operational plans require contingencies.

    11-101-21

  258. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-102-11

  259. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    M'hm.

    11-102-18

  260. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I wouldn't have necessarily used that terminology, but I think it was well known and agreed upon and certainly my intent that there was some urgency to get this resolved. We needed to be able to minimize the number of protests that were going along -- going on around the province simultaneously. We've already discussed the impact that the Ambassador Bridge had, as well as we needed to be able to deal with what was going on in Ottawa at the time. So absolutely, I would agree that there was some urgency to this. The longer it was left, the harder it would be to resolve. We were at risk of people moving from Ottawa, which was some of the information that we were managing at the time, that people that were actively protesting in Ottawa would be making their way to Windsor. We know that's a day's worth of travel. So the quicker we could resolve Windsor, we also mitigated that risk of a protest just dispersing itself as opposed to us being able to resolve those matters.

    11-102-26

  261. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears to be correct, yes. I do see that, yes.

    11-103-19

  262. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so joint command isn't necessarily a technical term. So a lot of times, we'll refer to an integrated command or a unified command. And again, those aren't defined in law or nor are they necessarily defined in procedure, but an integrated command is one where one police service provides the other police service with a level of subject matter expertise within the command structure to assist them with developing and executing an operational plan. Overall command and control remains the purview of the police service of jurisdiction. So they have final say on the plan. A unified command indicates that it is just that, that the decision making is equally shared amongst the participating police services.

    11-103-24

  263. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    On February the 10th, I would say we had not arrived at the point of a unified command. We had introduced the Integrated Planning Team, but I would say that there was not even an integrated command at that point in time. The plans were still being developed. There was an operational plan, or what I've heard referred to as a concept of operations, I believe, that was established on February the 9th. That was provided to the Integrated Planning Team, which they built upon, and they had submitted their inputs to that to Ottawa on or about the 11th of February. And then I believe by the 13th of February, that integrated team had come to agreement that that was the plan that would move forward. There was some obstacles from the 13th through to the 15th with operationalizing that, but that was the sequence of events.

    11-104-11

  264. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, in general terms I can. More specific evidence would probably be best to come from Provincial Liaison Team Inspector Beaudin, but certainly it was brought to my attention as a proposed strategy through Deputy Commissioner Rose DiMarco, who ultimately oversees the Provincial Liaison Team, as a way of deescalating the activities that were going on in Windsor. I supported the idea. I thought it was appropriate, and it was certainly worth the effort of trying to deescalate those activities.

    11-105-01

  265. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Whether it was ready or still in development, I certainly knew that we were working towards that with the intention of activating that plan on the 12th, so thank you.

    11-105-13

  266. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Point of contact is probably a fair description. There's many people that assist with the administration and the flow of information, but essentially, the request would have been made at my direction, with my support, with my endorsement, absolutely.

    11-105-21

  267. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The request of the Solicitor General to sign the letter extending the invitation for further discussion or a meeting if the blockage -- blockade was to end immediately.

    11-106-02

  268. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Ultimately, yes, it's my request, yes. I can't say whether I personally emailed the request, but ultimately, that is my request, yes.

    11-106-09

  269. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I recognize that letter, yes.

    11-106-16

  270. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Ultimately, that would be my decision.

    11-106-21

  271. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, we were presenting that on behalf of PLT, and it would be important, I think, for PLT to be able to speak with some sense of authority, that they are carrying the message that was relayed to me, and it created that appropriate separation between the Minister and the protesters and allowed PLT to have that empowerment. PLT needs to be able to build rapport, establish a relationship, be able to create win-win situations to try to deescalate the situation. That's, I think, in part why it would be most appropriate to come from me. That was the request that I received. More detail on that and the philosophy and the theory behind that PLT would be much better -- in a much better position to describe in more detail, but certainly my understanding.

    11-106-25

  272. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It would have been, yes.

    11-107-13

  273. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would have been aware. I can’t say at what time I became aware, but I certainly am aware and was aware at some point in time of that, yes, absolutely.

    11-107-16

  274. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, the letter proved not to be effective; it did not have the desired outcome. The injunction -- I can’t say that that was effective because we still ended up moving forward with deploying Public Order; certainly a helpful tool, but I can’t say that any of those were effective in isolation. But what was effective was a holistic, complete plan to deal with the situation, and the Incident Commander having the discretion as to when they would execute that plan.

    11-107-27

  275. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say I independently remember that specifically being brought forward. But as I’ve shared with you earlier, these are all intertwined and connected and you can’t make a move at one location without it impacting and affecting the other, so that’s exactly the type of thought process and discussion that ought to have taken place. These are not isolated incidents.

    11-108-13

  276. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t have that level of detail; I can’t say that I personally noted anything. I don’t think I can answer that question, honestly.

    11-108-23

  277. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I approved this letter. So we provided -- PLT provided the recommended wording in the letter. This was a request by us to the Solicitor-General to assist in trying to de-escalate the situation. This was driven and borne from our Provincial Liaison Team, but this was not something that independently came out of the Minister’s Office. This was a request that we made of the Minister, and was granted.

    11-109-01

  278. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t speak with great knowledge on that. I know that there was discussion; I know Insp. Beaudin, who’s already provided evidence, I know he had discussion with Ottawa Police; he had discussion with Deputy Minister Stewart. There was discussion around it. The details of that discussion, he is in the best position to provide you with a firsthand account of that. I also know that there was communication that took place between the Mayor in Ottawa and protest organizers, or those that were identified as such. But I don’t know that I can say with any level of knowledge what letters may have been provided. But there was certainly dialogue, and I believe that one point in time they had agreement for partial components of the demonstration to move, which would have moved them into OPP jurisdiction but cleared up some of the area of concern in Ottawa, and that did not come to be either.

    11-109-12

  279. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry; I don’t understand your question.

    11-110-04

  280. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So it was the result of a request to me.

    11-110-08

  281. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-110-11

  282. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. I did, yes.

    11-110-14

  283. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-110-17

  284. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s a question you would have to ask of Ottawa Police, that’s not a question that I can answer. We were not at -- we were not in charge of the operation in Ottawa. One of the slight differences with Windsor, we did agree to assist but it was with a clear understanding that although it was a unified command, that we would be in charge of the development and execution of the plan.

    11-110-22

  285. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was important to me, given the situation that we found ourselves in. With all of the activity taking place, I felt it was absolutely crucial that we maintain the trust and confidence of Ontarians, and that we absolutely needed to succeed with the development and the efficient and effective execution of a plan, and I felt that we were in the best position to take responsibility for that. Not to push Windsor Police aside; it was something that they would have to agree to. But that was something that I had requested of Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins, and his initial discussions with the Deputy from Windsor, and it was something that was agreed to. So our Major Critical Incident Commander was ultimately responsible for that operation, which is why this request would come to me. We were never ultimately responsible for the operations in Ottawa up to this date; therefore, I can’t speak to why a request would not have come to me, of this nature. Did provide access to Insp. Beaudin on multiple and numerous occasions, to provide advice and guidance as it relates to PLT strategies. But why I did not receive a similar request, you’ll have to ask that of the Ottawa Police, I’m sorry.

    11-111-03

  286. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair to say. There was all sorts of public and political attention on what was happening in Ottawa Police -- in Ottawa, sorry, and with the Ottawa Police and there was all sorts of public comment. This was an opportunity to work in a coordinated and collective way to resolve the matter and to ensure that public trust and confidence in their police was maintained. And then from Windsor, we looked forward to doing the same in Ottawa, which was ultimately accomplished.

    11-112-02

  287. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was. I believe we had approximately 20 protests that we responded to around the province, and without referring to records but going by memory, I believe during the whole duration of what we would define as the Freedom Convoy, we responded to 137, approximately, of demonstrations or protests across the province.

    11-112-14

  288. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not to my knowledge, no.

    11-112-23

  289. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And it’s -- you know, it’s important, I think, to speak about the amount of integration and cooperation that was happening at this time. There’s been reference to the calls that included the Police Chiefs of all of the affected jurisdictions, included Canadian Border Services Agency, included the RCMP. So at this stage in activity everybody is pitching in, leaning in, propping each other up, all of the resources are coordinated. By the 8th of February, we have what we called the Public Order Hub officially established. They are making decisions on where Public Order assets need to be when, and what amounts, and when they can move. So this is a very coordinated integrated effort that I think policing across the province deserves to get some credit for the coordination at this stage of the events and activities.

    11-112-25

  290. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, you know, that direct evidence is best to come from those that were actively participating in the development and the approval of the plan. Anything I can share with you is from my arm’s length viewpoint and is hearsay. And I think you’ve already heard from C/Supt. Carson Pardy, you’ve heard from Supt. Bernier, you’ve heard from a number of witnesses that I think have been able to provide you with their detailed account of those events.

    11-113-15

  291. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not. I participated in a meeting where I was connected by phone. I believe there was a PowerPoint presentation of an overview of the plan delivered in Ottawa. There was members from RCMP in that meeting. I listened in on the briefing. I did not see, nor did I approve the plan, nor would I be expected to. We had a Chief Superintendent there that was given the autonomy and the responsibility for the development of that plan in an integrated format. That’s not something, as the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, I would be involved in.

    11-113-25

  292. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely. Whether he chose to escalate that higher to his Deputy Commissioner, that would be his choice. But he had full authority and autonomy to approve any plan that was binding the Ontario Provincial Police. He certainly kept up informed and updated and made us aware of the intentions of the plan, but that was his responsibility that he fulfilled exceptionally well.

    11-114-10

  293. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so as you’ve indicated, certainly aware of it, endorsed it, approved it, in terms of Insp. Beaudin having those conversations, and determining whether there was a de-escalation tactic that could be used through encouraging a meeting, encouraging correspondence, whatever that would look like. And of course, I absolutely would make the Deputy Solicitor General aware of that. If I am granting permission or supporting one of my members to meet with a federal Deputy Minister, my provincial Deputy Minister needs to be aware of that.

    11-114-24

  294. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t share with you what his view on it was. I certainly don’t recall him expressing any concern. Would have been, “Thank you for the update.” I can’t specifically say. you’re best to ask his viewpoints of him, I think, with all due respect.

    11-115-08

  295. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say that he was supportive. He certainly was aware. He didn’t express any concerns to me. it wasn’t something that I was seeking permission on. This was an operational activity, but out of respect for the Deputy and his position, and ensuring that he has the appropriate level of situational awareness, it was something that I felt he needed to know.

    11-115-16

  296. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, there’s a lot of activity in and around the coordination of heavy tow trucks at this point in time. There was a lot of challenges with identifying the number of tow trucks that were available, those that would willingly provide those services, those that were looking to be compelled or indemnified. There was a lot of work that went into the administration of this, yes.

    11-116-01

  297. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not looking to -- well, I shouldn’t say not looking to be compelled. My understanding was that there were some of them that were reluctant. There may have been some that were refusing to assist, but there had been some identified that were willing to assist. There were concerns that they may back out at the last minute, which prevent -- or presented a risk to moving forward with the plan. The biggest concern was around indemnification. So one tow company in particular was seeking indemnification, which is not something that we would normally provide. And we were trying to determine the best way forward through the Province, and how, if -- and if so, how we could provide some indemnification.

    11-116-11

  298. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. This is all happening simultaneously. And as you can appreciate, we are not paying any attention to the invocation of the Emergencies Act. There was no pre-warning to me. There was no heads up. There was no consultation. Learned of it as it was happening, and we are adjusting in real time. So this is work that is taking place concurrently. So it’s not as easy as stopping and starting with a demarcation point.

    11-116-26

  299. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know that I’d categorize it as a surprise, it was just something that was not known to me, nor was it something that I had turned my mind towards. It had nothing to do with the Ontario Provincial Police. It was something that the Federal Government chose to do. I wouldn’t -- yeah, I wouldn’t have necessarily expected that I would get a heads up, but it was not something that I had at forefront of mind, nor did we ever contemplate if it happened, how would this impact us.

    11-117-12

  300. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    M’hm.

    11-117-23

  301. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. Yes. Yes. One was with RCMP and OPP and then the subsequent one included Ottawa Police. So it was the difference in those two meetings, yes.

    11-117-28

  302. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-118-06

  303. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So what became increasingly known, or reported, was that there was confusion over whether the plan had been approved or not, who was required to approve the plan. And that was creating a delay and actually operationalizing all components of that plan.

    11-118-14

  304. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was the concerns over being able to move the plan forward, the perception that that plan needed to be approved by the Chief of Police and if not the Chief of Police, then by the Chief’s counsel. And there was confusion within, it appeared, OPS, certainly within OPP and RCMP in relation to that. So the discussion was in relation to that confusion. Certainly on the 13th, the email is clear from Chief Sloly, which I thanked him for. I was under the understanding that the plan was ready to be operationalized and, as we move towards the 15th, we’re now in a position where we appear to have challenges that are preventing that integrated plan from being realized.

    11-118-23

  305. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. So we got to the point where I was going to speak to Chief Sloly post the Police Services Board meeting, so I knew that he was tied up in a Police Services Board meeting. We had offered or agreed to lend the support of Superintendent Morris to assist him in communicating with the Board as well as Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy was supposed to attend that Police Service Board meeting. So I had undertaken the task of speaking with Chief Sloly when he was free to ask if he would consider if he needed or was willing to allow us to assume command and control if we were not able to move the plan forward had we got to that point that there were enough barriers in place that the plan was not going to move forward. And I was planning on having that conversation with Chief Sloly.

    11-119-12

  306. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    “Lost confidence” is a harsh and strong way of putting it. This is a police service that is in a very unenviable position, is struggling to move forward with an operational plan. My job was to support them, provide whatever assistance was required to see that plan succeed, and to have that further dialogue with Chief Sloly to determine whether he felt that could be done under the current command structure or whether us taking command and control of that incident, allowing them to focus and he to focus on the policing responsibilities for the entire rest of the city, may be a resolution to that. Subject to the outcome of that phone call, I would have then had to make a determination as to whether I had confidence or did not and whether I escalated that to the Ministry. But at that point, I needed to have that conversation with Chief Sloly. All of the information that we were receiving about the obstacles and challenges that were not firsthand, I owed it to him to have that conversation and to offer our support. As you are well aware, he’s able to make the request of the OPP legitimately through the Police Services Act for that assistance.

    11-120-05

  307. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Based on what we were hearing in that meeting and all of the events that had taken place or had been reported to take place up to that point in time, I felt that we were at that point that I ought to be offering that assistance in making sure that he was aware that if that was what he wanted, we were willing and able to take that on.

    11-121-02

  308. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It may be semantics. They needed -- they needed our assistance at that point in time. There was no question about it. They absolutely, in my opinion, needed our assistance to succeed. If you want to describe that as lost confidence, I certainly wouldn’t describe it as that way. In need of our assistance, was our assistance required to succeed, depending the response to that request, that may further clarify whether I was in a position to say I had lost confidence. This was a police service and a police leader that was in need of assistance and we were able to provide that assistance, willing to provide that assistance. If that assistance was not received, then I may have been in a point where now I’ve lost confidence and would have to escalate that for further consideration.

    11-121-13

  309. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. I’m -- yes, absolutely. I’m not in a position to say I’m coming in and taking over. I don’t have that authority or that ability. That is not the role of the Commissioner of the OPP. So the appropriate, the lawful, the professional next step was to have that conversation and then to be able to make that determination. Were we going to be able to move this forward in a collaborative way by taking the lead? Was it actually necessary? Maybe Chief Sloly had other information that would cause me to reconsider where I was at at that point in time. But that’s where I was at. I was at that juncture that had we not been asked to assume command and control of this operation that I would have felt obligated to make that known to the Minister for consideration to be known to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

    11-122-03

  310. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did not, no.

    11-122-23

  311. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. Some time between us having this call and plans to seek a meeting with Chief Sloly.

    11-122-26

  312. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-123-04

  313. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was confirming that we were in a position to operationalize the February 13th plan. There were no obstacles standing in our way. There was a clearly articulated and described command structure. There are various forms of describing Incident Command, so we wanted to make sure there was a clear understanding, so we diverted to a model most commonly known to the RCMP, gold, silver, bronze, and at that point came to agreement that it would be an absolute unified command and that we would be sending Deputy Commissioner Chris Harkins and the RCMP would be sending Deputy Commissioner Mike Duheme to represent our services on the gold level, which was on the same level as the Chief of Ottawa.

    11-123-10

  314. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think Ottawa Police Service is in the best position to answer that. You know, not having had the opportunity to have that conversation with Chief Sloly, I can’t say that I’m in a position to sit in judgment as to specifically what prevented that plan from moving forward from the 13th to the 15th. You’re going to have to discern that from the evidence provided by Ottawa Police and your discussion with Chief Sloly, but I had yet to have that conversation with Chief Sloly.

    11-124-02

  315. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-124-17

  316. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    On the 15th, yeah, I can't say exactly at what time, but we did have communication throughout the day, and certainly by the time we had concluded things he was well aware of the way forward. There -- I did have some concerns over the resignation of Chief Sloly, and what the Board would be doing for an interim chief. My concern was that if an interim chief was appointed that was unfamiliar with all of the work that had been done, and we were in a position that we had to start from ground zero and do a briefing and seek commitment and agreement, that was a concern of mine. And I did have that conversation with the Deputy Solicitor General just to make him aware that I was concerned as to how the Police Service Board would choose to move forward. And again, that was for his situational awareness. As it turned out, somebody from within the Police Service assumed that position, so we did not have to start from ground zero.

    11-124-21

  317. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct, yes.

    11-125-12

  318. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    At some point in time throughout the day we had that conversation, yes. And not concerned in terms of the Board exercising its authority, but it would need to be clearly defined in that if somebody new was being introduced to the relationship it would have to be exclusive to the day-to-day Operations of the Ottawa Police Service outside of this event. We needed to be able to move forward seamlessly with this plan without having to start from the beginning.

    11-125-15

  319. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No.

    11-125-27

  320. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I just relayed the concern. In the event that the Ministry was going to be providing any advice there are policing advisers that advise Police Services Boards, so should that discussion be taking place, I thought it was appropriate that my concerns be relayed in the event that that would have any impact on decisions that would be made by the Police Services Board. But at no point in time did I recommend anyone or oppose anyone for that position. It was not about the individuals.

    11-126-01

  321. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am. Thank you, Commissioner.

    11-126-25

  322. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. I don't think I called it a definition. It's in reference. When they reference national security. I'm not familiar with an actual definition as it relates to Public Safety Canada, and of course, the CSIS Act refers to the security of Canada. But in the context of speaking to national security, there are many components that Public Safety Canada referred to, and referred to it as a multi-faceted approach that is required across various programs, initiatives, and considerations.

    11-127-10

  323. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, there's all sorts of materials on Public Safety website for anyone who is -- Public Safety Canada website for anyone who is interested. There is various Acts. There has been reviews of the CSIS Act. There is all sorts of material that references and responsibilities in reference to national security.

    11-127-24

  324. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    This is Public Safety Canada material. I cannot point you to a specific document. There's certainly lots of reference to it in the various materials, and that is my understanding.

    11-128-05

  325. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, what was the date on that?

    11-129-02

  326. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-129-05

  327. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I would agree with that sentiment, yes.

    11-129-07

  328. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-129-12

  329. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, absolutely. In reference to trying to deescalate the situation, not only in Ottawa but elsewhere around the province, this had been going on for a considerable amount of time, and those that felt at jeopardy to be charged criminally, I feel, would have left through negotiations or discussions with PLT. And having the additional tools in the emergency EMCPA of the province provided encouragement for those to discontinue their illegal activities, as was borne out on Highway 402. And this was in relation to public messaging that was going to be distributed through PLT on Ottawa letterhead, and I felt as we moved forward and considered the larger impact across the province, we could word it differently and get different inputs, for example, from a forensic psychologist as to how best that should -- could and should be structured, not only to prevent additional disruption, but to disperse it and deescalate.

    11-129-23

  330. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-130-15

  331. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not recently, no, but I do recognize it, yes.

    11-130-20

  332. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, it was.

    11-130-25

  333. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And it formed art of the negotiations that took place with the tow operators that were done by other -- people other than me, yes.

    11-130-27

  334. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-131-05

  335. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, this is correspondence that was pulled together with assistance from Legal Team, trying to satisfy the requirements of our procurement policies as it relates to engaging these services. Not compelling them I think is somewhat semantic in that tow trucks were coordinated, they were organized, they appeared willing to proceed. Many of them wanted indemnification, which was not something that we could provide them with without making additional arrangements through emergency provisions with the province. So when the Emergencies Act was invoked, that ability to provide that indemnification was extremely helpful. We were also concerned at the time that those that had agreed to provide their services would back out as we got closer to the operation. So technically, could we have compelled them? Did we provide them with information in writing that would insinuate they were compelled? Quite likely. But did we actually have to direct them? No, they had willingly agreed to assist. It was the indemnification that was the issue, and we were trying to make sure that with new legislation and procurement processes that everything was done appropriately and legally.

    11-131-22

  336. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's how I would describe it. You would be best to speak with those who had direct contact with the tow providers. They were provided correspondence under my signature and the authority to disseminate that correspondence. My understanding is they did not have to rely upon that to compel anyone to provide their services. It was the indemnification that was the critical part.

    11-132-17

  337. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct, yes.

    11-133-01

  338. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So proper role of a Police Chief, depending on the -- depends on the situation. It depends on the circumstance. It depends on the size of the police service and the capacity of a police service. For a small police service, a Chief of Police may fulfil many roles, some of which will be very operational. To mid and large-size police services where the larger the police service, the more distant the Chief of Police becomes from operations. Ideally, your Chief of Police would be that of a strategic level, if they have the necessary, qualified people within their command to fulfil the other operational roles. But what is most important is there's clarity on command and control. When embarking upon any situation, planned or unplanned, there needs to be that clarity of command. And you will have likely have heard reference to SMEAC, which is the operation planning format, Situation, Mission, Execution, and Communication or Command and Control, depending what form you use. And those terms need to be clearly defined who is in charge, who has what roles, and who has what responsibilities. There are various forms of Incident Command Structure. What would be very helpful is having a consistent Incident Command Structure that is relied upon by policing right across Canada.

    11-133-10

  339. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-134-07

  340. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think given all that we've experienced as of late, I think it's very worthwhile being revisited and appropriate consultation taking place with the affected police leaders, with the affected police boards. I don't think it would be fair to suggest that, you know, I as the Commissioner of the OPP would necessarily have the authority to go in and take over operations, but I think there is value in examining a mechanism by which a threshold could easily be identified that would allow that to happen seamlessly, and more integration as it relates leading up to these events. So if, you know, we can take one lesson away from this, it would be absolutely ideal that we had one central repository of how many police resources are on duty at any given time and projected out for a period of time. So if we found ourselves having to plan something, that integration is able to respond and react much more quickly, efficiently, effectively, and we do manage what's called the Provincial Operations Centre, which would make good common sense to house that type of information as to the resources that are available and accessible.

    11-134-14

  341. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I think it’s a really good question. And on the surface, it may appear to be a contradiction, but I think to be -- to be fair to the proceedings, that contradiction is mitigated by actually looking at the data and the evidence. Look at the number of officers that were deployed on each and every day at various intervals. Look at the requests that were made and how they were responded to. And it’s only till we get to a point in time where we need to be able to manage the availability of those police resources for a protracted period of time across the province and manage all of the logistics that are associated to that that there needs to be a more defined plan. So I don’t think they’re contradictory in any way. There’s a point in time where we hit a threshold where it’s just not possible to provide 1,700 police officers and 100 civilians. On any -- on any given day, as I’ve mentioned, we may have a little over 1,000 working with the OPP and we’re managing on a daily basis, on average, approximately 3,400 calls for service, 20 percent of which are what we call priority zero or priority one, so those are emergency 911 calls that warrant an immediate response. To manage all of that across 330 municipalities and a critical event, you need to have a plan. And in the absence of me being satisfied that there is a plan to deploy those resources, I and every police leader would be negligent in their duties.

    11-135-21

  342. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Windsor? Was Windsor preventable?

    11-136-28

  343. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think you’d have to ask Windsor Police that. I think they felt -- they felt prepared to respond to the intelligence that they had before them. I think you would have to ask them what prevented them from being able to mitigate the blockade. It’s a very tenuous situation. We have to allow the environment for lawful protest, so you know, it sounds easy -- it sounds easy to those that may be listening to the police evidence to say there’s a clear demarcation and delineation between lawful assembly and criminal activity, and it’s not always that case. So although there may be rhetoric, there may be very good intelligence that some parties are planning on participating in what we would describe as an unlawful protest, we have a responsibility to facilitate lawful assembly under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. So how do you find that demarcation? It’s not the difference between saying on this side of the road is long distance and on that side it’s not when we had old telephone networks. It is extremely difficult to decide in some cases at what point this is going to become unlawful assembly and how do you prevent that in that moment of time. Sometimes you cannot prevent it. When presented with it, I think the important question is, how do you de- escalate it. And that’s where the framework, the national framework that this Commission has spent some considerable time hearing about, I think that’s really where the focus needs to be. How do you leverage that framework that once you find yourself in that situation that you can de-escalate? And if you do have to move to enforcement, how can you do that in the most efficient, effective and primarily the safest way to those that are involved in the protests, to the officers and to the community? So that is not a straightforward question, nor have I provided you with a straightforward answer. I apologize.

    11-137-03

  344. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think that’s -- I think that’s an unfair question. I don’t know that I could say earlier, active engagement of the OPP. The information was there to the police services of jurisdiction to build the plans as they saw was appropriate. The intelligence was provided. We’re there as a willing policing partner and, as in my previous very longwinded answer, I apologize, Commissioner, I don’t know that it’s always possible to prevent these things. Are there mitigation strategies that could be put into place and maybe should have been put into place? I will concede that. But I don’t know that I can say that there would be a different outcome if the OPP were put in a different position.

    11-138-18

  345. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-139-06

  346. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you. Good afternoon.

    11-139-15

  347. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-139-26

  348. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-140-04

  349. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think that is very fair, yes.

    11-140-08

  350. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-140-12

  351. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely, yes.

    11-140-15

  352. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-140-18

  353. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-140-21

  354. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is the way that I’ve articulated it, yes.

    11-140-26

  355. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They may be more effective, depending on the situation, depending on the circumstances. They were definitely and -- definitely an effective tool for those three areas that I’ve highlighted. We have common law authorities to prevent entry into restricted zones. That is available to the police. But the messaging that went along with the Emergencies Act about those restricted zones specifically being able to highlight prohibiting children from entering into those zones, which was a concern for the police, was an effective tool, I believe. Also, being able to message the other consequences, that is an effective tool that was available to us. Absolutely.

    11-141-04

  356. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-141-22

  357. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. We had sent initial correspondence on February the 15th regarding a non- competitive procurement process while we were procuring the services of tow operators, yes.

    11-141-27

  358. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-142-08

  359. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-142-13

  360. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-142-17

  361. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In some cases, that was a concern by tow operators, yes.

    11-142-20

  362. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t recall the specific advice but that advice that we received was what generated this letter that was constructed for me.

    11-142-27

  363. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Can you point me to that paragraph, sorry.

    11-143-04

  364. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, thank you. Yes.

    11-143-12

  365. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-143-18

  366. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-143-25

  367. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct

    11-144-05

  368. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s right.

    11-144-11

  369. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-144-14

  370. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-144-22

  371. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-144-25

  372. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-145-01

  373. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-145-05

  374. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-145-10

  375. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes, signed by both myself and the Commissioner of the RCMP.

    11-145-16

  376. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-145-19

  377. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s what it says, yes.

    11-146-01

  378. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There had been discussion with the towing companies, many of which had agreed to provide services. Some were concerned over indemnification. Some were concerned over identity. And there was a concern that some of them may back out as we got closer to activating the operational plan, yes.

    11-146-05

  379. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-146-20

  380. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-147-03

  381. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, we had provided that written direction and, had they failed to provide those service, we would have been able to compel them to do so, absolutely.

    11-147-08

  382. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-147-15

  383. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am aware of that, yes.

    11-147-19

  384. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-147-23

  385. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes, it does.

    11-147-27

  386. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it does.

    11-148-03

  387. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears that the range, yes, absolutely.

    11-148-07

  388. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-148-13

  389. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m assuming so. I have never seen this or another invoice like it, but it certainly appears to be, yes.

    11-148-17

  390. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-148-24

  391. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do see that, yes.

    11-148-28

  392. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears so but I would not have that level of detail. That would have to be determined by our business management bureau but it certainly appears so by virtue of what you’ve presented to me.

    11-149-04

  393. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I have no reason to dispute that.

    11-149-09

  394. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it does. Yes.

    11-149-14

  395. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do, yes.

    11-149-24

  396. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's what it says, yes.

    11-149-27

  397. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I didn't know, but thank you for the explanation, yes.

    11-150-03

  398. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I will accept your explanation.

    11-150-06

  399. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-150-12

  400. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay, thank you.

    11-150-16

  401. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-150-19

  402. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears reasonable, yes. Via text, yes.

    11-150-24

  403. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, absolutely.

    11-151-01

  404. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-151-05

  405. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-151-09

  406. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-151-12

  407. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I see that, yes.

    11-151-16

  408. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-151-20

  409. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be Secretary of Cabinet, yes.

    11-151-23

  410. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-152-04

  411. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So this is dated the 27th; sorry?

    11-152-11

  412. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay, thank you.

    11-152-17

  413. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That does. It's helpful because I had put the date at the top; otherwise, I would've fallen victim to the same timestamp. Thank you.

    11-152-20

  414. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-153-04

  415. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-153-08

  416. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-153-17

  417. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-153-21

  418. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-154-01

  419. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-154-10

  420. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-154-14

  421. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-154-18

  422. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. Correct. And I also note there, for your attention, the belief that: OPS will not be allowing any trucks carrying heavy equipment or other items of concern to travel into the city." I know that was a topic of discussion earlier.

    11-154-21

  423. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-154-28

  424. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-155-04

  425. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-155-08

  426. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair, yes.

    11-155-12

  427. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You -- we would have to seek that clarification from those that were actually deployed there to see, you know, what type of visibility they had. I can't say.

    11-155-16

  428. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I'm not aware, sorry.

    11-155-22

  429. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-155-28

  430. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-156-03

  431. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-156-06

  432. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears so, yes.

    11-156-09

  433. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I certainly do not. Those that were operational during the time could answer that with more accuracy, sir.

    11-156-15

  434. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Generally, yes.

    11-156-21

  435. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-157-05

  436. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-157-11

  437. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-157-19

  438. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not at that particular time. I had not thought of that as a concern of mine with a provincial mandate, no.

    11-157-22

  439. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I did. It was all part of providing accurate situational awareness as to what was happening at the time. Yes.

    11-158-01

  440. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.

    11-158-12

  441. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-158-18

  442. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-158-21

  443. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-158-26

  444. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. And sorry, when you say -- did you say "your people"?

    11-159-01

  445. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Okay. No, thank you, yes.

    11-159-05

  446. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, thank you for the clarity.

    11-159-10

  447. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes, it is.

    11-159-15

  448. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-159-20

  449. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-159-25

  450. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it is. Yes, sorry.

    11-160-01

  451. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-160-07

  452. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was, yes.

    11-160-12

  453. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that it me, yes.

    11-160-19

  454. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-160-25

  455. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-161-04

  456. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-161-08

  457. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-161-12

  458. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I -- yeah. I'm not going to suggest that -- I would say, yeah, everyone hoped it would leave, but certainly was not expecting it to leave.

    11-161-15

  459. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I -- yeah, there's not enough information there for me to assume that that’s specifically what he's hoping for. It may have been that things do resolve, nobody gets injured; it could have been a number of things, but obviously, he's wishing good luck and doesn’t want to see any harm come to anyone.

    11-161-21

  460. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, yes, yes.

    11-162-04

  461. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would hope so, yes.

    11-162-07

  462. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-162-11

  463. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-162-16

  464. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-162-21

  465. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it was not.

    11-162-24

  466. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, it's February the 2nd, yes.

    11-162-28

  467. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-163-05

  468. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-163-08

  469. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It has been noted in various Hendon Reports, yes.

    11-163-13

  470. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-163-20

  471. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I am.

    11-163-27

  472. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-164-05

  473. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-164-09

  474. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-164-12

  475. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do, yes.

    11-164-18

  476. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is exactly what would be ---

    11-164-23

  477. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- happening across the organization, yes. Not me personally, but absolutely, our team would be making those provisions.

    11-164-26

  478. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay, thank you.

    11-165-05

  479. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, very fair. So Deputy Cox oversaw the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, so he was in receipt of all of the Hendon information. He was also in receipt of the situational reports that we were receiving at various intervals. So not even comparable, my communication with the Deputy Solicitor General is to keep him informed and provide an adequate level of situational awareness. Deputy Cox would have access to all of that same information. So a different relationship, but very fair to say not near as much communication.

    11-165-09

  480. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-165-22

  481. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do.

    11-165-26

  482. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-166-10

  483. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-166-13

  484. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-166-16

  485. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-166-20

  486. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do recall having that conversation with Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox, yes.

    11-166-23

  487. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The concerns that were relayed, which could be more accurately relayed by Superintendent Morris, but in general sense, the concerns were that the description, to the extent of the protest and those who were involved and how it was being represented in the media was not consistent with the intelligence.

    11-166-27

  488. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it is.

    11-167-15

  489. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yeah.

    11-167-20

  490. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I lead CCT, so that's a abbreviation for Commissioner's Command Team, which I previously described who comprises of that, and I can re-explain that if it's helpful, sir.

    11-167-22

  491. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-168-01

  492. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-168-05

  493. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it is.

    11-168-10

  494. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-168-17

  495. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's what he says, yes.

    11-168-24

  496. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-169-01

  497. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-169-07

  498. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So we talked about this as well. He certainly was concerned about individual requests coming in outside of the channels of Hendon and what those requests were, but also about the dis and misinformation that was out there as well.

    11-169-10

  499. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not in the sense that I think it's being portrayed here. In relation to making sure that all requests are prioritized, they're ethical, they're in keeping with standard operating procedure, this is not about slow walking or not responding to requests that should not be happening. And Superintendent Morris I think goes on to cite his reasoning for that.

    11-169-18

  500. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To being reported in the media, and there had been some Hendon documents that had made their way into hands to people that should not have been receipt of them -- in receipt of them. So he was concerned about protecting the integrity of the Hendon reports, yes.

    11-170-01

  501. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do, yes.

    11-170-10

  502. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It does, yes.

    11-170-14

  503. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-170-22

  504. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-171-02

  505. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, did you say inappropriate?

    11-171-07

  506. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Appropriate. Yeah, I don't see anything inappropriate about it.

    11-171-10

  507. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, he does.

    11-171-23

  508. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's what he's communicating, yes.

    11-171-27

  509. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-172-10

  510. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it was. Correct.

    11-172-13

  511. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-172-18

  512. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-172-22

  513. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-172-25

  514. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It actually didn’t come into effect, I believe, until the morning of the 12th. But no, it would not have had any effect at that point. It was later effective for us on Highway 402, but that’s a different date and a different situation.

    11-173-02

  515. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They certainly did not, no. And I know you’ll have Superintendent Dayna Earley before this Commission in the future, and she can speak in more detail, but from a strategic level, no effect. You are correct.

    11-173-12

  516. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-173-19

  517. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s right.

    11-173-23

  518. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-173-27

  519. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it was.

    11-174-02

  520. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It could be. We’ll see the texts. Where are they; sorry?

    11-174-06

  521. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Oh, okay. Sorry. Yes, it’s Superintendent Mike McDonell, yes.

    11-174-11

  522. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, he would have.

    11-174-16

  523. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-175-02

  524. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry. This is blocked out. Is this a text message to me from the Superintendent?

    11-175-09

  525. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-175-12

  526. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, he does.

    11-175-16

  527. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-175-20

  528. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-175-24

  529. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It certainly is.

    11-175-28

  530. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s what he’s communicating, yes.

    11-176-05

  531. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We are concerned about violence erupting from that scenario, yes.

    11-176-10

  532. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do see that. Yes.

    11-176-21

  533. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-176-26

  534. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-177-01

  535. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-177-08

  536. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is the information that the Superintendent has provided, yes.

    11-177-11

  537. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say whether I did or not. I would have to review my reports. But certainly this information was very helpful to me and it informs a lot of the thinking that I’ve already provided to the Commission in relation to potential threats to national security and the need to coordinate all of our efforts. This is all in relation to that fateful day that we talked about, being the 12th of February. All this activity is happening simultaneously, Windsor, Cornwall, Ottawa, Toronto, Fort Frances. It’s happening right across the province.

    11-177-15

  538. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. In the process of being cleared. We stood down operations there from a Public Order standpoint on the 14th.

    11-178-04

  539. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-178-11

  540. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would have been a problem.

    11-178-14

  541. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-178-28

  542. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I was not. That was a discussion that was taking place and you can clearly see from my communication that that was not something that I was recommending.

    11-179-04

  543. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, absolutely not, sir. Not special constables from the Canadian Armed Forces. We employ special constables within our police services and I was specifically talking about police-controlled assets. At no point in time did I ever support, suggest or recommend the deployment of the Canadian Armed Forces.

    11-179-12

  544. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay. Thank you.

    11-179-23

  545. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-180-02

  546. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Counter-protests were a concern throughout the duration. They were.

    11-180-07

  547. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There was a counterprotest concern, yes.

    11-180-13

  548. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.

    11-180-18

  549. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-180-22

  550. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, we did.

    11-180-25

  551. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-181-01

  552. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.

    11-181-04

  553. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-181-07

  554. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We didn’t, but they did, yes.

    11-181-10

  555. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, thank you.

    11-181-14

  556. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. Yes.

    11-181-18

  557. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. Yes.

    11-181-23

  558. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.

    11-181-28

  559. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I would agree.

    11-182-04

  560. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I agree with that.

    11-182-09

  561. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-182-13

  562. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, these are all statements that I have made. I believe you’re reading an actual statement that I have delivered.

    11-182-18

  563. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes. I’m not sure whether you’re asking me a question, asking me to confirm your reading of my previous statements. So there’s a little delay when you look up at me.

    11-182-26

  564. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay. Thank you. So you are asking me questions as to whether I agree with each of these statements?

    11-183-05

  565. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay. Thank you for the clarification.

    11-183-09

  566. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-183-14

  567. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-183-17

  568. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-183-21

  569. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-183-24

  570. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So we’ve talked about that. Yes.

    11-183-27

  571. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. That is the -- that is my opinion, that collectively, based on everything that was going on around this country, that posed a risk to national security. Yes, that is my opinion.

    11-184-06

  572. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-184-12

  573. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Pleased to meet you, sir.

    11-184-21

  574. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-184-24

  575. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I have. Yes, sir.

    11-184-27

  576. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. So we were both deputy chiefs at the same time for neighbouring police services when Chief Sloly was with Toronto Police Service and I was with York Regional Police.

    11-185-02

  577. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely. Yes.

    11-185-11

  578. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-185-14

  579. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-185-18

  580. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, correct.

    11-185-22

  581. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely, yes.

    11-185-26

  582. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We were never assigned together to a specific investigation, but our services were involved in what we would call joint-force operations. Yes.

    11-186-03

  583. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-186-10

  584. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Shared responsibility, sorry, sir, with -- in the case of a municipal police chief, that is a shared responsibility between the chief and the board.

    11-186-12

  585. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Provides that oversight. And as the Commissioner, I’ve got some additional responsibilities with regard to that that a municipal police chief does not have.

    11-186-17

  586. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is right, sir.

    11-186-28

  587. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that’s fair.

    11-187-05

  588. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, there’s a lot less interaction between the Commissioner of the OPP and, in this case, me and the Ministry, or Provincial Government, than there would be with a municipal police chief, ---

    11-187-09

  589. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- who has monthly meetings, committee meetings, and various intervals of reporting that are required, where mine is an annual report and interaction on an as needed basis. So ---

    11-187-14

  590. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-187-24

  591. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So two answers, if you don’t mind. No, I do not take direction from any political entities. And two, yes, the police chief is a direct employee of the Police Services Board. In fact, under the Police Services Act, there is only permissibility to have two identified positions employed directly by the Board. That is the Chief of Police and the Deputy Chief of Police.

    11-188-02

  592. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Some of which, yes. I did view on online meeting. I believe it February the 6th but certainly had been privy to other comments that were circulating around via media and social media.

    11-188-14

  593. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So, from that meeting, I would agree with that.

    11-188-24

  594. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That meeting, the questions that were being asked, the level of detail that was being requested, that would have been most appropriately conducted in an in-camera private session. The Board has the ability to ask the Chief information, but that -- those particular questions, I felt, many of which should have been done in-camera.

    11-188-27

  595. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say I became specifically aware of those. I did not watch or participate in any of those meetings but I would not be in any way, shape, or form surprised to learn that he was participating in those.

    11-189-11

  596. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not be surprised at that at all, no.

    11-189-19

  597. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I would hesitate to say that I specifically observed demanding action but certainly observed the questions, and I’ve shared my opinion that I felt that should have been done in-camera.

    11-189-25

  598. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, the command structure, for the benefit of the Commission, is clearly defined in the Police Services Act as it relates to a municipal police service. There are specific ranks identified that the chief can choose to utilize. Chief, deputy chief, superintendent, inspector are the senior officer ranks, and then staff sergeants and sergeant.

    11-190-07

  599. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is usually the organizational structure, yes.

    11-190-19

  600. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I rely heavily upon my chain of command and police experts as a “command team”, we often like to refer to ourselves as, so yes.

    11-190-25

  601. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Somebody other than the Chief of Police would be responsible for the development of that plan. Ultimately, the Chief of Police is responsible to ensure that there’s a satisfactory plan in place -- that equates to adequate and effective -- but a Chief of Police would never be writing that plan, no.

    11-191-04

  602. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To provide it to the extent that they are qualified and capable of doing so and/or to request the assistance of another police service to provide that assistance.

    11-191-18

  603. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    But they are responsible for ensuring that that level of expertise is present and available.

    11-191-23

  604. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, as appropriate, yes.

    11-192-02

  605. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would agree that we satisfied a need for intelligence, as Supt. Morris has articulated in relation to Shutdown Canada Movement, the Patriot Movement, a need for intelligence that we saw existed in this province and for collaboration in intelligence-sharing across the country.

    11-192-13

  606. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair, yes.

    11-192-25

  607. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would say the information was used differently. In some cases, it was not used; in other cases, it was not even known.

    11-193-03

  608. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was aware that, specifically, Supt. Craig Abrams was engaged with the Ottawa Police Service and did have a level of awareness over the planning that was taking place, yes.

    11-193-11

  609. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-193-18

  610. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not to monitor the situation but to lend the assistance that was required.

    11-193-23

  611. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    He was part of an overall operational plan that was overseen by a Major Critical Incident Commander, Insp. Varga, and then there were various incident commanders along the way. Fair to say that Supt. Abrams was the strategic superintendent that was overseeing the operations in East Region that had responsibility for the convoy as it travelled on the King’s Highways.

    11-194-02

  612. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would not be fair. That was considered. That was discussed but there were no provisions in law to stop that convoy any time while enroute to Ottawa. There was no way to determine that any of those participants were going to be engaged in any unlawful activity. We have a right to ensure lawful assembly, respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and had there been any criminal infractions along the way, I’m confident my officers would have dealt with that.

    11-194-14

  613. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We would not have had sufficient authorities to deny them the right to access the municipality. I think as you get closer to locations of concern, there are ample authorities in common law, as well as in the Highway Traffic Act, to prevent access to certain areas.

    11-194-28

  614. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Ambassador Bridge is actually in the jurisdiction of Windsor Police and not in OPP jurisdiction, but certainly not prior to that. And a different situation as well, not hundreds of trucks travelling at one point in time together. That was a slightly different situation. But to directly respond to your question, sir, we did not have the authorities to stop any of that movement while on the King's highways or within our jurisdiction.

    11-195-10

  615. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's right. You know, there's nothing saying that even though the Ottawa protest is on way, that does not mean that somebody wishing to engage in lawful protest should be stopped from doing so.

    11-195-21

  616. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So it's determining that demarcation point that I talked about earlier, when does it become unlawful? When does it become necessary for the police to exercise their authorities, which I believe they managed very judiciously.

    11-195-26

  617. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am aware of that, and it was my understanding that Ottawa Police did have a plan to deal with the enormous amount of vehicles that were arriving.

    11-196-09

  618. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That I did not know. No, sir.

    11-196-15

  619. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say what folks within the OPP would have ---

    11-196-21

  620. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- opined on. I would hesitate to say that.

    11-196-24

  621. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you for your assistance.

    11-197-03

  622. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-197-12

  623. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-197-18

  624. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not agree with that, no.

    11-197-23

  625. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Deputy Commissioner Harkins is indicated here he's going to work remotely from the house in Orillia. He had a construction project on the go where he would have had to be at another location, I believe, on the Monday. He was also not directly supervising this particular operation. As we talked about the rank structure and the distance between a command officer and operations, Deputy Commissioner Harkins is responsible for almost 6,000 people in field operations spread over 5 regions. He has other responsibilities other than this. This, at this point, was being managed by East Region with oversight from the Emergency Operations Centre through the Major Critical Incident Commander. So long-winded way of saying I don't find that this indicates in any way, shape or form that he thought it would be concluded on Monday.

    11-197-26

  626. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't know. I can't say. I somehow suspect he didn't, and ---

    11-198-15

  627. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- even if he tried to, I'm pretty sure I would have interfered with it.

    11-198-18

  628. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Very quickly they were overwhelmed with this protest.

    11-198-23

  629. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not on their own, and as it turned out to be, no, they definitely required assistance.

    11-199-01

  630. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You know, I -- generally I would say yes. I think Ottawa Police can more specifically identify when that was identified, but I was aware that Ottawa Police had made provisions with other police services as well for additional resources. So OPP was not the only police service in Ottawa that first weekend and throughout, and that's where it became even more valuable to coordinate all of those resources.

    11-199-06

  631. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Actually, in excess of 2,000. I think it's closer to 2,200. Please don't hold me to that number, but an approximate number.

    11-199-18

  632. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that would be fair.

    11-199-25

  633. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So not 1700 police officers and 100 civilian members. The OPP could not facilitate that. It was absolutely flagged with the service to provide the resources that we could, that were required for identified tasks, and you see the numbers build throughout the duration of the convoy that ---

    11-200-02

  634. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- exemplify that.

    11-200-09

  635. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah.

    11-200-15

  636. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They started to work on amassing the availability of resources. That is fair.

    11-200-19

  637. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Can be coordinated and the mobilization would depend on the phase of the plan and the timing of the plan, but certainly, you ought to be starting to coordinate the availability of those resources.

    11-200-23

  638. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. So I received the request on the 7th of February. We assigned Chief Pardy the assignment that day, that evening actually. He met with us first thing on the 8th, and then he made his way to Ottawa immediately.

    11-201-01

  639. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that is true. So we had a conversation on January the 31st, and then on February the 1st, he gave me a heads up via text that a request for resources would be coming, and then I believe that that formal request came on February the 2nd, and it was actioned immediately.

    11-201-12

  640. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And some of those resources were already on ground in Ottawa.

    11-201-18

  641. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-201-26

  642. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-202-05

  643. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I'm not sure I understand the statement there in terms ---

    11-202-08

  644. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- of two tracks.

    11-202-11

  645. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, as was in Ottawa. If you look at the number of resources that we had on any given day on average 135, building up to over 400 resources on any given day before the plan had been finalised.

    11-202-14

  646. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It's much more than that. The Public Order component is one piece of an overall Operational Plan.

    11-202-20

  647. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It is typically the piece that requires the most resources. I believe the initial assessment, when the Integrated Planning Team arrived to provide assistance in Ottawa, was that they would require 800 Public Order Member Units, and that would require initiating requests from outside of Ontario from other provinces to assist us.

    11-202-25

  648. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Different, not as complex. I hesitate to use the term "easier" because of ---

    11-203-16

  649. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- connectivity to all of the other activities happening nationally across the country.

    11-203-19

  650. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, sir.

    11-203-22

  651. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It appears as though she has, and she has also identified a specific date in which the plan would be operationalised. So there would need to be significant amount of detail in terms of how many resources we required on what date and for what anticipated duration.

    11-203-27

  652. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And I believe they were estimating a two to four day duration on this event.

    11-204-05

  653. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    My understanding is there were two Public Order sections of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that did reposition from Ottawa to Windsor. I do not believe that there was a single OPP officer that was moved from Ottawa to Windsor, and in fact, our numbers increased by almost 200, I believe, between the 12th and the 14th in Ottawa.

    11-204-09

  654. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We also had to rely upon Public Order Units from other jurisdiction. London, for example. So this is where the Public Order Hub that we activated on February the 8th formalised. They were able to analyse and determine what Public Order Units were required when to mitigate what threats within what time period.

    11-204-16

  655. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is my understanding, yes.

    11-204-24

  656. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    As we did in Ottawa. So you will recall from Superintendent Abrams's message, we initially deployed frontline officers to assist with traffic management and traffic points. That started with 18 officers, that built to 30, and then when it built to 60, it went beyond the capacity of East Region, and we started moving resources from around the province, and that was done in the absence of an overall -- an overarching Operational Plan to bring an end to the demonstration. So very similar situations.

    11-205-17

  657. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-205-28

  658. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-206-03

  659. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-206-08

  660. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In terms of relationships within the Ottawa Police Service or just in general?

    11-206-17

  661. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Where I felt appropriate.

    11-206-25

  662. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was not also going to be bothering the Chief with rumours that I did not think were relevant or were impeding or hindering the Operational progress, compromising officer or community safety.

    11-206-27

  663. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes, please.

    11-207-08

  664. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-207-14

  665. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-207-17

  666. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was definitely challenging.

    11-207-23

  667. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That turned out not to be correct. Whether the statement was made or not, I have to accept Superintendent Craig Abrams at his word, and Chief Sloly can confirm or deny that. But we certainly determined that the number was not far off ---

    11-208-03

  668. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- what was required.

    11-208-09

  669. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-208-12

  670. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair.

    11-208-18

  671. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-208-21

  672. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-208-27

  673. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-209-03

  674. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, that would have either been through Deputy Commissioner Harkins or through Chief Supt. Carson Pardy. So at this point, Chief Pardy is the primary contact with Chief Sloly there to support him.

    11-209-06

  675. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-209-15

  676. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, sir. Whose notes are these?

    11-210-01

  677. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    On what date, sorry?

    11-210-06

  678. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-210-09

  679. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you very much.

    11-210-14

  680. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not to contradict, but I have been made available to me specific numbers of resources in various charts which are not necessarily consistent with that. And if it’s permissible to the Commissioner, I’d be more than happy to share those through future evidence.

    11-212-19

  681. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You would have to ask my counsel that.

    11-212-28

  682. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    They can certainly be made available.

    11-213-03

  683. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-213-07

  684. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-213-13

  685. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do.

    11-213-18

  686. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe so. So we had spoken. I knew there was a request coming. But that was the only formal request that I had received in relation to the 1,800. Chief Sloly had made previous requests of me, informally and formally, and I think entered as an exhibit into these proceedings have been the communication from February the 2nd.

    11-213-22

  687. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not receive two copies of the same letter, or what would resemble a similar request.

    11-214-04

  688. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-214-09

  689. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Good afternoon.

    11-214-15

  690. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m good, thank you. How are you?

    11-214-18

  691. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. I hesitate to say I’m very familiar. Sounds like a leading question, counsellor.

    11-214-24

  692. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-214-27

  693. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it evolved with time. It was a constant process of collecting the information, analyzing it, and disseminating it, which was all part of the intelligence process.

    11-215-03

  694. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would like to refer to the Intelligence report to say specifically what was in there, but that was the first formal communication through Hendon about the convoy.

    11-215-12

  695. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-215-18

  696. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say that there were no numbers with respect to demonstrators or vehicles. I wouldn’t characterize them as demonstrators at that point in time. Numbers would have been in relation to the number of vehicles in the convoy. So if that information was available, it would have been contained in there.

    11-215-23

  697. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Certainly.

    11-216-03

  698. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I have no reason to dispute it, ---

    11-216-06

  699. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- I just can’t say for certainty without having it in front of me.

    11-216-09

  700. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I wouldn’t say that it changed, as much as it evolved. And I believe on the January 20th Hendon Report, there was information about it being a long- term, no exit plan, unresolvable requests were being made. So there was a substantial amount of information in that report.

    11-216-15

  701. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-216-22

  702. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. It would be more current, but you cannot dismiss the information you have received previously. One Hendon Report does not replace a previous report.

    11-216-27

  703. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There can be new information in those reports, yes.

    11-217-08

  704. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say that I recollect that without having the Hendon Report in front of me. As you've identified, they're coming out on a daily basis, so I hesitate to say specifically what was in what report to that level of detail, but happy to review it if you'd like to show it to me, sir.

    11-217-14

  705. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-217-22

  706. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not agree as categorizing that as a delay. Once that information was known, that information would have been disseminated.

    11-218-01

  707. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-218-08

  708. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would subject to constant change and at various points throughout the travels of the convoy as they went through OPP jurisdictions. There were other products produced over and above Hendon Reports. There were situational reports that would have been shared at a command level made available to each region, and therefore, at the point of integrating in any form or fashion, I would hope would have been made available to Ottawa Police as well. So I just wouldn't want to leave you with the impression that Hendon was the only source of information or operability -- interoperability.

    11-218-14

  709. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, and I believe Supt. Pat Morris did a nice job of explaining what an intelligence gap is. It's where information is being sought to create a clearer picture.

    11-219-02

  710. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would hesitate to say that that is correct. There -- I believe there was information contained previously in the Hendon Reports that there was no date that they would be leaving, and that there was a commitment to staying long term. The specific dates, no, were not identified, but there was evidence or there was information that was available to indicate this would be more than a weekend.

    11-219-12

  711. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely. And I think it would helpful to reference any previous Hendon Reports that may have indicated what they knew at that time.

    11-219-23

  712. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-220-05

  713. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. Correct, thank you.

    11-220-10

  714. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-220-17

  715. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say that that is not a priority. No, I would not agree with that.

    11-220-22

  716. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If that is the case, I will take your word for it.

    11-221-01

  717. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, I would have to reference the report. You're asking me to comment on the content of a report that I can't see the content of, so I hesitate to do that, sir.

    11-221-08

  718. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-221-16

  719. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. He does.

    11-221-20

  720. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s what he has cited, yes, sir.

    11-222-08

  721. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-222-13

  722. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-222-16

  723. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So as a point of context, I think it's important to note that Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox is solely overseeing the POIB initiative in this, the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, and he would be referencing to the integration and information sharing taking place across intelligence units, and he would not be inferring to any other operational entities that he would not have any insight into.

    11-222-18

  724. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's correct, sir, yes.

    11-223-01

  725. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I'm not sure how they were situated in there, but they were certainly there to ensure that the deployment of our resources were done in accordance with our operational objectives and to lend whatever support was necessary.

    11-223-05

  726. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You would have to ask that of Superintendent Pat Morris as to specifically where the officers were positioned. I hesitate to mislead you with not knowing that for certain.

    11-223-13

  727. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would assume if they're working together, they're sharing information. But if you're citing specifically intelligence reports, these are going directly into the Ottawa Police Service, directly in to identified members of Ottawa Police, directly into the Intelligence Unit within Ottawa Police. It would not be the responsibility of an OPP officer sitting in the National Capital Region Command Centre, who has other responsibilities outside of intelligence to ensure that Ottawa Police is in receipt of this intelligence and has actioned it.

    11-223-20

  728. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I will take your advice on that. If you have that information, I can't disagree with that.

    11-224-05

  729. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely, sir, yes.

    11-224-10

  730. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It can, yes.

    11-224-15

  731. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Peaceful protest can result in significant traffic disruption, yes.

    11-224-18

  732. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, sir, if I can, Superintendent Cox or Deputy Commissioner Cox or Superintendent Morris. I just want to make sure I'm orientating myself to the right individual.

    11-224-22

  733. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do recall that, yes.

    11-225-05

  734. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-225-09

  735. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    If involved, we would certainly facilitate the lawful right to protest.

    11-225-14

  736. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There were comments about potential weapons. There were reference to civil war, but there was nothing that empowered anyone to take enforcement action prior to the convoy arriving in Ottawa.

    11-225-20

  737. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We did have Public Order assets on ground, and to the extent of a Public Order Plan, I'm not certain, but we did have Public Order assets on ground, as did other municipal police services in the aid to Ottawa, yes.

    11-225-28

  738. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Can't say that we would expect that the rest of the protesters, I'm not sure if you're referring to those that we had concerns about as a possible fringe movement?

    11-226-07

  739. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-226-13

  740. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Certainly, the contact that was had between PLT and those that they perceived to be protest organizers were indicating that it would be peaceful.

    11-226-17

  741. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We would not stop anyone that we didn't have lawful authority to, meaning that we would have to have reasonable and probable grounds that they were about to or had committed a criminal offence.

    11-226-23

  742. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Oh, yes, I would.

    11-227-06

  743. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do.

    11-227-17

  744. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do, yes.

    11-227-24

  745. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-228-02

  746. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To exactly know how many trucks would be arriving, it would be impossible, yes.

    11-228-05

  747. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-228-19

  748. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it appears so, yes.

    11-228-25

  749. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To go ahead and send it, yes.

    11-229-04

  750. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is what Superintendent Pat Morris has cited, yes.

    11-229-09

  751. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-229-14

  752. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-229-17

  753. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In many ways it was, yes.

    11-229-20

  754. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-229-24

  755. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I remember concerns over OPP officers being there, available for duty, and had not been deployed, both from a frontline perspective but also the Police Liaison Team. I do recall that.

    11-230-04

  756. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, they can, yes.

    11-230-15

  757. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The 12th, which was the same date as the email you just reviewed with me, yes.

    11-230-20

  758. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Ramer.

    11-230-24

  759. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Toronto Police Chief James Ramer. Yes.

    11-230-26

  760. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-231-07

  761. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say I recall that word for word, but I certainly had conversation with Chief Ramer, and I know that he would tell you that he benefitted from the experience in Ottawa to be able to respond in Toronto. He would also share with you that they have a pre-determined lockdown plan for certain areas of Toronto which is exercised on a regular basis, and built in coordination with the City.

    11-231-16

  762. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We did, yes.

    11-232-01

  763. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. For the most part they were not, and they were not in the numbers that Ottawa had dealt with either.

    11-232-05

  764. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-232-11

  765. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We have heard that, yes.

    11-232-15

  766. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Can't say that there wasn't an immediate public safety risk. I am aware that there was some resistance to closing the 417 exits, that was brought to my attention, and I thought, in my opinion, that that was a reasonable and lawful request and that we would facilitate it.

    11-232-22

  767. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't recall describing it as an uncomfortable conversation. It was a professional conversation that I felt needed to happen, and one that I was confident that I could have with Chief Sloly.

    11-233-04

  768. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    About the challenges that were being reported with operationalising and activating the plan, yes.

    11-233-13

  769. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-233-21

  770. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That he took over immediately after Chief Sloly resigned?

    11-233-25

  771. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I would agree with that.

    11-233-28

  772. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    With Chief Sloly? No, I did not.

    11-234-04

  773. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, we did have a conversation within Interim Chief Bell, a very similar conversation, to determine that there were no obstacles in moving forward with the plan. We clarified Command and Control lines of communication, and we moved forward. So it would've been a very similar conversation with Chief Sloly, I just can't indicate at this point what the outcome would be. I would be, you know ---

    11-234-09

  774. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- not in a position to do that.

    11-234-18

  775. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair, yes.

    11-234-25

  776. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-234-28

  777. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-235-02

  778. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Good afternoon.

    11-235-08

  779. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-235-15

  780. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-235-21

  781. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-235-25

  782. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I have been.

    11-235-28

  783. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-236-03

  784. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Portions of, yes.

    11-236-08

  785. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is my opinion, yes.

    11-236-13

  786. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I have no listened to his testimony in totality, but I would have no reason not to agree with anything that he would provide as evidence.

    11-236-16

  787. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say that specifically I remember that interaction.

    11-236-23

  788. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There was no intelligence ---

    11-237-01

  789. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There was no credible intelligence of a threat?

    11-237-05

  790. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That -- I would agree with that.

    11-237-08

  791. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be my understanding, yes, as determined by Supt. Pat Morris, in consultation with CSIS and the RCMP.

    11-237-15

  792. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do not have intimate knowledge of the threshold that’s required for invoking the Emergencies Act. That’s not something that I have any responsibility for.

    11-237-21

  793. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s understood. Yes.

    11-238-02

  794. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-238-08

  795. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Nobody ever said that to me.

    11-238-12

  796. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Certainly.

    11-238-21

  797. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-238-27

  798. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-239-02

  799. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-239-04

  800. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s fair.

    11-239-08

  801. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-239-16

  802. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-239-21

  803. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say to what extent they can go outside Parliament. There’s the Trespass to Property Act that has to be taken into consideration as well, and I’m not familiar enough with what is permitted on those grounds to say yes or no.

    11-239-24

  804. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-240-03

  805. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-240-08

  806. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct.

    11-240-12

  807. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m aware of that. That sounds very familiar with what is in the Criminal Code. I hesitate to agree word for word without having it in front of me, ---

    11-241-01

  808. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- but it sounds very reasonable. Thank you.

    11-241-06

  809. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-241-12

  810. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would agree with that.

    11-241-19

  811. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-241-24

  812. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-242-01

  813. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’m familiar that that is contained in the Criminal Code. I don’t have intimate knowledge of that though.

    11-242-08

  814. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-242-13

  815. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. Yes.

    11-242-21

  816. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. Yes.

    11-242-25

  817. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I don’t know that I can comment with accuracy on that, because as you will recall from my previous testimony, I was under the understanding that there would be designated parking, which would not facilitate any form of protest out in front of the Parliament buildings.

    11-243-09

  818. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that would best be posed to Ottawa Police, who were in charge of the operation ---

    11-243-15

  819. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- at the time.

    11-243-18

  820. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That could be, yes. And there are authorities to deal with that.

    11-243-24

  821. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, can you repeat that, sorry?

    11-244-04

  822. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s very complex law - --

    11-244-12

  823. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- that is beyond my education and comprehension. I’m sorry.

    11-244-15

  824. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was aware that there were cement barriers in place, but I was not on the ground to observe where they were or what impact they would have had.

    11-244-23

  825. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That sounds reasonable, yes.

    11-245-03

  826. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would say that that is accurate, save and except surge and contain is -- are not terms that are generally used within the OPP. As it relates to your previous question around physical barriers, those could be barriers put in place by police, could be put in place by protestors. I know there were some concerns that people did want to leave, but they were boxed in by other vehicles ---

    11-246-11

  827. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- and they did not feel as though they could leave of their own accord without the assistance of the police.

    11-246-20

  828. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that was going to happen anyways. They were on a timeline focused on de- escalation and negotiation with the anticipated approval of the plan. There was the intent to move forward, yes.

    11-247-03

  829. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-247-11

  830. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was a fact, yes.

    11-247-19

  831. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I will take your explanation on that as fair.

    11-247-24

  832. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't think I could agree that there was no lawful assembly, and it's what came first and what came second. Were people trapped and couldn't get out because the barriers were up, or were they trapped and couldn't get out because other trucks and heavy equipment were blocking them in? But I think what's fundamental to your question is, the discretion is to whether there are reasonable and probable grounds to lay a charge rests with the police officers who would investigate that unlawful assembly.

    11-248-14

  833. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you for sharing that.

    11-249-01

  834. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So a point of clarification, I did not approve a plan. I did authorize Inspector Beaudin to have a conversation with Deputy Minister Stewart. I did not approve a plan, nor did I ---

    11-249-15

  835. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- approve anything that went to Cabinet.

    11-249-20

  836. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did not see that plan, but I have all the confidence in the world in Inspector Beaudin, and ---

    11-249-26

  837. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- he is an absolute national expert as it relates to provincial liaison teams, negotiation, and de-escalation. So I would have no reason to question his advice that he provided.

    11-250-02

  838. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was aware that Commissioner Luckie had insight into the discussions that had taken place between the inspector and the deputy minister.

    11-250-08

  839. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't comment. I didn’t see a plan. This is the first I'm seeing any documentation in relation to it.

    11-250-14

  840. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, I'm not a federal civil servant.

    11-250-23

  841. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I wouldn't indicate that the deputy minister is part of law enforcement, and policing is not a hierarchy. I am not above a municipal police chief in a rank structure. So I wouldn't disagree with -- I would not agree with that.

    11-250-26

  842. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Within the Ontario Provincial Police, I am the highest ranking police officer.

    11-251-06

  843. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    For the RCMP.

    11-251-10

  844. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s a question best posed to the deputy minister ---

    11-251-15

  845. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- I think.

    11-251-18

  846. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-251-20

  847. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can. Good afternoon. Thank you.

    11-252-01

  848. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It would have been available to me. I would have reviewed that as a cursory review, yes.

    11-252-09

  849. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-252-16

  850. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. I would agree with that, yes.

    11-252-20

  851. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Public Order Hub, we formally established that. It had been operating since February the 4th at an operational level amongst superintendents, and we coordinated it at a chief level and made it official on February the 8th, yes.

    11-252-26

  852. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't know that I would categorise it as the fair distribution. This wasn't a case of being fair or equitable, it was ensuring that the right resources were in the right place at the right time to mitigate the threats that were before us.

    11-253-07

  853. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So, sorry sir, are you asking me if they would be responsible for the financial costs of deploying OPP officers?

    11-253-18

  854. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So I can't speak to whether there are any charges from other Municipal Police Services to Windsor Police. I can assure you that there has been no cost back sought from the OPP from any other Police Service throughout the Freedom Convoy. Those costs have been borne by the Ontario Provincial Police.

    11-253-23

  855. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-254-03

  856. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Good evening.

    11-254-10

  857. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Generally. I've never policed in the City of Windsor. I have visited the City of Windsor, but I am not intimately familiar with the locations.

    11-254-14

  858. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it's not here yet either.

    11-254-24

  859. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yes, I do.

    11-255-02

  860. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I thank you for the assistance of the cursor. Without my glasses that's helpful. I see that, thank you.

    11-255-06

  861. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not be aware of that based on looking at the map and my lack of specific jurisdictional awareness, no.

    11-255-13

  862. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not disagree with that, no.

    11-255-19

  863. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am aware of that, yes.

    11-256-02

  864. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay, thank you.

    11-256-05

  865. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I know that it goes over the river. I did not know that it was privately owned.

    11-256-10

  866. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I agree with that, yes.

    11-256-15

  867. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-256-21

  868. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-256-25

  869. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, it -- sorry, can you repeat that?

    11-257-01

  870. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-257-06

  871. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-257-11

  872. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. There were other Municipal Police Service that leant some assistance as well, but theoretically, yes.

    11-257-19

  873. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    On February the 14th, yes.

    11-257-25

  874. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it was not.

    11-258-01

  875. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-258-05

  876. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe until on or about February the 28th.

    11-258-07

  877. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    In part it was to ensure the flow of traffic, it was to ensure that there were no further unlawful demonstrations that resulted in the bridge being blocked again.

    11-258-12

  878. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-258-18

  879. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, I wouldn't say they were specifically assigned there to protect the million dollars --- millions of dollars worth of trade, but as I have shared previously, I think that is important part of overall security in this country is economic security.

    11-258-22

  880. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I was aware there was a Traffic Plan in place that formed an appendix to an overall Operational Plan, yes.

    11-259-02

  881. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-259-18

  882. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-259-23

  883. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You'd have to go to the details of the plan to determine how long it was limited in traffic. My reference, sorry, was to the amount of time that we had dedicated resources assigned to the activities in Windsor.

    11-260-02

  884. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was not specific to the control of traffic flow.

    11-260-07

  885. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-260-11

  886. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not be surprised at that.

    11-260-17

  887. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, they did.

    11-260-21

  888. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Superintendent Earley would be the best to speak to the interoperability there, but it would obviously have required the support oof the City, and as I understand it, there was great cooperation.

    11-260-25

  889. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would not surprise me.

    11-261-04

  890. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-261-08

  891. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That does not seem unreasonable; however, I think it requires some context to say as a result of the actions of the police, the police are responding to unlawful protest to make the area safe and maintain a reasonable flow of traffic and community safety. So I don't think it's fair to categorize it as a result of the police actions.

    11-261-14

  892. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay.

    11-261-24

  893. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't dispute that.

    11-261-26

  894. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I ---

    11-261-28

  895. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would not agree with you on that. That's not something that is the Commissioner of the OPP, I have any responsibility for, and I think there's other people that should be providing that advice to you.

    11-262-04

  896. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Superintendent Mike McDonnell.

    11-262-16

  897. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    He reports to me daily on a regular basis. This was some additional responsibility that he undertook. The hubs did not report directly to me. They reported through the appropriate Major Incident and Critical Incident Commanders and our Emergency Operation Centres. I was not providing direction as to where those Public Order Units would be when and what amounts, for what length of time.

    11-262-20

  898. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Superintendent Mike McDonnel was the representative of the Ontario Provincial Police that coordinated that in cooperation with the other leads or representatives of the Public Order Units across the province.

    11-263-02

  899. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Superintendent McDonnell?

    11-263-09

  900. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not MacDonald? Thank you.

    11-263-11

  901. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I have not.

    11-264-03

  902. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I see that, and I was aware of that.

    11-264-28

  903. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-265-08

  904. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that, yes.

    11-265-19

  905. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I very likely would have been aware of that at the time, and the hesitation that you're observing is in relation to documents that were put forward before me earlier today where I had to orientate myself as to where those requests might have come in to the organization. So this was not a formal request that came into my office, but a good example of how those connections are made at an operational level and that assistance is provided. This is not something that the Superintendent would have had to seek my authorization on. He is completely empowered to make that type of decision.

    11-265-22

  906. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe that was the date.

    11-266-16

  907. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It would appear so from the evidence that has been provided here, but there was no formal request made of me, and when I inquired whether anything else was needed, I was advised that it was not.

    11-266-23

  908. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-266-28

  909. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, Paul.

    11-267-14

  910. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-267-19

  911. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would agree with you. I'm not familiar with anything in there that would define that, no.

    11-267-24

  912. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don't know that the framework would be the right place for that. We'd have to go through the framework in its totality, I think, for me to give you an honest opinion.

    11-268-03

  913. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, there would be nothing in that document. That's not what that document was intended for.

    11-268-15

  914. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    But that varies from province to province, and I don't know that police leaders need direction on that. And here in Ontario, it's very clearly defined in the Police Services Act how to request assistance. It's also clearly defined in what's called Adequacy Standards where regulations state that police services must have agreements for certain abilities and services if they're not able to provide them on their own.

    11-268-24

  915. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, but there’s a framework and how it is done. So I may not be interpreting your question correctly in terms of a threshold. How would you propose that that threshold is defined?

    11-269-10

  916. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I don’t know that I would categorize his decision as “ad hoc”. These decisions are based on the experience of the chief, the advice of their subject-matter experts. If there was a way to quantify a threshold for an integrated or unified command, that would obviously be of assistance?

    11-269-25

  917. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I -- I’m sorry. I’m not trying to be difficult with you. I just think you’re convoluting it for me to be able to provide you with a very direct and clear answer. There’s the framework that deals with the use of provincial liaison teams and lawful assembly. There’s adequacy standards that deal with how we deploy our Public Order Units, what their qualifications are, what their training needs to be, requirements for a police service to maintain certain capacities. There’s core responsibilities in the Police Services Act. So there’s a number of components to this.

    11-270-04

  918. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To have a conversation with him to determine whether the obstacles that had been communicated to us were seen by him in the same light and to determine whether it was that time ---

    11-270-21

  919. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- whether we should be assuming command of that, whether that was something he was seeking our assistance with. And based on that conversation, I would then have to make a decision as to whether it was something that I felt should be elevated or it was something that could be managed by Ottawa Police with our assistance.

    11-270-26

  920. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, yes.

    11-271-11

  921. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That could be the inevitable outcome, yes.

    11-271-15

  922. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was a conversation that needed to take place based on the description of what was happening with the activation of the plan.

    11-271-22

  923. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So you’ll have to ask Commissioner Lucki her opinion ---

    11-272-01

  924. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- in terms of losing confidence. I hesitate to say that we were losing confidence in the Chief of Police. We were certainly concerned about the ability to move the plan forward and it required our assistance, and it may have required us to take command and control.

    11-272-04

  925. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am, yes.

    11-272-17

  926. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would have been very difficult.

    11-272-21

  927. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s going to be something, I think, for this Commission and others to determine. Perhaps it could have been ended earlier with more engagement through PLT. I would suggest that that was likely the evidence of Insp. Beaudin yesterday; I have not observed his evidence. But earlier engagement and more robust engagement of PLT, it is possible that the protest could have been ended earlier -- possible, yes.

    11-272-26

  928. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-273-08

  929. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It could have, yes.

    11-273-12

  930. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Just because an operational -- just to put it into context, sorry. Just because an operational plan is prepared and ready to go, that does not mean that we immediately move to enforcement. We’re bound by the Ontario Use-of-force Model and de-escalation is always going to be the first and foremost priority, but it is important to have the plan and the assets ready to go should the decision be made by the critical incident commander that deploying the Public Order Unit is the appropriate and responsible next step.

    11-273-14

  931. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I would not agree with that, that there was a delay because we did not have confidence in the plan. We were providing resources for tasks and job descriptions that were required. We needed to define the resources that required and, to do that, we required a plan.

    11-274-03

  932. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Until we had a plan, yes.

    11-274-13

  933. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, not an intentional delay to say, “We’re not sending resources.” I think it’s really important to put it in context because there has been some concern and some reference to not enough resources being there for functions that were required to be performed and I just want to be clear that that was not the case.

    11-274-16

  934. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is not right?

    11-275-01

  935. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would describe a significant number of OPP officers being there prior to that. I would describe over 400 OPP officers being in Ottawa prior to that as a significant number. When we only have just over a thousand on any given day deployed across this province policing our communities, more than 400 in the City of Ottawa is significant.

    11-275-03

  936. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was officers in total; that was not specific to the OPP.

    11-275-14

  937. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is fair, yes.

    11-275-22

  938. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We did not have the numbers to deploy Public Order Units simultaneously in both locations; that is correct.

    11-275-26

  939. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was not helpful operationally, correct.

    11-276-06

  940. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Making OPS vulnerable as well as other jurisdictions across the province.

    11-276-11

  941. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was likely very obvious to a number of people but getting into specific number of officers that is required ---

    11-276-18

  942. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- is not best practice. You will note that we never discuss the number of officers that we’re deploying publicly in relation to an operational plan.

    11-276-22

  943. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know if it was one day before but it was publicly stated before, and that was not the Ontario Provincial Police that released that number.

    11-277-03

  944. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was not helpful.

    11-277-08

  945. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Who was politicizing it?

    11-277-10

  946. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    You’ll have to talk to the Solicitor General about the -- why that was released and in what context.

    11-277-12

  947. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-277-22

  948. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-278-02

  949. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Words to that effect. We would have had to assess the request and our capabilities, but the willingness would have been there.

    11-278-13

  950. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-278-26

  951. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. So really, there’s the four, because you could get a request from the Board, or you could get a request from the Chief of Police. And as it relates to the Crown Attorney, that is normally specific to a very specific investigation or incident.

    11-279-06

  952. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-279-17

  953. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-279-27

  954. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-280-04

  955. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would agree. I don’t know anywhere where assistance is defined.

    11-280-07

  956. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It could. So normally OCPC would provide direction in circumstances like this over the administration of a police service so they can appoint a temporary chief, they can ask the OPP to provide policing services, they can appoint an administrator. There’s various forms that this can take place.

    11-280-13

  957. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I wouldn’t call it a takeover. It’s providing the policing services in the municipality. That doesn’t mean that the police service becomes defunct, but we would be relied upon to provide the services that the Commission felt were not being provided.

    11-280-21

  958. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Generally. It’s not something that I deal with on a day-to-day basis. So I’m not intimately familiar with it, but somewhat.

    11-281-06

  959. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Okay. Thank you.

    11-281-15

  960. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, thank you.

    11-281-21

  961. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, thank you.

    11-281-24

  962. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is a general description of their responsibilities, yes. They’re two-fold. There’s the adjudication piece and then there’s the investigative piece. There’s two mandates.

    11-282-02

  963. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Of a municipal police board?

    11-282-09

  964. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it does not.

    11-282-15

  965. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, it does not. And the Commission is no exclusive to the OPP. Their responsibilities are overarching over all police services in the Province of Ontario.

    11-282-20

  966. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It’s not a police board, but they have province-wide authorities. There’s essentially three independent oversights. There’s the OIPRD, the Office of Independent Review Directorate, there’s the Special Investigations Unit, and then there is the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, that are defined in the Act.

    11-282-26

  967. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I have no interaction with the Commission on a daily basis or at predetermined intervals.

    11-283-07

  968. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be a question to ask of the Commission. And this is one of a number of ways that you have highlighted. So a Police Services Board can also ask for that level of assistance.

    11-283-20

  969. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not.

    11-283-26

  970. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And I don’t make recommendations directly to the Commission.

    11-283-28

  971. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, somewhat.

    11-284-12

  972. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, can you point me to where that's articulated?

    11-284-28

  973. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's what that reads.

    11-285-04

  974. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I would agree with you that that's what's written here.

    11-285-14

  975. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's a fairly technical question in law, as I would have had to seek legal advice on any such order. The EMCPA that we dealt with, dealt with identifying critical infrastructure, which was legislation that was enacted on February the 12th that did provide very specific locations or descriptions of locations where activities were prohibited and then gave us the tools to deal with those activities.

    11-285-19

  976. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that's a legal question that as a police officer I am not qualified to answer.

    11-286-03

  977. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-286-07

  978. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    For who, sorry? The signal cut out, I apologise.

    11-286-15

  979. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-286-19

  980. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct, in cooperation with Windsor Police, yes.

    11-286-24

  981. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't speak to the extent of Windsor Police Service's experience, but they certainly would not have the experience of a large city like Toronto or Ottawa.

    11-287-02

  982. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It was what, sorry?

    11-287-08

  983. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't specifically state the numbers, but I would define it as a larger protest. In terms of impact, there were a number of motor vehicles, there were a number of people, and it took over 400 police resources to deal with that protest.

    11-287-10

  984. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-287-20

  985. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it was the Operational Plan of February 12th that enabled the police actions to successfully disperse the blockade, yes.

    11-287-23

  986. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Between February the 12th and into February the 13th. It was a two day operation.

    11-288-01

  987. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah.

    11-288-11

  988. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. So there was a large piece of geography that the officers had to contend with, so the specific blockage at the bridge was cleared on that date, and they still had more protesters that had to be cleared out of the general area to ensure that that was secured.

    11-288-16

  989. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The second portion of the Operational Plan happened on the 13th, yes.

    11-288-22

  990. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-288-27

  991. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it was.

    11-289-02

  992. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe so. I believe so, but that's best to come from the local Police Service of jurisdiction or Superintendent Dana Earley, but that's my understanding, yes.

    11-289-05

  993. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I did not. That's the first I have seen the plan is when it was presented to me here today.

    11-289-14

  994. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That would be correct. There would be no ability to reference legislation that did not exist.

    11-289-24

  995. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There specific duties, I would suggest, should be provided by Superintendent Earley, or specifically the Windsor Police. I'm not familiar with what they had them doing day-to-day, I'm sorry.

    11-290-03

  996. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That was my understanding, yes, of two-way trade.

    11-290-11

  997. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's just something that I'm aware of, yes. Certainly not my specialty, not anything that I have verified or confirmed, but certainly my understanding.

    11-290-15

  998. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That's not something that I could comment on no; sorry.

    11-290-23

  999. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-291-01

  1000. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t recall the exact date, but we were able to clear it in and around that date, yes, in very close proximity to clearing the Ambassador Bridge.

    11-291-04

  1001. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    EMCPA, yes. Correct.

    11-291-10

  1002. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe there was farm equipment at that protest, yes.

    11-291-20

  1003. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say that it was effective because it was farm equipment, but it was an effective tool that we relied upon. I can't say in the case of Cornwall of what effectively enabled them to de-escalate that situation. That was a momentary blockade, a momentary demonstration that did not last for any prolonged period of time.

    11-291-28

  1004. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It did, correct.

    11-292-09

  1005. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-292-12

  1006. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Hi.

    11-292-19

  1007. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-292-26

  1008. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not specifically. I believe there was -- there may have been reference to up to 250 RCMP resources that were available that were not being utilized, but that’s just going by memory, and that’s evidence best shared with you by the RCMP. I was aware of the concern, but not something that I was intimately involved with.

    11-293-01

  1009. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I don't remember. It would have been very early on, so I would say within the first week of February, and it wasn’t so much that they were conveyed to me as much as I became known of it, so you would have to verify that information. I don’t have firsthand direct information of that.

    11-293-09

  1010. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We have responsibilities -- some responsibilities for Queen's Park, but there's also LPS, Legislative Protective Services that has responsibilities for the protection of individuals within Queen's Park. We have responsibility for the physical security aspects of it.

    11-293-19

  1011. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Somewhat. I don’t have intimate details as to who has what mandate and responsibilities. I know that they exist and that we work in collaboration with them, but I can't provide any direct insight into mandates or responsibilities.

    11-293-28

  1012. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-294-09

  1013. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Well, I think if we look back at the events that have transpired and we look forward, part of our responsibility is to mitigate something like this happening again in the future. This is the Parliament for our country. It's an extremely important critical infrastructure and there ought to be a pre-determined plan that can be exercised to shut that area down if there is a threat relying on hard security features and interoperability between the various security agents that have -- or agencies that have roles and responsibilities.

    11-294-12

  1014. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-294-24

  1015. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Good evening.

    11-295-14

  1016. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do.

    11-295-19

  1017. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct, yes.

    11-295-23

  1018. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    This whole event and series of events were unusual, so it would be extremely unusual that there would be that amount of communication required back and forth between myself and the deputy solicitor general.

    11-295-27

  1019. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely not, no.

    11-296-06

  1020. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No.

    11-296-10

  1021. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely not.

    11-296-13

  1022. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I was certainly asked by the Ministry, which is under the supervision and direction of the deputy, whether there were any tools that would be of assistance, and I believe the first meeting where those conversations commenced was on February the 10th, and ultimately, I made suggestions towards the Emergency Measures and Civil Protection Act that resulted in the ability to seize permits, seize vehicles, and there were charges related to not following the direction of a police officer.

    11-296-18

  1023. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Asking for the ability if somebody was engaged in unlawful activity that was posing a risk to critical infrastructure, and in this case, border crossings and other ports of entry, that officers had the ability to put an end to that by being able to seize the vehicle, seize a permit for the vehicle, what's called a CVOR which is in relation to a commercial motor vehicle, and be able to seize a driver's licence, and impose fines.

    11-297-03

  1024. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We were provided with the tools we requested, yes.

    11-297-13

  1025. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe that they were useful to the OPP, and not so much in that there were ample charges laid, but as a deterrent, being able to, as has been previously indicated, rely upon the framework to discourage or disrupt any would-be illegal activity or anything that is currently ongoing.

    11-297-17

  1026. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe that those tools were effective in the Highway 402 blockage, yes.

    11-297-26

  1027. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I did not, no.

    11-298-04

  1028. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    The -- at the time that it was invoked, it was made known publicly. And I think in and around that time as well, Commission Lucki and I very likely would have connected on that, but I received no official notification that it was going to be or that it had been invoked.

    11-298-06

  1029. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I was not.

    11-298-16

  1030. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, we didn’t have a discussion around specific tools that would be included in the Emergencies Act. We made have had discussions in an around, you know, what is required for policing in general but never in the context of the Emergencies Act. I did make her aware of what -- the advice I had provided in relation to the EMCPA but no, no discussions specifically to the Emergencies Act or the contemplation thereof.

    11-298-20

  1031. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think that would be appropriate and useful, yes.

    11-299-07

  1032. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, certainly, if it related to activities that are ongoing in the Province of Ontario or could be going on in the Province of Ontario, I think it would ne nice to have the opportunity and to provide any insight or guidance that may be applicable.

    11-299-11

  1033. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think it can -- it could go either -- in both ways. If the Commissioner of the RCMP is the one that is providing that advice to the federal government, then that’s an appropriate conversation to have between commissioners. If the federal government is asking for inputs from a provincial ministry, then that request should flow through the deputy minister to me, if he deems or she deems appropriate that I provide such advice.

    11-299-21

  1034. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-300-03

  1035. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    We were dealing with a number of event and activities in 2001 and it was extremely important to us at the time that our decision-making considered impacts that may be felt nationally to decision that we would make locally. And we required additional intelligence to be able to make those informed decisions, hence Hendon was born through the cooperation of our partners which include the RCMP.

    11-300-09

  1036. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There was not a similar product that I was in receipt of, no, not as it specifically related to the activities that were of interest to us.

    11-300-18

  1037. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Regularly and often, yes, lots of positive feedback on the quality of the Hendon Reports, the timing of the Hendon Reports, the briefing that were provided to the Intelligence Bureaus by the Provincial Operational Intelligence Bureau, and also very positive feedback on the briefings that Supt. Pat Morris provided to the affected chiefs of police.

    11-300-26

  1038. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-301-18

  1039. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    For the contents contained in the Hendon Report, specifically on February the 7th, that caused concern for the combination of events and activities that were taking place that, as was articulated, in that report, it posed a possible threat to national security.

    11-301-21

  1040. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    And I wouldn’t call it “criteria” as much as I would reference in various material. I think national security is much more complex and broad than the threat to the security of Canada that’s confined in the CSIS Act. National security has a number of components. It’s the extent to which that poses a threat should determine how that is mitigated and how that is dealt with.

    11-302-02

  1041. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I believe this is the one that refers to foreign influences, I believe, counsellor?

    11-302-13

  1042. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I -- I certainly can’t provide much more detail than that without examining it further but I know that there were concerns raised in this report as well in relation to national security or the security of Canada.

    11-302-18

  1043. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I’ve read the first paragraph, thank you.

    11-302-27

  1044. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I think it -- I think it’s fairly clear and, at the risk of just reading it back, it is conveying that it is almost that the Freedom Movement blockades and protests represent a long-term threat to public safety and security domestically.

    11-303-05

  1045. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, absolutely.

    11-303-12

  1046. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-303-16

  1047. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, what do you mean by “the time horizon”?

    11-303-20

  1048. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I don’t see a timeframe specifically identified in those paragraphs. It would range from at that moment in time and looking forward.

    11-303-25

  1049. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I am familiar with this document, yes.

    11-304-07

  1050. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that’s representing the number of frontline officers which would be separate and apart from the number of Public Order officers that were in Ottawa and other specialties that were there.

    11-304-12

  1051. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that’s one component of the deployment that was there.

    11-304-17

  1052. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To my knowledge and understanding, yes.

    11-304-22

  1053. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I do see that. And I see reference to a number of 463 over a 24-hour period.

    11-305-09

  1054. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I do not.

    11-305-13

  1055. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-305-16

  1056. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-306-09

  1057. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. And this is ranging from the time they arrived on ground to the end of February or February 28th.

    11-306-13

  1058. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. In total. In total OPP deployed.

    11-306-19

  1059. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-307-04

  1060. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so there were reports of obstacles that were preventing the planning team from moving forward. We had had this email exchange on the 13th of February. It was consistent with the communication on the 12th of February, that the Chief was in support of the plan. However, by the time we got into the 14th of February and the morning of the 15th, we were receiving reports that there were obstacles preventing the plan from moving forward, and some of those obstacles were perceived that the Chief had to approve the plan, which was inconsistent with the communication we had previously had, which was part of the need to speak with Chief Sloly myself to determine what was actually going on.

    11-307-08

  1061. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Maybe. Maybe, yes.

    11-307-25

  1062. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct. That was inconsistent with the email that I had received from Chief Sloly on the 13th.

    11-308-01

  1063. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. I can’t specifically recall the numbers, but it’s consistent with what I recall.

    11-308-21

  1064. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    So that may have been in relation to where they were going to stage the tow trucks, how they were going to maneuver the tow trucks, and where they were going to remove the seized vehicles to. What’s the date of this email, sorry?

    11-309-05

  1065. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    February the 13th. So there was a lot of times that the EMCPA was being referenced, and there were other times that the EA was being referenced. At this point in time, there is no Emergencies Act.

    11-309-11

  1066. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Right.

    11-309-16

  1067. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-309-19

  1068. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    No, I don’t perceive that is a concern on behalf of the towing companies themselves, although there were concerns from the towing companies about indemnity.

    11-309-24

  1069. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    That is correct. And it was a bit of a scramble to get orientated with the provisions in that legislation, not having any advance notice that it was coming, there was no ability to provision in our planning for the utilization of those tools. We required legal assistance to determine what was possible, and then to be able to look at how we might be able to use those tools.

    11-310-06

  1070. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-310-26

  1071. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes. We had had officers dealing with the tow providers directly and through the Ministry of Transportation. My understanding was they were all coordinated, organized, and ready to go.

    11-311-02

  1072. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Correct.

    11-311-19

  1073. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, for direct evidence, Acting Staff Sergeant Kirk Richardson was having the contact or coordinating the contact with the towing companies, but I can certainly share with you my understanding. There was concern that tow operators were becoming reluctant. They wanted to have some protections that there would be no retribution or retaliation leveraged against them for participating, and there was still the ongoing concern over indemnification. So yes, they had been lined up, yes, they had been coordinated, but there were still concerns being expressed by some of the tow operators. The plan had a contingency that they could execute the plan with as little as two tow trucks, and we also had police personnel lined up to operate heavy tow vehicles should we not be able to get the assistance of professional tow operators.

    11-311-28

  1074. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can't say what the proportion of concern would have been, but I was assured that with or without they would've been able to get the job done. It would've taken more time, it would've required potentially our officers having to operate tow trucks, but we still would've moved forward with the execution of the Operational Plan.

    11-312-20

  1075. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-312-28

  1076. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not specific to this, Commissioner. So there are a number of products that are produced federally in relation to threat assessments in relation to national security, but there was nothing specific that dealt with the issues we were managing in 2001 specific to rail blockades that were happening around the province. So that filled that need by constructing this particular product.

    11-313-09

  1077. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It's certainly something that could, and we would need to be an active contributor to that, as would all other Police Services across Canada, but that is something that would provide substantial value having a national picture.

    11-313-22

  1078. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. So my thoughts on that are I did not feel it was merely circumstance that we had two challenging demonstrations at the furthest points in the southern part of the province. We had protests going on in Ottawa that were challenging the capacity of police to respond. To then have a demonstration at the Ambassador Bridge to be going on at the same time, knowing the distance that it takes for police to mobilise and look after both locations, while at the same time there were demonstrations taking place in Toronto, I believe that there is a possibility that that was organised and coordinated by somebody or a group of people.

    11-314-06

  1079. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely no evidence, Commissioner, just a suspicion, let's say, and something that I think strategically had a responsibility to consider and be aware of.

    11-314-22

  1080. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    With Commissioner Lucki, not to my recollection, and certainly not with anybody else, no, sir.

    11-315-07

  1081. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    There are defined Command Structures, but it is up to the individual Police Services which Command Structure they follow. So there would be some value in ensuring that all Police Services are following a consistent Command Structure. So in cases like this, where it warrants moving police resources across the country, with more than 20 Police Services engaged, if we ever have to engage in something like this again in the future, having that consistent Command Structure would certainly be helpful.

    11-315-15

  1082. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not into the Declaration of Emergency, Commissioner, but there was legislation that followed that through the EMCPA, and I was asked for my professional advice from a law enforcement perspective, whether there were any tools that would assist us with managing and protecting critical infrastructure.

    11-316-03

  1083. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Not into the Declaration of Emergency itself, but into the legislation that flowed through the ECMPA that gave police officers those enforcement tools, I had input into that, yes sir.

    11-316-12

  1084. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    It gave us those authorities, yes.

    11-316-19

  1085. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Or compelling ---

    11-316-23

  1086. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    --- for towing? That was definitely discussed. There were a number of things that I asked for that could not be supported by the Legal Team, and we did have discussion around compelling service providers, but the results of those discussions did not bear out in terms of tools that were made available to us.

    11-316-25

  1087. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, there was lots of discussion that happened in my absence, and the decision -- it did not appear in the Act, so I can't honestly say why it did not or to what extent that was considered. There was lots of discussion around it, lots of ideas proposed, and then we were grateful to receive the legislation when we did.

    11-317-06

  1088. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, there was no written request, Commissioner, so this was done through a series of meetings and discussions. So I wouldn't want to honestly say how far that discussion went, but that was certainly on the table and something that had been discussed and we had talked about a situation whereby we did have trouble getting a tow truck to lend assistance when there was a blockade that had emerged in and around the Peace Bridge and we had a challenge getting tow trucks to provide the necessary assistance. So these types of things were discussed but I can’t say to what extent given that it wasn’t a written submission; it was merely discussions where I had an opportunity to provide some input.

    11-317-15

  1089. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    To the best of my recollection, I would say yes, because it was an issue that we were experiencing, but I can’t state with certainty how much discussion we had on that.

    11-318-01

  1090. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes.

    11-318-10

  1091. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    I can’t say that specific locations were discussed in and around Wellington. It was more the categorization of critical infrastructure. So I can’t say that Wellington was discussed specifically.

    11-318-14

  1092. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    My understanding was that the officers could have exercised the authorities contained within to use those enforcement tools, which wouldn’t have been the same as communicating an exclusion zone as define under the Emergencies Act. But if they were asked to disperse from the area of critical infrastructure, the officers had the tools to proceed with charges or seize vehicles, licences, permits under the EMPCA. So that was a tool that was available to officers in Ottawa in and on Wellington.

    11-318-22

  1093. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Critical infrastructure. So I don’t have the legislation in front of me but I believe that that would have fallen into the definitions of the types of locations that would be covered by the EMCPA. If it’s helpful, the OPP did do up a chart that explained to the officers where we felt the various powers would apply. It became very complex for officers to try to navigate their way through these new powers that they weren’t used to in real time, so it may be very helpful to walk through that chart at some point.

    11-319-05

  1094. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so I think I can be much clearer. So contained in the EMCPA was the “not to block any highway”. So the definition of a “highway” would include any roadway, so that would include Wellington. So highways were deemed critical infrastructure which addresses the concern on Wellington out in front of the Parliament Buildings. So the roadway itself is deemed to be critical infrastructure.

    11-319-17

  1095. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Yes, at that point in time. And as time went on, those authorities were narrowed to a much narrower scope to be specific to borders. But at that point in time, it was blocking access to any highway, as I understand it.

    11-319-26

  1096. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Absolutely, yes, sir, that was my understanding.

    11-320-07

  1097. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you very much, Commissioner.

    11-320-13

  1098. Thomas Carrique, Comm (ON-OPP)

    Thank you.

    11-320-17