Volume 24 (November 16, 2022)

(jump to testimony)

Volume 24 has 275 pages of testimony. 21 people spoke before the Commission, including 3 witnesses.

Very important disclaimer: testimony from this site should not be taken as authoritative; check the relevant public hearing for verbatim quotes and consult the associated transcript for the original written text. For convenience, testimony includes links directly to the relevant page (where a speaker started a given intervention) in the original PDF transcripts.

The testimony below is converted from the PDF of the original transcript, prepared by Wendy Clements.

Speakers, by number of times they spoke:

  1. John Ossowski, former President (DM) - Canadian Border Services Agency / Government of Canada (GC-CBSA) (spoke 476 times)
  2. Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister - Transport / Government of Canada (GC-TC) (spoke 333 times)
  3. Alexandra Heine, Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 248 times)
  4. Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel - Government of Canada (GC) (spoke 116 times)
  5. Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 113 times)
  6. Jennifer L. King, Counsel - City of Windsor (Win) (spoke 84 times)
  7. Brendan Miller, Counsel - Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers (spoke 75 times)
  8. Christian Dea, Director General and Chief Economist (DG) - Transport / Government of Canada (GC-TC) (spoke 71 times)
  9. Paul Rouleau, Commissioner - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 54 times)
  10. Stephen Armstrong, Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 50 times)
  11. Hatim Kheir, Counsel - Democracy Fund / Citizens for Freedom / Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms Coalition (DF / CfF / JCCF) (spoke 41 times)
  12. Jessica Barrow, Counsel - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 34 times)
  13. Stephanie Bowes, Counsel - Government of Alberta (AB) (spoke 34 times)
  14. P. Mitch McAdam, Counsel - Government of Saskatchewan (SK) (spoke 33 times)
  15. Cara Zwibel, Counsel - Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) (spoke 29 times)
  16. Daniel Chomski, Counsel - City of Ottawa (Ott) (spoke 25 times)
  17. Jinan Kubursi, Counsel - Ontario Provincial Police / Government of Ontario (ON-OPP) (spoke 20 times)
  18. The Registrar - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 20 times)
  19. Nikolas De Stefano, Counsel - Peter Sloly (spoke 14 times)
  20. Christine Johnson, Counsel - Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses (spoke 2 times)
  21. Heather Paterson, Counsel - Windsor Police Service / City of Windsor (Win-WPS) (spoke 1 time)

Upon commencing on Wednesday, November 16, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.

The Registrar (POEC)

Order. À l'ordre. The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session. La Commission sur l'état d'urgence est maintenant ouverte.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

The next witness is Mr. John Ossowski.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-06

The Registrar (POEC)

Mr. Ossowski, will you swear on a religious document, or do you wish to affirm?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-11

The Registrar (POEC)

For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-14

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

John Ossowski. J-O-H-N O-S- S-O-W-S-K-I.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-16

MR. JOHN OSSOWSKI, Affirmed

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MS. ALEXANDRA HEINE

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Good morning, Ms. Ossowski. Nice to see you again. My name is Alexandra Heine. I'm Commission Counsel, and I'll be doing your examination today. And at the end, my colleague, Gord Cameron, will have a few questions for you. So we're just going to start by pulling up your witness statement, which, Mr. Clerk, is WTS00000046. Thank you. So you recall that you participated in an interview with Commission Counsel in anticipation of your appearance here today on August 24th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 7 24-007-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And three of your colleagues, Christine Derosiers, Scott Harris and Ted Gallivan, who are not here today, were also interviewed; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 8 24-008-04

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so I would ask you to confirm that you've reviewed the summary of that interview, and if you have no changes to make, confirm that insofar as it contains your information, it is accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief and you adopt it, and insofar as it contains information from your colleagues, you believe that information to have been reviewed and accepted as accurate by your colleagues?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 8 24-008-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. So, Mr. Clerk, if we could also pull up DOJ-IR0000006? So, Mr. Ossowski, your department prepared and filed with the Commission this institutional report. Have you reviewed this document?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 8 24-008-17

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And is it accurate to the best of your knowledge and belief?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 8 24-008-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Can you confirm that CBSA has filed this institutional report as part of its evidence before the Commission?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 8 24-008-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. So at the time of the Freedom Convoy events, you were the President of the CBSA; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-02

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And the CBSA is the Canada Border Services Agency?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So you left that role in June of 2022 I understand?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That's correct. I retired.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-11

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. You're retired now. And CBSA manages 117 land border crossings, 22 of which are commercial ports of entry; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And amongst other things, CBSA is responsible for administering and enforcing legislation that governs the admissibility of people and goods in and out of Canada ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-16

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

-- amongst 90 pieces of legislation and regulation, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. It also identifies detaining and removing people who are inadmissible to Canada?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-24

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And ensure compliance with Canadian laws in the border-related context?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 9 24-009-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And it also protects food and safety, plant and animal health, and Canada's resource base; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-02

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And Border Services officers, which are sometimes called BSOs, carry out some of those responsibilities; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And BSOs have regulatory authorities under the Quarantine Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Customs Act; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

They have -- well, if there was something happened with respect to the Quarantine Act, if there was something that officers suspected was offside, they would refer that to a Public Health official for how they would decide to enforce that particular provision.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And I understand that BSOs don't have authorities beyond sort of the confines of ports of entry or CBSA property; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That's correct. They're not peace officers. They have very limited Criminal Code powers under the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So they wouldn't have the power or authority to conduct an arrest, for example, outside of the port of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No. Well, in the case of an immigration enforcement inland, they might ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 10 24-010-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

But not -- otherwise, no.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 11 24-011-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And so accordingly, the CBSA doesn't typically intervene in activities that occurs outside of its port of entry and its property; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 11 24-011-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So in the case of the convoy, the CBSA did not intervene directly in the protest and blockades because they happened near the ports of entry and not on the ports of entry's property; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 11 24-011-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So on that note, I'll take you through the convoy, and the way I'm going to structure this is I'm going to start by asking you questions about CBSA's response to the convoy and specific blockades, and then I'm going to ask you more specifically later in the examination about your roles and responsibilities during the convoy. Thank you. So we'll start with CBSA's response to the convoy. I understand that on January 25th -- sorry, January 15th, there were certain Order in Council provisions that had previously allowed foreign national truckers to enter Canada unvaccinated that expired; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 11 24-011-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And on the same day, Canadian unvaccinated commercial truckers entering Canada became subject to testing and quarantine requirements for which they had previously been exempt?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 11 24-011-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So this caused the sporadic protest activities and ultimately the movement that we know as the Freedom Convoy; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And CBSA had intelligence, mostly open source intelligence, that there were going to be some blockades near ports of entry sometime in late January; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, we certainly saw the first slow roll activity on January 17th in Emerson.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And that slow roll did not become a blockade; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. That came later?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And in response to sort of this intelligence, CBSA put into place a contingency plan. Did you have any involvement in that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That would have been put together by the operational folks in the field with the supervision of the leadership in Ottawa, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But you knew about it?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 12 24-012-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that was on January 28th, I believe; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Amongst other things, I don't think we need to pull it up, I'll just note for the record that it's PB.NSC.CAN.9523, but it identified the safety and security of CBSA employees as its top priority. Is that consistent with your recollection?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And it also provided regions and headquarters with high-level contingency awareness and guidance on CBSA’s operational posture?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And it also set out a process whereby BOC, which is the Border Operations Centre, would provide situational reports twice a day. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And my colleague, Gord Cameron, is going to touch on that, so he’ll pick it up later, but I understand that CBSA, in addition to the contingency plan, also implemented different port hardening measures?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Can you describe what those measures were?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It would vary by port of entry, but certainly one of the things that we started to do was, and very unusually, apply cameras facing back into Canada so that we could be aware of what was coming from behind. Obviously the officers are facing the United States. We have lots of cameras facing vehicles and passengers coming into the country. But this was done so they had situational awareness of what might be coming at them from the Canadian side.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 13 24-013-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not -- that was probably the most significant piece that we started to do.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And cameras, you mean CCTV, ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- like surveillance footage? Okay. And I understand that BSOs were also instructed, and that’s, again, border services officers, BSOs, were instructed to refer foreign nationals entering Canada for the purpose of participating in protests to secondary for confirmation of their eligibility to enter Canada? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes. It was called the Enhanced Vigilance Exam.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Enhanced Vigilance Exam. And can you explain what sending somebody to secondary means?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-23

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It means that either they declared something during the primary inspection during the initial interaction with an officer where the officer suspected they weren’t being truthful and they went to secondary for a complete exam to make sure that they were eligible to enter the country.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 14 24-014-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So if a BSO suspected that somebody wanted to come into Canada to participate in the protest, they would send them to secondary?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And BSOs were also instructed to closely examine those travellers to ensure -- and travellers generally, to ensure the requirements issued by the Public Health Agency of Canada under the Quarantine Act were met by the individuals entering Canada? Is that also right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So that would involve questions about sort of, you know, their vaccination status, testing for covid? Things like that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah. Proof of vaccination.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So I’ll take you to January 29th, which is when the Coutts blockade started. So that was sort of the first major blockade? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-17

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And understanding that there was sporadic protest activities, so specifically slow roll convoys at other ports of entry in late January/early February, I understand that the next major blockade happened at the Bluewater Bridge, which is in Sarnia in Ontario, on February 6th. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that blockade dispersed on February 8th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 15 24-015-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And then the next major blockade happened in Windsor on February 7th? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that’s when CBSA issued its first border alert?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Which advised people that the Ambassador Bridge Port of Entry was experiencing delays? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And specifically experiencing service disruptions?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So could you explain, first, what’s a border alert and what is, second, what is a service disruption, as opposed to a service suspension and a closure of a port of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-16

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Sure. So a border alert is just something that we would have sent out to the travelling public or to the commercial side so that they’re aware that they might need to choose another port of entry to come into the country. service disruption just means that for some reason the port of entry isn’t accessible, and/or there’s some -- it could be an IT outage, for example, if there’s a disruption, or it could be that there’s an excessive backlog of traffic. We try to maintain a 60-minute service standard, no longer than 60- minute border wait time. And if that’s not the case, then we’d send out an alert for traveling public and commercial entities to know.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 16 24-016-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And a port of entry closure, I understand, doesn’t happen very often? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-04

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And in what circumstances would that happen?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Like maybe -- very -- I don’t remember we actually closed the port of entry, except for a very short period of time, for example around flooding in Manitoba.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

But we would -- we actually had the ability to suspend service at a port of entry. This is what actually happened in Coutts at the request of the RCMP.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-14

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And we’ll get to that. But a service suspension, what does that look like on the ground?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-17

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So the officers are still there, but they’re not processing vehicles or people anymore, except in exceptional circumstances. So you might have the situation where you’re not providing the service but if somebody came and there was a need for an emergency vehicle to get across, then they would facilitate that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. It’s sort of a skeleton crew that’s sort of at the port of entry just ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 17 24-017-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And maybe let’s pull up the Institutional Report. And that’s DOJ.IR.00000006. And Mr. Clerk, if we could go to page 32, please? All right. So this is a chart that sets out the service disruptions and suspensions that occurred sort of at the major ports of entry during the convoy? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And we see that there was a service disruption, as I mentioned earlier, issued on February 7th for Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And the next service disruption was issued on February -- sorry, service suspension was issued on February 12th? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And there was also a service disruption at Coutts on February 10th as well? Sorry, -- -

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- Emerson. Thank you. And on February 12th, if we just scroll down a bit, there was also a service disruption issued for the Pacific Highway Port of Entry, which is in B.C.? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So there’s a total of three disruptions and one suspension at those ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Were any other service disruptions or suspensions issued for any other ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 18 24-018-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not that I’m aware of.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 19 24-019-02

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Can you walk us through, generally, in terms of border wait times and the like? What were the impacts on these main blockades? The impacts of the blockades on these main ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 19 24-019-03

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Certainly. So as you mentioned in your opening remarks, there’s 117 land ports of entry. Twenty-two (22) of them are designated commercial ones. And they are specifically set up to receive and process commercial traffic, including livestock and/or time sensitive goods that need to sort of pass expeditiously. Often they’ll have the presence of a CAF food inspector. And importantly, it's set up with our friends to the south in terms of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. They would have a similar processing capability to mirror the Canadians at those ports of entry. So for example, Coutts is the only designated port of entry that does commercial processing in the Province of Alberta, and the next available one would have been either in Saskatchewan or in British Columbia. There were other ports of entry, but they weren’t designed or set up to process commercial traffic, which is what made it so impactful.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 19 24-019-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And so let’s go to Coutts in terms of specifics. So as you mentioned, there’s some commercial ports of entry neighbouring Coutts in Saskatchewan and B.C., but I understand that those are eight -- around eight hours away from Coutts? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 19 24-019-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It’s quite a drive, yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not feasible in the winter, especially with livestock.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And those are North Portal in Saskatchewan, or Regway, and Roosville in B.C. or Kingsgate? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe Kingsgate, but I don’t have the list in front of me.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. I think you can just take my word for it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so the CBSA, I understand, in response to the convoy, and because those alternative commercial ports of entry were so far away, they identified Del Bonita and Carway, which are two ports of entry that are closer to Coutts, much closer, Del Bonita is about 50 minutes away and Carway is about an hour and a half away, as potential alternative ports of entry. But as you noted, they were not outfitted to necessarily process commercial traffic? Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely. So we would have redistributed officers to help with any traffic that chose to go those routes. But they’re not set up, for example, if we had to do an enforcement action, there’s no facility there to offload the vehicle and inspect it completely. So there -- they just weren’t set up to deal with that type of full commercial operation.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 20 24-020-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And they don’t have infrastructure either, like Canada Food Inspection Agency set up there?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And no USDA veterinary services for livestock.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And so, I understand that in response to these obstacles, Brad Wozny, who is your colleague -- was your colleague, and he’s the Regional Director of the Prairie Region, which captures both Manitoba and Alberta, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

The Regional Director General, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Regional Director General, thank you. And so he worked with the RCMP, which was the local police of jurisdiction in Coutts, the US Custom Border Protection Services, and CFIA, so that’s the Canada Food Inspection Agency, and the US Department of Agriculture, to facilitate the movement of commercial traffic through those alternative ports of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So that’s specifically Del Bonita and Carway. And as he explained in his witness summary, which for the record it’s WTS000000044, they arrange for traffic moving southbound, so that’s going from Canada into the US, to effectively move across to Sweet Grass, Montana, which is located South of Coutts, and access a USDA Inspection Services there, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 21 24-021-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so then they would be able to, sort of, divert the traffic in that manner. And then the northbound vehicles, so those going from the US into Canada, would drive up to Sweet Grass, and they were inspected by CFIA, and their loads were sealed, and then they would move across to Del Bonita and enter Canada in that way.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so I understand that there were impacts to the Coutts port of entry all the way until February, around February 13th, where there was some enforcement action by the RCMP, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And can you explain sort of what that enforcement action entailed?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

The RCMP arrested four individuals and laid criminal charges.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And there were guns and ammunitions that were seized?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And the rest of the protesters that were remaining agreed to leave sometime midday, or in the afternoon of February 14th, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 22 24-022-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And if we can pull up, Mr. Clerk, PBCAN1385. (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So, Mr. Ossowski, this is an email that you sent to Minister Mendicino, who’s the Minister of Public Safety, on February 15th, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-04

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And you advised him that protestors were leaving Coutts as of 3:00 p.m. on February 14th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that around 8:30 p.m., the CBSA was advised that the RCMP had removed the conveyances blocking the lanes and had been able to secure the area, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-11

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And you also advised Minister Mendicino that the CBSA was in a position to open the Coutts POE on the next day.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Sorry; on that day, on February 15th.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay, so we’ll move on to Ambassador Bridge. So Ambassador Bridge, the blockades start on February 7, and a service disruption was issued on that day. And then if we can pull up the Institutional Report again, Mr. Clerk, so DOJIR00000006. And if we could go to page 38, please? So this is a chart that was provided to us by the CBSA that shows the commercial conveyances volume from January 15th to February 25th at the Ambassador Bridge, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 23 24-023-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Can you walk us through the chart, sort of from February 8th to February 13th, and just explain to us what those numbers mean?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 24 24-024-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, as you can see from the preceding days and it’s -- there’s a very sort of predictable weekly pattern here in terms of the movement of goods, so obviously less on the weekends, and more as you build towards the end of the week. So, for example, February 1st, on Tuesday, we had 4,982 commercial conveyances, so that’s the truck and trailer across the border, and on February 8th as a result of the disruption, five passages were recorded.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 24 24-024-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And then if we go to February 13th, for example, we see that there’s zero commercial conveyances that passed on that day?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 24 24-024-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so, Mr. Clerk, if we could just scroll down. So traffic -- yes, keep going. Thank you. So traffic from the Ambassador Bridge was diverted to Blue Water Bridge, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 24 24-024-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Which is approximately two hours away from the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 24 24-024-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And, also, traffic was diverted to Queenston?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Which is further; I believe it’s four hours away, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, it’s about 400 kilometres away.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And it was also diverted to the Peace Bridge, which is about four hours and 30 minutes away, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so if we look at this chart again, we see that from February 7th to February 13th, which were the days that the blockade was impacting on the Ambassador Bridge, we see that Blue Water Bridge has sort of absorbed the traffic that would’ve normally gone through Ambassador Bridge; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-14

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I would disagree with that. So the difference is -- if you look at, again, the Tuesday before, the Blue Water Bridge processed 2,800 vehicles and there was 2,000 more vehicles on February 8th, so that’s only part of what would have normally gone through at the Ambassador Bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And the other part would have presumably gone through Peace Bridge which, if we scroll down, we see that Peace Bridge also has an elevated amount of commercial conveyances on those days.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 25 24-025-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, again, if you look at the numbers, the difference is only about 250. So it’s not the 5,000 or so that would have normally come through on that day.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And there was also some traffic that was absorbed by Queenston.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes, again, but if you do the math, it wasn’t fully absorbed in terms of what would normally pass at the Ambassador Bridge. And I think the important part to remember here is even though they might have gotten across, it depends on the nature of what they were bringing across. If it was for the auto sector, driving four hours away, and then coming back another four hours would’ve had impact, and it obviously did. And certainly for livestock, it would’ve been not feasible to do something like that either. So it really depended on the load, but if you do the math, there was not a complete replacement, despite the fact that these other ports of entry were potentially available for them to use.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So was CBSA tracking what happened to those commercial vehicles?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-19

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

They weren’t -- no? Okay.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-22

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No. We just -- we just simply tracked the passages through our systems.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So, it’s possible that those vehicles went home; it’s also possible that they entered in a different manner?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I couldn’t speculate on that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 26 24-026-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. So is it fair to say that most of the commercial vehicle traffic was successfully diverted to neighbouring ports of entry, but not all of it?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I guess it depends on how you define “Most”.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So if you go day by day and look at the numbers, I would say a portion of them, but I wouldn’t say most.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And what about at other ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think, if the -- when I looked at the data for the Prairie Region, so Coutts and what would have gone through some of the other ports of entry, I think there was a higher level of substitution there, if you will, in terms of finding another way to get across.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

But it’s less so in southern Ontario.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-19

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So, it’s fair to say that southern Ontario, the commercial traffic was diverted slightly less successfully than some of the other ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s my understanding, yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

But the other ports of entries were able to successfully divert commercial traffic, largely.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 27 24-027-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And so in Emerson I understand that there were five days where traffic was largely not getting through, and that was from February 12th to the 15th, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Sorry; I guess that’s four days. Yes. And traffic was redirected to two neighbouring ports of entry, which were Tolstoi and Gretna, is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And your colleague, Brad Wozny -- Emerson falls also within his region -- explained that although those two ports of entry, so Tolstoi and Gretna, were not equipped to process large volumes of commercial traffic, his knowledge was that all vehicles carrying commercial goods were diverted -- that were diverted made it across the border; is that consistent with your recollection?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s correct. And, in fact, we -- neither Tolstoi or Gretna are designated commercial ports of entry and if -- we actually included pictures of them in the Institutional Report; you ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- can see that they’re actually very small operations without the appropriate facilities to conduct ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- normal commercial operations.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 28 24-028-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But Brad Wozny, Regional Director -- Regional General Director Wozny was able to work with the US authorities and with the Canadian authorities to outfit those neighbouring ports of entry so they would be able to process some of those commercial vehicles.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s correct. And making sure that they had the staff there that were trained and to do that type of function.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So a resource diversion ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- basically? Right. And lastly, the other main port of entry where a blockade happened was Pacific Highway. We touched on that briefly, but I understand -- and this is from your colleague, Nina Patel, who's the Regional General Director of the Pacific Division, or the Pacific Region.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And in her interview summary, which we don't need to pull, but for the record it's WTS00000045, traffic was rerouted from Pacific Highway on February 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And it was -- they were redirected to the neighbouring ports of entry of Aldergrove, which is about 20 kilometres away from Pacific Highway?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 29 24-029-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And Huntington, which is about 40 kilometres away?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And I understand that Aldergrove and Huntington are commercial ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't believe Aldergrove is, but I could be wrong.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

I think your colleague, Nina Patel, said that they were. They just didn't have the same commercial vehicle capacity as ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, they might not have had a same number of lanes available for ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Yeah, that's exactly right. So in the email that we showed you earlier, which we don't need to pull up again, but it was the email where you advised Minister Mendocino in regards to the Coutts port of entry; do you recall that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-17

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And you also advised him that at 11:05 p.m. local time on February 14th, the RCMP had successfully cleared and opened north and southbound roads at the Pacific Highway for the resumption of traffic; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 30 24-030-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so the traffic flow had resumed and there were very few protesters remaining on site, which is what you advised him of?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And so you've mentioned that when traffic is diverted, there's an increase in border wait times, truckers have to drive longer to get to their destinations. In the case of Ambassador Bridge -- thank you -- in the case of Ambassador Bridge, there were some impacts on supply chains?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-07

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely. So I think it's closer to 200 kilometres away from Ambassador Bridge to the Bluewater Bridge. The Bluewater Bridge has 7 commercial lanes compared to the Ambassador's 15. You know, given the fact that processing time takes the same, you're trying to squeeze more volume through a smaller sort of sieve, if you will. And at one point, I heard reports that the traffic lineup was 10 kilometres long at the Bluewater Bridge. So that had a significant impact.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And there was a significant, or a specific impact on the automobile industry; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely, just because of the just in time manufacturing sector in southern Ontario where the whole process is set up to not have inventory on hand, but have it delivered as it's required, so it's very finely tuned.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-24

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And the Ambassador Bridge blockade was cleared up on February 13th as a result of enforcement action; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 31 24-031-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think it was February 14th we reopened.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. You reopened on February 14th, but because the protesters had cleared on February 13th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. Overall, would you say that the CBSA responded well to these blockades?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I was very proud of the way the organization responded to it. I mean, I think that -- I can't emphasize enough how unpredictable and escalating this was for us, and it was more than just the ports of entry that you're referring to, and certainly, when you look through our institutional report, this was literally from coast to coast. And obviously, some suffered more severe disruptions than others, but it really kept us on our toes in terms of trying to anticipate and work with our American colleagues and the local police of jurisdiction to make sure that we continue to manage the border effectively.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-11

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And CBSA took -- you'd say took active steps to mitigate the impacts?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And it staffed alternative ports of entry as well?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That and as well worked with all police of jurisdiction. If they were going to set up a command centre, we would embed ourselves in there, so we had good situational awareness, to the point, you know, the Port Harding that we talked about earlier in terms of installing cameras to make sure that officers were safe in their operating environment ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 32 24-032-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- working with their U.S. colleagues, so they could understand what they might need to do in terms or reallocating their resources. So it was a very busy time.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And as we talked about earlier, CBSA was able to successfully divert much of the commercial traffic, not all of it, especially at Ambassador Bridge, but a lot of it, due to the steps that it took?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-11

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

I'm going to now turn to your role specifically during the convoy. So as President of the CBSA, you were first in command; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And you reported to Cabinet?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I reported to the Minister of Public Safety.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that's because CBSA falls within the general umbrella of Public Safety; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

All of the Deputy heads report directly to the Minister.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 33 24-033-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

To the Minister, you mean Minister Mendocino?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And Deputy heads, you mean of the agencies that fall within Public Safety's mandate?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes, so CSIS, RCMP ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- CBSA, Correctional Service.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. How did you report to him? So was it oral briefings, written briefings?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Emails, text messages, oral briefings, written briefings, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And your second in command was your Executive Vice-President who at the time was Ted Gallivan?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So I understand that you attended meetings throughout with officials and at the political level?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

You attended Deputy Minister Committee on Operational Coordination meetings and ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 34 24-034-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- the DMOCCs. Right.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And sometimes, I understand, you've sent Mr. Gallivan as your delegate to those meetings or ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So you didn't attend all of those?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And you also attended meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Safety, Security and Emergencies; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And we refer to that as the SSE.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so there were three meetings, the 3rd, the 6th and the 8th. Did you attend all of those meetings?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't recall exactly which ones but ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

I think you attended the 3rd and the 6th and Mr. Gallivan attended the 8th. Does that refresh your memory?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-24

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And you also attended meetings of the Incident Response Group?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 35 24-035-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And those occurred on the 10th, 12th and 13th, and then every day from the 15th to the 23rd, I understand?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Do you recall whether you attended all of those meetings or only some?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-07

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think most of them, but I don't think that was all of them.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And if you weren't at one of those meetings, you would have sent your delegate, I assume?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, Ted would have went.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-14

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And you also attended some of the FPTCPPC meetings, which is the Federal Provincial Territorial Crime Prevention and Policing Committee; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So I'm actually going to take you to a read out of that committees -- one of the meetings of that committee, which happened on February 7th. So that's SAS0000000012, Mr. Clerk, please? And if we go down to page 2? So we see that you gave an update here, "...major commercial vehicle traffic [in Alberta]. One lane open [...]. Still protesters there, but allowing through." Presumably allowing some traffic through. And, "Normally double. Other area is ambassador bridge, blocking in Windsor/Detroit area, major port of entry. Blocked. Is a police of jurisdiction issue, working with POJ to share intel but comes down to enforcement. Ready to work with PT partners to share what we know. Will continue to work with them." Do you recall this?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 36 24-036-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Is this the type of update that you would have typically provided at these meetings?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 37 24-037-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, just to sort of give everyone situational awareness of what we were seeing and hearing and what potentially might happen.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 37 24-037-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And if we go down to page 3, keep going, keep going -- it might be a bit lower. Keep going. Keep going. There we go. Sorry, page 4. So you say, "Issue is large trucks, tow trucks and cannot compel drivers. Emergencies Acts could be used to compel." So we've heard a lot of evidence throughout this inquiry that there was an issue procuring tow trucks, and that one of the powers that the Emergencies Act provided was for people -- or the police would be able to compel those tow truck drivers to assist. So this is on February 7th. Were you -- does this mean that you were contemplating the use of the Emergencies Act as early as February 7th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 37 24-037-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No, and in fact, when I saw this read out, I looked at that and I was looking at the plural of that. And I think in the context of the call with FPT meeting that we were having. We were talking about provincial emergency powers that could be brought to their -- to compel tow trucks.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-04

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And your understanding with that provincial emergency powers could be used to compel tow trucks?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I wasn’t sure who had them. I understood afterwards that Alberta actually had that power, but I wasn’t sure who else might have that power.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And when you say "Alberta might have had that power", what do you mean by that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-16

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Under their Emergency Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Is that the Critical Infrastructure ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No, I think that’s another Act that they have the ability.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Their provincial emergency?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And your understanding was that other provinces may or may not have had?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

And that -- I think that’s what we were trying to discuss here, was how could we get these tow trucks into action.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 38 24-038-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Was there ever any follow up on that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not that I'm aware of.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

To make it clear, we had no authority to procure tow trucks at the CBSA ourselves, and ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- had a very limited role that we'll probably discuss later with respect to helping tow trucks come in from the United States because of an agreement that we have with U.S. CPB for emergency vehicles.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. Well, we can discuss it now. So I understand that effectively, CBSA's role could have been not the procurement of tow trucks, but facilitating immigration for those tow trucks to come assist; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah. So normally there would be -- you would -- to bring a vehicle like that in to work in Canada, you need a work permit, and so what we would do is say we would waive that requirement in the sense of the emergency agreement that we have and allow them in and make sure still that they weren’t, you know, unable to enter so that they didn’t have any serious criminality issues, weren’t bringing in guns with them, or anything like that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And did you provide that assistance for any of the ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-26

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

We did in Windsor, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 39 24-039-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And how -- do you recall if tow trucks actually came over the bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 40 24-040-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Any other ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 40 24-040-04

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

All right. So Mr. Clerk, if we could pull up SSM.NSC.CAN00000214? While Mr. Clerk is pulling that up, Mr. Ossowski, this is the meeting minutes from the February 12th IRG meeting, which you attended?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 40 24-040-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And Mr. Clerk, it's on page 6, please. And keep going down. Sorry, page 7. So we see here at the bottom that it says: "The prime minister asked for an update on other POEs and what is being done to prevent further disruptions. The minister of public safety and president of CBSA --- " --- that was you --- "--- confirmed that there is real-time reporting in all critical POEs and ongoing engagement with local law enforcement. If an authority or asset gap is identified, departments remain ready to respond. Currently, it remains only three blocked POEs. There was an attempt to block the Pacific Highway, but police successfully thwarted this attempt." So I have a couple of questions about this. What was meant by "if an authority or asset gap is identified, departments remain ready to respond"?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 40 24-040-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, just whatever we had within our authority to sort of deal with the situation and collectively with respect to all of the partner departments. You know, I was just -- I don’t recall seeing this language before, but I would say that I was referring to the fact that we were looking collectively as deputy ministers at the time in terms of any authorities or asset gaps to resolve the situation.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And when you say "Currently, it remains only the three blocked POEs" -- this is on February 12th, so which ports of entry are you referring to here?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It's current in my report here, so I think it would have been the Ambassador Bridge, Emerson ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-17

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And presumably Coutts?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So Emerson, Ambassador Bridge, Coutts.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It's on page 54 of our institutional report, all of the disruptions on February 12th.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right, thank you. And then if we can go to SSM.CAN.00000095? While that’s being brought up, Mr. Ossowski, this is the February 13th IRG meeting minutes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 41 24-041-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Mr. Clerk, we'll just go down to page 5. So the prime minister asked the minister of public safety to outline additional actions that could be taken by federal authorities to deal with and prevent further blockades. Do you recall this?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 42 24-042-05

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And the minister of public safety explained that great progress had been made in clearing and securing the Ambassador Bridge, but that there was no definitive timeline for reopening?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 42 24-042-11

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And but as we established earlier, the Ambassador Bridge was reopened the next day?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 42 24-042-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And he also noted that enforcement actions were occurring in Coutts and Emerson. Do you recall this?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 42 24-042-19

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And lastly, that -- and we'll skip the part about Ottawa -- at the Blue Water Bridge crossing, the CBSA had also doubled its capacity for commercial vehicles, allowing carriers additional corridors for cross- border trade; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 42 24-042-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And that was in response to the Ambassador Bridge blockade?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So that was the update that Minister Mendicino provided. Did you also contribute anything to this meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Generally at these meetings I would have provided any situational updates in terms of what was happening at ports of entry and/or what we might have gathered in terms of potential disruptions that would be happening in the near future.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And when Minister Mendicino gives an update like this, is the information that he's conveying information that you have briefed him up on ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- in the context of your daily touching base?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-16

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, we would have, and/or reports that we would have shared with the minister's office and public safety, as well as other departments.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And what kind of reports were those?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

We provided a number of different reports, situational update reports, called the BLUFF reports, Bottom Line Upfront reports that were very real time in nature.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And the Border Operations Centre Situational reports that we talked about earlier, those as well?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 43 24-043-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So those were sent to both Minister Mendicino's office and public safety?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 44 24-044-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. I'd like to now ask you questions about the invocation of the Emergencies Act, and sorry, the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act. So earlier, we talked about how you and some of the other deputy ministers discussed alternative authorities that could be used; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 44 24-044-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And in one of your deputy minister briefing talking point packages, which I understand are binders prepared for you either for DMOCCs or IRGs; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 44 24-044-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

We don’t need to pull it up, but the reference for the record is SSM.NSC.CAN321. And so that briefing package said that the CBSA considered various avenues of deterrence so the NEXUS trusted trader status of a commercial driver, cancellation of FAST applications, and other options. This is not the first time that those options had been raised; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 44 24-044-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

It was not the first time or ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 44 24-044-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't think it was the first time, no.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 45 24-045-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right, because this was February 13th, and if we go to February 10th, which actually, we will pull this one up. So this is an email from Mike Jones, who is Minister Mendicino's chief of staff; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 45 24-045-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

To Mike Maka from Transport, Samantha Khalil from PMO, and Zita, who is Bill Blair's chief of staff; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 45 24-045-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And she says: "I've received these enforcement options from CBSA which I've asked for more context around. I understand that it is part of a broader effort to provide options to the clerk. I'm tracking down from my side and Z is going to check in with the NSIA." So the clerk here would be the clerk of the Privy Council; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 45 24-045-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And then he goes on to list some of the options that we just talked about, so the Trusted Trader Program, Trusted Traveller Program, NEXUS, and others. Do you know whatever happened to those deterrent options that you put on the table?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 45 24-045-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, I think we ended up dismissing the Trusted Trader Programs because these are administered bilaterally with the United States, and so we just weren’t sure that we could do something very expeditiously here in terms of what's referenced above as the Good Tariff or clause for these purchase events in the program and try and leverage that so that we would -- they would be aware that there was consequences for their participation in the protest. And then as well, the designated international trade corridors, there, I think, I would just point out that ports of entry up until the invocation of the EMA and the regulations was not a critical infrastructure, and certainly the trade corridors, the highways, were not federal, they also are provincial responsibilities. And so the designation of the routes to and from the ports of entry were an important aspect.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 46 24-046-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. Right. So the EMRs designated the ports of entry and the trade corridors as critical infrastructure?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 46 24-046-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And we won't pull it up, pursuant to section 6, made those exclusion zones. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 46 24-046-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So ultimately none of these options ever went anywhere?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 46 24-046-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, except for the trade corridor piece.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 46 24-046-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. Because of the Emergencies Act. I mean prior to the Emergencies Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-02

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And did you play a role in the decision to invoke the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I simply provided advice from the CBSA perspective in terms of managing the corridor.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Can you elaborate on that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, the one thing, we identified a gap in the sense that as we were starting to get to the point of declaring the protest a prohibited protest, that there was no ability for us to stop people from coming in and foreign nationals from coming in and participate in that protest if they were otherwise able to enter. So they met all the other program requirements, the Quarantine Act requirements, whatever else may be involved, but we identified that as a gap.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And when you say "we identified" you mean you reported it to Cabinet?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, through -- first through, obviously, through the deputy minister ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- colleagues and then ultimately to Cabinet, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But you were not asked for your advice on invoking the Emergencies Act ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- or directly for your input?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 47 24-047-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

So you never advised any of the Cabinet members whether they should or should not invoke the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so you just identified this legislative gap to Cabinet. And you've explained that the gap was that there was no authority to turn somebody away in relation to wanting to participate in a lawful protest; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-07

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Correct. I was surprised to know at that time that we couldn't do that, that a foreign national could enter the country for the purpose of participating in a protest.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-12

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And the CBSA was concerned with this legislative gap in allowing foreign nationals to come into the country to participate in a peaceful protest?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-16

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, I think collectively, when you look at the tools that we were discussing, at that point in time we were trying to de-energise the situation, and obviously allowing people to continue to come into the country for the purpose of participating in a protest was inconsistent with that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-20

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And was it your understanding that many U.S. or foreign nationals were coming into the country to participate in the protest?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 48 24-048-26

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, certainly, as part of the enhanced vigilance exam process that we invoked before the Emergencies Act, we turned away people that intended to come and participate in a protest or we suspected were going to participate in a protest, but it was only because they weren't vaccinated or didn't meet up with some other program legislation requirement.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-01

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So they would go to secondary and be turned away because they didn't meet the requirements of the Quarantine Act, for example.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Did the CBSA consider whether they had the authority to turn away foreign nationals on the basis that they wanted to participate in an unlawful protest?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't quite understand the question because, like, it's not a prohibition on entry under the Immigration Refugee Protection Act to come and participate in a protest. So what the EMR added to was to our abilities under both the Customs Act and the Immigration Refugee Protection Act for a new prohibition on entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-16

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But the Immigration Refugee Protection Act would -- it does set out admissibility/inadmissibility ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-22

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And if somebody went to the border and there was reasonable grounds or they were suspected to go -- wanted to be admitted to Canada to engage in unlawful activity, would that be sufficient basis to turn them away?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 49 24-049-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Certainly, if the officer felt that they weren't here for a lawful you could turn them away.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

But -- if someone, you know, showed up at the border today and said "I want to come to Ottawa to protest something" that's not a reason to prohibit their entry if they're otherwise admissible.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So the issue -- the legislative gap was specific to turning foreign nationals away who wanted to participate in a lawful, peaceful protest?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

In an unlawful protest. In a -- what was defined in the Act as a prohibited protest I believe is the language.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-15

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And -- so I guess what I'm getting at is it seems like the Immigration Refugee Protection Act would have already given the CBSA that power at the point in which the protests were deemed to have been unlawful.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not specifically, because it wasn't a specific prohibition on entry into the country.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

What do you mean by that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It -- it's not -- it wasn't part of -- there are tools that were available to officers to exercise. So we don't know where you're going to go once you come in.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 50 24-050-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But if there were reasonable grounds or there was a suspicion that that was there, and destination, then that would be a sufficient basis to turn them away?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe so, but you're assuming that they're going to tell us the truth about where they're going.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-06

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. And I mean, border services officers are trained to assess whether somebody is telling the truth or not?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-09

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So you talked briefly about how a lot of foreign nationals were turned away because they didn't meet the requirements under the Quarantine Act if they weren't vaccinated, for example, and my counsel -- my co-counsel will get into this further, so I'll leave that to him. But I guess my question is whether that was sufficient to attenuate CBSA's concerns that foreign nationals were entering to participate in the protest, the idea that they would most likely be turned away pursuant to the Quarantine Act requirements?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, as I said, yeah, I think it was -- we were fortunate in that we had these other prohibitions on entry at play to prevent people from coming in and participating, but there were people that came in that met all the requirements and could have gone to the protest.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-23

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. Okay, thank you. So I only have about five minutes left before I'm going to turn it over to Mr. Cameron, so I just want to pull up one last document. And that's, Mr. Clerk, COM00000670. So this is the government's section 58 explanation. Are you familiar with this document?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 51 24-051-28

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Did you have any role in drafting it?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think we might have given some factual inputs that were used later on in the document with respect to sort of the situation at the border.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So inputs, but you didn't hold the pen?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-13

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right. So if we go to page 7. Yeah, right there. So just a little bit up, just where it says, "In addition". So it says -- it describes two events where it's -- that occurred, one at the Pacific Highway port of entry, and one in Fort Erie, and it says that at those two locations: "...protesters had breached the confines of the CBSA plaza resulting in CBSA officers..."

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-16

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Could you slow down, please?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-25

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner: "...locking down the office to prevent additional protesters from gaining entry." So the event at Fort Erie happened on the 12th; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 52 24-052-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And according to a situational report, it was 120 vehicles that converged on -- in the area of the Peace Bridge; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And protesters accessed the CBSA plaza, which I understand to mean sort of the parking lot - --

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes, the buildings, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-14

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- on foot. And then it says that police and the CBSA were able to direct the protesters to leave after 20 minutes. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-15

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, the officers, in the case of Fort Erie, locked down the building because they were trying to get access to the building, and I think the building was locked down for 12 hours. And I would just actually make a correction here that at Pacific Highway, there was a vehicle that you may recall there was pictures of in the media that had sort of military camouflage paint that breached a barrier, but I don't believe that they actually locked down the building in the Pacific Highway region.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-18

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Right, and we have evidence from Dwayne McDonald who’s the Commander for the “E” Division of the RCMP and he describes the event, basically, as a -- exactly as you’ve just put it, so that there was sort of a painted vehicle that crossed a threshold but it wasn’t a breach, per se.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 53 24-053-27

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And he also observed that the media reports on that specific event were not accurate; would you agree with that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I couldn’t speculate without reading them, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-08

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Do you have any doubt to -- any reason to doubt his evidence?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-10

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And just for the record, I’ll note that that’s WTS00000069 at page 20, which is the RCMP Panel Witness Summary, and Dwayne McDonald’s evidence is in there. So my last question for you before I turn it over to my colleague is that the Section 58 explanation also talks broadly about the economic impacts of the border blockades, and I understand that CBSA itself did not conduct any analysis on the economic impacts; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s correct. We just simply track the number of conveyances that cross the border and, as well, we do something else called “value-for-duty”, but that’s -- wouldn’t be used for and kind of real economic value impact analysis.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-21

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Did you say “value- for-duty”?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 54 24-054-26

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And who did you provide that data to?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

All of that data is provided as a matter of course to other government departments, Department of Finance, Statistics Canada, other entities that sort of track these types of things.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-03

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

And so they would have, then, undertaken the economic analysis ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-07

Alexandra Heine, Counsel (POEC)

--- based on your data you send them? Okay. Okay, thank you so much, Mr. Ossowski. Those are all of my questions. I’m going to pass it over to Mr. Cameron now.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-10

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. GORDON CAMERON

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Good morning, sir. My name’s Gordon Cameron. I have just a few questions to finish off your examination by Commission counsel this morning. Let me begin, just so that I don’t get it wrong for the whole examination that I did, do you prefer Ossowski or Ossowski?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Ossowski, thank you. And I’ll apologize if I speak in the present tense because I acknowledge you’ve since retired. So if I talk to you as if you’re still in charge of CBSA, just ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-22

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I still feel like I am.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-26

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Yeah, just make the time change on my behalf. But certainly, when you were at CBSA, CBSA had, and you would have had overall responsibility as its president or deputy minister, the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 55 24-055-27

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And am I correct -- I’m just going by website information, so if I get it wrong, please correct me -- that Ted Gallivan, as executive vice president, would have had that under his purview as well?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 56 24-056-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No, at the time, it would have been Vice President Scott Harris that was in charge of the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 56 24-056-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And tell me briefly why CBSA has an Intelligence and Enforcement Branch.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 56 24-056-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So what that branch was responsible for is giving the frontline the situational awareness in terms of targeting, for example -- so we have a targeting centre -- and where we do -- and try to add value to officers on the frontline in terms of things that they need to be aware of. So, for example, if law enforcement partners want lookouts on the system, they’re the ones that would sort of manage that type of thing. If somebody’s of interest coming into the country or leaving the country, all -- they would be the relationship lead with all of the other national security partners on intelligence that would be important in terms of the day-to-day functioning of the border. They’re also responsible for the removals of the people that are found to be inadmissible to Canada after they’ve gone through due process. So it’s a complicated job.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 56 24-056-14

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And it’s a fairly substantial department within CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-01

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Yeah. And they produce what we’ve learned to call “intelligence products” for use by CBSA management and personnel?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, they -- I would say that in term of the national security apparatus, we’re largely a consumer of intelligence, so they would do, as I said, the liaising with other partners domestically and abroad to create products that would be useful to the frontline in terms of how they’re managing the border on a day-to-day basis.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Fair enough. So they would take in information and distill from it the information that’s most likely relevant to ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

--- CBSA’s mandate and then distribute within the organization?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And it seems, just by instinct, that the two concerns here will be using that intelligence and those assessments to protect the security of Canada in terms of people who might be coming into the country and to protect your personnel who have to deal with these situations on the frontline; is that ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 57 24-057-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Now, you produced for the Commission, helpfully, a series of these situational reports and intelligence assessments, if I can use that term, and I’d like to call up the first of these, if I could, Mr. Clerk, SSM.NSC.CAN000000068. I say the “first”; it isn’t the first sequentially, it’s just the first I’m going to refer to. And we can see that is a Situation Report for February 14th at 10:30 in the morning. Is this a type that you’re familiar with, Mr. Ossowski?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 58 24-058-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s correct, yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 58 24-058-10

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And if the clerk can just scroll down the page so that people looking at the screen can see the -- just the type of content in this sort of report. We see a description of each -- of several ports of entry. And keep going, Mr. Clerk. I’m going to ask you ultimately to get through to page 8 but just scrolling through, people can see the type of statistical and observational analysis that this type of report would give to your personnel for the objectives we just described. And when we get through to page 8, there’s a table and then a heading, “Intelligence and Law Enforcement” -- sorry, “Intelligence and Enforcement”, and then underneath that, a heading, “Intelligence Landscape”. And I’m going to make the point of observing the parenthetical comment, “(Updates in red)”, and then the first heading there is “BLUF”. Can you tell us what that acronym is for? Do you remember?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 58 24-058-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Bottom Line Up Front.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 58 24-058-27

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Bottom Line Up Front, so it’s a compact presentation at the top of the assessment that gives the high-level view?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 58 24-058-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, and this was an evergreen document and so it was just so you don’t have to scroll through the entire thing every day. You can get to the - --

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-03

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

To the bottom line.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-07

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. And the words there: "As of February 14th, 2022, at 08:30 ET, the overall threat to CBSA officers and infrastructure is low." And this is February 14th, the convoy and the protests have been going on for more than a couple of weeks. I just wonder if you can confirm for me, because it’s certainly the impression that Commission counsel got, that that had been the BLUF in these reports throughout February, that is exactly as it appears there. Is that your recollection too?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah. I don’t think it ever changed from low. And I would say overall, we’re looking at the entire national picture here, right, as opposed to little things that might be happening at individual ports of entry. But overall, the threat was low throughout the entire period.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Now ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

And if I just may add, what I’m really referring to here is, and it says officers and infrastructure, that is our domain; right? So there’s obviously a duty of care responsibility to the officers to make sure that they’re trained and operating in a safe environment, and as well that the infrastructure itself is properly protected.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 59 24-059-25

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. That’s actually a very helpful addition for the point I’d like to see if we can learn from the next document. And so, Mr. Clerk, if you could pull up, same prefix, but 1519? SSM.NSC.CAN.00001519. And so here we have the Situational Report. And you’ll recall that the last one was for 10:30 in the morning. We are now at 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 60 24-060-03

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And was it typical for these Situational Reports, at least during -- you’ll note that it’s a Situational Report specific to the COVID-19 mandate protest. Was it typical -- and its our impression from your documents that these would be produced twice a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 60 24-060-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s my recollection.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 60 24-060-18

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And again, Mr. Clerk, if you can just scroll through and take us down to page 8? Again, the same type of situational analysis of the various crossings with tables, and statistics, and maps, and what not. Then we get, again, our BLUF, Bottom Line Up Front. And we have the same statement as we saw in the last one, and that as you confirmed, had been in all of the BLUF, Bottom Line encapsulations of intelligence and enforcement at this time, February 14th, 2022, though now later in the day. The overall threat to CBSA officers and infrastructure is low, but there’s now an addition.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 60 24-060-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And the addition to this BLUF is: “There has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada’s economic security and prosperity.” Now, you know why you’re here today, and we’ve all been watching the progress of events in the first couple of months of February, so you’ll appreciate the significance of the date, February 14th; right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 61 24-061-04

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

As the date that the Government invoked the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 61 24-061-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And do you recognize that language, “There has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada’s economic security and prosperity” as language that is lifted from the section 58 justification that Canada used for the invocation of the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 61 24-061-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I’m not aware that it’s exactly the same language, but if you say so.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 61 24-061-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

I’m not going to say it’s the same language, so let me put it this way. It’s the concept that you will have been familiar with, as having been part of the section 58 ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 61 24-061-26

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

--- explanation; correct? Thank you. And so I’m going to circle around to this later, but can you tell me, do you have any knowledge as to why your BLUF report, which throughout all of the protests had been describing the risk to your front-line personnel and the guidance for your management, why it changed from a description of the threat being low to your officers and infrastructure to the addition of this point about “operational impact may result in a threat to Canada’s economic security and prosperity”?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 62 24-062-03

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So I can tell you at the time that I didn’t even pay attention to that new language in the report. And after the fact, and this was brought to my attention, and we looked into it, and what I understand is the Acting Director General of the Border Operations Centre at that point in time decided of their own volition, given all the events that had happened up to that point in time, to put this in. And I’m -- I want to be very clear that I’m satisfied that they did that in no way trying to provide any tacit or implied support for the Emergencies Act. I believe they just did this on their own volition. And that’s what I understand to be true.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 62 24-062-13

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Fair enough. And thank you for that. Let’s look at another sequence of similar threat assessment or situational reports. Mr. Clerk, could you call up SSM.NSC.CAN000000064? Now just have a look at that Mr. Ossowski, and perhaps as the Clerk scrolls down, you’ll be able to just tell us roughly speaking, what -- this is a very similar looking report, although different in some respects. Can you describe what type of report this is?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 62 24-062-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So this would have just been something that sent to a very long email list that shows what has transpired and whatever the current situational status is of the various ports of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 63 24-063-06

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And again, scrolling down just so Mr. Ossowski can see the report as it progresses, but stopping there, please, Mr. Clerk. Again, we have a BLUF, Bottom Line Up Front, description under the same type of heading, “Intelligence Landscape”. And again, for this report, it says that at 8:30 in the morning, on February 14th, and I’ll quote: “…the overall threat to CBSA officers and infrastructure remains low.” And do you see that, Mr. Ossowski?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 63 24-063-10

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And can you agree with me again, so that we don’t have to go through them all, and perhaps subject to check if you do want to, that that had been the report given in all of these reports throughout February?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 63 24-063-21

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And Mr. Clerk, if you could next call up SSM.CAN.00006200? And I think we’ll see that, as you described it earlier, a wide distribution email with similar situational information. And if you could just scroll through it, Mr. Clerk? We’re looking for page 4. Bottom of page 4. Again, tables and statistics about activity at the various border points. And then we get the “Intelligence Landscape” “BLUF”. And I’m sorry, you know what I forgot to do? Was to get the date and time of this. Mr. Clerk, could you go up to the top please? Thanks. So we are now the next day. So this is February 15th. Thank you, Mr. Clerk. I just wanted to make sure we understood this. So this is the next day’s report of the same type. And when we look at the “Intelligence Landscape” Bottom Line Up Front, we see the same word about -- sorry, same words about the threat being low, but now there’s some more words: “…but caution should be exercised in light of recent reporting surrounding IMVE groups.” And do you know why that appeared on February 15th, the day after the invocation of the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 63 24-063-26

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not specifically, no. But I can say in general, when events like this happen, one of the things that, as a national security -- part of the national security apparatus is that you’re always concerned that that might tilt somebody from just being an online sort of person thinking about this type thing, that actually moves to action and does something. And that actually happened later on, after this, on February 17th. I can describe an event where something like that potentially happened.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 64 24-064-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And do you see that before the sentence we were just talking about, IMVE groups, we have a repeat of the observation that the protests at POEs have significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada’s economic security and prosperity. That one that we saw last time in the other report; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 65 24-065-06

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Now your explanation, as I understood it earlier, for the appearance at the end of the day on February 14th in 1 type of report and then in the next day on February 15th in the other type of report for the appearance of these references, in the intelligence landscape description of the threat to CBSA officers and infrastructure, this sudden appearance of references to a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity as being not motivated, in your view, by an effort on the part of the drafters of these reports to repeat the government explanation for invoking the Emergencies Act, you're confident of that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 65 24-065-14

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe that to be true.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 65 24-065-25

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And I think you'll agree that a threat assessment is meant to be a guide to action and policy, not to serve as a vehicle to rationalize it; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 65 24-065-26

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And, in fact, if your personnel get the idea that the content of these threat assessments that they are getting are driven by an attempt to repeat government talking points, it's going to dilute the utility of those assessments to your personnel and to their ability to protect Canadians?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 66 24-066-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't disagree with that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 66 24-066-08

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So it's important that the explanation you gave, that is that it was more or less a coincidence that this language appeared immediately after the invocation of the Emergencies Act, that it was just a coincidence and not an attempt to repeat the government's talking points for the invocation of the Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 66 24-066-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe that to be true, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 66 24-066-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Another point that chronologically, because we're at the end of the process here, chronologically at the invocation of the Act, you mentioned that the only -- you mentioned in answer to questions by my colleague, Ms. Heine, that the only input that CBSA gave to Cabinet when it was considering how provisions in the Emergencies Act could assist CBSA's mandate was to observe that you didn't currently have the authority to prohibit entry on the grounds that people were heading to one of these protests and that that would be useful to you in terms of the objectives that Cabinet appeared to be trying to achieve. Do you remember that evidence?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 66 24-066-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And if we can call up, Mr. Clerk, SSM.NSC.CAN.00000405? This is IRG minutes for February 20th. Do you recall participating in IRG meetings, Mr. Ossowski?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-02

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And, Mr. Clerk, if we scroll down to page 6 at the bottom of the page -- so just slow down a little bit, Mr. Clerk, so we can get the context here. Can you go up just a bit? So this is the IRG reporting on progress and with respect to actions that have taken place consequential on the invocation of the Emergencies Act, and then we have some input from CBSA at the very bottom. And, Mr. Ossowski, did you provide that input to the IRG?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-06

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And did you participate in person or virtually in this meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And for your virtual participation, was this you speaking, or had you submitted a report to this effect?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It was probably me reporting this.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And you would have been briefed in advance, I suppose, for a -- even for the President of CBSA, an appearance at the IRG is a significant event. You'd have had your staff brief you on this input?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes. So February 19th, there wasn't an end in Prescott where 2 people were turned back using the Emergency Management Regulations.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 67 24-067-28

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Sorry, can you just slow down a little bit and repeat that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-03

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So on February 19th, in Prescott, at the Prescott port of entry, 2 individuals, 2 foreign nationals attempting to come into the country for the purpose of participating in the protest, who were otherwise not prohibited from entering, were turned back using the EMR powers, and that's what that refers to.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-05

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. And had you made any other reports to the IRG about similar instances in which the Emergencies Act powers had been used by CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That was the first time I reported on that, I believe.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-14

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And I think it was the last time also?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And so as far as CBSA is aware, the authority in the Emergencies Act that empowered CBSA to deny entry to people was with respect to a couple who were turned away on February 19th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And that's the totality of it?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Those are my only questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 68 24-068-27

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. So I'd like to first call on the Convoy Organizers to ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-01

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BRENDAN MILLER

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Good morning, sir.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-04

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

For the record, Brendan Miller. We've corresponded before on other files, as you might recall. I'm Counsel for Freedom Corp., which is the representatives of the protesters that were in Ottawa in January and February. Nothing to do with the border, sir. So I just wanted to get out some of the information with respect to the information that you gather internationally and that is given to the CBSA, if you don't mind, so if you can turn your mind to that. So Canada, of course, is a part of what they call the Five Eyes. Can you just sort of give an explanation of that for the folks at home?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

The Five Eyes is Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and it's a term that's been used to -- the allied relationship since World War II.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-18

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And in the Five Eyes group and everything, a lot of the information that is gathered by the Five Eyes is provided to the CBSA for security purposes; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-22

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And so -- and, of course, the Five Eyes, the United States, you get information from the agencies in the United States about any sort of threats that may exist both for Canada, but also for the United States, and that's essentially put into the CBSA's information bank and so that you have it with respect to people coming across the border; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 69 24-069-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

If the information is relevant to the border, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-06

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And it's fair to say that throughout the protest and at least based on disclosure, the agencies in the United States such as the FBI, et cetera, they did not provide the CBSA or the Five Eyes any form of information with respect to any threat to Canada; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I wouldn't be aware of that exactly. I think you'd probably better talk to those like Communications Security Establishment and/or CSIS to ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-13

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-16

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. But nothing to -- was brought to your attention as the President of the CBSA with respect to any sort of threat to Canada coming from the United States during the protest; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-18

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And so of course you never relayed such information to Cabinet or to any of the political executive because you weren't given any?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-23

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe that to be true, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-26

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And just to be clear, and I think my friend has made this clear, at no time did you advise Cabinet or provide information to Cabinet that there existed a Section 2 CSIS Act threat under the CSIS Act; is that fair?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 70 24-070-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It wouldn't have been my purview to refer to a CSIS Act threat.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-05

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And so is it within -- and we keep hearing that. We haven't had CSIS testify yet. All of the law enforcement agencies that have testified to date have said that that purview was solely up to CSIS. Is that your understanding of how it works?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-07

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. So and if CSIS is the only agency providing that information and CSIS says there's no Section 2 Security Act threat, is it fair to say that Cabinet would have been never advised of any Section 2 CSIS Act threat?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-13

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

You'd have to talk to the Director of CSIS about that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-17

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

When you were present, when you were dealing with the IRG, is it fair to say that no law enforcement agency, no intelligence agency within Canada advised the government that there was a Section 2 CSIS Act threat?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Again, you'd have to talk to the Director of CSIS about that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-23

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right. And during your dealings with the political executive, essentially, they have been stating in public that law enforcement agencies advised them that the threshold for invoking the Act was met, all right? What law enforcement agency advised them of that, to your knowledge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 71 24-071-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I’m not aware of who may have provided that advice.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-03

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Right, and neither are we. Thank you.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-05

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay, next I’d like to call on the City of Windsor.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-07

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JENNIFER KING

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Good morning, Mr. Ossowski. Am I pronouncing your name correctly?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-10

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. My name if Jennifer King. I’m legal counsel to the City of Windsor. The Ambassador Bridge proper and the structures housing the CBSA around the bridge are privately owned by the Canadian subsidiary of the Detroit International Bridge Company; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-13

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And the Canadian subsidiary is the Canadian Transit Company; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-19

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Does the Canadian Transit Company own the land around the bridge infrastructure and the structures housing the CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-22

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe so, and it’s provided to us under Section 6 of the Customs Act ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- for us to use that facility.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 72 24-072-28

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Are there any other international border crossings managed by the CBSA that are owned and operated by a private corporation?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Several. Yes, there’s several, what we call, Section 6 operators that provide us the facilities in order for them to provide that availability for travellers and commercial vehicles to cross. So the Peace Bridge, for example, is another example of that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-05

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. I take it, Mr. Ossowski, that you are familiar with Windsor and the location of the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-10

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

The Ambassador Bridge sits at one end of a municipal roadway, Huron Church Road; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-14

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And that road about three kilometres or so from the provincial highway?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-17

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

So truck drivers have to contend, Mayor Dilkens testified, six or seven local intersections with traffic as they move along Huron Church Road to and from the bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-20

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Is this unique, in particular, with respect to points of entry geared towards commercial conveyances?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I wouldn’t say it’s unique but I would say that there’s -- every port of entry is different in terms of the infrastructure leading to and from them, but that is a different situation, for sure.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 73 24-073-28

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And the road is surrounded by residential areas on both sides, educational institutions, and businesses?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-04

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

The University of Windsor is right beside the bridge and the CBSA facilities; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-08

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And you’ll agree that Huron Church bisects the city, so serving as an assess point between the east and west sides of Windsor?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-11

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And are you aware that the route under the bridge along Huron Church is an important route connecting West Windsor to downtown?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-15

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I’m familiar with that particular route.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-18

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. So the thousands of trucks that cross the border every day share Huron Church Road with local Windsor residents?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-20

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Mayor Dilkens of Windsor testified last week in response to a question from Commission counsel who asked whether or not there was any discussion about trying to prevent the blockade, and Mayor Dilkens testified that because of the distance between the Ambassador Bridge and the highway, and the number of businesses, homes, hotels, and schools that require direct access to Huron Church Road, he said that it would be, for all intents and purposes, practically impossible to guarantee with any certainty that you could provide a route for trucks without having huge disruption to the community. Would you agree with Mayor Dilkens?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 74 24-074-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I agree. And in fact, there was a fair bit of activity after the bridge reopened to put Jersey barriers up there to make sure that other protests didn’t manifest along those intersections.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-07

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. Well, if I can just ask -- I wanted to ask you few questions about that. If Mr. Clerk could please pull up SSM.NSC.CAN00000340_REL.0001. Mr. Ossowski, I’m not sure if we’ve discussed this document yet today. I’m not sure if I missed that. Have you been asked any questions about this document yet this morning?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don’t believe so.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-17

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. Can you tell us what this is?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So this is briefing material that would have been prepared for me to participate in a meeting. I’m not sure which one.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-20

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. So these are the February 16th date. It would have been around February 16th and certainly after the invocation of the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-23

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. If you could just go to the last bullet on the first page, please. And you’ll see here that the last bullet discusses -- or states that: "Since the reopening of the bridge, we have not seen any service disruptions or border wait time, which is good news. Law enforcement partners are maintaining a strong presence in the area with police erecting concrete barriers along the length of Huron Church between the Ambassador Bridge and EC Row." (As read). And so that was what you were referring to?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 75 24-075-27

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

All right. If you could please scroll to page 3, Mr. Clerk, and the heading “Temporary POE and Trade Corridor Hardening”. The second bullet, you’ll see that the CBSA: "…identified 22 high-risk POEs that, if impeded, would continue to exacerbate the fragile international trade chain." And the Ambassador Bridge was one of those 22 high-risk POEs?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 76 24-076-13

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Now, the CBSA collaborated with police agencies of jurisdiction and provincial and municipal officials to ensure the integrity of these essential transportation routes; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 76 24-076-23

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely, although ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 76 24-076-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- our responsibilities are just the port of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-01

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Just the port of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-03

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

So in Windsor, the police of jurisdiction would be the Windsor Police?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-05

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And the municipal official obviously would be the City of Windsor?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-08

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Are you aware that this temporary hardening had a significant impact on the community around the bridge and Huron Church Road?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-11

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. I have a few questions about -- just to clarify the impact of border blockades on other border crossings. Mr. Clerk, you can take down that document. So the CBSA Ambassador Bridge Operations is also responsible for the Windsor Truck Ferry; right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-15

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I’m not aware of a ferry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-22

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. Well, then, perhaps I won’t ask you any questions about it. I’ll note that the CBSA produced an Ambassador Bridge profile. I won’t bring in up if you’re not familiar with it but the profile, for the record, is at PB.NSC.CAN00009539_REL. And that profile, Mr. Ossowski, states that the CBSA Ambassador Bridge Operations is responsible for the Windsor Truck Ferry, and I wanted to ask you whether or not there was any impact on the truck ferry operations.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 77 24-077-23

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, unfortunately, I’m not even aware -- I wasn’t aware that there was a ferry aspect to the Windsor-Detroit bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-03

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. You spoke this morning about the impact of the Ambassador Bridge blockade and the Blue Water Bridge and some of the other bridges. Did the slow rolls and blockades of other border crossings like Blue Water impact traffic at the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely. So I -- I mean I think it’s -- I can’t overstate sort of how tied together these -- all these events are, and that when one slows down, people -- we would send out a border alert or people would go to our app to see where the border wait times are the shortest and they would reroute themselves. And so if there was a disruption or a planned disruption, then we would try and reallocate officers and/or provide situational awareness to our American counterparts to make sure that we could manage whatever flows might materialize. So it was a very dynamic time for us.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-11

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

I understand this morning you stated that the Blue Water Bridge -- the blockade of the Blue Water Bridge started around -- was it the 6th of February?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe so. I’d have to go check my notes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-24

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And at that time, were there slow rolls also at the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 78 24-078-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Again, I’d have to go back and look at the reports, but yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-02

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. But certainly, slow rolls and blockades of any of the bridges in Southern Ontario will impact the use of the neighbouring bridges?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-04

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. I have a few questions just to clarify the CBSA’s authorities at and near ports of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-08

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

This morning, you testified that the CBSA has limited authority to arrest within the port of entry. You’re Institutional Report confirms that the CBSA does have arrest authorities when conducting their duties at a port of authority.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah, so we have limited -- our authorities are limited, generally, the arrest authorities under the Criminal Code for what happens to -- under the Customs Act, sorry, and the Immigration Refugee Protection Act. So an example might be if we would detain somebody that is suspected of drinking and driving or drinking under the influence, then we would call local law enforcement and then they would proceed with whatever criminal charges of that. So we’re circumscribed through the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protections Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-17

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

CBSA officers, do they have the authority to arrest under the Criminal Code?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 79 24-079-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Only with -- I’d have to defer to the lawyers, but I believe that it’s only with respect to the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protections Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-01

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. So they don’t have the authority to enforce, for example, a breach of a court order under the Criminal Code?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-05

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not that I’m aware of, unless they were under -- you know, they were listed as, you know, an open warrant for their arrest, for example.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-08

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

So if we could look at SSM.NSC.CAN0000340_Rel.0001? This is back to your briefing material. And if you could go to page 5, please? This seems to be an attachment to your speaking notes, Mr. Ossowski, entitled “Emergencies Act - CBSA Actions”. Are you -- do you recognize this document?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

No, but looks like it was one ours, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-18

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. If you can just go to page 6 in the second last bullet please, Mr. Clerk? And you’ll see here, it states: “CBSA officers are not designated to enforce the criminal arrest provisions of the Emergencies Act and cannot directly engage in enforcement operations at prohibited public assemblies.” Do you see that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 80 24-080-20

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And that’s your understanding?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes, because CBSA officers are not peace officers, so they wouldn’t be able to enforce those provisions under the Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-04

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And then the last sentence states that: “…CBSA officers are advised to immediately contact their Regional Intelligence Officer who may share information the appropriate law enforcement agency in accordance with disclosure requirements.” And I missed the first part of that sentence, but it’s in circumstances where an officer encounters an offence under the EA regulations?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-07

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. So if a prohibited public assembly happened even within the port of entry, you would still rely on the police of jurisdiction to enforce?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

We’ve always worked with the police of jurisdiction for matters that we don’t have the authorities to deal with ourselves.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-21

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And certainly outside of the port of authority in Windsor, you relied on Windsor Police Services to address the blockade because that blockade happened at a municipal intersection; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s correct. Yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 81 24-081-28

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

You embedded CBSA’s District Director in charge of Windsor, Mr. Joe McMahon, in command -- at the Command Centre that WPS set up near the Ambassador Bridge; right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-01

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Were you aware that the Command Centre was located in the City’s Emergency Operation Centre?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I wasn’t aware of the exact location, no.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-09

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. Was it your understanding that there was some disagreement between the Province of Ontario and the Federal Government over which level of government had the jurisdiction and authority to respond to the blockade at the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not in any great detail. I was aware of the extent of our authorities, which are, you know, limited to the port of entry itself.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-16

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. If we could bring up SSM.CAN00000374_Rel.0001? This is an email that Nathalie Drouin sent to you on February the 10th. Who is Nathalie Drouin?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-19

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

She’s the Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-23

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. If you could scroll all the way to the end of the email chain, Mr. Clerk? And you’ll see here the email from Nathalie Drouin to yourself and some others.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 82 24-082-25

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And so she’s asking whether or not we can: “…declare the region of the Ambassador bridge a trade corridor and then get jurisdiction?” Do you see that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-02

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

So if you can scroll up, Mr. Clerk? We’ll see that, Mr. Ossowski, you sent this question to Michael Keenan of Transport Canada?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-09

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

And if you continue to scroll up, we’ll see his answer. Do you recognize this email?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-14

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Yes. And I won’t go through the entire response, but I will -- but this email references that the Ontario Minister of Transportation was continuing to suggest that the Federal Government had full authority to manage international crossings. And Mr. Keenan responds that: “…this purposefully confuses authorities between governments.” Do you recall that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I’m reading it as you’re telling me this. Yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-26

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And Mr. Keenan refers to the federal authorities under the Customs Act and the International Bridges and Tunnels Act, but concludes that these Acts don’t: “….directly bring any authorities to bear on the blockade…” Right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 83 24-083-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That’s what it appears to be, yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-07

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And do you agree with Michael Keenan’s email?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-09

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

All right. Thank you, Mr. Clerk. Mr. Ossowski, you understand that Windsor and other municipalities were challenged in terms of their capacity to respond to these protests, in terms of the availability of local policing and other resources, such as in Windsor’s case, jersey barriers?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-12

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Would you agree that bolstering local capacity and resources is necessary to mitigate the risk of major impacts on the operation of the federal border crossings in the future?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think that would apply to many ports of entry that saw disruptions like this, based on their unique geography and/or access routes to and from the ports of entry, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-24

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Thank you. Would you agree that the blockades revealed a mismatch between jurisdictional authorities and responsibilities?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 84 24-084-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think we saw that across the entire country, and I think that, you know, from my perspective of trying to run the border in a nationally consistent manner, and seeing the variations in response across the country, either how law enforcement chose to respond to it, or what the particular infrastructure was, was problematic for us.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 85 24-085-03

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. Mr. Commissioner, I know I’m at the end of my time. I just have a couple more questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 85 24-085-10

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

You’re actually over your time, but please wrap up as quickly as possible.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 85 24-085-13

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Thank you. Mr. Ossowski, Mayor Dilkens of Windsor, we’ve heard that he wrote to the Ontario and Federal Governments in March earlier this year and he stated that following the blockades, the need for broader collaboration and support, and I think in this case he meant of local authorities, from Provincial and Federal Governments to bolster the safety and security of our borders appears obvious. Do you agree with Mayor Dilkens?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 85 24-085-15

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And given the particular jurisdictional issues surrounding international bridges, like those in Windsor, and the evidence that you’ve already given, would you agree that a specific plan should be developed by all three levels of government for international border crossings?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 85 24-085-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

If I were to be so bold as to offer a potential recommendation of the Commission is, is that I think that that is something that should be done, and as well, in terms of how police of jurisdiction choose to respond to something like this should be exercised regularly so that this type of thing doesn’t, you know, take root and be so hard to disentangle, as was the case in January and February.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-03

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Okay. And my final question, Mr. Ossowski, and thank you, Mr. Commissioner, for this indulgence, would you agree then that coordination across all three levels of government, including the coordination of responsibilities and responsibility for costs should be part of that plan?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well I can’t speak to costs, but I can certainly speak to coordination of responsibilities would make it a lot easier, I think, for all parties to manage these situations in the future.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-16

Jennifer L. King, Counsel (Win)

Thank you. Those are my questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-20

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. And next I’d like to call on the Government of Alberta.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-22

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. STEPHANIE BOWES

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Good morning. For the record, my name is Stephanie Bowes. I’m counsel for the Government of Alberta. I’ll ask the Clerk to please pull up the Institutional Report, DOJ.IR, and I believe it’s 00000006. And when that report is up, I’ll ask to scroll down to page 35. I just want to ask some questions about the accommodations made during the Coutts border closure at different ports of entry in Alberta. And I’m not going to run through this chart, other than to note that there are days during the course of the blockade where traffic was -- commercial traffic was travelling through the Coutts Port of Entry, but there were also days when there were no traffic. In particular, January 31st to February 2nd. Do you understand that that was at a time when Highway 4 was completely blockaded?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 86 24-086-25

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And then we see that again on February 9th for reasons of a blockade?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 87 24-087-14

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And then on February 13th and 14th, that was due to the RCMP request for the closure of the Coutts port of entry; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 87 24-087-17

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

The suspension, thank you. And then if we go to page 36 in the institutional report, we can see the charts for the Del Bonita and Caraway [sic] ports of entry, and those charts will track some of the changes in traffic through those ports. And there were accommodations made to try to accommodate some of that commercial traffic that would normally travel through Coutts to these two ports of entry; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 87 24-087-21

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

For example, Del Bonita, which was normally closed on Saturdays and Sundays, was opened on February 12th and 13th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-02

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And hours were extended at both Del Bonita and Caraway [sic].

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-06

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Carway? Thank you. I also understand that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Services permitted boxed meat to go through other ports of entry and then reroute to Sweetgrass, Montana for USDA inspection; is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-09

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe that to be true, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-14

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And Sweetgrass, Montana is basically on the other -- on the Montana side of the Coutts port of entry; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-16

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And the USCBP also agreed to facilitate the clearance of livestock at any port into the United States with the carrier then diverting to a location that had USDA and veterinary services?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-20

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And the CBSA allowed livestock shipments coming into Canada to be inspected at Sweetgrass and then divert to another port of entry while services were suspended at Coutts; is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 88 24-088-25

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Now, did the Coutts port of entry experience any other protest or blockade disruptions after February 15th?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 89 24-089-02

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think there was some reference in my materials, and if I may, I would just refer to my -- the end of my institutional report that shows the day-to-day. So I think on February 21st, I reported in the institutional report on page 58: "The RCMP was monitoring assembly of protesters at Milk River." (As read) So yeah, I recall these more sort of skirmishes that were happening after the arrests were made when essentially the blockade came down, but there was still activity happening.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 89 24-089-05

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Activity, but did it affect services at the Coutts port of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 89 24-089-15

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Okay. And you were asked a question by Commission Counsel about a reference attributed to you, wherein you referred to the Emergencies Act, and I believe your response was that you think you were referring to provincial powers under emergency legislation to compel somebody to render services, for example, towing services. Is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 89 24-089-18

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

You're referring to the report from the FPT meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 89 24-089-25

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And you were specifically thinking about Alberta and powers that it may have under its legislation?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think I was just making a general reference to what provincial powers could be used to compel tow trucks.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

And I found out after the fac that Alberta, I think, has that power under its emergency powers.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-08

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Right. And I just want to clarify one thing because Commission Counsel put to you that it was under the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act. You said no, you believed it was under emergency legislation; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That's what I believe to be true, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-15

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

And if I told you that the legislation you're referring to is the Emergency Management Act, would that accord with your memory of what you were likely referring to?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-17

Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)

Okay. Thank you, those are all my questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-22

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay, thank you. Next, calling on the Ontario Provincial Police.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-24

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Good morning, Commissioner. Can you hear me?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 90 24-090-26

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Unfortunately, it appears my video is not working. I do have it on. My apologies. If you'll allow it, I'd like to proceed. I only have a few brief questions for Mr. Ossowski.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-01

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Yeah, go ahead.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-05

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. Thank you very much.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-06

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JINAN KUBURSI

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Mr. Ossowski, good morning. My name's Jinan Kubursi, and I'm counsel for the Ontario Provincial Police, and I have just a few brief questions for you on the topic of intelligence and information-sharing among agencies. So I understand from the witness summary you were also interviewed with your colleague, Mr. Harris, who was the Vice-President of Intelligence and Enforcement at the CBSA during the convoy. Is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-08

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Scott Harris, I should say his full name.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-18

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

And so I expect that you rely on Mr. Harris to report up to you with respect to intelligence; is that fair to say?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Anything relevant, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-24

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Right. And -- so of course, I appreciate that you may not be aware of the details with respect to processes and sources of information within the Intelligence and Enforcement Branch of the CBSA, but I'd like to ask, were you aware that the OPP Intelligence Bureau was in fact actively sharing Freedom Convoy related intelligence throughout the period of the convoy in January and February of 2022?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 91 24-091-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I would say I generally remember that happening, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 92 24-092-04

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. So given that you generally remember that happening... If we could just, Clerk, perhaps pull up the witness summary. It's WTS46. We were referring to it earlier in your evidence today. Now, if we go to page 3, I'd just like to look at that second paragraph. And if we go a little bit into the second paragraph, it says: "To Mr. Harris' knowledge, the CBSA did not provide or receive unique intelligence disclosures from or to law enforcement partners prior to the arrival of the convoy in Ottawa..." Mr. Ossowski, from what you just said, it seems to me that you did have a general awareness that the OPP was providing some intelligence information to the CBSA, or you have become aware of that at some point.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 92 24-092-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, I think that, as Mr. Harris states in the notes here, like maybe we wouldn't have -- I was aware that OPP was producing intelligence from other tables that I was sitting at, but generally, in a situation like this, what we would be getting from law enforcement partners was situational awareness so that we could actually figure out how we were going to make any adjustments at the border in terms of the management of the border. So I wasn't aware, and if Mr. Harris said that we didn't receive any direct intelligence from the OPP, then I believe that to be true.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 92 24-092-25

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. And you know, it's not that I'm questioning Mr. Harris' knowledge as set out in this witness summary, but just from the perspective of the OPP, just want to ensure that the record is accurate with respect to information-sharing in the Intelligence realm. And so for that reason, I'd like us to please pull up, Clerk, OPP4577 if you could. And Mr. Ossowski, this is a distribution list from the OPP's Intelligence Bureau that we'll take a look at together here. And also, for the record, this distribution list is referred to at the OPP's institutional report at page 23. But Mr. Ossowski, we can see here that... If we just scroll up to the top. This says Original Partner Agencies. It's dated 22nd of February 2020. And if we just scroll down to page 3. And I appreciate, Mr. Ossowski, I expect you have not laid eyes on this document before.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 93 24-093-07

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Is that correct? Yes. Okay. But if we take a look at page 3, and scroll down. This is a bit of a challenge, but there. We can see at the bottom there, there's Melanie Rose at CBSA. Can you confirm that you see that entry ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 93 24-093-25

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

--- with that CBSA email address.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-03

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Do you know who Melanie Rose is?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-06

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

No? And if we scroll down a little further to page 5, we'll go about halfway down, again, just seeing -- again, we see a CBSA address. Clerk, I think you can continue. On that page, we will see some additional CBSA addresses. Joshua Newby, for example. Mr. Ossowski, so you confirm that you can see that this distribution list includes some CBSA staff?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-09

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

And are you familiar with Joshua Newby, just to assist us in understanding his role within the organization?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-20

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

You're now out of time, so I'm -- you're going to have to wrap up.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-25

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. One last quick point. Thank you very much, Commissioner. Clerk, if you could pull up PB.CAN.00001535, please? I'd like to take a look at that document. Okay. If you could perhaps reduce it? I believe towards the middle of the document there should be an indication of the role of Josh Newby in this mandate protest incident command structure. Mr. Ossowski, do you see that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 94 24-094-27

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. And so according to this chart, it appears that Josh Newby was executive director in dealing with the mandate protest. Is that what we see here?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

That's what it appears to be.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-11

Jinan Kubursi, Counsel (ON-OPP)

Okay. Okay. Well, thank you very much. Those are all my questions. Thank you, Commissioner, for that additional time. Thank you. Those are all my questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-12

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Next is Democracy Fund, JCCF.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-16

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HATIM KHEIR

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Good morning. I'm Hatim Kheir, Counsel for the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms. The first topic I wanted to ask you about is the power for border agents to turn people away if they are coming to participate in a protest under the Emergencies Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-19

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

So you testified that that was one of the powers that was granted to border agents by the Emergency Regulations?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 95 24-095-25

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

And you were also asked about the ability of border agents to turn away people who are coming for a known unlawful purpose and they could do that if they knew about that; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Before or after the ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-05

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Sorry, before the Emergency Measures were ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, it wasn't an unlawful protest at that point in time, before the Emergencies Act; right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-08

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right, but you were asked if you knew someone was -- if your agents, sorry, were -- knew that an individual was coming to enter the country in order to engage in unlawful activity, your agents could turn that person away; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

If it was not for a lawful purpose, yes, they can turn somebody around.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-16

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. And you indicated that one of the problems with that is that your agents would actually have to know that a person is coming for that purpose, which could be difficult; right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-18

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

And under the Emergency Regulations, your agents could turn someone away if they were known to be coming to engage in a certain kind of prohibited public gathering that might breach the peace through ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-23

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. So but your agents would then face the same problem in terms of having to identify a person's intentions; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 96 24-096-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, a standard question for a foreign national is what's the purpose of your visit to the country; right? And so that would just lead you down a line of questioning that the officer then would decide whether or not the person was prohibited from entering or not.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-03

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. And the same thing would happen if a person's purpose for coming was an unlawful reason; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-08

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Okay. Thank you. And the other topic I wanted to ask you, so you described how the CBSA was able to help facilitate obtaining tow trucks by waiving the requirement for a work permit to enter the country; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

A little bit broader than that, but essentially, yeah. So basically, with the agreement with the United States for emergency vehicles where we got many communities that share access to these vehicles to help each other out is we would facilitate the entry of those vehicles to participate in whatever the event was, notwithstanding the fact that they didn't have a work permit.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-16

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Okay. So under the normal circumstances, there's some sort of a regulation, I assume, that requires them to have a work permit?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-23

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, you have to have a -- one of the requirements for entry would be a valid work permit.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 97 24-097-26

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. So and just trying to understand how that actual process worked, would it fall under the discretion that border agents have when they're enforcing these laws to just not ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-01

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe it's just a ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-05

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

--- apply that ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-06

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- memorandum of understanding that we have with our American counterparts, to facilitate emergency vehicles for the purpose of participating in resolving whatever the issue is.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-07

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. But would I be correct in thinking that that would operate as an exercise of the border agent's discretion to simply not apply what would normally be the requirement for entry into the country?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, I don't know that the individual officer would do that. I think that would probably take -- it would go a little bit further up the command chain in terms of saying, yes, this is where we're going to invoke this memorandum, for lack of better words, to facilitate the entry of the emergency vehicles.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-15

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Okay. But what I'm trying to get at is the operation of law that's happening here. It's a decision not to apply a law that normally exists ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-21

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

--- right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

So, yes, officers had discretion.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-26

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Right. Okay. Now we heard yesterday from Deputy Commissioner Curtis Zablocki that one of the things that the RCMP tried to do in Coutts was to obtain tow trucks from the United States but some of them couldn't actually come and help because they were unvaccinated. Did the CBSA waive any of the vaccine requirements for tow truck drivers to come and help?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 98 24-098-28

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I'm not aware of that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-07

Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)

Okay. Those are all my questions. Thank you for answering them.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-08

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Thank you. I don't know if we should take the break now and -- because there's not much time left for this witness, but I'm in your hands.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-10

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Mr. Commissioner, if it's all the same to you, I would probably benefit from the break to just tighten up my examination a little bit, but I could also go, if that's your preference.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-13

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Well, if you're okay, we'll take the break now and ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-17

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

--- come back in 15 minutes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Okay. Perfect. Thank you.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-22

The Registrar (POEC)

The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes. La commission est levée pour 15 minutes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-23

Upon recessing at 11:36 a.m.

Upon resuming at 11:55 a.m.

The Registrar (POEC)

Order. A l’ordre. The Commission has reconvened. La Commission reprend.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 99 24-099-27

MR. JOHN OSSOWSKI, Resumed

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA GONSALVES

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Thank you, Commissioner. For the record, I am Andrea Gonsalves, counsel for the Government of Canada. Mr. Ossowski, you mentioned in your testimony that the impacts of the blockades in the protest activity were coast to coast and the situation was escalating and unpredictable. Do you recall that evidence?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-03

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And you testified that there were official service disruptions at three ports of entry, Emerson, Ambassador Bridge, and Pacific Highway?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-11

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Correct, where we actually put out a border alert ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-14

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

--- I think was the context of that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-17

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And at the Pacific Highway, it was in fact, two times there were border alerts issued, right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-19

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And the second one was after the Government of Canada had invoked the Emergencies Act on February 19th, right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-23

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And there was then the service suspension at the Coutts port of entry. But is it accurate to say that the impacts were experienced beyond just these service disruptions and the service suspension and at other ports of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 100 24-100-27

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely. And in fact, if you look at the institutional report, I believe 22 different ports of entry had varying degrees of disruption throughout the protests.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 101 24-101-04

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

You mentioned in your evidence in response to Commission counsel's questions the delays, the added travel distances and times of having to divert to other ports of entry, that this created problems in particular for just in time supply chain, manufacturers, as well as for perishables or livestock.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 101 24-101-08

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

We have heard some evidence that at some ports of entry, there were alternate roads, in some cases, gravel roads. Were those a viable option for commercial traffic looking to cross the border?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 101 24-101-15

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Not always, because there we're load limits, so an example that pops to mind is at Coutts, there was a side road that the BSOs were able to use to drive to and from the port of entry while it was functioning, but that would not have been appropriate for a large commercial vehicle to go on.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 101 24-101-19

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Let's go to SSM.MSC.CAN00000050. This is the CBSA sitrep as of February 12th, so that’s the Saturday of the third weekend, 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time. And if we just scroll down, we see reports of activity at Cornwall. Mr. Ossowski, I understand that the port of entry at Cornwall is particularly complex jurisdictionally; is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 101 24-101-25

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

It is. Its placement is not at the first point in landing in Canada which makes it very inconvenient for the members of the Mohawk Akwesasne Band that live on the island.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-06

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And so the members of that First Nation live on an island that is between the Canadian side where the port of entry is located, and the US side; is that accurate?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-10

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yeah. So the actual international boundary is to the south of the island, but port of the entry is on the mainland to the north of the island.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-14

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And for members of that First Nation, then, if they want to access any services on the mainland on the Canadian side, they have to pass through the port of entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-17

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And so a disruption to that port of entry would be particularly problematic for that community.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-22

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. And then also on February 12th there are incidents being reported at Lansdowne, which I understand is in the Thousand Islands area?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 102 24-102-26

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Ambassador Bridge, Peace Bridge -- let’s scroll down -- Sarnia, Blue Water, Emerson, Coutts, Pacific Highway. And then there’s a table there of upcoming protest events that are ongoing, confirmed, and unconfirmed.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-02

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Mr. Ossowski, does that help illustrate the coast-to-coast dynamic that you testified about earlier?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-08

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And did the protests and slow rolls and blockades near ports of entry stop on or before February 14th, or did they continue after?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Several disruptive activities continued well after the invocation of the Act.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-15

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And we can look to the details of that in the chronology in the CBSA Institutional Report?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-17

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

You mentioned port hardening measures that were imposed at the time. Are those still in effect?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I believe the cameras stayed up, yes, that I referred to earlier, the CCTV cameras.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-24

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Now, in response to some questions earlier, I understood you agreed with the statement that prior to the invocation of the Emergencies Act and the EMRs, CBSA could use the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to stop a foreign national from entering Canada to join an unlawful protest. Do you recall those exchanges?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 103 24-103-26

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And I just want to be clear; my understanding is that under the IRPA, there must be an assessment made that an individual poses a danger to Canada, or will engage in violent crime when they cross over into Canada. Am I correct on that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-05

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And where that assessment is made, it’s not the situation that the CBSA would prohibit entry, but rather it would look to detain the individual?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-11

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And then there are two options from there: Either to transfer the individual to the police of jurisdiction to handle concerns about future crime; that’s one option.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-15

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Or CBSA could prepare an Inadmissibility Report on security grounds under IRPA and then that would trigger the inadmissibility process before the Immigration Board; that would be the other option?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-20

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And both of those entail delay and expenditure of resources that is significant?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-25

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

So it’s not a situation of being analogous to the EMR provisions that create a direct back power where the individual could simply be denied entry.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 104 24-104-28

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. You testified that CBSA collected information from open sources, including social media in relation to the convoy protest.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-04

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And based on the information that was available to you, did you understand that there were connections between the Ottawa protests and the border blockades?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-08

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I think events like this, they feed off each other’s energy and their successes and defeats, so I think even -- it might not have been direct but certainly through social media channels, I would say that there was an implicit link between what was happening all across the country with all of the different activities.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-12

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

So let’s go to PB.CAN.00001317. (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-18

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And this is an email from Lynne Lamarche, who’s with the CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-21

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And if we scroll down, she discusses reports this morning from information received by BIS operations. What’s BIS?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Border Information Service.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-27

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. And pasted there is information received from the public by email, and we see where it’s shaded in the first bullet: “In Alberta, those who cannot go to Ottawa are being encouraged to block the Coutts border and not move until the demands in Ottawa are met.” And so is that the sort of information that you’re discussing when you said about energies feeding each other?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 105 24-105-28

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And let’s go to PB.CAN.00001523. (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 106 24-106-11

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

This is a CBSA Prairie Region Intelligence Alert, and if we scroll down they’re reporting on some information about a group that intends to stay at the Coutts border, and if we look to right there they’re talking about -- there’s the poster, and it says: “Trucks [and] vehicles all over Alberta [are] planning to head for Coutts, [Alberta] starting Jan 29 and [are] staying there until all mandates and restrictions are lifted.” And did you have any understanding about whether that -- well, in fact, on the left it says: “Sources indicate that the group intends to stay at the border as long as the larger convoy stays in Ottawa.” And did you have any understanding of whether those objectives were similar to the objectives of at least some of the Ottawa protesters?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 106 24-106-14

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Yes. And they’re obviously inspiring each other in that same way.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 107 24-107-04

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Your Institutional Report speaks to threats to safety and security, both to CBSA officers, as well as information received by CBSA. I just want to highlight a couple of those, including examples that are referenced. If we go to PB.CAN.00001541? (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 107 24-107-06

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

This comes from the CBSA Border Operations Centre on Sunday, February the 13th, although I think we’re in a situation there where we subtract the five hours, so it’s the evening of February 12th. And this email, Mr. Ossowski, indicates that: “...the BOC was notified that two emails from [the] same client containing threats to the CBSA as well as to the Prime Minister of Canada were received through the CBSA Contact Us webform.” Am I understanding that’s a online form where individuals can submit?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 107 24-107-12

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. The first email, which was on February 7th, says: “We would like to come to Ottawa to support the protest and if you want a war on your people we are prepared to die to stop you. No Border of yours will hold us back! Liberty or Death. You Choose!” I take it this is being reported by the BOC because that’s a matter of concern for CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 107 24-107-26

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And the second one, which is sent on February 12th, says: “In the event there is no solution and the Canadian Government continues it’s [sic] destructive path we are prepping to come to Canada to support THE PEOPLE’S FIGHT AGAINST CANADIAN GOVERNMENT TYRANNY! We will donate a Gallows to The People of Canada to Assemble for Justin's hanging.” Again, that was a matter of concern for the CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 108 24-108-09

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Let’s go to SSM.NSC.CAN00000351. (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 108 24-108-21

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And this is a CBSA Sit Rep February 17th, 1600 hours. So this is a few days post- invocation. And let’s go down to page 4, please. Under that chart. Pausing there. “[February 16th], Border Information Services...is reporting increased activity related to the COVID Mandate protests; email containing conspiracy theories., threats [...] against the CBSA and Law Enforcement agencies from the same phone number and an increase in calls relating to the importation of items such as body armour, ammunition, firearms, and gas masks." And was that report a matter of concern for the CBSA?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 108 24-108-24

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Absolutely, and we referred to that in the institutional report as well, where people were asking for information particularly on amour piercing and Teflon-coated bullets and what it would take to import those into Canada.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 109 24-109-13

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

That's not something you see very often at CBSA I assume?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 109 24-109-18

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And let's go to OPP00000938. Mr. Ossowski, what is a controlled delivery?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 109 24-109-21

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Controlled delivery is when we pick up something at the border, usually in courier or postal mode, that is prohibited and we'll work with the local police of jurisdiction to deliver the goods in order to ascertain the extent of if it's an organized crime ring, or whatever, to sort of instead of just holding back the good, to actually see what - - if there's any further criminal activity that needs to be investigated.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 109 24-109-24

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. So if we go down to page 3, this is an OPP document. And it advises that, "At 4 am on the 17th of February [...] CBSA and OPP [...] executed a weapons importation warrant in the York Region [...]. Upon entry to the residence it was discovered [...] the suspect was not present [but] firearms and ammunition were observed located improperly stored in the residence. A 3D printer was located. The POI..." I understand it to be person of interest, "...had ordered parts to complete a Glock style handgun ([...] items seized by CBSA). [...] believed [they may have been --] may have manufactured frames using the 3D printer. Machetes were located at entry doors and antigovernment/police notice was observed taped to the front storm door [...]. The POI is prohibited firearms. Neighbours indicate he is currently in Ottawa." Is that information that you knew at the time?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 110 24-110-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

At the time it was reported to me, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 110 24-110-28

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. And if we scroll up, please, to the top of page 2. So I understand that the OPP put out a BOLO, a be on the lookout for this individual?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-02

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And it says here, "The phone was just pinged and the location has him within 8 meters of the war memorial..." And that's in Ottawa at the time of the protests?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-07

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And then if we go to PB.NSC.00004460? This is a email on Okanagan Nation Alliance letterhead sent to the Prime Minister, Premier of B.C., Minister Miller and Minister Mendocino, and this was also copied to you by cc?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-13

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Sorry, we just need a ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-19

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Yeah. And I understand this is a letter regarding an assault of a Syilx Nation member by protesters at the Osoyoos border crossing; is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-21

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Yeah. I believe, Commissioner, I still have a few minutes. I just wanted to go to a couple of videos. Let's go to PB.CAN.00001800. And we're going to begin at the 2 minute 49 second mark. [VIDEO PLAYBACK BEGINS]

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 111 24-111-25

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And this is -- there's no sound on the video, so I'll just speak. What we're seeing is time-accelerated footage of the backup at the Bluewater Bridge as of February 8th, which is the second day of the blockade in Windsor?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-02

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And you mentioned before, you said at one point, this backup was approximately 10 kilometres long?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-08

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

We'll let it continue to play while I ask my questions. When we look at a backup of this nature, would this meet the one-hour service standard for processing that the CBSA sets?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-12

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And this is, as I said, only one day after the Windsor blockade. You mentioned the difference in the lanes for commercial vehicle processing between Ambassador and Bluewater Bridge. You recall that evidence?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-17

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And so when we look at that footage -- we can stop it there. [VIDEO PLAYBACK ENDS]

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-23

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Would you say that Bluewater on its own was a viable solution to the Windsor blockade?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 112 24-112-26

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

As I testified earlier, it was not able to accommodate all of the volume that would normally have gone through the Ambassador Bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-01

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And if the Bluewater Bridge was blockaded at the same time as the blockade in Windsor, what would the impact of that have been?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-04

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

Well, it would have made it very unfeasible for traffic that was hoping to cross in that part of southern Ontario to do their particular trade, because the next available ports of entry were 400 kilometres away at Queenston/Lewiston or the Peace Bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-07

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And are you able to able to comment on how long it would take to work through a backlog of that nature even once the blockades are cleared?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-12

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't have the volume of the actual number of vehicles involved there, but, you know, essentially, the process takes say on average a minute per vehicle to do that and you only have 7 lanes available to you at the Bluewater Bridge, and so I think there -- you know, the math could be done in terms of how long that -- it was certainly well beyond an hour.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-15

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. And my last video and last set of questions, PB.CAN.00001802. And we'll begin at the 7-minute 26-second mark. (VIDEO PLAYBACK)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-22

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And you testified earlier, Mr. Ossowski, about the activity at the Pacific Highway port of entry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 113 24-113-26

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

We can stop that there. Mr. Ossowski, did we see in the video what you were describing of the protest being essentially on the doorstep of the plaza, the POE?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-03

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

And the vehicle that you described military style being painted in camouflage?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-08

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Okay. Thank you. Those are my questions.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-11

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. Any reply?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-13

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you, Commissioner.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-15

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. GORDON CAMERON

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Just briefly I'd like to take the witness back, and, Mr. Clerk, could you call up for me, please, SSM.NSC.CAN.00001519? And go to page 8 of that document. Mr. Ossowski, this is the February 14th in the afternoon, the one that is dated February 14th, 2022, 1600 Eastern Time. And this is the one we looked at before where the sentence is added to the bluff, bottom line, up front heading of the Intelligence Landscape, and on the next page, a line was added: "There has been a significant operational impact that may result in a threat to Canada's economic security and prosperity." And when I asked you questions about this before, I might not have gotten as complete an answer as I should have about why you believe that sentence appeared on that document. Do you know where it came from? That is, where the person who added that sentence got the information and why they decided to put it there?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 114 24-114-17

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't know why they decided to put it there, but when we were made aware of this additional sentence the colleagues at CBSA went and made some enquiries, and my understanding is what they found out is the Acting Director General at the Border Operation Centre decided to add that line in.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 115 24-115-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

So if I can just put a little flesh on what you were saying. What you're saying is when this point was put to you in your interview by Commission Counsel you then followed up on this point?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 115 24-115-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And can you repeat that again? It sounds like you consulted with the person who added this sentence, and the answer was they decided to add the sentence.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 115 24-115-20

John Ossowski, DM (GC-CBSA)

I don't understand or have any intel -- understanding of what their motivation was to add this in, but I think that what was reported to me was is that with all the activities that had escalated to that point in time, they decided to put that particular language in. I also believe they said that this was not an attempt to provide any tacit or implied support for the Emergencies Act. So that's all I know about it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 115 24-115-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Mr. Commissioner, that's the only matter I wanted to follow up on.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-04

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. So thank you very much for coming and testifying. You're free to go back to your retirement, and it's much appreciated that you came to give evidence today.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-07

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. So next, we have, I believe, a panel. It may be preferrable that we take a short break to organise the panel; is that...? So I'll just take five minutes to do that if that's agreeable. So we'll just take a five minute break and come back.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-12

The Registrar (POEC)

The Commission is in recess for 5 minutes. La Commission est levée pour 5 minutes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-17

Upon recessing at 12:21 p.m.

Upon resuming at 12:27 p.m.

The Registrar (POEC)

Order. À l'ordre. The Commission has reconvened. La Commission reprend.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-21

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Good morning, Commissioner. We have now the panel for Transport Canada. Could I ask that the witnesses be sworn?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-23

The Registrar (POEC)

Mr. Keenan, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-26

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

A religious document.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 116 24-116-28

The Registrar (POEC)

We have the Bible, the Koran or the Torah available.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-01

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Bible, please.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-03

The Registrar (POEC)

For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-04

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Michael James Keenan. Last name is K-E-E-N-A-N.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-06

DM MICHAEL KEENAN, Sworn

The Registrar (POEC)

Mr. Dea, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-09

The Registrar (POEC)

For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-12

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. My name is Christian Dea, D-E-A.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-14

MR. CHRISTIAN DEA, Sworn

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. GORDON CAMERON

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Good afternoon, gentlemen. My name's Gordon Cameron and I have some questions for you on behalf of Commission Counsel. First, I would ask you to cast your minds back to August 30th of this year when you were interviewed by my colleagues in company with some of your colleagues. And so what I'm going to ask you to do is confirm to some extent what you can confirm and to some extent what you can confirm on behalf of your colleagues, and in particular, have you reviewed the summary of that interview that was prepared by Commission Counsel?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 117 24-117-18

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, I have.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-01

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And you, Mr. Dea?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-02

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And to the extent that that summary captures information that you two provided to Commission Counsel, can you confirm that it's accurate and that you adopt it as your evidence before the Commission?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-04

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, and yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And to the extent the information is that of your colleagues at the interview, can you confirm that it was reviewed by them for accuracy and believe it to be accurate?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-11

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, and yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And also, Transport Canada filed a -- an institutional report with the Commission. Can you confirm that that document is accurate and that it forms part of the evidence that Transport Canada has submitted to the Commission?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you very much. Now, let me ask you each, gentlemen, to introduce yourselves and describe the role you have in Transport Canada.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-22

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

My name is Michael Keenan. I am the Deputy Minister of Transport Canada. So I am responsible for overseeing all aspects of the operations of Transport Canada, and I'm the head of the transport portfolio, which includes eight Crown corporations, four agencies, and fifty shared governance organisations, and I am responsible for providing advice to the Minister of Transport.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 118 24-118-25

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And Mr. Dea, can you give us an outline of your position and what you do there?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 119 24-119-04

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. My name is Christian Dea. I'm the Chief Economist and the DG, Director General, of the Transportation Economic Analysis Unit at Transport Canada. My role and the role of my group at Transport Canada is to monitor the performance of the transportation system and to conduct economic assessment on any disruption affecting the transportation system. And in doing so, I'm providing the advice and the result of the analysis to the senior management, including the deputy and the minister.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 119 24-119-07

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. And if I can go back to you, Mr. Keenan, and ask you to describe -- it would probably take you all day if you were comprehensive, but just describe what Transport Canada does, what its jurisdiction -- what is the federal jurisdiction that Transport Canada administers?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 119 24-119-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

So Transport Canada is responsible for all aspects of the Canadian transportation system that is within federal jurisdiction. And we have three key priorities that we pursue across the organization of 6,400 people. The first is to ensure the safety and security of the part of the national transportation system that’s in federal jurisdiction, ensure the environmental safety, environmental green performance, and then -- and to ensure the system is efficient, both for moving people and goods and so that there is a strong trade and transportation network. In terms of jurisdiction -- and it varies by mode, so in aviation, it's essentially exclusively federal jurisdiction, so Transport Canada is responsible for all aspects of aviation, working with international partners like the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is responsible for the vast majority of marine transportation, although there is some provincial involvement; the majority of rail transportation. Road transportation is very much a shared jurisdiction. Transport Canada is responsible for some aspects, but provincial governments are responsible for significant aspects as well, and we have significant federal/provincial/territorial governance to coordinate our efforts in that respect.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 119 24-119-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And I'm going to ask you to expand on exactly that last point that you mentioned, that road transportation -- which of course is, for a truckers' convoy, the more relevant aspect of your department's jurisdiction -- for road transportation, you have this divided jurisdiction where there are federal responsibilities but there are also provincial responsibilities. If you could just describe to some extent what that division is, and then I'll ask you to expand on how that prompts you to have interfaces with the provincial and territorial authorities.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 120 24-120-18

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

So in the area of road transportation, Transport Canada has responsibilities under two pieces of -- principally under two pieces of legislation; there are some others. We administer 74 Acts and 400 sets of regulations, but the two principle Acts involved here, the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, where we certify the importation and the use of motor vehicles as to their safety; and the Motor Vehicle Transport Act, where we have responsibilities and authorities with respect to international and interprovincial road transportation. Intra-provincial road transportation, i.e., within a province, is the -- is essentially the exclusive domain of the province except for the aspects that touch the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which is the safe -- the certifying that the equipment is safe. In practice, while we have, for example, international, interprovincial trucking, things like their safe practices, like, hours of service limits for truckers, in practice, that is federal. The interprovincial rules are federal jurisdiction, but for trucks that don’t travel interprovincially, they're provincial jurisdiction. We work together very closely at the two levels of government and there's a lot of coordination of all of the rules and the regulations and the policies with respect to commercial transport through the CCMTA, the Canadian Council for Motor Transport Administrators; and the Council of Deputy Ministers of Transport; and the Council of Ministers of Transport. Some of the federal rules, we delegate to provincial authorities to enforce, for example, the hours of service with respect to interprovincial trucking. And we work as much as possible to get an alignment between the provincial and the federal rules so there is as much as possible a consistent set of rules across Canada. Canada being a decentralized federation, there is some diversity in the rules across the country with respect to motor vehicle transport. The use, the licensing of the operators and the conduct and the operation of the vehicles on the roads is typically in provincial jurisdiction and most provinces have something like a Highways Act that where they set out the -- all of the rules and governs the regulations by which they oversee the use -- the transportation on the roads and highways, each province.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 121 24-121-01

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you for that. And now, if you could help us with the second half of what you were describing, which is as the result of that interplay between the federal jurisdiction over some aspects of transportation by motor vehicle and the jurisdiction of the provinces over other and territories over other aspects, you have quite a bit of intergovernmental connection at your level, and probably at the level of the people that work with you. But can you expand on that for us?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 122 24-122-15

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I think that’s exactly it. For the reasons you stated, the effective transportation policy in Canada requires extensive intergovernmental coordination. And so it starts at the top of it, there's a council of Ministers of Transport and Road Safety. And then there's a Council of Deputy Ministers of Transport and Road Safety that I coach here with a rotating provincial partner. There is the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators. There is a group of Assistant Deputy Ministers, people that report to Deputy Ministers; the PPSC, the Policy, Planning, and Support Committee; and there are, I would guess, at any moment in time under PPSC and CCMTA -- and I apologize for the acronyms -- there are probably a dozen working groups of various experts working on some aspect of coordinating federal and provincial transportation policy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 122 24-122-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Now, with that background in mind, both the complexity of the overlapping jurisdictions and the extent of your network, the network that your department is responsible and presumably also you personally have between the federal government and the provincial government, I want to take you to the beginning of the convoy and the days as it is just sort of starting to appear on the horizon. What did Transport Canada see, when, and what was your reaction?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 123 24-123-11

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

At Transport Canada, we began to -- we saw -- and sort of in the lead up to that weekend of the 22nd, 23rd, which was a full week before the trucks arrived in Ottawa, we began to see the reports of trucker convoys that was just beginning to show up on the screen. I think some folks in the department noticed something as far back as January 19th. I think that’s in our institutional report. It came to my attention around, I would say, the 22nd. And we were initially watching it because it was truckers, and so there was for two reasons. One is we have relationships with the commercial trucking industry. The second is that when you have convoys and the prospect of slow rolls, that has a potential to have an impact on the transportation and trade corridor system, a potentially negative one. So we began watching it about a bit more than a week before the trucks got to Ottawa. And then shortly after that, it began -- the interdepartmental monitoring and deliberations began through the deputy -- for example, the Deputy Minister's Operations Committee, DMOCC, of which I'm a standing member.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 123 24-123-20

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

I'm just going to stop you. Just -- we've heard about that, and -- but I'd just like you to rewind just a little bit, describe the committee again, and what your role is in it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 124 24-124-13

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Sure. The Deputy Ministers' Operating Committee is a standing committee of about eight Deputy Ministers who have responsibilities that are directly related to maintaining the safety and security of Canadians and protecting the national security of Canada. It's chaired by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, the Prime Minister, and it has -- the security agencies are RCMP, CSEC, et cetera, as well as a number of departments that have responsibilities that connect directly to the safety and security of Canadians. Transport Canada is one of them. Our responsibilities in that respect are geared towards the transportation system, but we have significant responsibilities with both respect to safety and security. For example, a threat -- there’s -- there have been, unfortunately, in the past, terrorist and ideologically motivated extremists have targeted the transportation system. And so we have a mandate to ensure the system is safe from such attacks.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 124 24-124-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And so I had interrupted you there when you were describing the invocation of the ADMNSOPs meeting that you attended as the convoy was coming onto the horizon.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 125 24-125-06

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

A small correction, if you’ll permit me. I’m a member of DMOCC, the Deputy Minister’s Operating Committee.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 125 24-125-10

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

But my assistant -- my Assistant Deputy Minister for Safety and Security is a member of the ADMNSOPs.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 125 24-125-14

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. So you were describing the DMOCC. Please go ahead with that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 125 24-125-17

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

So Transport, because of it was -- it started out with, I would say, the brand of a trucking -- of a truck convoy and a trucker protest, Transport was involved because we were monitoring early because of our relationships with the industry. The -- that started a few days before the DMOCC -- I think the first DMOCC meetings on this were early -- around the 24th or 25th. Around there. The one thing that came to our attention fairly early on is that the brand of a trucker convoy wasn’t really accurate. And in fact, when we talked to the professional trucking industry, the Canadian Trucking Alliance, the Private Motor Carriers Transport -- PMTC, I can’t remember, too many acronyms, focused on acronyms, -- they made it clear that this wasn’t them and this didn’t represent the professional trucking industry and pretty quickly started making public statements eventually -- initially distancing themselves from this activity, and then making it clear that they didn’t support it, and then finally, articulating how it was harming professional truckers.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 125 24-125-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And can you describe the steps then that your department started to take to respond to the emerging convoy?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 126 24-126-10

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The first step was trying to understand what was happening and what was brewing, because as I think you may have heard from other witnesses, it was quite hard to get a fix on, because there was -- it was rapidly changing, it was dynamic, and quite unpredictable. So it would have been some initial discussion with industry partners to get a sense of what was going on and finding that point I raised, that it really wasn’t the industry, per say. Second was working with the -- in the structure of DMOCC and ADMNSOPs, working with our partners in public safety to understand what was -- what the collective assessment was of what’s going on. So that was a key aspect of the -- I would say the early activities leading up to the arrival of the movement in Ottawa. As things progressed, our roles evolved into probably about four different types of activities.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 126 24-126-13

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Why don’t you list those now and we’ll go from there?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 127 24-127-02

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Sure. So the first, I just covered. The second is that as the -- as we started to see blockades and occupations, we started analyzing what the potential impact was on eh trade and transportation system. And then that accumulated in, I would say, peak impact, once the Ambassador Bridge was closed for several days. The third is that when you start -- in the event of major events, protests, incidents, whatever, that requires a large and complex police response and crowds, Transport Canada will provide a certain sort of technical expertise and authorities in support of local law enforcement. And in this crisis, we did that in two ways. The first is that we -- because of our responsibility for aviation, we will close air space at the request of local police as they try to manage large events, riots, whatever the activity. Over the course of this crisis, I think we issued air space restrictions, they’re called NOTAMs, Notice to Airmen. So -- and we issued about -- we issued them in about a dozen cities across Canada. And we do that as a matter of course when the police of jurisdiction are seeking that in order to help them manage some major event or crisis. The other aspect of operational support is that we make our sort of -- we essentially make our authorities and our expertise available in support of police of local jurisdiction as required. And that will vary. In this incident, one very relevant authority and expertise we have is the transportation of dangerous goods. We have a significant directorate and we have significant responsibilities to ensure the safe transportation of dangerous goods in Canada. And I think around the 9th of February, the Ottawa Police Service, who was -- they were growing quite alarmed at the extent of propane being stored in unorthodox manners and the extent of the transportation of diesel and gasoline, and they sought some expert advice and support from Transport Canada. We had the same assessment, just watching from a distance. There was a lot of dangerous conduct with respect to explosive and flammable material, like propane and diesel. We provided two inspectors who did ride alongs with the Ottawa Police Service to give them technical advice as they were seeking to monitor and ensure the safety of the occupation in Ottawa. And over -- they were on scene with the OPS, I think for about three days, and supported the OPS in writing up probably about 20 sort of administrative monetary penalties for violations of the safe handling of essentially a lot of propane and diesel. So I think the fourth, it would be the -- after coming out of a meeting organized by my colleague, Deputy Minister Stewart of Public Safety with the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police Service, we were absolutely struck by the overwhelming challenges the Ottawa Police Service was facing on several areas. And that generated -- that led to some thinking of how we could be of assistance to our front-line police of jurisdiction. And from that, so in thinking about that, we ended up developing two strategies that we worked with a lot of partners on through the course of this national crisis. They became known -- the first became known as the Strategic Enforcement Strategy, and the second became known as the Tow Truck Strategy. And that would be, in sum, the four areas of work by Transport Canada with respect to the crisis.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 127 24-127-04

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Maybe I could ask the Clerk to call up for us PB.CAN.00000860? Now to assist you, Mr. Keenan, I’ll draw your attention to the upper right-hand corner of this page where it says, “Working Draft February 13, 2022”. But we haven’t found a later draft, and I think that you’ve confirmed for us already that this is effectively the final version of this strategy. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 129 24-129-10

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, that’s correct.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 129 24-129-18

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And describe if you can what you were trying to accomplish with the strategic enforcement strategy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 129 24-129-19

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Sure. So the genesis of the strategy enforcement strategy came out of the February 3rd call between a few Deputy Ministers of Canada with the City of Ottawa, the Chief and a few senior officers of the Ottawa Police Service. And in -- it was an update on the situation in the NCR, was the purpose of it. When the Ottawa Police Service described the challenge they were facing, I think we were all struck -- I know I was personally struck by three things. The first is that the sheer scale of the -- and intensity of the unlawful activity was eclipsing their ability to manage, clearly. The second is that when they applied fines, they were issuing fines to the people blocking the street, and they were quite struck by they just ignored the fines, they threw them out, they laughed, whatever. So they were -- the deterrence effect from the fines that they were levying seemed to be very low. The third is that when they did try to -- when they did try to take -- when an officer tried to take an enforcement action, they would often be swarmed and then they would have to back down in what they described as in the interests of officer safety and public safety. And the fourth was that they were trying to build an operational plan to bring the occupation to an end, but one of the -- one of the impediments was they were unable to secure the heavy tow trucks they needed to move the commercial vehicles. And so we found that was a very sobering discussion. In coming back from that and reflecting on that, we had discussions inside Transport Canada, briefed Minister Alghabra, and he was obviously keen for us to do whatever we could do to help resolve the situation. And that because we’re a large organization with extensive regulatory responsibilities, we have a large oversight operation, compliance operation, enforcement operation, we have some expertise in compliance promotion and encouraging and strategies to encourage parties to comply with, well, usually transport regulations short of actual enforcement. And so we started developing two sets of things. One was a strategic enforcement strategy, and that’s the document you have here. The other’s a tow truck strategy. The idea here was to try and marshal every legal resources available and all of the best practices and strategies to try and convince people that, first of all, what they’re doing is illegal because there was some sense that a number of the people involved in the occupation did not have a clear understanding of how much illegal activity they were undertaking. Second, the consequences of it and how that is -- could be quite significant adverse consequences for them. Third, to -- thereby encouraging them, at least the ones that were open to any persuasion, to cease participating in the occupation and thereby so-called shrink the footprint. And so the -- given the fact that the initial attempt to levy fines, according to the Ottawa Police Service, had no effect, the thinking here was what if we looked at all available legal tools and had a comprehensive approach to deploying everything, municipal by-laws, Highway Traffic Act, Criminal Code, et cetera both in terms of as a communications exercise to encourage people to cease and desist the illegal activity and then, as necessary, using multi-pronged sort of options for enforcement. This product you see here, the February 13th final draft, was the -- was the ultimate product of that initial thinking on the part of Transport Canada, but it was refined through extensive discussions and consultations with our federal partners and with our provincial partners. It had -- it went to probably, I would say, call it 10 different federal-provincial discussions both with our provincial transport colleagues and with Public Safety’s provincial Solicitor-General Public Safety colleagues.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 129 24-129-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. We’re going to come back to the aspect of inter-provincial cooperation in developing this strategy. While we’re, though, describing the items you mentioned earlier in your list of points that Transport Canada mobilized to react to the situation, can you tell us about the tow truck policy or the approach that Transport Canada developed to the point you were describing about the need for heavy lift tow capacity?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 132 24-132-08

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

And so that was the second stream of thinking and strategizing that came out of the stark realization from the February 3rd meeting with Ottawa, and the - - we began exploring through a series of discussions both through the meetings convened by Deputy Minister Stewart with Ottawa and with our police and procurement colleagues at the federal level and with provincial colleagues. We began exploring options for solving -- what I would say solving the tow truck problem. What could be done in order to prevent -- to address the fact that the tow truck industry was declining to provide service to police in Ottawa, Coutts and multiple -- and in Windsor, everywhere? And so that ended up -- we ended up developing a six-part tow truck strategy. The initial focus was to work around, if you will, the inability to secure tow trucks by having a strategy of using -- first of all, using this, the strategic enforcement strategy, to try and convince the commercial drivers that’s in their best interests to stop, cease and desist, and leave the occupation or the blockade because if they voluntarily drive their truck home, we don’t have to tow it. The second is that if -- in the event that you can’t secure the tow trucks, the services of the industry, but police are ready for operations to bring the occupations and blockades to an end, to have strategies like as you -- as they enforce to get the keys and if they detain the driver because they’re breaking the law, have somebody who knows how to drive a truck drive it away to some secure location. A lot of the trucks were purposely disabled, and so then you’d have to have -- the next stage was to have mechanics get the truck in working order so it could be driven away and then a key part of the strategy is that, having maximized what you can do without tow truck services because they were blanket refusal, looking at a whole range of strategies to try and overcome the reluctance of the -- of this part of the tow truck industry -- and I should emphasize that because of the commercial vehicles involved, some locations you needed not just your average, everyday CAA small tow truck that shows up for a Honda Civic. You needed a large wrecker that had the mechanical capacity with an operator with the skill to safely move like a semi truck. And so we worked through a series of ideas that we kicked around with different partners to try and overcome the reluctance of the -- of that specialized heavy wrecker or heavy tow industry to provide service. Through the course of that, it became clear how deep we -- when we started this out around the 5th or 6th, we were optimistic we could find a solution. As we worked it and worked it and worked it, we got to the 13th, we were still -- a solution was still illusive. And what we came to realize over this period was essentially how deeply rooted the reluctance is from the industry and they -- quite frankly, it was quite clear what -- the picture that emerged to us was quite clear that they felt quite threatened and that -- that if they showed up and -- in support of a police operation on a convoy, they were putting their future business at risk, their property at risk and, to a significant extent, their safety at risk. And so while we thought we could figure out a financial instrument that would get them to show up, we didn’t - - we weren’t able to figure out a financial instrument strong enough to overcome those threats.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 132 24-132-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And whatever happened, then, with the tow truck strategy? Did it get implemented in any measure?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 134 24-134-23

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The -- it was the product of a lot of discussions and, in some -- and was implemented in some different -- some marginal ways in some places. Its ultimate manifestation, I would say, was the -- was the fact that, having sort of worked through all of this, that the ultimate manifestation was that -- and I should make a point that, interestingly enough, on the 12th and 13th, I think between myself and the Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security, I think we had about four meetings and discussions to try and find the solution to the -- to try and find a way where the tow truck strategy would actually work. We -- and there was some interesting back and forth with different provinces, police and procurement officials on that point. Ultimately, I would say the tow truck strategy found its -- was ultimately manifest in the Emergency Act Orders where there was a specific provision to request essential services, specifically tow trucks.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 134 24-134-26

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

If I can capture what you’ve just said and then I’m going to ask you some questions about this, the purpose of developing the tow truck strategy was to come up with a solution to all of the parked trucks that -- that is sort of obvious on its face, and you describe an effort in which you and your colleagues try -- thought of everything you could to deal with the fact that you needed to move these big rigs, different ways of either getting them to go on their own or to move them with tow trucks. And ultimately, by the 13th, you’d basically decided there was not a viable solution with the authorities you had at your disposal. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 135 24-135-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I would say that we had -- by the time we got to the 13th, we had failed to find a viable solution.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 135 24-135-27

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. Now, on that point, what I’d like to hear is your response, if you’re familiar enough with the facts I’m going to suggest to you. The Commission has heard evidence from different representatives of the Ottawa Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police that they had had some success in securing voluntary compliance from heavy lift tow truck operators without -- this is before the Emergencies Act gave them authority to compel that. So I’m not going to ask you to offer a view on the truthfulness of that because I don’t think you were directly connected to it. But do you -- did you have information about that effort by the OPS and the OPP at the time you were developing this tow truck strategy?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-02

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

No. And I should say that we’d had a lot of discussions with a lot of partners on the strategy and we -- and no partner had shared any information with us to that effect.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-16

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And did your partners include representatives of the OPS, the OPP and the Ontario government?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-20

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

To -- yes, they did.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-23

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Is this a good time for the lunch break?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-24

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

This is a perfect time.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-26

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. So we’ll take the lunch break and come back at 2 o’clock.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 136 24-136-27

The Registrar (POEC)

The Commission is in recess until 2 o’clock. La commission est lever jusqu’à 14 h.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 137 24-137-01

Upon recessing at 1:07 p.m.

Upon resuming at 2:04 p.m.

The Registrar (POEC)

The Commission is reconvened. La Commission as reprend.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 137 24-137-05

DM MICHAEL KEENAN, Resumed

MR. CHRISTIAN DEA, Resumed

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. GORDON CAMERON (Cont'd)

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Good afternoon again, gentlemen. If I can pick up roughly where we left off, we had run through the lifecycle of the tow truck strategy. And I wanted to ask you some questions, and this will, to some extent, bring back in your enforcement strategy and your tow truck strategy, but just talk to you about the point we began with, which was your federal, provincial, territorial coordination as you were trying to come to solutions. And in particular, I'll call up a document, though I don't know if we'll need reference to it, but we'll get it on the screen just in case we do. It's SSM.CAN.00000363. And to -- while that's coming up, Mr. Keenan, you'll recollect, perhaps that on February 7th, Transport Canada, Public Safety, and CBS convened a feds, provinces, territories discussion?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 137 24-137-10

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And now, you can see on the screen an email, "My notes from the FTP call". And if you -- if to recollect your memory, and in response to any of my questions you want to have the clerk scroll down and help you through your answers, please feel free to do so. But perhaps just generally, who convened the meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 137 24-137-27

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The meeting was convened by Deputy Minister Stewart of Public Safety, and -- but in part upon the suggestion of myself.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 138 24-138-05

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And what was the purpose of the meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 138 24-138-08

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

There was a number of purposes, but the -- it was to bring together the -- there was one overall purpose, which was to bring together at the federal and provincial level the deputy ministers of Public Safety and Transport to take stock of developments, and to talk about ways of working together to deal with this sort of rapidly evolving national crisis.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 138 24-138-10

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And then you have the notes there that -- well, actually, I suppose I should back up a second. It was a federal, provincial, and territorial meeting. Without listing all the names, can you just describe the categories of people who were participating in this?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 138 24-138-17

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

There was probably three. At the federal level it was -- it would have been the Deputy, Rob Stewart and his -- some of his senior people from Public Safety, the -- myself and senor folks from Transport Canada. And I see here on the list, on the notes that we also had CBSA, which would have -- I'm sure was John Ossowski. And then from the provincial side, essentially my counterparts, the deputy ministers of Transport or Transport and Road Safety from all of the provinces and the territories. And then on the Public Safety side, the Public Safety Departments or Solicitor General, whatever they're called in each of those jurisdictions. So it would have been a fairly significant number of people in total.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 138 24-138-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Significant in number, and it sounds like the senior or close to the most senior officials in their portfolios for each province and territory?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-06

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes. And sometimes when you have these calls, like sometimes when I'm called to a meeting, I'll be called to two or three meetings at the same time, I will delegate the less important ones. This was the most important discussion any of us were having. So if my memory serves correctly I think it was almost all of jurisdiction showed up with the -- what you call the deputy head, deputy minister, or deputy solicitor general, et cetera.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And under the fourth bullet there is a Transport Canada proposal, and the first bullet, I'll help you through, I believe maximum enforcement strategy is one of the early monikers for what became the strategic enforcement strategy; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-17

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, that's correct.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. So there's your strategy and some bullet points for it. Did you present the strategy, you or one of your officials?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-23

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I presented the strategy. At that point we didn't have a written document, so I verbally outlined the concept and the idea of the strategic enforcement strategy, which at that time we were referring to as the maximum enforcement strategy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 139 24-139-26

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And then, Clerk, if you could just scroll down a little bit. And then, Mr. Keenan, I'll ask you, what was the reception to the strategy?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 140 24-140-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The -- as these notes that Aaron and Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport took were captured the next -- so you could see. In general, when we were having this discussion, there was a cool reserved response by provincial colleagues, good colleagues in collaboration, but there was a lot of anxiety about the rapidly escalating scale of unlawful behaviour. So everybody was nervous and being careful. The -- that said, there were -- there was different complexions in the response. Alberta had mixed feedback, as per these notes. And they made the point that they -- we were seeking both ideas and participation and engagement on the strategy, and they were making it clear they were prepared to be engaged. The appropriate and usual cautions about letting police make operational decisions. I think the -- as you go down, I think my recollection is B.C. was more positive. Quebec was positive. In fact, I think they were saying you can't -- that's the point I was remembering, that not only were they supportive, they said that the strategy that we were advocating aligned well to the strategy that they had executed the last weekend to, in their view, of some success.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 140 24-140-07

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

With respect to the protest in Quebec City?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 140 24-140-28

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Yeah. And then how did Ontario receive the strategy?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 141 24-141-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The -- I think they were in the -- they were on the slightly cooler side. The government should issue a statement of support for police. They were one voice and there were -- to be fair to Ontario, there were other voices that was uncomfortable with the word "maximum". And so we -- in the spirit of building a consensus, we were happy to change the word "maximum" to "strategic", at the expense of making the title a little bit redundant.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 141 24-141-05

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Now we're going to go to the next day after this FPT meeting, February the 8th, and we're going to talk about a letter you received and that I think you know well by now, from the Ontario Deputy Minister of Transportation, your counterpart in Ontario. Before we get there, I'd like to put up, if you could, please, Mr. Clerk, PB.CAN.00000820. And this is an email chain that starts with the transmission of the letter, but -- okay. If you could go back to the top, please, Clerk, just for a second? So not sure where this ends up taking us through, but if you scroll down, you'll come to a paragraph, "We have had several discussions..." There we go. So this is your contribution having received the letter. And I'll just read this out, so that it's in the transcript. "We have had several discussions with Ontario about enforcement options. Ontario has always been cautious and reserved about making full use of its authorities under the Highway Traffic Act but was engaged. This letter..." And I'm going to try to ellipse your typos here, but, "This letter [...] represents a pull- back from those discussions. It is consistent with the pattern we saw in the last 48 hours where Minister Mulroney is unavailable to talk to Minister Alghabra." And then it's got your name at the end. Have I been fair to the typos there and ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 141 24-141-13

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, I think you've done them more than justice and I apologise for the typos that came ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 142 24-142-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

--- from typing fast.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 142 24-142-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

We've all been there. Now we're going to go to the letter in a second, and you'd already mentioned that in the FPT meeting you sensed some coolness to Ontario and some of the other provinces about the enforcement strategy. But the reason I wanted to begin with this email is you foreshadow by saying the letter was a less than embracing acceptance of the enforcement strategy by Ontario. And you're saying that that is consistent with the pattern in the last 48 hours. Can you explain what you mean by that about Minister Mulroney, which would be an Ontario Minister, being unwilling to talk to Minister Alghabra or unavailable?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 142 24-142-20

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Certainly. So the -- in the follow-up from the -- on the call with the Ontario Police on the 3rd, so we started thinking about this on the 4th. And on the -- over the weekend of the 5th and 6th, had reached out to Ontario. I reached out to the Deputy Minister Leblanc by phone. My Assistant Deputy Minister of Safety and Security reached out to his counterpart, and so we had started the conversation. And we were getting good colleagues returning our calls, you know, constructive discussion about cool and reserved. And so that was notable. At the same time, at the Ministerial level, Minister Alghabra, because, well, obviously, briefing him day by day, reached out, saw the importance of this issue, and reached out to Minister Mulroney. And the normal course of events in the good relationships amongst the Minister of Transport when one Minister is keen to talk to another, they connect quite quickly. They can be busy, but they'll find time. And it was several days -- I guess here, it was -- at this point, it was at least 48 hours where Minister Mulroney was unavailable to talk to Minister Alghabra. And that then this letter arrived on February 8th from -- in that context, this letter arrived in February 8th from Deputy Minister Leblanc. And I believe that Minister Mulroney then got back to Minister Alghabra and said that my -- that we're providing a response -- my Deputy Minister is providing a response to your Deputy Minister. And that response was this letter. The -- not -- a slightly unorthodox way of having those communications, but it did close the -- it closed the loop.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 143 24-143-04

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And just so we have the cast of characters accurate, for those who haven't been following this too closely, Minister Alghabra was the Federal Minister of Transport and Minister Mulroney was Ontario's Provincial Minister of Transport?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 144 24-144-04

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Now if we can go to the letter? Clerk, it would be PB.CAN.00000821. Now you by now, I'm sure, are quite familiar with this letter, and as a matter of fact, it's had some airtime at the hearing already in front of other witnesses, so we don't need to spend too much time on it, but perhaps you could explain to me the substance of this response and your reaction to it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 144 24-144-10

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The substance of the response was, I guess, first and foremost, the tone of the response was collaborative and collegial. The substance of the response was negative in the following sense. And as you go through down -- if you could scroll down just maybe a little further? You can stop there. Stop -- scroll up just slightly, please? Thank you. The -- there was an explanation for the -- this is based on us inquiring about the possibility of finding a way to leverage the potential sanction of a commercial truck driver losing their commercial operating certificate because of significant and repeated violations of the Highway Traffic Act as a result of blocking a highway with a truck, honking the horn, all of these violations of the Highway Traffic Act. And we were sort of exploring that and sort of asking a question to our provincial colleagues in charge of that, like, what could be done here? And this is a very sort of detailed sort of description of the various reasons why, and we -- what I concluded was a polite, detailed, substantive description of why and how nothing could be done in this respect. And there are very good points of procedure, et cetera, procedural fairness, et cetera, but I interpreted this that if the -- there -- because it ended saying, “We don’t think we can do anything here and we would ask that you redirect discussions to my colleague, the Solicitor General, this was a very polite but firm, “No, we’re not going to get involved here.”

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 144 24-144-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Thank you. And with that response, I’ll ask my colleague to pick up a new line of questions, Mr. Commissioner. Stephen Armstrong, Commission Counsel, will pick up for a section of questions, and then I’ll come back to finish.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 145 24-145-16

EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. STEPHEN ARMSTRONG

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Good afternoon, Mr. Keenan, and Mr. Dea. My name is Stephen Armstrong. I’m Commission Counsel. I’m going to be asking some questions about the economic impact analysis from the border blockades, and my questions are primarily for Mr. Dea, but Mr. Keenan, if you have anything to add, please do. So Mr. Dea, I understand that your directorate has previous experience analyzing trade shocks? Is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 145 24-145-22

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Can you tell the Commissioner about some of that experience?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 146 24-146-05

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. Well basically my group is responsible to monitor and track any disruption on the transportation system. And of course, you know, with what happened in the previous years, in terms of the rail blockade, for example, but also other events, you know, we develop expertise and knowledge about, you know, how to assess these different disruptions on the Canadian Transportation System, but also in the Canadian economy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 146 24-146-07

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And just in terms of understanding the impact on border blockades, the Commission understands from the Institutional Report that the nature of trade between Canada and the United States, I guess some of the features of the economy are an important background. Can you describe or provide some context on that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 146 24-146-15

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. For any kind of economic impact assessment, we follow a very vigorous framework to make sure that we’re using the best data, but also that we validate that with industry. So we always start our analysis by having a good assessment of the context and what is happening. And in order to do that, we use the best data available. For example, in the context on the issue on the cross-border, we’re using Statistics Canada data to get a good sense in terms of the nature of the trades that are affected at different border points in terms of the magnitude, but also the type of the merchandise that were affected by the reduction or the blockade of the bridge. We’re also using other sorts of information, for example, information from CBSA about daily movement at the border, just to get a sense in terms of the fluidity and the capacity of the movement at the different borders. We were also using direct information and data from the industry to get a sense from them in terms of how they have been impacted and the impact for the operation overall. So based on this data, we’re getting a bit of a portrait of what is really happening. And following that, we always validate this information directly with industry. So I was having, or my colleagues or my group were having daily calls with the different sectors affected by the blockade on the borders, in order to validate, again, the data that we have, but also get a better insight from them about how they have been affected and what might be the implication for them in terms of production, in terms of issues for investment, for example, which was also a real threat for the auto sector, for example. And it’s ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 146 24-146-21

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

If I could jump in, sorry?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 147 24-147-24

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Could I just ask, I guess, more specifically of the ports of entry that experienced blockades in February 2022, which were the most concerning from an economic perspective and why?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 147 24-147-27

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well when you look at the Ambassador Bridge, for example, this is a very significant, you know, I would say corridor to exchange basically merchandise between us and the United States. The magnitude is important. It represents, just by itself, about 26 percent of the value of the export that Canada is moving to the United States and 33 percent of the imports that Canada is making the U.S. is going through the Ambassador Bridge. So in terms of the strategic importance of this bridge, it was very, very clear. It’s clearly also very strategic in terms of the sector affected. In the south of Ontario, the auto sector, the manufacturing sector was clearly affected directly and quickly, because they are all now in adjusting time, you know, kind of a production schedule. So any delay, or reduction, or not accessing the equipment that they need in order to produce had a direct -- almost a direct impact ostensibly in terms of their activities. But there are other commodities that have been affected as well that are important for the Canadian communities, like, you know, the basic medical equipment, pharmaceutical equipment, as well furniture, food. So there is a lot of movement of merchandise through the bridge that clearly had a direct and simultaneous impact in terms of not only the manufacturing sector, but also the Canadian communities about accessing some of the goods that are important for them.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 148 24-148-03

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Thanks. And I just wanted to pick up on a point I think that you were just getting into there, is that some of these goods that you were looking at is critical goods; correct? Or something that could be deemed critical goods. Can you explain to the Commissioner what are critical goods? What is the significance of that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 148 24-148-28

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well there’s no official definition of the critical goods right now, but we can probably extract to and get an agreement saying that when it touches the health and the food security of community, for example, these are very critical to the day to day needs of the community and Canadians. And there is also another element of the critical aspect, when it’s also affecting the economic activities. And again, coming back to the manufacturer sector, not having access to the different equipment that was needed in order to produce had a direct impact on them in terms of their capacity to basically conduct their activities. So we have seen reduction and stoppage of the production in the auto sector and other sectors following, you know, the block at the Ambassador Bridge, for example.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 149 24-149-06

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But I just want to tie back to the critical goods for a second. I think you linked that to sort of the wellbeing -- the goods that are essential for wellbeing and health. Is it fair to say that if we’re looking at critical goods, that imports are more important than exports? Or are they equally important?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 149 24-149-21

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

You know, when you look at the composition of the imports and the exports, they are both very important. They are important for our colleagues in the U.S. as well, because we do export some of these critical goods as well, and not only for the community, but also to ensure that they can, on their side also, you know, produce what they need to produce in terms of sustaining the economic activities in the auto sector, for example. And the auto sector is a bit particular in the sense that the two economies are very integrated overall in terms of economic activity, but the auto sector is probably one of the most integrated. And the way they manage all the supply chain, it’s really integrated. It’s not a U.S. supply chain, it's not a Canadian supply chain. It’s an integrated North American supply chain. So any disruption in terms of the movement of what is needed on the supply chain is affecting, you know, both sides of the country very, very quickly on that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 149 24-149-27

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

So Mr. Clerk, I’d like to call up the Institutional Report. It’s at DOJ.IR. several zeros, number 5. And if we could turn to page 22, please? And I guess I’m going to ask about paragraph 89 here. You have some figures. So this is focusing on the Ambassador Bridge. And am I correct in understanding that, for example, where it says “agri-food” in the bullet, it’s 10.7 percent of all exports. Is that a percent of agri-food exports nationwide that are going through the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 150 24-150-16

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

If I remember correctly -- let me see. Yeah, I think it’s correct.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 150 24-150-26

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And that would apply to pharmaceuticals and critical minerals.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 151 24-151-01

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And so in paragraph 90, you address western Canada. And in the second -- the second sentence there -- I’m sorry. I shouldn’t say “you”. It’s the institutional report. But it refers to western Canada as one to two percent of critical exports and imports. Is it fair to say that when we’re talking about critical goods, is the main concern the Ambassador Bridge?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 151 24-151-04

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, given the magnitude and the importance of the value and the importance of these commodities, yes.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 151 24-151-11

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And then on paragraph 91, the report addresses the impact on automobile manufacturers. Can you tell the Commissioner, how did you come to learn -- how did Transport Canada come to learn about the impact on automobile manufacturers, and can you just expand on that a bit?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 151 24-151-14

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. Again, you know, it’s based on, first of all, getting good data and statistics from Stats Canada and other sources about the situation there. But again, data is not always reflecting what is really happening right now, so that’s why we have different, you know, engagements with the industry in order to get a sense in terms of how they have been affected by the different reductions of the movement at the border. And we have been in contact with -- here we have a short list of the key, you know, auto producer, but we have had a comprehensive engagement with also other sectors as well that were affected just to get a sense in terms of how the different sector were affected by the blockade of the -- at the border.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 151 24-151-21

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And did you consider in your analysis whether these auto manufacturers could make up production after the blockade’s ended?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 152 24-152-07

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yeah. We implicitly take that into consideration because I was saying at the beginning, the first element is to get an assessment about the -- how the movement at the border’s affected, so we had a good understanding based on Statistics Canada about the magnitude of the export and the import and the value of that. And at the bridge, it was about 390, 93 million per day that are affected by the blockade there. And after that, we’re trying to translate that in terms of how much of these movements at the border will lead to a real issue in terms of economic cost and loss of economic activities. And in order to do that we’re using, well, what we think state of the art economic model in order to look at the impact of a reduction of the movement of the merchandise of the -- at the border and get a sense in terms of what are the sectors that will be the most affected and how they will be affected. And these models allow us to get a good picture, a good portrait of what happened on that side. And it’s with these models, again, validated with the industry, that we’re developing a kind of a net economic assessment of the impact of the blockade.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 152 24-152-10

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

I’d like to paragraph 92. It’s on the screen already. Here you address the food and beverage industry and it says that it appeared likely at the time that some manufacturers would have to shut down if the blockade persisted, which in turn could lead to less availability of food and beverage products and higher prices. Can -- do you know -- how did you come to the opinion that that appeared likely? What was the source of that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 153 24-153-04

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, this -- well, there’s three elements to consider here. First of all, it was during the winter. It’s always more of a challenge to move perishable, you know, products during the winter so you have to work in a window that, you know, it’s already really more narrow. And after that, we had a good information that in terms of how much these industries on both sides of the border were affected. And of course, for them it’s real time. You know, if you’re not taking the fruits, vegetables, the flours, the other, you know, perishable goods and even if there’s a delay of one day or two, it means that they are losing basically some of the business or their business on that side. So they were very, very concerned about, you know, not having predictability on their side about when they can move their products and where. And again, even a delay in terms of the transportation on either side were not only adding costs, it was sometimes, you know, causing a problem of not being in a situation of delivering their products to their client.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 153 24-153-13

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

How did you come to understand that that occurred?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 154 24-154-05

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, it’s through, you know, conversation we have had with different, you know, shippers on that front in order to get an appreciation of the challenges that they were facing.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 154 24-154-07

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Mr. Clerk, can we please go to page 23 of the report, the next page. There’s a chart in the middle of the page. We can scroll up or down if you want the context, but Mr. Dea, could you walk us through this chart, briefly?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 154 24-154-11

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. This is basically a table summarizing what I just mentioned, so we’re, of course, monitoring the situation at the different border crossings in terms of what is happening there. And using, you know, Statistics Canada trade data, we had basically statistics about the value of the import and the import that was affected for specific days. And this table is just trying to provide -- again, contextualize in terms of the value of the exports and the imports that were affected by the different blockades in the different border crossing.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 154 24-154-16

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

So trade -- sorry to interrupt. So just to get clarity on some of the terms, I guess -- and I know they’re -- I think they’re explained in the paragraphs above, but trade per day, that includes imports and exports; correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 154 24-154-26

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And what is -- what is “trade impact”? What is that figure ultimately showing us?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 155 24-155-05

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, the trade impact is basically looking at the trade per day that are affected times the number of days of the blockade. So this is giving you a bit of an estimate of the value of the exports and imports that are affected or have been affected by the blockade in different border crossings.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 155 24-155-07

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Right. But it doesn’t purport to be the cost to the Canadian economy; correct? It’s - --

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 155 24-155-13

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

No. No, this is -- again, we’re starting to get a sense in terms of what is affected first and in order to derive the net economic cost, we’re going through this validation process and through economic modelling, we can generate basically the loss of economic activities that were associated with the blockade at the different border crossings.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 155 24-155-16

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And then at paragraph 97 here, we have a figure that says that the total number of trucks entering or returning to Canada from the United States was down five percent in February 2022 relative to the same period in 2021. Are you able to say what the cause of that five percent reduction was, what was the cause?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 155 24-155-23

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, the numbers here refer for the full amount, but given the data that we’re getting on a daily basis from CBSA, we were in a position to look at, you know, the impact of the blockades at the different border crossing points. And I think my colleague on CBSA this morning presented some of these tables where you’re showing a significant reduction, if not, you know, a total closure of the traffic in the different border crossings. So we were -- we were in position with this information and the validation with industry to get a good sense in terms of what was really stopped or reduced at the border crossings in terms of traffic.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 156 24-156-02

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Are there any other factors that would impact, if you just looked year over year from 2021 to 2022, that would impact the flows?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 156 24-156-15

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Of course we were -- at that time we were in an environment that was under stress, I would say, economically. And for the transportation sector with the COVID situation, there were some challenges in term of the global supply chain and the domestic supply chain. But, you know, looking at historical average was giving us a bit of a benchmark. So -- and usually when you’re doing this kind of analysis, you’re using different benchmark just to ensure that, you know, your assessment is robust enough. And here in the paragraph we’re referring to the previous year, but we use, you know, different time period just to make sure that, you know, our benchmark was robust enough to get a sense about the impact of the blockade of the bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 156 24-156-18

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And do you know how much of the 5 percent, do you know how much that represents critical goods flowing across? Was that impacted?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 157 24-157-03

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

I don’t have this information with me, but you can assume that, you know, depending of the composition of the -- you know, the movement of the trucking, that probably most of the commodity that I have highlighted at the beginning were affected. How much, it’s very -- we don’t have this information.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 157 24-157-06

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And at paragraph 98, the report notes that a reduction in traffic was observed in Western Canada, and the number of trucks entering or returning to Canada decreased by 48 percent at Coutts and 29 percent at Emerson. Do you have the information for whether there were corresponding increases at the other nearby ports of entry in Alberta and Manitoba?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 157 24-157-12

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, in our analysis, and using, again, daily information from our colleague on CBSA about the movement on the different crossing border, we were in a position to see if the traffic were redirect, at least partly, to other border crossing.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 157 24-157-19

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

And in some part, yeah, the traffic has been redirected to other border crossing point, but it’s -- it was never a perfect, you know, rerouting of the traffic from one bridge or one areas to the others; they were always a net cost or a net loss of traffic. And there were also, even though if the traffic was rerouted, there were some cost issues in term of adding time, adding cost, adding capacity in another area, and causing problem in terms of the just-in- time kind of production in the different sector that were affected. And depending of the region, on the -- I focus a lot on the manufacturing sector, giving the south of the Ontario challenges, but on the western side, their focus was more on, you know, live animal products, agrifood products, for example, or mining. And, again, there were some specific problematic there as well in terms of a -- you know, not being in a position to timely deliver these products to the different markets.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 157 24-157-25

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Mr. Clerk, I’d like to go to the next page, please? So it sort of ends the economic impact section here of the report, saying, it’s clear that there has been a impact; however, it’s hard to attribute the shifts noted above solely to the impact of the blockades. Can you tell the Commissioner, I guess, some of the challenges in making that assessment, and why that’s not possible?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 158 24-158-14

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, what was possible to do first is to -- given the shock, and we had good information about the value of these export and import that are affected, that were affected by the different blockade. It was relatively straightforward to translate that through modelling and validation, in term of net economic cost for the different region. We have done the analysis for the Ambassador Bridge, for example, and we come with an estimate of the net economic cost. In term of the attribution of the overall other factor that is happening, that’s where it was getting difficult for us to assess the role of vaccination, COVID, global supply chain challenges, and/or challenges in term of, you know, shortages of workers due to COVID or other, you know, issues. It's really difficult to make an assessment about the exact contribution of each of these factor when you’re doing a global and a macroeconomic impact assessment.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 158 24-158-24

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And if that’s the case, then how can it be clear that the blockades have an impact?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 159 24-159-13

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, because, you know, for the reasons that I just mentioned; we were in a position, in the context of the blockade, to know exactly what was affected, in term of the traffic of the merchandise on the exportation and the importation. So that was -- it was clear about, you know, the sector affected, so we can use, basically, and we have used this information through our modelling to see how the Canadian economy and the regional economy and the sectoral economy were affected by the reduction, for example, of the traffic on the Ambassador Bridge. And that was a clear, you know, assessment of the impact of the reduction of the importation and the exportation at the Ambassador Bridge. So for this one it’s really clear. It’s when you’re trying after that to look and get, I would say, a kind of overall perspective about how the Canadian economic growth was affected for the different other shock, and how can you attribute, you know, the reduction of economic growth, for example, in a specific areas, then it’s getting more difficult to make sure that you can -- well, that you can do the causality or the attribution for the global shock versus domestic shock, health-related shock, or any other shock. But in the context of the Ambassador Bridge and the blockade on the crossing border, because we had information about the nature and the magnitude of the export and import affected, we were in a position to derive a net economic cost estimate.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 159 24-159-15

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And I’d like to talk about that now, actually. So Mr. Clerk, if you could pull up PB.CAN.00000840? (SHORT PAUSE)

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 160 24-160-13

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

So Mr. Dea, I think you’ve been alluding to this document. This is a document that your -- I understand your Directorate prepared; is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 160 24-160-18

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And we have some -- a Key Messages box here that summarizes the analysis. Could you walk the Commissioner through some of the key messages?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 160 24-160-22

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes. Again, the first key messages was basically to highlight the trade that was affected at the Ambassador Bridge; again, using Statistics Canada data that was available there. And we were in a position to highlight that about 390 million of trade daily were affected, which again represent 26 precent of the export of the country to the US, and 33 percent of the merchandise imported from the US by road. So we were looking at data now, and the next bullet, the next point was to say, “Okay, how this translate into economic loss in Canada?” In order to do so, we have used, you know, a modelling that we have right now in our group, and this model are state of the art model; they are giving you a snapshot based on Statistics Canada of the whole economic structure in Canada, giving you the detail by sector, so -- which allow us to look at, you know, not only at the macro level but at the very sectoral level and regional level, the nature of the impact of the reduction of the import and exported order.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 160 24-160-25

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

And when we do that we got -- we got an estimate of about 45 million of economic loss per day. But we were using -- giving, you know, that they are modelling tools, giving some uncertainty about how the different sector might have been affected at the beginning of the reduction of the activities. In order to bring a bit more certainty about the magnitude of the impact, we wanted the strategist to the right scenario. And the second bullet there present three different scenarios of all the reduction of the trade at the border impact the economy. The first one, assuming that the main factors affected will be transportation sector and the manufacturing sector, and more precisely, the auto sector. And again, this was informed partly by also the conversation we were having in -- with industry. And when you will look at, you know, this impact, the modelling is giving you an estimate of about 45 million of net economic loss, which means that the industry are producing less or stopping their production. It means that they are losing income and salaries. And this is less expenditure in the economy, less economic activities, and the 45 million there is capturing the direct impact of the reduction of the trade on the transportation and the auto sector. The other element were more to explore, you know, assuming that other sector might have been also affected by the reduction of the trade activities at the border. The 86 million refer to a scenario where it was not only the transportation and the auto sector; it was the full manufacturing sector in the south of Ontario that was affected, and then the estimate then rise from 45 million to 86 million a day. And the last one, which is more, kind of an extreme case for us, is to look at, okay, what is happening if all the sector are instantaneously affected by the reduction of the export and import at the border, and then you’re getting this estimate of 161 million.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 161 24-161-16

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And can I ask, what kind of assumptions went into the $45 million a day scenario?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 162 24-162-22

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

The 45 million scenario is assuming that, again, looking at what is the traffic at the border that is affected. So we’re shocking, basically, the economy saying -- if we’re saying these export and import are affected, what will be the impact for the transportation and the auto sector first. And that’s where you’re getting the 45 million estimate.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 162 24-162-24

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And there’s a reference in the -- when you’re describing in the Key Messages the $45 million a day scenario says: “...$45M/day over the first week based on current mitigation efforts put in place by shippers and available alternative options.” What assumptions were you making about mitigation efforts for that scenario?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 163 24-163-03

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, we’re assuming -- given that we’re assuming that the others -- the -- only the transportation and the auto sector were affected, we’re assuming that all the other sector of the economy; the food sector, the resource sector, the furniture sector, for example, they find a ways to get access to the material that they need to maintain their economic activities. And through -- by redirecting some of their, you know, traffic, or their import and export from trucking to rail or other mode, for example, or they were in a position to have and sustain economic activities because they had some inventories to allow them to do so. So that’s why the 45 million for us was a kind of a conservative estimate of the impact because we’re assuming that more or less all the other economic sector find ways to continue to produce, to continue to operate with minimal disturbance.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 163 24-163-12

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. Mr. Clerk, I’d like to go to another document, it’s SSM.CAN.00003798. And if you could go to the bottom, it’s an email chain. Okay. So Mr. Dea, I don’t have any questions about this first email, but I just would pause on it to let you refresh your memory. Okay. And can we scroll up to the next email? So here, Mr. Dea, you’ve responded to Ms. Turcotte on February 10th, on economic impacts of the blockades at border crossings. And Mr. Clerk, could you scroll down? And so in these three scenarios you outline here trade shock 1, 2, and 3. Do these correspond to the scenarios that we were just talking about?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 163 24-163-28

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

So this is about the Ambassador Bridge.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 164 24-164-16

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And Mr. Clerk, could we scroll up again? And so Ms. Turcotte responds to your email and she had some questions for you. Well, first she says: “At first glance, impacts seem large to us, especially scenarios 2-3, implying limited diversion options and high sensitivity to any delays.” Do you have any response to that comment?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 164 24-164-19

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Yes, we do -- first of all, we have to acknowledge that when we’re doing this kind of analysis, there’s a lot of exchange with other department as well, just to, again, validate if they have any information that we don’t have access to. But also making sure that we collectively play this challenge function together in order to make sure that we’re getting the best advice to our respective Minister. And there have been exchange throughout this process with the Department of Finance, at different level, at my level and at the working group level as well, in order to make sure that their assessment, the way they are conducting their assessment, to get a sense in term of if they can share any of their insight was. And we’re sharing a bit of their insight. On their side, they are using more -- it is my understanding that they are using more macroeconomic, you know, modelling tool to derive impact. And on our side, we’re using other set of tools that is giving us a lot more sectoral details about the nature of the shock and how the different sector are affected. So we always, in that regard, trying to collaborate, and collaborate effectively, to make sure that what were coming, in term of economic assessment, were consistent in the way to move forward. And if they were some question about, you know, some of the result from the different tools that we’re using, we’re trying to get a good assessment together about how can we explain the difference between the two. But in the context of the work with the Department of Finance, they have used our assumption about the trade impact or the shock in their model. And they were shocking the economy using their macroeconomic tool, and they got some result; and, on our side, we’re doing the same. And this email is in that context; to exchange information about, you know, the preliminary estimate of the impact from their side and our side. So we had agreement, or were very consistent in term of the way to get to the first element of this -- the impact, which is referring to the scenario 1, at 45 million per day. But they were questioning, in term of how far and solid are -- were the other scenario that we were doing. And we -- the email was just to exchange and provide them with more information about what we’re trying to capture in scenario 2 and scenario 3, in term of the sector affected but also the dynamic aspect of the shock on the trade in the Ontario economy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 164 24-164-28

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And so she had a number of questions for you. I’m -- I think mostly just looking to highlight the first one, she asked: “What do you assume in terms of % of [impact] shipments that are able to divert to other crossings (e.g., Sarnia/Niagara land crossings; rail [and] air)?” And Mr. Clerk, if we could go up to the next email, I believe Mr. Dea, you’ve responded. If we could go up to the next page as well; this is the beginning of your email. Well let’s find the -- yeah, so this is Mr. Dea’s response on February 11th. If we could scroll down a bit. Here we see some of the information from the backgrounder that we just looked at. If we could scroll back down to the other page. So my understanding, Mr. Dea, if you recall this email, is that the questions are in the bullet points, and your response is below in a different sort of colour; is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 166 24-166-15

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And so your response to the question about your assumption on diversion, it looks like you said, "Our scenarios do not consider any diversions to other crossingS." Is that correct?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 167 24-167-07

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

We -- the shock are assuming that it's a pure shock for the sector, but that's why we're also looking at them coming to that in the different response later in term of how can we, you know, capture the dynamic element associated with the rerouting as well. And that's why we were using every day, you know, the information that were coming from CBSA about, you know, the movement of the traffic, or the perceived movement of the traffic to other bridge to get an appreciation about, okay, if, you know, our shock was still reflecting what was happening on that side.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 167 24-167-11

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Okay. And so does your comment about the scenarios not considering diversion, does that apply to scenario 1 as well, the $45 million a day?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 167 24-167-21

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

The scenario one does not consider any redirection of the traffic at the day of the shock and on that front, yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 167 24-167-24

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Sorry, I'd like you to clarify on that. So does that mean there's no diversion on just day one of the one-week closure, or any of the seven days of the week?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 167 24-167-27

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, implicitly, you know, the short answer to your question is that the model is already capturing the potential substitution of the rerouting to a certain level. And this was already embedded in the modelling that we had have, because we can't see in term of how economy needs to be moved, and it was moved in the past. And all the past behaviour was captured that -- there in term of the way to get access to these element. And they have been shocked in the past as well. That was affected also some of the manufacturing sector that will giving us some benchmark about the dynamic element of the rerouting. What the model was not capturing though is the day-to-day change that we were seeing with some redirection of the traffic from Ambassador Bridge to the other bridge. And the model was not allowing us to capture also the cost associated with this rerouting, because rerouting doesn't mean that, you know, it's basically reducing the overall cost, the net economic impact. It might be a bit of a reduction associated to that, but there is also cost associated with rerouting about time, additional cost, loss of economic opportunities and we mentioned previously the perishable good, the food sector, where basically, you know, delay means for them that they are losing economic production and activity. So in order to fully capture that, we had to basically play a little bit more with the model or qualify a bit more the result of the model to see how we can take that into consideration.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 168 24-168-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

If I could add in?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 169 24-169-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Christian, I think -- tell me if this is right that there's a number of real-world kind of challenges that some sectors had in diverting to other bridges that the model, for all its sophistication, couldn't fully capture. One of them is in the auto sector. It's a just in time system where sometimes a truck is really geared to make two round trips in a day. And then with this diversion, they can only make one round trip or half a round trip. And so that -- because it's so time sensitive and so synchronized, and that's one of many crossings, it's hard to have that in the model. The second is that one of the -- we came to this issue at Transport, which is the hours of service limit, because for safety reasons, truckers are limited on how many duty hours they can have before they have to stop and rest. And that their -- the trips under normal conditions are synchronized around the duty hour requirements. When they have a, like, a 4-hour diversion and a 10-hour wait, they kind of -- they time out and then they have to pull over for the safety rules. There was some discussion of a temporary waiver of those, which we do at occasion, so those kind of costs are material. And I don't know -- I assume the model in its sophistication can't fully capture all of that. Yeah.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 169 24-169-05

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

So, Mr. Clerk, could we go up to the first part of Mr. Dea's response? Yeah, you can pause right here. So at the bottom of the screen, I just -- there's this -- looks like you got some data here on diversion. And so I'm just -- I would ask you some questions about that. Where did you get this information from?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 169 24-169-28

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

That's the daily data that we're getting from CBSA.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 170 24-170-06

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And so were you able to factor that into your scenario one, or is that not factored in?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 170 24-170-08

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

This was not fully factored in the scenario. But the reason why we use the scenario one was precisely for that reason. We haven't shocked all the sector of the economy. And implicitly, by doing that, we're trying to take into consideration that there will be some rerouting, and it's not all the sectors that won't have access to all the equipment that they were looking for. So that's why we're quite, you know, prudent with the scenario one. We're saying the sector that has been affected, it's mainly transportation sector and the auto sector. All the others, you know, were continuing basically to produce business as usual almost. And this is the attempt to try to capture that, to say that, you know, all the others will find ways to get access to their input, their equipment, to continue the production. So we did explicitly use these number, but the fact of restricting the shock to the transportation sector and the auto sector was more or less to capture these element that, you know, a lot of the other sector will be in a position to access, maybe not on a timely basis, but access what they need to continue to produce.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 170 24-170-10

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Mr. Clerk, can we scroll up to the next email in the chain? So, Mr. Dea, I think you're not on the chain anymore, but I wanted to get your response because finance officials continue to comment on the scenarios. And in the first bubble, they say, "Based on description scenarios 2 and 3, I'm not sure we should include these [...], especially given that [the] Ambassador['s] open again." And then in bullet two, they say, "Scenario 1 seems like a reasonable upper-bound for the daily cost [...]. They could easily get there, and they see it as an upper bound. Do you have any comment on that point, or anything to add?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 171 24-171-02

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, you have to refer that the date of this email as well. We're talking about ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 171 24-171-18

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

--- February 14, so we weren't -- you know, we have started to do these estimate at the beginning of the blockade, so in early February when we're starting to see some issues in term of the blockade, we were starting this estimate, not knowing exactly what kind of rerouting would happen and how it will happen. And I think this email was on the February 14 because ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 171 24-171-21

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Mr. Clerk, could we scroll up and see the date?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 171 24-171-28

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

And it was exchanged within the Department of Finance between the analysts there. We had a lot more information at that time about, you know, what happened over the past few days in term of rerouting, and that's where they were focussing a bit their element, saying, maybe now the scenario two and three, giving what we know right now, were probably a bit more on the high side in the way to look at the economic impact of the situation. And they were more in line with us with, you know, the scenario one as a prudent and a conservative estimate of the -- to assess the net economic impact on that regards.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 172 24-172-06

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And at the end of the second bullet, I just want to get your comment on the remark that, "The costs are also probably mostly transient with catch-up production expected [in] the coming weeks." Do you have any response to that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 172 24-172-17

Christian Dea, DG (GC-TC)

Well, again, it's -- we were all trying to infer maybe some behaviour in term of the economy there. I think on the February 14, we had a bit more better understanding about, you know, the nature, the magnitude of the shock and the return to that. And I think there -- this exchange there was more or less to capture now or better reflect this information. But again, it was more to say that giving what we know right now and giving the current situation on February 14, maybe a scenario 2 and 3s were more on the upper bound of economic impact.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 172 24-172-24

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Could I -- if it's helpful, could I add a point here because the -- first of all, in -- what you’re seeing is an exchange between Finance and the Department of Economic Analysis, which is very typical. I’ve been involved in that in three or four different departments. But there’s -- on this issue, I think there’s an important point around this issue of transient that I think is an important context. And this is a good discussion to put this impact in context. In one sense, there’s a transient and once the bridge opens, the shock wears off and the economy adjusts and gets back -- gets back going. There’s two aspects that are not transient. One is that there was some period -- and because the thing was closed for six days, it wasn’t that long, but there were a number of days and shifts where billion-dollar plants were idled and you don’t actually ever regain that. If you shut down a billion-dollar plant for a day, that’s a loss of production that you don’t actually ever truly get back. The -- but if you looked in paragraph 91 on the institutional report -- you don’t have to show it -- but it listed the impacts on the auto manufacturing plants in Ontario and it went through like Honda, GM in Oshawa and these different places in Ontario. What it was -- what it didn’t say because it wasn’t a Canadian economic impact, is the same thing was happening in the U.S. and there were auto plants as far south as Kentucky that were disrupted because they couldn’t get the parts across the Ambassador Bridge they needed for their production. And that created an economic impact that was -- could have been quite devastating and permanent, and that is the loss of confidence that Canada’s a reliable trade partner. And that -- a loss of confidence that a production -- in U.S. boardrooms and U.S. state and national capitals that a production system that cut -- that went across the border wasn’t reliable and you should consolidate in the U.S. And so there was an immediate extremely high level of anxiety out of the boardrooms of the automakers. Out of Michigan, the Governor of Michigan -- calls were coming in from Washington. I was getting calls from my counterpart immediately, “What’s up? Can we help?”. And because there had been a significant disruption two years ago with rail blockades, there was a growing -- we were seeing a growing sense of that, a question as to whether Canada was a reliable trade partner and whether its - - these trade corridors would stay open. That’s really important because that affects investment decisions. And there was -- there was a high level of concern at Transport, at Finance and at GAC that this was having an adverse effect on investment decisions in boardrooms of U.S. companies and, in particular at the worst possible time because there were a number of major decisions pending on production mandates and investments in auto plants in Ontario. And they typically weigh competing locations. And this bridge outage, particularly if it’s extended, could actually tip the balance in Canada’s disfavour, and so billion dollar investments that would have otherwise happened in Ontario were going to happen in Ohio or Kentucky or Michigan. That was a -- I would say an extremely high level of concern, and that if this had gone on longer -- if it had restarted, the risk of that happening was quite high. In the end, I think the consensus was it was a near miss. While it was a problem and there was a lot of anxiety, we were still -- Canada was still able to land a number of billion-dollar investment decisions by automakers like Stel Lantos, Honda, GM in the following months. All made billion- dollar investment decisions in Ontario. If this had gone on longer, if it had been repeated, then any one of those could have been easily unwound because a big decision like that is not final until it’s final and boardrooms are always assessing those kind of risks. So that is a major, I would say, strategic economic risk that -- and represents economic harm to the country that comes in the future that is quite material to the national interest, but by the -- but as sophisticated as these models are, either the Transport one or the Finance one, there’s no way to -- there’s no way to include them in the models. So my assessment would be the economic cost is, say, different versions of around $50 million a day and potentially much higher if this disruption undermines and reverses some future investment decisions in Canada.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 173 24-173-06

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

And if I could just follow up on that with one question, the concerns you outlined, Mr. Keenan, about the automotive industry and about Canada’s reputation and attracting investment, was that more top of mind than the importation of critical goods? What was most important in your mind at that time?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 176 24-176-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I think both were really important. The importation of critical goods is a here and now problem that puts the health and safety of Canadians at risk. And the investment confidence is a future economic prospects issue that puts future really good, high-paying jobs at risk. And both of them are important.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 176 24-176-10

Stephen Armstrong, Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. Those are my questions. My colleague, Mr. Cameron, has some more.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 176 24-176-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ve been told I’ve got 30 minutes left, and I think I can probably eliminate some material and get this done in that time. And for those of you who’ve been following the last hour or so, I can point out that tomorrow the Finance panel comes on and we’ll have another perspective on the similar analysis about the impacts of that. So in the spirit of if you liked this, you might like that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 176 24-176-20

EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. GORDON CAMERON(cont’d)

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Gentlemen, if I can take you back to the narrative of the development of the federal government’s response to the convoy, we were just talking about the letter from Ontario saying that they weren’t enthusiastic about the enforcement strategy for the reasons articulated in that letter. I’d like to pick up now where things went from there beginning with a question to you, Mr. Keenan. Did you brief that letter up to Minister Alghabra?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-01

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes. I think you could see from the email chain I briefed that letter to key federal colleagues almost immediately, and I briefed that letter up to Minister Alghabra probably even before then.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-11

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And did you have discussions with him or give him feedback on what you thought the implications of that letter were for the development of your enforcement strategy?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-15

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And can you give us a few minutes on that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-20

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

The -- I think I characterized the letter as disappointing. Ontario’s pulling back and this narrows the -- this narrows the tools available for the strategic enforcement strategy, but we will continue working with them and others to try and flesh it out.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Now, leading up from the time of the letter towards invocation on the 14th, what was Transport Canada’s role in developing the government’s thinking on the potential use of the Emergencies Act?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 177 24-177-27

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Our first role was working up the strategic enforcement strategy and the tow truck strategy, which we’ve discussed. Second key one was assessing the scope of the adverse economic impact that was unfolding starting February 7th because of the accumulation of the border blockades. And then -- so over that course of sort of 7th through to the 10th and into the weekend of the 12th and 13th, we were continuing to advance those strategies as -- essentially as the index Track 1 approach. Somewhere around the 10th to the -- and through into the 12th and 13th, we put our minds to options for increasing authorities under a Track 2 Emergencies Act approach and had produced a couple of background pieces where the experts in safety and security with the different -- and aviation, road, marine, et cetera, rail were explaining, well, what could we do with our existing authorities and where could there potentially be a new authority that might be helpful? And those were assembled into some tables of background analysis.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 178 24-178-03

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And tell me, as you're doing this thinking on February 11th, Ontario adopted its emergency measures. And how did that emergency measures, and how did that have an impact on your thinking about, first of all, how you viewed the Ontario measures, how they might have counterparts in other provinces or federally?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 178 24-178-22

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

First and foremost, the -- we got the news on the 10th that Ontario was contemplating or was about to issue an emergency declaration, and then I think on the 11th we saw the orders that -- and we understood that on the 11th that it would include things like an ability to suspend the CVOR, the commercial operating certificate, of a truck that's involved in an illegal activity. And so through that evening of the 10th and the 11th, we took that as a very welcomed development. It was clear that Ontario had executed a major pivot and had -- and that the February 8th letter to me saying, "there's nothing we can do" had been replaced with a decision to do something material and significant. And that was a welcome development that contributed to -- in a material way to the strategic enforcement strategy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 178 24-178-28

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And did you -- did that prompt you to either think about or perhaps even encourage other provinces to consider similar measures that they might be able to take in their jurisdictions?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 179 24-179-15

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes. In fact, the -- there was a -- almost an evergreen draft of the strategic enforcement strategy that would evolve through discussions with provincial colleagues, it would evolve through developments, and we began explicitly citing the Ontario Emergencies and Civil Protection Act measures, and in particular, the -- some of the elements of that that were relevant to the transportation enforcement strategy, like the ability to suspend CVORs. And I remember making the comment that Ontario is stepping up and taking some action, and the extent to which other provinces can take similar action will strengthen this strategy.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 179 24-179-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Now, the next point I'd like to bring to your attention as we're following this chronology, the -- there was an email thread on about February 10th. And Mr. Clerk, if you could call up SSM.CAN.00000374. This is the email thread started by the Deputy Clerk, Ms. Drouin. And again, this is a document that's received some attention already in the hearing. We don't need to go into it line by line, but you might remember this as the enquiry by Maître Drouin as to whether or not there is an opportunity for this concept of a trade corridor that might assist in giving federal jurisdiction that could prevent obstructions at border crossings. Do you remember that?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 180 24-180-02

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And if we could just scroll down in the email a bit. And if we can start by going to the bottom just so we can see the actual proposal. There we are. I'll read it out: "As you know we are looking at different options to get jurisdiction. One of the questions I received is: Can we declare the region of the Ambassador Bridge a trade corridor and then get jurisdiction?" And then if you -- you received that and considered it, and we'll now look at your response, Mr. Keenan. So Clerk, if you could scroll up again. Further, please, to Mr. Keenan's thoughts. Okay. Now, you have a number of points that you mention in here. It's a four-part answer, and because we've only got a little bit of time, perhaps you could just give it to us in bullet points, and then I'm going to ask you to talk in some detail about this. But if you can just give us the quick overview of your thoughts about the trade corridor idea.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 180 24-180-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

And the context was -- of this was both the question from the deputy clerk as well as I think a public comment that the Ontario Minister of Transport had made I think the day before after the letter came that the problem at the Ambassador Bridge was a border crossing, it's federal jurisdiction, so were looking to the -- what -- for the federal government to solve it. And it was a combination of those two things that I think led to the deputy clerk's question. And so the four -- the key points are raised, because we had looked at this, and the first is that there is no in statute in law, as of today there is no trade corridor or federal authority. So that -- it's that simple. There is -- second of all, I think the second point is that there are -- there is legislation that governs and protects the point of the crossing, and the two of them are the Customs Act, the CBSA authorities under the Customs Act, and Transport administers the International Bridges and Tunnels Act. And so there was a lot -- there were suggestion we should go use this Act to solve that problem. And we looked at that, but the Act gives the Minister of Transport some very significant authorities, but the geographic scope of those authorities is the actual federal infrastructure itself. So if the protesters had set up in the middle of the bridge and were blockading from the middle of the bridge, then that Act would be of some potential use, but because they were on the... The third point is because they're on the city streets of Windsor, the -- these federal acts have no scope covering the city streets of Windsor. And that the remainder of it was making the point that Ontario sort of backed away, either on the basis that they think this can be left to the federal government and its jurisdiction. But we needed to make it clear that that doesn't work, and that if they -- the only feasible way that they have to do something and -- because the streets of Windsor are under the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities of Windsor and the provincial government. And if they really truly want us to solve this the only way to do that is to declare and emergency and ask us to intervene through our Emergencies Act. That would be a very provocative approach, and it may succeed in having Ontario come back to the table and start kind working using their authorities to solve the problem.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 181 24-181-08

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Okay. If we could, Mr. Clerk, just scroll back up to the point. First of all... Down, please. So the -- your first point is there is no such thing as a trade corridor. I think we get that. The second point you described to us as being there are authorities but they don't work in this context because they only cover the -- you're thinking of only cover the actual facility itself. And the third one intrigues the reader because you say: "The Ontario Ministry of Transportation [continues] to suggest the feds have full authority to manage international crossing, but this purposefully confuses authorities between governments." And I think this was your point here, that when Ontario says, "they are your bridges so you can control the blockades", you think Ontario, this is my expression not yours, Ontario is being cute because everybody knows the problem isn't in the centre of the bridge it's on provincial territory with provincial jurisdiction or municipal authority. Is that right?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 182 24-182-23

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I think that was part of it, and the -- it was -- I would say in the main that was right.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 183 24-183-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Yes. Now, did Ms. Drouin's proposal go any further than this, than your critique of it?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 183 24-183-19

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I think she was asking a question, and I think in the follow up discussions, both in email and in person, I think colleagues found this four-part analysis helpful in clarifying. And then actually it’s interesting, because as I was typing this, this was the 10th of February, and that day, perhaps at the same moment, unbeknownst to me, the Ontario Cabinet was deliberating on declaring an emergency and getting active and fully exercising its jurisdiction on the streets of Windsor. That became known to us later that evening and it became a reality the next day. So I would say that to a certain extent, on this particular issue, it was overtaken by events, the event being a pretty hard pivot on the part of Ontario.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 183 24-183-21

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. A welcome pivot, as you described.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 184 24-184-07

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

A welcome pivot.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 184 24-184-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Yes. Moving ahead to February 13th, so we’re now just coming right up to the invocation of the Act, you participated in a DMOCC meeting where the potential use of the Act was contemplated. Do you recall that meeting?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 184 24-184-10

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

And do you recall, we’re not going to ask for a roll call or perfect memory, but who was at that meeting, to the best of your recollection?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 184 24-184-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

It was the -- and it’s interesting, because on that weekend, I think there were up to 12 Deputy Minister and Cabinet meetings. So it was a bit of -- it was jammed in. But on that one, it was the core group of deputies working on this issue. So the National Security Intelligence Advisor, Deputy Minister of Public Safety, the President of CBSA, myself, RCMP, CSIS, and some of the normal members of DMOCC were not -- who didn’t have -- who weren’t actively involved may not have been there, like the Public Health Agency. But the core people working on the crisis were there.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 184 24-184-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. Mr. Clerk, perhaps it would help Mr. Keenan if we called up his notes of that meeting. It’s SSM.CAN.00000399. And what you can see here, right at the beginning of the notes -- first of all, are these your notes? I assumed that, but I should get you to confirm it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 185 24-185-03

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Yes, because it’s in the -- for “Rob and I”, and the I here is me.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 185 24-185-09

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Right. And your first point, I think is self-evident. The next one: “Rob and I argued that Emergencies Act can backfire in building more energy.” We heard some evidence from Mr. Stewart on that point. Can you give us your perspective on that point?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 185 24-185-11

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Sure. We’re in an environment -- we’re in the third weekend. Going across the country, the level of unlawful behaviour energy is really high in a lot of places and there was an assessment that there’s enough energy that things are really very close to some significant violence. And so managing the energy and trying to bring it down and downscale is obviously a key objective. There were -- we are -- on the 13th, we are well into the discussion of the Emergencies Act, and the options, and sort of how and whether to use it. And there was a discussion about the implications of what we would gain, in terms of necessary tools to resolve the blockades and occupations, and whether the invoking the Act itself would add energy to the blockades and the options. And both Rob and I, in different ways, but we both made the point we had to be very mindful of the Emergency Act causing a bigger blockade than it’s trying to solve. This is -- it’s like at night, it’s an intense weekend, but this reflects us working through and grappling to understand, as quickly and as best we can, all the intended and unintended consequences of something as serious as invoking the Emergencies Act in order to provide the most rigorous analysis we can. If we -- to add one more point, if we hadn’t been looking at this kind of issue of unintended consequences, it would have almost been irresponsible, given how serious the decision to invoke the Act is.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 185 24-185-17

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

That’s a helpful point. And if I can key off that and ask you, having weighed that point into the balance, that is, the potential adverse effects of invoking the Emergencies Act, did you express a view at the meeting about whether you thought the invocation of the Act was appropriate at this time?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 186 24-186-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I certainly expressed view on implications, and I expressed a clear -- I brought into it a clear analysis of the impact of the -- that the -- I brought into it a clear analysis and on what the Emergency Act could do to solve the tow truck problem. I didn’t provide an overall comprehensive view on the Emergencies Act for the following reason. There was a number of potential powers that were being considered and authorities that were being considered, and I didn’t feel I had the expertise to assess the total sum of it. But on the tow truck issue, it was very clearly would solve the problem.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 186 24-186-22

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you. That’s a very helpful answer. And I’ll use that to just ask the last question, which is, having been in the position you were, which appears to have been very senior in the Federal Government and very intricately connected with your counterparts at the provincial and territorial governments on the Transportation portfolio, which turns out to have been quite involved in the Government’s reaction to these events, are there things you could -- you wish -- the Commissioner should take into consideration in contemplating recommendations for how you would have been better able to handle a problem like this if they’d been in place, or looking into the future, what structures, regimes, or tools you would hope to be in place if you encounter a situation like this again?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 187 24-187-05

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I’ve had the fortune or misfortune of encountering this kind of -- well, this situation was an unprecedented crisis in the country, but the two years before, there was also a series of fairly significant blockades of transportation infrastructure, the rail blockades in the winter of 2020. I would say that looking at those blockades and the much graver crisis the country faced in the winter of ’22, there is an issue related to the emails -- the email that was up on the screen about trade corridors. And that confusion, imputed it was purposeful, but there’s a -- I would say my assessment is that there’s a gap in the laws of the land with respect to the tools available to government to secure strategic trade corridors, because you -- once you get -- once you step one meter off of a bridge, you go from a federal -- a broad federal toolset to municipal bylaws. And that bears attention. I think there’s a solution to that. And if I would submit any suggestion to the Commission, it would be thoughts in terms of that problem and what governments in toto should do about it.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 187 24-187-19

Gordon Cameron, Senior Counsel (POEC)

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Those are the questions of Commission Counsel for this panel.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 188 24-188-10

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. So with that, we can turn to the questioning by the convoy organizers.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 188 24-188-12

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Mr. Commissioner, before we begin the cross-examinations, during the examination by Commission Counsel, my friend, Mr. Miller, for the convoy organizers, emailed some documents that he proposes to put to the panel. We weren’t given notice of those in accordance with the rules. In a couple cases, they’re not even in the database yet. And before cross-examination begins, at the very least, I would like an opportunity to review those documents with the witnesses so that they could be properly prepared. Given the breach of the rules, I think that that is appropriate.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 188 24-188-14

Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)

Well, one of them wasn’t uploaded to the database until today. I just found it. The other two -- that’s fine. I don’t have any issue. If that -- these are, I think, important, so we just found them. Big database, sir. I don't have an issue with my friend talking to ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 188 24-188-24

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

Okay. So maybe we can start with the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and what we'll do is you can speak to the witnesses at the break, when we take the break; is that agreeable?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-02

Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)

Yes, that's fine. Thank you very much.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-06

Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)

And we'll simply go to the Convoy Organizers after the break. Okay. So?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-08

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

Thank you. Good afternoon. Can you hear me okay and ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-11

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

-- see me hopefully?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-14

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. CARA ZWIBEL

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

Okay. Good afternoon. My name is Cara Zwibel. I am Counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. A lot of the questions I'd intended to ask you have been covered, so I just have a few things I want to take you through and they are relevant to some of the issues that Mr. Cameron was just talking to you about. That trade corridor email, and if you want, we can pull it back up, but you might be able to answer this question without it. But there was -- I think you described it just now as a provocative suggestion in there about, you know, letting Ontario know that if they wanted the federal government to take some sort of action, Ontario would have to declare an emergency. And I take it you -- it was your view that the federal government would not really be in a position to declare an emergency if Ontario, where probably the most significant of the blockades were taking place, had not yet taken that step. Is that accurate?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 189 24-189-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I apologize. Could you just clarify the question?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 190 24-190-04

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

Sure. So I've just -- there was the suggestion in this email, I think you talked about sort of this poison pill where Ontario needs to be made aware that if they expect the federal government to step in that they will have to declare an emergency. So leaving aside I guess that sort of characterization of it, was it your view at the time that the federal government could not or would not be in a position to make use of the Emergencies Act unless or until Ontario had declared an emergency?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 190 24-190-06

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

I think I got it. Thank you for that ---

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 190 24-190-16

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

--- clarification. Thank you. That's very helpful. The core point or the core logic of that particular point in the email was a bit different. It was the - - and the purposeful -- and the earlier point relates to the fact that if you look at the letter that came from Deputy Minister Leblanc on the 8th, the public comments of Mr. Mulroney on the 9th, Ontario was really backing away, sort of washing its hands and saying this is a federal problem. The federal government has to solve it. And so the provocative point was to go back to Ontario and say, "No, it's in your jurisdiction. You have to use your authorities to solve this, or it can't get solved. If you're not going to use your authorities, we don't have any unless you hand it over to us, and the only way to do that is the Emergencies Act." So it was more of an attempt to get -- to be provocative and get Ontario back in the game of actually exercising its jurisdiction on the streets of Windsor.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 190 24-190-19

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

Okay. And I know you said that, you know, while all this was happening unbeknownst to you, things were already in the works in Ontario to declare an emergency. So I take it, that notion was never communicated to Ontario, by you at least. Or are you aware whether anyone articulated that to Ontario, that the federal government's emergency power is unlikely to be used unless Ontario has declared an emergency?

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 191 24-191-08

Michael Keenan, Deputy Minister (GC-TC)

Well, I don't think that that point was in my email, and then -- and I don't know if -- I know I did not communicate that, and I don't know if anybody else communicated that.

Volume 24 (November 16, 2022), page 191 24-191-16

Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)

Okay. Thank you. Sorry, just eliminating things that have been covered. There's a few emails right around when Ontario declared the emergency where you're -- you seem pretty happy that that's happened; right? That's a significant turning point potentially, and especially I think when you see the Ontario -- the orders and understand the potential to use those to incentivize drivers to leave. Those seem to be useful powers to you. Now there was a document -- if we can turn up SSM.CAN.00000409? And just while it's coming up, I think this is an email from -- so I think this is a different -- I think there's a Doug -- oh, no, sorry, there's a Mike Jones that we've heard about. This is a Doug Jones, who I think is in Ontario at the Ministry of Transportation. And we can -- sorry, we can scroll down to the bottom, just so Mr. Keenan can see where this starts. So this is on the 15th of February. And