Pat Morris

Pat Morris spoke 329 times across 1 day of testimony.

  1. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I will swear.


  2. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  3. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Patrick John Joseph Morris, M-o-r-r-i-s.


  4. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Good afternoon.


  5. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’m a Superintendent in the OPP, Bureau Commander of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau.


  6. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  7. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  8. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I am.


  9. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  10. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’ve been the Superintendent in charge of POIB since September of 2021, having acted in that position since July of 2021, and prior to that I was an Inspector in POIB responsible for two sections that are relevant to these matters.


  11. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau is the Intelligence Directorate or Bureau for the Ontario Provincial Police, so responsible for our jurisdiction, and also under the Police Services Act for issues where we provided specialized investigative services. We have six sections within the Bureau. The first is Intelligence Operations Section, which has to do with organized crime, et cetera. The second is the Protective Services Section, which has to do with close body protection for protective persons in the Province of Ontario. The third is Covert Operations Section, which has to do, administratively, with policies and procedures in relation to covert operations, undercover operations, informant recruitment, agent recruitment and handling, and also the operational responsibility for that. The next section is the Criminal Intelligence Production Section, which is primarily the handling of metadata information and the translation of information into intelligence. And the last section is the Provincial Anti- Terrorism Section, which is a large-scale, joint-force operation which engages in intelligence operations, covertly and overtly, in relation to national security threats. Lastly, we’re engaged in the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams.


  12. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  13. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Thanks. Will do.


  14. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes. You’ll have to cut me short probably. In 2019, early 2020, the OPP witnessed a significant amount of protest, dissent, some of which caused us reasonable grounds to suspect or believe that those issues would engage in criminal activity or illegal activity that would have a public safety impact. As a result of that, we created a collection plan and reached out to partners in law enforcement and in the intelligence community to create a cooperative collaborative approach to collect information on issues that related to that. The reasoning was many of these issues, I might say all of those issues, are larger than any specific jurisdiction. So we collected a collection plan -- sorry, we made a collection plan, we created business rules, and we formally reached out to multiple agencies in Ontario, law enforcement, intelligence, we went further than Ontario, engaging federal agencies such as the RCMP, many components within the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Department of National Defence, and then other police services were added as we went along, because there was impacts. So for example, the Vancouver police Department, Sûreté du Québec, et cetera. The rational for Hendon was to deal with large scale protest matters that impacted public safety. Very specifically, we did look at reasonable grounds to suspect and believe, as a sort of precursor for our involvement. In a very practical way, at the beginning of 2020 and the end of 2019, there was activity going on that had to do under the umbrella of Shut Down Canada. There was activity that activists would engage in to have a negative impact on the Canadian economy and on the Canadian democratic system generally. As we moved towards February of 2020, one of the major points of consideration was rail blockades, rail shutdowns, which came to pass in Tyendinaga for approximately three weeks, emanating from events in British Columbia, specifically the Wet'suwet'en issues and dealing with gas pipelines, coastal gas link, et cetera. We began, at that time, to engage closely with all of our partners because there were main events, such as Tyendinaga, such as British Columbia, but there were also a proliferation of events. And as my colleague, Insp. Bowden, will say, and Provincial Liaison Team, it was impacting multiple jurisdictions. And so that is how we chose to approach it. As time evolved, we had several events in Caledonia, and in the McKenzie Meadows occupation, which were relevant to our duties, and also had impact for other police services. I believe at that time, we engaged approximately 30 entities. We had regular calls, we had regular dissemination of intelligence products, and we regularly collected information for that purpose. As the pandemic became more pronounced, or more prolonged, some of those public safety concerns or threat variants altered. By April of 2021, we noted the emergence of something that we referred to as the Patriot Movement. And we focused on this specifically because it presented different threat components. I will say this. We had concerns. There was very, very little criminal activity, there was illegal activity, and there were impacts that we were facing. So through the summer of 2021, we noted more and more of that activity. I will also say that other factors occurred, such as hate crime statistics that were published in August of 2021. As a result of that, we evolved our collection plan and collaborated with our partners to focus on what we considered to be the primary threats. Our findings, our intelligence, our assessed information, was produced to all of our partners in the form of the Hendon Strategic Intelligence Reports, and I believe that was going out at that time to about 32 agencies, and it was going out to approximately 200 individuals within those agencies.


  15. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes. So I recall this list very specifically. What you note in blue is a Hendon Strategic Intelligence Report, or Situation Report that was disseminated. What you note in white in the first column on the left is a teleconference, because that was regular as well. And then we evolved our dissemination. We had our main Hendon group. On January 21st of 2021, our Commissioner, Commissioner Carrique asked me to begin to disseminate that intelligence product to nine police services, the Chiefs of the nine police services, to ensure that they were aware. So that’s what you see in one column. The Hendon Group in the next column, where you see the highlight in yellow. The third column is a column I created because of our geographical distribution to keep the OPP commanders aware. And the last column is our Commissioners Command Team, which consists of three deputy commissioners and our commissioner.


  16. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  17. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Beginning on January 21st, yes, of 2022. That’s correct.


  18. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Only germane to this issue?


  19. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We held our first one on January 21st, and then on January 24th, we completed them daily, I believe with one exception.


  20. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. So that’s a difficult question to answer, but I will do my best. We had a dissemination list which was very large, as I’ve described. At this point in time, I mean January 21st, we had grown to approximately 300 participants. From the Ottawa Police Service, given that Hendon had evolved since 2020, there were multiple people on the distribution list for the documents, and that same list received a request to participate in a teleconference. We could not go through our entire list from Vancouver across Canada every time, so we only knew the people who identified as participating. I can say that the members from Ottawa that showed great consistency in their participation were Det/Cst. George Boris (Phonetic), Det/Cst. Steph Quinell (Phonetic), at other times, and I apologize, I’m not always aware of their rank, I believe it’s S/Sgt. Isabelle Lemieux. The superintendents participated at times. In that case, I mean Supt. Mark Patterson, Insp. Ken Bryden. There were other people from Events and Intelligence that participated at various times, and we would only know it specifically by them self-identifying.


  21. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’d like to make a point of clarification here. The simple answer is yes.


  22. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    But from August of 2021 to the end of December 2021, there were regular reports, approximately one a week. The discussion about the possibility of a galvanized effort to illustrate to Ottawa some of the grievances and the possibilities of doing that via a convoy was often discussed and was often in the Hendon Reports. The events that were planned came to very little fruition, I would say, or minimal fruition. So it was discussed, it was commented upon the reports previous to this, but in this report is the first finite plan that says, “We are going to do this and we are going to do it on these dates.”


  23. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, I think it's a little bit more extensive than that, but that's just a summation provided for quick reference for people who are reading the document.


  24. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  25. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So we had multiple investigative techniques that were employing. So I could run through them. One was open source collection. And I want to stress, that's information. Open source -- so I put a lesser value on that, at the origin point. Also, we had covert operations ongoing, which you won't see as related in the documentation before you because of the sensitivities. We engaged in a large degree of analysis, and at times surveillance operations, and that's -- and source recruitment for covert operations. That information, all of which is information, is collected, and then we go through the collation and analysis process, and then we provide our analysis, which I refer to as Intelligence. And that is how we came to the conclusions and assessments that we did.


  26. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  27. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it does. And if I can just add a comment. As a result of the information we became aware of in early January, as reflected in the first report you showed to me, we stepped our assignments, our taskings and our information collection in order to produce more intelligence on what we felt was a burgeoning priority.


  28. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, it's an important question. For those not actively engaged in intelligence operations, there are knowns and unknowns, and we key in on those as intelligence gaps. So in this case, the fact that there was no exit strategy but there were extensive demands being placed, and the fact that we felt those demands could not be met, it meant that they, meaning the protesters, would be there for a long period of time. And I do want to say this. This may appear to be anecdotal. I refer to Intelligence as being engaged in acquiring secrets or mysteries. Their plans, while in Ottawa, were not a secret that we couldn't discern. The plans while in Ottawa were a mystery until they got there, and I think that is borne out by events.


  29. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sure. So throughout COVID-19, and the impacts of COVID-19, specifically since I'll say the spring of 2021, the growth of various movements, and I want to be clear on this, this is not one monolithic entity. These are grassroots, what I refer to as affinity groups, that share grievances. They acted locally, and also tried to coalesce, and I would say that this was the first successful coalescence. So in doing so, the information that we were collecting and the analysis that we were engaging in to produce the intelligence illustrated that yes, Ottawa would be the culmination of this, but there would be other factors along the way and across the country, and specifically in relation to specific infrastructure, like border crossings, and specifically in relation to what we refer to as the business of government, so Queen's Park and also obviously Parliament. That's what I mean, and discussion of plans to exceed our resources and our capacity to respond.


  30. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I'm thankful you asked me that. They had certain demands. We felt the demands could not be met. But we believed it would be unlikely for them to follow through on the promise to stay until the mandates were lifted, but we did think that it would be a long-term. It's just that over the period of time that would transpire people would become frustrated, people would need to return home. I want to be clear, we felt this would be a long-term event.


  31. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We felt that they would arrive on January 28th to 29th, and we were positioning ourselves to be prepared for a longer term. I don't know that I had a specific idea in mind, but we were even beginning to schedule and plan at that time for, you know, two weeks, three weeks, a month, et cetera. And we also didn't know what the nature of negotiations or discussion would be, i.e., Tyendinaga that occurred with multiple levels of government, so those things would have impact as well. But even at this time we were talking about scheduling to have relief, et cetera, and we were engaged in the OPP within our Major Incident Management group to be planning between the various entities that engage in that group.


  32. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Because the information that we were collecting from open sources and other venues, it was consistent that this is what they intended to do. That's one point. One of the critical points in producing intelligence is the reliability of the source, but also the validity of the information in juxtaposition with all the other information. Travelling from British Columbia or Nova Scotia to Ottawa shows an incredible motivation, and we felt that it would be there for a long period of time, and we felt that for the most part the entities that were engaged in the planning would follow through on what they were saying?


  33. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  34. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    The pronouncements they made were in earnest. I felt that they meant what they said. The grievances, and I want to stress, there were multiple grievances, had been expressed at this point for about 18 months. We had seen expressions of those grievances in multiple jurisdictions throughout Ontario specifically. There were new factors that we took into account. The experiences that were faced during the federal election illustrated that people were prepared to go to further lengths to illustrate dissatisfaction. The experience with the incoming passports that had occurred in relation to Covid-19, the impacts in the workplace for some people and how some people experienced that; the vaccination -- I think it was called “pediatric vaccination”, these were all factors for the people involved, for the people motivated, that impacted their motivation and increased their frustration and we believe that they would follow through on what they were saying they would do.


  35. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sure. In any intelligence initiative you create a collection plan. And when you satisfy the collection plan and you feel you filled that gap, but always you have gaps that are still there. The numbers are always a gap. Like so, for example, I’ve been asked a lot about the numbers. We couldn’t possibly know what the numbers would be because until that given day, we don’t know how many will arrive. What we could do, and what we did do, was reach out to our colleagues in the RCMP through the Divisions, to get assessments of the numbers of people to the extent they could; the numbers of vehicles to the extent they could; and specifically on tractor trailers, the types of vehicles, the mood, the behaviour, et cetera, et cetera. So we were trying to determine the size, the impact of the protest, et cetera. Now, that’s for all. Now, also in terms of being armed, I want to be clear on this. We had no -- we produced no intelligence to indicate that these individuals would be armed. And there has been a lot of hyperbole about that. That was something we wished to in the –- when people think about what happened on January 6th of 2020, that is presence of mind, but we produced no intelligence to indicate that that would be the case.


  36. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. So if I could just use, I guess, perhaps some of my experience. I’ve worked in undercover operations and managed undercover operations in entities that have significant grievances. And in some of those instances very specific plans are made and followed through or not followed through. Apart from stages, music, speeches et cetera, we could see no specific plans for actions of that type. And we believe, because of the amalgamation of affinity groups, there really was no specific plan in relation to that. It was a matter of -- we call it being event-driven and we’ll see what happens when we get there et cetera. We had no expectation that their demands would be met and so we wondered if that would create increased frustration and then we tried to collect information to produce intelligence on how that frustration might be borne out.


  37. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We were collecting information and producing intelligence on the organizers. That was a fast moving atmosphere of individuals that we didn’t necessarily know a lot about, nor do they come from our province. So those individuals may have a plan, probably a fairly loose plan, but when a large scale protest event et cetera occurs, there will be a lot of individuals or entities that attach themselves to that protest atmosphere. And then they may engage in activity that has absolutely nothing to do with what the individuals who are organizing the protests, entertain. So we were collecting information, which is part of our normal operation, about affinity groups or associated entities that may attach themself to this protest and trying to determine what their actions may be.


  38. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can say that we had already taken steps. In terms of individual entities that we were concerned about, we already had ongoing operations that would inform us as to what was occurring on those milieu and would they be engaged et cetera.


  39. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Our collection plan for this issue specifically needed to have the information on numbers, vehicles, mood, et cetera that was emanating from several different locations at various times. If I can just give an example. From BC on January 22nd. But it’s not just BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba; it’s various locations. Also on route there were a number of mini events that occurred in Regina, Medicine Hat, Winnipeg. And I’m only speaking to the west, because that was the longest period of time and we needed to get that information. And so we were reaching out -- excuse me – during the Hendon calls, to basically create what we referred to as an intelligence requirement for the divisions of intelligence in the RCMP. And the reason Sébastien is referring to it, is we did the same thing with the Sûreté du Québec.


  40. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s fair to say that the numbers would be extensive, and I would say in the hundreds. And the reason I say that is this. A lot of the events in the western part of the country were still a great distance from Ottawa and may not come to Ottawa. And there were a lot of localized events where people might just drive and participate. Exuberantly, yes, but they might only participate as far as Winnipeg. And for us in the Ontario Provincial Police, we are cognizant the drive from the Manitoba border to Ottawa is, like, a 20-hour drive. So we could not assess, necessarily, whether those truck drivers, or the drivers of private vehicles, commercial vehicles, would continue. In Quebec, much easier to do due to proximity, Sébastien in Quebec, sorry, Quebec City and Montreal. Certainly though, to your point, we knew it would be in the hundreds and we knew it would be significant. And there were multiple convoys, because that’s the information coming at that time from the west due to the distance to be travelled. But there were multiple convoys from within Ontario that just hadn’t left yet.


  41. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We were definitely keeping an eye on it, and here’s why. For any type of event of this nature, no matter what the motivation is, social media has altered the way we collect information and the meaning that we derive from it. we can always significantly discount some of the numbers that like it or say they’ll be there. What we noticed in this event, and in some other previous events related to these grievances, was that there was much more meaning in the support. And the reason that the finances are so important is money is a powerful motivator, and this was growing rapidly. And I can say it was growing at a rate that, for us, was unprecedented. And so that added impact, that added impact to our assessment that this would be significant.


  42. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think it’s both. We definitely felt there was widespread support. I mean, I realize that the narrative, going back to the spring of 2021, the narrative was that people who felt a certain way were a small number of people, et cetera. The fringe, so to speak. This was difficult for us to deal with in policing in Ontario specifically because there was a large degree of support and there were a number of instances. So it spoke to that support. That’s one thing. And yes, how the money would be utilized. There were a lot of ways we knew the money would be utilized, and our information -- fuel and logistics, et cetera. We didn’t know all the factors, but the biggest take away from the money was the degree of support and the means that would be in possession to make it more long-term, even for things such as accommodations.


  43. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think the answer is quite simple, because there was no major definitive plan. The organizing went into the convoy, the transport, the participation, but the event, what would actually transpire, was less organized. And I would say that in my experience, that isn’t that unusual.


  44. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s -- I can’t give a day. I can say this. We saw significant support. We saw significant fundraising. In real terms, we saw that play out in significant numbers of people and significant numbers of commercial vehicles and private support. In fact, our information from coming across western Canada was not only that, it was almost unanimous in our calls that there were people lined up on the sides of highways and on overpasses. And we even got to the point of talking about inclement weather that people were there. And we were quite surprised. So we felt it would be a significant event and it would be a long-term event, specifically because the demands could not be met. And the promise was to stay until they were met.


  45. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Oh, certainly a couple weeks, three weeks. I mean, there’s just so many variables after a plan meets a response that I can’t speak to that. And I didn’t know what the plan of the Ottawa Police Service was. So certainly -- when I say long term, I’m going to say, you know, certainly a week, probably two weeks, et cetera.


  46. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s a good point. And perhaps that’s something we can take away to improve our products in the future. These are strategic intelligence reports. There were other products that were provided that were operational and tactical in nature. We felt that we were stating that this will be a significant event and a long-term event, but we didn’t say the number of days. And I can’t -- I’ve played this back in my mind in terms of knowing what I know today, what would I say if I could myself back on January 25th, to use an example, and I would basically say what we said. But I don’t know that I could have put a day to it.


  47. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So these are documents that we create and put out to our frontline officers so that they are aware of what’s occurring, and so all -- and there may be an officer safety component, it may just be informational, but we also have a vested interest. It’s a way to collect information. So this document absolutely would have gone to every member of the Ontario Provincial Police. And I have an independent recollection that this document was sent with our Hendon Report to our recipients. So in so saying, that would go to approximately 32 services as well. We also provided it to the Criminal Intelligence Services of Ontario so it could be further disseminated. So it was disseminated broadly.


  48. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Right. They could utilize it in any way they could, parade briefings, shift briefings, et cetera, or dissemination.


  49. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  50. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We talked about it being long term. We talked about the logistical capacity of the entities involved. We talked about the degree of grievances. Most of the discussion was involved in collecting -- just to give you -- I would do an overview and introduce it and say what the pertinent issues were for the day in terms of information collection and intelligence production. Then our Inspector, Brian Barclay, who was our case manager, would have an analytical overview provided by our lead analyst, strategically and tactically, and then we would go to the other entities in basically, an order of primary importance, Ottawa Police Service being key, the RCMP being key, and the Sûreté du Québec being key. And then we would do a roundtable for everybody's input, et cetera. Certainly, we discussed this being long term, and how -- what intelligence requirements we would have in order to be -- help out. We recognized that the Ottawa Police Service was our primary client. There's only a few points in time over this period of time, roughly up til February 20th, where the clients alter to Toronto Police Service, et cetera. Ottawa is - - and the Windsor Police Service.


  51. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So there's some -- I noticed that we were being pressed for numbers, and at this point, I reached out to our Indigenous Policing Bureau. And that may seem strange to some people who are listening, but our Indigenous Policing Bureau houses our provincial liaison teams, and our provincial liaison teams are interlocuters to organizers, to truck drivers, to all the people who are responsible for running the protest. And they had established relationships, so they were the individuals who were providing the numbers because they were there to observe them and stay in once place to do that. So at the start, it was difficult. And I believe in some of the cases, there was really difficult weather, et cetera, so we made a clear delineation about who would be responsible for which tasks. So on this case -- I'm sorry, what is the date of that?


  52. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. So that’s why the numbers weren’t there on that point in time.


  53. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think in our assessment, we said, you know, it's going to be significant, like, in the hundreds.


  54. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Can I just make a point? I just -- a lot of your questions have to do with preparation and the purpose of intelligence. I just want to explain my mindset. This might seem anecdotal, but it's important to me. intelligence is made up of two words, "inter" and "legare". And in Latin, that means to choose between. So I really see it as our job as the Intelligence Bureau, insomuch as the Police Service Act permits us to help police of jurisdiction and in specialized services, to inform decision making, to allow them to choose between operational courses of action in their preparation. So that’s how -- that’s the premise under which we were working.


  55. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Right. So this is a key component. I'd have to put you in the mindset of the Ontario Provincial Police at this point. In terms of large-scale critical incidents and protests, McKenzie Meadows occupation, which occurred in close proximity to Six Nations, for which there was an injunction in September of 2020, was something that we were contemplating at this time. There was the theft of some large-scale heavy machinery, and the use of that heavy machinery to tear up roads and impact rail lines and to threaten critical infrastructures such as gas lines, et cetera. So that was something that was heavy on our minds at the time. We had no intelligence to indicate what the use of that heavy machinery would be, be it compressors, be it tractors, et cetera, apart from some in relation to snow clearing for the purposes of parking. So that was a key thing that we were trying to determine, because the inductive leap there is why bring the equipment if you have no intent to utilize it?


  56. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    There were, like, on the back of flatbeds, there was a large compressor. There were all- terrain vehicles, and I'm sorry, I don't know the -- I mean, very, very large, like, a monster truck type all-terrain vehicle. And then there were -- there was equipment that could be utilized for digging, et cetera.


  57. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, Commercial Motor Vehicles and Personal Motor Vehicles. And the rationale for the delineation is that large-scale commercial motor vehicles would be consistent with the intentions of the organizers, and also more detrimental, more impactful in terms of impeding the business of government in downtown Ottawa.


  58. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, absolutely, it was concerning. I mean, just from a planning perspective, what this is causing, this puts me in a hard spot, because I'm not in the Ottawa Police Service, but if I -- I was a detachment commander in Orillia, and if I was facing this situation, you're saying to yourself, "Where are these trucks planning to go, and how will we house this, how will be manage this?" And at a certain point, the numbers become irrelevant, because once you surpass a certain number, it basically becomes impossible.


  59. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No. I was not involved in OPS planning.


  60. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, I'll be blunt. I wouldn't know if the planning was being based on the reports. We have an expression often in policing that you stay within your lane, and so my lane -- pardon the pun -- my lane is intelligence and my goal, as I saw it, was to produce intelligence to assist in decision making, both to the Ontario Provincial Police and to the Ottawa Police Service, which was what I was attempting to do. I was involved in planning, as I've mentioned, in the Ontario Provincial Police. We created the Major Incident Management Group, and so we were having discussions about that, as it would impact other jurisdictions, including -- and most specifically including our own.


  61. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No. Yeah, I didn’t see Ottawa Police Service planning. I assume they were planning. I now know information I didn’t in terms of other people's witness statements. I assumed they were planning. Ottawa is a very experienced police service and has dealt with many of these events, so I knew that they would be planning and utilizing that information.


  62. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can't recall specifically why February 4th was said, but I believe it was the collection or capturing of open source information that cited February 4th. But I’ll say again, that would have only been from one entity of many. And so for me, personally, the dates are less important than the fact that there was going to be significance and longevity to the event.


  63. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    If I could just use an example -- I know you’re asking a lot about that, and it’s an important question. In other events, such as Toronto, both on the 5th of February and the 12th of February, in that case, we had definitive information about timing from the events; “We will not be there for long. It will be this long,” et cetera; “We will not stay.”


  64. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. Just with the numbers that were there and the grievances that were possessed, we felt that there was the potential for a public safety threat and an officer safety threat due to the role that police officers are put into in these situations. There was, specifically, a great deal of frustration in the Province of Ontario with police services in Ontario enforcing the Reopening Ontario Act because a lot of people, and some people who are philosophically supportive of that side, felt that it wasn’t our role and that even the fact that it was unjust and unconstitutional and that would elevate the threat posed by some people towards the police.


  65. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So, first, coming across Canada -- and I’m going to speak bluntly but I have to say that -- I’m trying to be blunt but I don’t have all the facts in relation to this. There was almost no reported criminal activity of any of this activity coming across Canada. There was a motor-vehicle collision on the day before the event, and that had to do with somebody running into somebody who was in the freedom convoy, so it was conspicuous for the absolute lack of criminal activity. So we were concerned because when a plan meets a counterplan, we didn’t know what would transpire. We were also concerned, in large cities such as Ottawa, such as Toronto, protests attract a multitude of elements who may have absolutely nothing to do with the protest. There’s been a lot made of extremists, et cetera. That’s a difficult word for me because it doesn’t really have a definition in law and it’s very subjective. But individuals with an individual agenda -- sometimes I refer to it as an “independent asymmetric threat”, in the vernacular, lone wolf -- that’s the type of thing that were more concerned about.


  66. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sure. We in the Interprovincial Police, we’ve come to call this the “elastic effect”. When we deal with a specific event in a specific locale, the dealing with that event will immediately lead to a flurry of social media, some true, some not, and that information that emanates will have an impact. So we’ve experienced that with a large of degree of protests elsewhere. We experienced that in G8 and G20; we’ve experienced that with Indigenous critical incidents. So whenever we go to take an action in a location, we do a strategic intelligence assessment to try to ascertain what the impact of that action will have. So to be very specific to this, if the RCMP took action on the border in Alberta, and if the individuals in Alberta, or the individual entities were closely connected to people in the Ottawa, then there would be an impact.


  67. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  68. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, did I observe what?


  69. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so just please recall that HENDON wasn’t all about this threat variant. So HENDON actually came to fruition as a result of the enforcement action in British Columbia in relation to the Wetʼsuwetʼen having immediate and apparent ramifications in Tyendinaga for three weeks, and then in the area of Six Nations for like a month, and then in the area of Six Nations again in Caledonia McKenzie Meadows for a period of months, so significantly, yes. In relation to this activity, yes, the publications of enforcement in relation to the Reopening Ontario Act lead, at times, to other activity and other protests. I remember specifically events Toronto that had to do with certain restaurants acting in defiance of the Reopening Ontario Act having an impact in relation to protests. So that is why Coutts, Alberta was important to us. And I should also say that at this point, and from January 29th on, our lens and our collection had evolved significantly. From January 29th on, and every day until the fruition, the Ontario Provincial Police, with the permission of the Ottawa Police Service was engaged on ground in a covert capacity to collect information about all the things that we’d be interested in in terms of mood, tenor, plans, et cetera.


  70. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, “civil disobedience” or “direct action” are terms we use for protests when it pushes beyond totally lawful descent, like entirely lawful descent. And given that we had a great deal of online rhetoric requesting, “If you cannot travel here, act locally,” and we had organic movements communicating that they would do things in certain locations -- I know right near general headquarters in Orillia and Barrie, there was an organic growth of a group that would engage in low-scale civil disobedience on highways. So we certainly saw growth in this regard and HENDON, every day, talked about, and these reports tracked what activity was occurring in what locales. And there was an extensive, so much so that some things we just didn’t look at because it was sort of not below our radar but below the threshold of what we would engage ourselves in. I know that there was information collected in relation to Maritime transportation so we were concerned about different ports in Vancouver and on the East Coast, and we were certainly concerned about border crossings because we had collected information to that regard.


  71. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    The grievances still exist, and the people aren't changing, and they're not achieving their goals at ending mandates, and several other factors, so we felt that they would continue. And I'll be honest for two -- like I have to say, a lot of this stems from pandemic legislation and -- but there were a raft of grievances involved here. Some, I would say, is anti-authoritarian, some may have had to do with firearms legislation, some had to do with oil and gas prices. There were a multitude of grievances that people possessed. Some was specific to individuals, such as the Prime Minister or the Federal Government. So there are multitude of grievances occurring. Some was specific to our premier, Premier Ford.


  72. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's a fairly common event. If I could go back to even the G8 and G20 in Kananaskis, and the G8 and G20 in Huntsville area in Toronto, entities of various natures create a security culture and collect information and produce intelligence reports, and that is how they maintain their own security. And there are various skillsets, and I would say the skillsets in this entity were fairly significant, especially with some of the individuals, so they produced intelligence documentation in terms of what they anticipated, law enforcement techniques, et cetera, negotiating processes. So it was something that we were going through.


  73. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    There was also -- sorry, I should say one other thing. There was also information collected that they -- some of the individuals involved were looking for, quote/unquote "infiltrators" because of course they would be cognizant, I would think they would be cognizant that there would be undercover operators collecting information during the protest.


  74. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. I would say that for any protest of this type, and I mean various types of protests, they're primarily made up of regular citizens, and they're looking for a form of legitimacy, and then in the media they are presented in a very different light, depending upon the nature of the media, whether it's news reporting or editorialising, but by and large they're looking for legitimacy. So -- and I'm not casting a judgement on this, but when they receive legitimacy, whether it's an Indigenous issue in Tyendinaga, based upon past grievances, residential schools, or whether it's a Freedom Convoy issue in Ottawa, based upon perceptions of civil liberties and constitutional rights, they become emboldened. Because they feel themselves to be illegitimate already, and when they're leant legitimacy they feel emboldened.


  75. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And they communicate to that effect. That's part of the strategy.


  76. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, I lose track of the date. What ---


  77. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay, the 7th. The 7th, yeah.


  78. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, it's a great question, and it's one I anticipated, and it's one that on that day we had a great deal of discussion about. Why? We put in that there was a potential national security threat because of the movement to the borders, and specifically to the Ambassador Bridge. The apparent long-term capacity for the protesters to stay in place in Ottawa, the ongoing calls for actions elsewhere, the events in Coutts and the movement to the Ambassador Bridge and discussion of the tunnel. The Ambassador Bridge specifically because I believe it has the largest sort of exchange in terms of financial -- a dollar value in our country. So that is why we put that in in terms of a potential. I will say I spoke about that with colleagues from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and with the Integrative National Security Enforcement Team, and they did not see things that reached their threshold in terms of what would be deemed a threat to the security of Canada. So we were an anomaly in that regard, but we phrased that as a potential.


  79. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry. Okay, I just want to be clear. They weren't concerned about me utilising it. I wanted to be certain that we were using the best terminology we could in a very fluid situation. So when this information is collected, our analysts are, I use the phrase "drinking from a firehose" in some regards, and trying to produce intelligence under tight timelines. So they came to the determination that there were potential national security threats. I reviewed the report, and we had Inspectors Barclay and Walker, and I, significant discussions about it and it's why I reached out to my colleagues. I became content with the phrasing that it was a potential and that they -- I was also content with their assessment.


  80. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think in essence it means the same thing, that we have a potential concern in terms of sovereignty in our border crossings, and our economic integrity in terms of trade and national security in that regard. It might also have to do with the analytical assessments of threat to reputation by virtue of coverage in the international media of what was transpiring in Canada.


  81. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I agreed with the fact that it had potential to be so.


  82. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’ve never seen this document. I did have a meeting with the Integrated Planning Cell when it was initiated. So I’m going to say yes. I’m just not familiar with the document.


  83. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I believe, just to be clear, I was contacted by then Chief Superintendent Pardy of the Ontario Provincial Police, and he was contacting me, together with, I believe a chief superintendent from the RCMP, Lou, and they were in discussions about the creation of a joint planning cell, an integrated planning cell, and I offered to them an intelligence briefing. I believe that’s what this is about.


  84. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, so this is a bit difficult, because these aren’t my notes. Okay. So I was discussing provincial liaison teams and I believe that they are an absolutely excellent source -- sorry, they’re an excellent aspect to two-way communication in events of this type. So they can communicate the situation to people who are engaging in terms of perhaps what jeopardy they may be, what consequences they may face, and also lead towards negotiated solutions. So that’s a very positive thing that we’ve utilized in the past, if it’s done, if it’s done properly. That was my component of this. In terms of the meeting with Chief Sloly at noon, that’s not me. That’s C/Supt. Pardy. I know that we discussed the intelligence with Chief Pardy, and there were other -- I’m sorry, I didn’t look at the list. I had my entire intelligence management team to give a complete overview. Chief Pardy was of the opinion that the planning wasn’t Intelligence-led. And so he wanted to have a discussion of that with the -- sorry, with Ottawa Police Service.


  85. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Mark Patterson was the superintendent of the Ottawa Police Service Intelligence Directorate. We were notified of that in early January.


  86. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Ken Bryden was the Inspector of the Ottawa Police Service Intelligence Directorate and reported to Mark Patterson.


  87. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, my eyes aren’t the best. I’m trying to keep up. Yeah. Okay. So I began giving -- I was requested by Commissioner Carrique and Supt. Mack Denala (Phonetic) of the OPP to provide intelligence briefings to what were referred to as the Big 12, meaning the Big 12 services of Ontario, the Chiefs of Police. I did so. And following that briefing, there’s parts of this that don’t involve me, so I believe D/Cst. Stephane Quesnel of the Ottawa Police Service sent an email to Insp. Barclay of the OPP and that email stipulated that Chief Sloly wished to have every Hendon report since its inception. And I was surprised by that request because the Ottawa Police Service did have every Hendon report since its inception, and Chief Sloly himself had received every Hendon report since January 1st of 2021. So for over a year. And so we were very, very engaged in a lot of operations and analysis and I didn’t want people to be looking for reports to disseminate for the course of what was almost two years at that point, when the police service already possessed them, and they weren’t relevant. The Hendon reports in February of 2020 were not relevant to the situation at hand. So I was explaining this to Mark Patterson so that he could deal with it internally in the Ottawa Police Service.


  88. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s -- I referenced Hendon in my report to the Big 12 and gave a background on it. And all of the people who participated, their services were participating in Hendon. It surprised me that we got that request, because I would have thought they would have already known and had their reports. So that’s why I was very specific in my response and told Mark all the things that had been going on, including providing an excerpt to my invitations to teleconferences that were relating to the issue at hand, the freedom convoy.


  89. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. So -- and I’m sorry, I don’t have my notebook. But anyways, I believe it was on February 11th. It was a Friday. I believe it was Friday, February 11th. And so that was a briefing that I provided to the Big 12 again. I want to be clear on this, I can’t tell you how many people were on that call, but they were chiefs of police. There were definitely more than 12. And I had been asked to provide this, and it was -- I think it occurred seven times. So I was asked to provide, I believe I had five questions. And they pertained to four geographic locales. So the locales were the City of Ottawa, the City of Toronto, the City of Windsor, and Sarnia/the 402 just outside of Sarnia in OPP jurisdiction. That was the four locales. The questions, to the best -- I think I should be able to remember.


  90. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  91. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I do recall them.


  92. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. That’s correct.


  93. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, what I understood it to mean is the best information possible, but he was very clear in articulating “only confirmed intelligence”. And that’s problematic in that you receive information, you produce intelligence, intelligence is not necessarily always factual. It's an assessment. And I certainly cannot provide a confirmation of a quantitative factor about the future. So in terms of I only want confirmed intelligence of the number of people in a location in the future, intelligence trade craft, or any trade craft, could not possibly provide that.


  94. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No, that was the first time we had the request.


  95. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I’ve never experienced it before. I found it unusual. And one thing that I perhaps found unusual is that generally the Chief of Police is trying to ascertain information or intelligence about their jurisdiction and, you know, the Ontario Provincial Police, or the RCMP, may be different in that regard, but not about the exact number of protestors on Highway 402 in Sarnia in the future.


  96. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes. Yeah, sorry, there are two presentations, so just for clarity, I -- there were a lot of briefings that I was asked to provide. The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police had formulated a planning entity. Our lead in that regard was Superintendent Mike McDonnell and Superintendent Dan O’Lakas(ph). So I would provide briefings on what was transpiring in multiple jurisdictions and what I felt would occur in those locations. And the specific purpose of that, was that the various police services could then make decisions about the dispersal of uniformed resources, be they uniformed resources or public order units: soft TACT, hard TACT in terms of that -- so that’s the OACP meeting.


  97. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, so that meeting occurred later in the evening of the 12th; I know it was set for 19:00hrs, it may have been delayed, and that’s the so-call “Big 12” meeting, which is a different meeting than the OACP.


  98. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I was asked by the OPP Commissioner Carrique to provide an intelligence overview. I have to say that on that day -- for Thursday and Friday -- I’m sorry, I’m going by memory -- the 10th and 11th, there were multiple priorities. So the Convoy protestors or the leadership of several segments, were planning to not move the entire protest, but to make a show of a protest in Toronto, and specifically at Queen’s Park. So I created, and my team created a separate collection plan and an operational plan to assist the Toronto Police Service. And it involved multiple entities -- I mean police services, because there were multiple rallying points and we were dispersing our intelligence personnel to go to the rallying points to collect the information to produce the intelligence for Toronto in real time in their Incident Command Centre/Major Event Centre et cetera. That protest was to have occurred and did occur on Saturday the 12th. So the meeting you’re referring to occurred after that. So I gave an intelligence overview of what was transpiring across the province. Obviously Toronto, the events in Toronto played a significant component -- or took up a significant component of that. Chief Sloly was not happy with the briefing or the presentation. He made his displeasure evident and articulated that he didn’t like comparisons between Toronto and Ottawa and then spoke about Hendon, basically about the Ontario Provincial Police not fulfilling their intelligence mandate to assist police services of jurisdiction and that he and his -- I don’t want to misspeak -- I’m going to say his team, but he referred to a scribe and he referred to a lawyer that were present, which surprised me, I never encountered that before in an intelligence briefing either -- had reviewed the Hendon reports and there was nothing -- I don’t know what his word was, so I don’t -- nothing of value nothing of significance or nothing that could have assisted them. So the meeting went -- I mean it was difficult. Our Commissioner intervened and we ended up having a separate discussion between Commissioner -- this is all virtual -- between Commissioner Carrique, myself and Deputy Commissioner Chuck Cox.


  99. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, I completely disagree. I’ll use the terms “inter and legere”, I believe we provided -- I believed that a discerning read of the intelligence products throughout the fall of 2021 and certainly from the 13th of January in 2022, and then with the tele- conferences where the Ottawa Police Service participated in, and the intelligence products that had been produced daily since that period of time leading to on this date, February 12th, said that there will be a significant event in Ottawa. It will begin on the 28th or 29th of January. It will incorporate large groups of motivated people who are protesting and these are their grievances. It will incorporate large use of commercial motor vehicles, tractor trailers. Their intention is to impede the business of government and to be in the downtown area. They used terminology like “gridlock”. We said there was no exit strategy and their demands could not be met and it would be significant and there would be other calls for resources because there would be other events. I believe -- I did say to him, there’s no golden key. Like sometimes when people look for a product, an intelligence product, it’s like a golden key that will answer absolutely everything. Intelligence is designed to inform decision- making. I believe that our information collected and our intelligence produced from our entire partnership, were instrumental in informing decision-making about what would occur. So I disagree. But I did say that in terms of his displeasure with what he referred to as a comparison of Toronto and Ottawa, one of the issues is, sometimes in planning people fail to appreciate an event that hasn’t occurred yet. I call it a deference of the important for the urgent. When Toronto acted, Toronto had the benefit of the experience in Ottawa to say, “Yeah, this is a big deal; this is really going to happen”. So -- and I agree with that, and I did also tell him that he and the Ottawa Police Service were faced with a difficult situation, 100 per cent, I totally agree with that.


  100. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    From a philosophical or ideological perspective many of the grievances believe that the legislation that was being passed during Covid-19 was unconstitutional and unjust and that the restrictions on their freedoms were resultantly unjust. So new legislation being passed was a self-fulfilling prophecy. I mean some people on one side of the coin call it a conspiracy theorist, there’s a conspiracy theory that they’re going to invoke the Emergencies Act. So when the Emergencies Act is invoked, it impacts the people who feel that way and it aggravates their perspective and creates more frustration. So the people who are engaged in the protest did not believe that the Emergencies Act should be invoked, did not believe government should have more powers and police should have more powers. So they are seen, and from their perspective, the correctness of their stance.


  101. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Good, thank you.


  102. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that’s correct.


  103. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that’s correct.


  104. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’m not aware of the criticism in relation to Idle No More but that is certainly possible.


  105. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I do -- I do recall that criticism, yes.


  106. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And I recall that, and I certainly understand that as well.


  107. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I agree that the events are difficult. I agree that it would be difficult for the public to understand what actions the police do or do not take, yes.


  108. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And that may be the appropriate approach, yes.


  109. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And certainly that’s a consideration, that’s a possibility, yes.


  110. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, it could, as in it occurred in Ipperwash, yes.


  111. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  112. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I agree with that, yes.


  113. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yes.


  114. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  115. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I agree that there were elements of this protest in Ottawa that were unprecedented; the financial component, the travel. I agree there were elements of that that were unprecedented, yes.


  116. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I don’t know that I can answer that, necessarily. I can say this: I do believe there were elements that were unprecedented, as you said. I do believe there have been attempts to do things like this for shorter period of times, as in Toronto on February 12th. But I definitely agree that the longevity and some of the tactics utilized are unprecedented, and the financing.


  117. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s fair that planning can be labour intensive, yes.


  118. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s true that months could be required in relation to certain events. It’s also true that circumstances present themselves that require more immediacy in terms of planning: The G8, G20 is an example of the months of planning. Other examples illustrate themselves and don’t permit that.


  119. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s the first production of intelligence from the Ontario Provincial Police, yes.


  120. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  121. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No, that’s true. I mean, there was 15 days, yeah.


  122. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It provided our best assessment based upon the known information, and it stimulated further collection.


  123. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’m not able to remember the wording specifically. I mean, you’d have it in the assessment but I -- honestly, I don’t want to say what it says in the assessment.


  124. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  125. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And that’s something that remained true until it came to fruition.


  126. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  127. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  128. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  129. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I agree.


  130. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s the first -- sorry; that is the next provision of a written intelligence document. In the interim there had been communication back and forth between the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau and Ottawa Police Service Intelligence personnel.


  131. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sir, do you mind pulling it up just ---


  132. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's true, yeah.


  133. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think that they did impede the activity of government by virtue of their presence, and I think that led to significant discussion about the workings of Parliament and some security concerns. I think they also attempted to impede activity in Toronto in relation to Queens Park on February 5th and 12th.


  134. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. I can't -- yeah, I can't speak to whether any of the members of Parliament felt impeded, so, yeah, so I -- yeah.


  135. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can't honestly say. I mean, I guess if there was any American citizen that participated, I guess that would be true. I can say that the impact and influence that was feared possibly by some American activists never occurred.


  136. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  137. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, but to be honest, we don't concentrate, I mean, generally speaking in intelligence on by-law infractions, although that was an important point here. I do believe that it spoke to impeding the business of government in the downtown core and business.


  138. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    But it did not make specific reference to residential areas.


  139. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, it's a subjective term, but, no, there's no reference to that, no.


  140. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that was certainly a potential, a possibility.


  141. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I mean, I have to say, from my perspective, the proactive handling of those possibilities was done through Intelligence operations. The presence of a Public Order Unit would respond to the outcome coming to fruition.


  142. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I would concur with that.


  143. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  144. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct. So I just want to point out on that, there were multiple affinity groups and multiple individuals, multiple grievances, and we were trying to address that and did through the creation of Tactical Intelligence Reports. They were completed later in that week and provided to the Ottawa Police Service.


  145. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, that's true. So, I mean, when we follow social media, it will be of unknown reliability. We try to mitigate that unknown factor with juxtaposing it in the context, and we came to the determination that there was significant support.


  146. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct. And I should say as part of Intelligence tradecraft, that is always a gap right up until the event actually occurs, because we would never know the exact numbers.


  147. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I do remember reading that.


  148. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  149. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  150. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It's not listed as one of the threats, no.


  151. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  152. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, I should comment on that. In terms of it's a -- weapons, no, in terms of being discerned as such, no. Presence of people with fringe views, I would say there were people present with fringe views, depending upon your determination of fringe.


  153. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That is accurate, true.


  154. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I -- not that I'm aware of. That would be best posed to the Ottawa Police Service.


  155. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I just want to point out, just I was involved in the production of strategic intelligence and providing a best assessment to inform decision making. In terms of some of the questions you're asking in terms of the use of, I think that's best to the operational commanders from the City of Ottawa -- or, sorry, from the Ottawa Police Service.


  156. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, words such as significant in terms, I mean, the numbers to me become -- if it's significant and there are large numbers, then perhaps the actual quantity is not as important. But, no, we didn't mention the length of stay, but we did certainly say that we felt it would be long term based upon the fact that they were going to stay until their demands were met and we felt they couldn't be.


  157. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So we worked together in Hendon with the Ottawa Police Service, and that was sort of my purview of responsibility. In terms of public order, et cetera, that would be a question that should be asked to Superintendent Abrams in terms of the OPP operations.


  158. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I'm not aware of the memos, but I wouldn't be in my capacity as the Intelligence leader.


  159. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  160. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, that’s correct.


  161. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That is not -- I'm not certain how PLT was utilized in the Ottawa Police Service.


  162. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct. And to be quite blunt, you're going to see that throughout because there was no -- apart from the public order event that would occur and be significant and of long standing, there was no specific intelligence about a specific action, i.e., an attack on Parliament, an attack on anything else.


  163. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  164. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I want to be clear on this. We felt it would be of long standing. The reason that February 4th was cited was because there was a specific piece of information that they would be there until at least February 4th, but it does not preclude the long-standing significant event that we said that would occur until the demands were met, which they wouldn't be.


  165. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes. There were two. I'm sorry, is it the one on February 12th, which was the more -- the Saturday, February 12th?


  166. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    There was one on February 5th as well.


  167. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, virtual meetings with the people in intelligence to set up our collection and our information and intelligence routing to assist them in their plans.


  168. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  169. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  170. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  171. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    In the main, yes. There were multitudes of demands, but those were some significant ones, and for the federal government to drop some of their regulations and mandates, and we didn’t feel that would be met, yes.


  172. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  173. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  174. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I saw many accounts, yes. I saw no information collected or intelligence produced in that regard, no, to support that, no.


  175. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So yes, I know where you're going, and I want to be fair to my colleagues in planning, I saw online rhetoric, I saw information on social media, I saw assertions of that type of activity, information. I'm aware of no intelligence that was produced that would support concern in that regard.


  176. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So again, not to be contradictory, because I'm just trying to be fulsome, our role is crime prevention, law enforcement, assistance to victims, public order, and emergency management. Therefore, in relation to the things you are discussing, we collected all the information which some information asserted attempts at that, so we did see that and had to consider that. Did we have any credible intelligence that that would occur? No.


  177. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can. Sorry, where did I say I have problems with that?


  178. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. So the word "extremism" does not have a description in law. Section 83 of the Criminal Code speaks to terrorist offences which possibly could be synonymous with extremism. Sections 318, 319, and 320 of the Criminal Code speak to hate-motivated crimes, advocation of genocide, et cetera. Other sections of the Criminal Code such as section 430 speak to acts against religious property that could be deemed to be extremist. I have problems with the term because everyone has a subjective belief as to what extremism means. At the low end and banal end, it means someone I disagree with, and I find that problematic. As a working definition for myself, I utilize "extremism" and I try to premise it in law by somebody who would advocate and utilize violence to achieve their goals, and they could be motivated politically, ideologically, religiously, et cetera.


  179. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I work -- we work with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on a daily basis. We have a Provincial Anti-Terrorism Section that is integrated with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. We are integrated with the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team and have members on that. That is their threshold and, as you’ve cited, Section -- Part II of the CSIS Act in terms of the threats to Canada. I communicated with my colleagues in INSET in Ottawa, INSET in Toronto, CSIS in Toronto, CSIS in Ottawa. They participated on the HANDON calls. I believe that I would have been informed. And in terms of those delineations, I guess I’ll know more at the end of these hearings but I received no information in relation to those -- the probability of that activity.


  180. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, the O’Connor Commission spoke to that in the Arar Inquiry.


  181. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    CSIS collects, advises, retains for government security intelligence. We act on criminal intelligence and translate that into evidence for law enforcement action.


  182. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We have a great relationship -- and I’m not trying to skirt your question. We have a great relationship with intelligence entities. I know that CSIS will present, as will the RCMP. We have a good relationship and I believe that I would be informed. But I also believe there would be instances where activity is occurring within that sphere that I may not be advised of because it may not be within my purview of the Police Services Act and criminal intelligence international in scope, perhaps.


  183. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Have I been advised by those actors that I have not been informed of something?


  184. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  185. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I remember the events and I would attribute that to what I refer to as “independent asymmetric threat”. I don’t want to say that that’s the last event just because I don’t want to misspeak. I am aware of other events but they weren’t, that I’m aware of, in the National Capital Region.


  186. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I believe that lessons were learned. I believe that resources were increased. I believe that cooperation and collaboration was enhanced. I was say this, as a caveat, an independent asymmetric threat, a lone wolf, is the largest concern for somebody in a position such as mine or other people who appear before you because we rely upon the collection of information to produce intelligence and, in the instance of an independent asymmetric threat, the circle of trust may be one, and that is a very difficult environment in which to succeed.


  187. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, certainly. I mean can -- that’s an area where the age of social media can assist because in many examples of lone wolves, as you refer to, those are preceded by indicators of activity.


  188. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So that is of assistance and that is something the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau engages in.


  189. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It does not require one, no.


  190. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Can I give you my answer in two parts?


  191. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. I would always agree with any recommendation such as that, to review what transpired and to how we can improve. I myself have done that already with -- in relation to these events. I will say that I honestly believe that we do have a high degree of collaboration in this province and in this country, and we do have trusted partnerships, and we do produce credible intelligence. It is not perfect, and it can always be improved, and I would gladly participate in any entity of that sort.


  192. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  193. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think that’s a correct assessment.


  194. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And I just want to give you like two -- there are issues we face as a law enforcement community proactively that are broader than our jurisdictions and galvanizing and collaborating can assist us in that regard.


  195. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s difficult ground for me. I can’t speak for the Ottawa Police Service. I can say that I’m happy with the ---


  196. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  197. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. That would be for other people ---


  198. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- to consider. I do believe that we had the resources that were required -- I’m speaking of intelligence -- to engage proactively and strategically ascertain what would transpire.


  199. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Aspects of it. The fundraising, yes. The issues, the grievances, were different. So there are certainly unprecedented components of it.


  200. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It presents a logistical change in the capacity of entities to fundraise. But I will say that we had already experienced that in McKenzie Meadows occupation and had approached entities such as GoFundMe to take steps in relation to that it aligns with their terms of agreement.


  201. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Roughly, yeah. It’s complex but that’s accurate.


  202. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  203. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, it’s different, for sure, 100 percent, I agree.


  204. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. Sorry, I think I understand. Our purpose in the Strategic Intelligence Reports of Hendon was to inform decision-making. Part of that decision- making is police operational planning to prepare.


  205. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    But I will -- I just have to say that there were other components. Once the event becomes a reality then the tactical intelligence collection through different investigative techniques and the information acquired by that activity lends itself to more operational and enhanced operational planning.


  206. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  207. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  208. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    The OPP Intelligence Bureau did not advise entities to do that, that's correct. I just want to say that in the interprovincial police, like within a police service, intelligence is part of the Major Incident Management group where when things impact our jurisdiction we have discussions of that. But no, we certainly as an Intelligence Bureau, as a Hendon, did not act to advise Ottawa what they should do.


  209. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think the answer there were there were no reasonable grounds to believe that they were committing a criminal offence at the time.


  210. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    They were in transit, and we were collecting information for that purpose. They were in transit and they were engaging in a lawful way. In fact, we were -- that was impressed upon us by the information collected.


  211. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I would agree with that assessment, and also the intelligence said that there would not be an event, a public order event until they entered the City of Ottawa.


  212. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I don't accept that. I don't recall any information which would lead to the induction that this will only be a three-day event. We believed, and our belief only became more enhanced as time went on, that it would be a longer event. I do know that February 4th, that came from a piece of information, but in all of our discussions and my read of the intelligence is this will be a significant event and it will be an event of longstanding. And there were also convoys arriving, leaving, et cetera, with a great deal of alteration.


  213. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  214. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, I actually don't. I don't know if it's the colour scheme. Is there something at the top?


  215. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think this is a Provincial Liaison Team document.


  216. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  217. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I'm sorry, it's the first document that I have seen that I don't recognise as such. It may be -- I've never seen this before, and it may be a provincially... Oh, I'm just going to read. So I recognise it as an OPP document.


  218. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  219. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So it's an East Region document, okay.


  220. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  221. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  222. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. And I'm sorry if I spoke incorrectly. Scott Semple, Inspector Semple, who is referenced here, and Superintendent Abrams, who I believe will be here tomorrow, they would be aware of this. And I'm not trying to say there wasn't a plan. My engagement as an intelligence professional wouldn't lead me to be engaged in that.


  223. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can speak to this document. If Scott Semple felt the plan was robust that's what he articulated here


  224. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    He's a Critical Incident Commander and Inspector in the OPP and Detachment Commander.


  225. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  226. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  227. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    He is the Commander of the Investigations Organized Crime Command, and I am one of the bureaus that reports to him.


  228. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  229. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  230. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  231. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can't speak to that exactly. I think -- that may be the case. I think that he had a discussion, I'm going from an independent recollection, with other police services, including Ottawa, and he got a lot of positive feedback, and he sent that email. I think that that's what happened.


  232. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. I'm just -- sorry, I'm just going to have a quick -- yeah.


  233. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. Is it my comments? "Further analytical" ---


  234. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. Sorry, I'm just looking. I didn't mention any time in my email.


  235. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's what I was checking for. And I see, I see that Deputy Cox mentions that it should maintain safety and security throughout the weekend.


  236. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And that's what he said. I accept that. I didn't make any comment in relation to time sensitive.


  237. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  238. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    He's a superintendent.


  239. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  240. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I do ---


  241. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I remember -- sorry. I just want to be clear. So the request's from Chief Sloly, and I'm speaking to the four locations, the five questions, that came on the 11th. I believe that the comments you're referring to, and I do remember them, came on the 13th, and that had to do with the request to appear before the Ottawa Police Services Board.


  242. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So they're two different factors.


  243. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  244. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  245. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It was -- I mean, to be blunt, the entire circumstance was unusual. It's unusual to be asked as the head of Intelligence for the OPP to brief the Ottawa Police Services Board. That's point one. And then to be followed up with the next day, I think -- I'm sorry, I don't recall her name, Christiane -- I think it was the lawyer for the Ottawa Police Services Board that provided the email. And I know that Superintendent Patterson felt that we should not -- we, the OPP, should not be doing that because that should be the responsibility of the Ottawa Police Service Intelligence Director. And that is -- the entire situation is unusual, yes.


  246. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So Chief Sloly asked verbally in the meeting, and he asked me together when I was with my Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. The formal invitation came the next day on the Sunday morning. When I received the invitation, I didn't respond at first. I discussed it with Deputy Commissioner Cox and Commissioner Curry, and we agreed.


  247. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We agreed to attend.


  248. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  249. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's correct.


  250. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I spoke about that with Deputy Cox and Commissioner Carrique. That too was unusual, not that I spoke with it but that it occurred. I do not know if that was discussed by them with Chief Sloly.


  251. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I found it unusual, I will say that. I understand the desire to have the OPS Intelligence brief the OPS Police Services Board. I found it unusual, to be honest, from the 11th, 12th and 13th, 14th and 15th, there was a lot that transpired that was unusual in relation to our integration and relationship.


  252. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Perhaps. It's unusual, for certain.


  253. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Good evening.


  254. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  255. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's roughly -- can I just comment on that?


  256. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Just in Intelligence tradecraft, I find it's a bit like financial advice. You always want exactly what's going to happen in the future. And we like to say that a plan never survives contact with the enemy. So it's impossible to expect that it will be exactly like that. So I just say that as context to what you said.


  257. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    But I agree with what you said.


  258. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I agree with that ---


  259. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- assessment.


  260. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, can you just go up to the very top? I just want to make sure. So I'm a little bit -- yeah, I'm a little bit uncertain because it isn't my document, but I do recognize the names, and I do know what the Integrated Planning Cell is, and I was contacted by Chief Pardy and others who are participating. And they had said what their purpose was and what their integration was and what they were trying to achieve. And we arranged to have an intelligence briefing. I'm thrown off slightly because it says start time 0700. And I'll be -- I got an invitation to a meeting that ran the entire day. I remember being confused by that because I didn't know when I was required to provide my briefing, which I believe I provided at either 0900 or 0930.


  261. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    So that's -- so that is why I'm saying what I'm saying, and we provided a briefing on everything, and I had all of the managers there to provide the different aspects, provincial, Ottawa, all the different areas that were ongoing.


  262. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  263. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, just one -- I'm sorry, I ---


  264. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- I'm just trying to -- no, no, I'm just trying to find where we are.


  265. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. I got you ---


  266. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- yeah, yeah. Sorry.


  267. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Okay. So the difficulty with this for me is these aren't my notes. And it's consistent with what we told Chief Sloly in relation to his questions. Everybody was asking about extremism. We weren't seeing much evidence of it. The group DIAGALON, I -- in my experiences, they are an extremist entity. They hold extremist views. FAARFADA is a group that until this event I was not familiar with, and I was informed by the Sûreté du Québec that they were not a violent group, although they were opposed to the pandemic mandates, et cetera, et cetera. So I referenced that DIAGALON and FAARFADA were two entities and that FAARFADA was geographically situated in a specific area. I believe Rideau and Sussex. And that we had people on ground ascertaining intent, motivation, individual's mood, sentiment, et cetera.


  268. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That is my recollection of what I was providing.


  269. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  270. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I think the -- generally, yes. I may have is synonymous with potential national security implications and that spoke to issues beyond Ottawa. I was talking about the situation at a global level ---


  271. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- and the increasing volatility was -- there were points in the Ottawa Police Service -- I remember Ken Bryden, the Inspector, talking about this. There were points when information came back from people on the ground speaking to joviality and congeniality, and there were points when it became more aggressive and egregious. And this specific location was a location where things were more egregious and it was the collection of our officers on scene that volatility was escalating. And I remember very specifically it had to do with the issuance of a provincial offence notice where people became aggrieved and there was a verbal exchange.


  272. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  273. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. So to be fair on that, when the arrests occurred we took multiple steps to acquire the information specifically as I discussed with the former counsel, to see what is the impact; what is the connection et cetera. We determined, we got the information from the RCMP. I spoke with the Assistant Commissioner; I believe it was Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner Mark Lynn and then with the person leading the investigation, and we determined that there was very little connection to Ottawa, and that therefore, our assessment was there would be very little impact and there was not.


  274. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Oh okay, yeah.


  275. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  276. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Can I just say that this document was produced -- I can’t be entirely specific -- it was produced for our Commissioner Carrique for his presentation or testimony, I’m not sure which, to a parliamentary committee in March of 2022, and we were asked by Superintendent McDonnell, to comment on certain elements. I personally believe that this document to a reader might seem unusual because the last component in relation to sexual assault seems to be out of context. That was a specific request due to a specific incident.


  277. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  278. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  279. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That was a movement as a whole and they were threats of violence; the threats were omnipresent and we tried to address them as we went along. In terms of producing intelligence, we found no credible intelligence of threats.


  280. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Primarily that would be activity that the -- sorry, that the OPS engaged in.


  281. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    And also, I’m talking about, yeah, threats generally that would be premised in intelligence. I’ll give you an example On February 2nd at 18:30 hours “We are going to breach security to the west wing of Parliament” et cetera. And I have been engaged in protests before where things like that have happened and we could find no credible intelligence of threats.


  282. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    But we never -- that’s true, but we never had intelligence of that, threats of those, and I mean I’ve reviewed the arrest and the charges and stuff to try and ascertain how accurate we were and there was -- I would say, the lack of violent crime was shocking, the lack -- I mean even in the arrests and charges considering the whole thing in totality, I think there were ten charges for violent crimes, six of which were against police officers.


  283. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Right. Yeah.


  284. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, and I can’t speak to whether those threats were cred -- I mean if they were, I guess charges would have been laid for uttering threats, death threats.


  285. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Or if there was actual ---


  286. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No, but if there was an actual threat, then there would have been an investigation, and if it was an actual threat, I assume the Ottawa Police Service would have laid a charge for uttering threats.


  287. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Right, right.


  288. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Or even to ascertain if it’s an actual threat if you can’t identify the individual.


  289. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  290. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  291. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I do.


  292. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  293. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I agree.


  294. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That was an easy one.


  295. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, so this is a large conversation; I mean I think it’s evident that I was concerned by a politicization and I was concerned by hyperbole and I was concerned by the affixing of labels without evidence to individuals’ movements et cetera. And if I can, I don’t want to waste your time, but this doesn’t just speak to this movement; I can give you a very specific example. Many people, law enforcement included, have an insatiable appetite. I can give you an example of person of interest profiles et cetera. I’ve always been very hard and fast no matter what the event is. I can use protest against coastal gaslink et cetera, that we don’t do POI, person of interest profiles unless we have reasonable grounds to suspect or reasonable grounds to believe that those individuals will be engaged in criminal activity or illegal activity that will present a public safety risk. And I just -- and I believe that the public expects people like me in my position to consider those things in the course of my duties.


  296. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct, yeah.


  297. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It's a reference to what's going on in relation to the protest writ large, not just Ottawa, but Ottawa, but Ottawa is certainly the largest component of it.


  298. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I'm just trying to articulate this properly. I was concerned by comments made publicly, by public figures and in the media that I believed were not premised in fact. I would be just another person with a subjective perspective in this case, except for the fact that from my perspective, I was leading the criminal intelligence collection of information and the production of criminal intelligence in relation to these events. So I believed I was in a unique situation to understand what was transpiring. So when I read accounts that the State of Russia had something to do with it; or that this was the result of American influence, either financially or ideologically; or that Donald Trump was behind it; or that it was un-Canadian; or that the people participating were un-Canadian and that they were not Canadian views and they were extremists; I found it to be problematic, because what I ascertained from my role -- which is not all knowing, and certainly, there may be information that is presented to this committee that illustrates the error of my ways -- but I did not see validation for those assertions.


  299. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I hesitate to -- I don’t want to say that, necessarily, because the media has an important role and I'm not trying to skirt the question. The media can provide editorials, and editorial boards can have stances. I believe that a lot of people were making assertions that weren’t accurate, and if they were based in investigation and in fact, then there was information that I was not privy to, and I wondered why. And I accept that I might not be privy to it. If the Communication Security Establishment of Canada or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service or the Integrated National Security Enforcement Team has received information at a classification above my level, I accept that, and that’s fine. I'm just saying that from my perspective, as Operational Command of Hendon and that joint force operation, I did not see information that substantiated what was being said publicly and via the media. And I found that the subjective assertions sensationalized, yes, and exacerbated conflict.


  300. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Again, that’s highly subjective. I mean ---


  301. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- in my line of work ---


  302. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, a lot of media that I read, I can't say that they were slanted, and I mean on both sides. I can't say that, because I'd have to know subjectively what they were hoping to achieve. The person who was writing it could have objectively believed that they were speaking the truth, and I'm not in a position to know that. But I do know that there are multiple media outlets -- even the definition of media has altered substantially -- and there are multiple perspectives, and some of those perspectives seem to be based in confirming a world view as opposed to -- and I'm not taking about editorials because that’s different -- I'm talking about news reporting -- that’s what's important to me because people, including law enforcement officers, are informed by that information, and I saw that information, those assertions, foreign influence, monies, et cetera, being played out by any number of people and talked about. And I would challenge that. And my point in this email was to make this point, which I believe is an ethical and moral point, and a point premised in law, you know, things like mens rea and actus reus are incredibly important in this in determining what we see and what we base it on. So the labelling was problematic to me.


  303. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I can. Good evening.


  304. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah. INSET is a federal joint force operation led by the RCMP. It stands for Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, and they have a responsibility to engage in investigations that meet the threshold of section 83 of the Criminal Code.


  305. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  306. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  307. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That’s correct.


  308. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, there seems to be a causal linkage in some people’s minds between certain things that are not illegal or criminal, they just may not be in line with, and a nexus to, somehow, and intelligence threat. I can give you an example. I have had instances where people have approached me professionally because there were bumper stickers that had to do with entities that they disagreed with, so therefore those people shouldn’t be police officers, or they shouldn’t be parked in policing -- sorry, parking lots. And I heard terminology, “That person is right-wing so…and then therefore an assumption.” I used to hear all that all the time about left-wing. And I was very concerned about it because I worked in Anti-Terrorism at the time of the 9/11 attacks and I saw what these kneejerk reactions do, where we get information from the public on any number of issues related to what they perceived to be threats from Wahabism, or Salafism, or Suni Extremism, and there always seems to be an overreach that comes with this politicization. And I’ve had many instances where I’ve been asked to go through these intelligence checks without the reasonable grounds to suspect or believe that there is a threat posed. There is merely the presence of something or someone that someone doesn’t like.


  309. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, can I give you an example, just to make an example of this?


  310. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    If somebody engages in criminal activity, violent activity, et cetera that impacts people, such as has occurred in London, Ontario, such as has occurred in Nova Scotia, these terrible things, or people who are engaged in weapons stockpiling, et cetera, et cetera, or illegal activity, or we even have grounds to suspect that, then, certainly, ideological affiliations, religious -- political motivations, mental health issues, all become issues to assess and look at. But because somebody has -- and I’m just going to use an example -- a Trump sticker on their bumper, it’s not a requirement to put the powers of the State against that individual. It illustrates to me that somebody who owned that car, previously or currently, supported, or wanted to be seen as supporting, a Former President or Candidate Trump and it’s as simple as that.


  311. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    It’s indicative of politicization.


  312. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I’m sorry, I’m not sure I -- I’m not sure I entirely got that but you’re asking me -- you’re saying -- asking me to agree with that I don’t agree that all acts of civil disobedience rise to the level of criminal activity; is that the question?


  313. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, there is a distinction. Yes, I agree with that; there is a distinction between. And I also premised that within where we, as an intelligence entity focus. We don’t focus on smaller acts of civil disobedience, i.e., a small business owner opening their business in contravention to the Reopening Ontario Act. That’s a matter for education from a detachment or a police service and a possible laying of a Provincial Offence Notice, et cetera, et cetera. But more broad issues and more significant issues of civil disobedience that present as public safety issues require our assessment and collection to determine the nature of the threat and the gravity of the threat. Does that answer you question?


  314. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Exactly, yes.


  315. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  316. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, correct.


  317. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, I do.


  318. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Well, one, we’re open any time to any questions. I, myself, am. Secondly, we had teleconferences regularly and, in relation to these events, daily, and there was a lot of give-and-take questions back and forth. And three, I communicated directly -- I did so today to the entire intelligence distribution list and actually created a different distribution list of intelligence managers to articulate goals, intentions, et cetera, and solicited any feedback.


  319. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    We received no request for extra activity. We received a great deal of gratitude for the activity that was on ongoing.


  320. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yes, we -- yes, we did, from the people involved in intelligence, et cetera.


  321. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Yeah, I remember Supt. Mark Patterson saying thank you, you know, for the collection efforts and the intelligence products. I believe Insp. Bryden as well, and I remember Interim Chief Bell saying, you know, thank you in terms of the Big 12 meetings, et cetera, for the information.


  322. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No, absolutely not.


  323. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Sorry, sir, I’m not aware of any federal project that is the equivalent to HENDON. I can say that my RCMP colleagues are very engaged in HENDON. And this can’t be comprehensive but the divisional intelligence officers were engaged, INSET is engaged, federal policing, national security is engaged, protective security is engaged. There's an entity and it's an acronym in relation to ideologically motivated extremists that are engaged. And at various times, other divisions such as Alberta and British Columbia, et cetera, participated.


  324. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    That's a good question. I do know the reason. I know the reason is because we started it. That is the reason, and that question has been asked of me several times. But, yeah, we started the Project HENDON, so that's the reason why we are.


  325. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    I ---


  326. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    --- I think it's lexicon or semantics. The highest level we got to was a potential for the national security threats. I would like to place that in context, just to be fair to all parties. So Ottawa's transpiring, Coutts is transpiring, the events in the Ambassador Bridge occur, and then there was posturing on the 402, not at the Blue Water Bridge in Sarnia, Port Huron, but close. And we had other information in relation to the Nipigon Bridge, not a border, but an incredibly important logistical link in northwestern Ontario, and Pigeon River between Minnesota and Ontario. So when we talk about potential national security, that's what we were concerned with, if those events transpire and if they're successful, then that's very problematic in terms of our national borders.


  327. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)



  328. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    No, I didn't mention them. You know, I heard about them at the time. I honestly, sir, haven't been -- there are -- were others, the Peace Bridge, Fort Eerie and Buffalo was a significant one. The bridge at Cornwall was very short lived, a threat it was going to be, and it ended very quickly. The Lansdowne crossing east of Gananoque, Watertown was also. The organic mobilization once the example was set, these were all possibilities, and so we tried to posture to try to prevent.


  329. Pat Morris, Supt (ON-OPP)

    Thank you, sir.