Robert Bernier

Robert Bernier spoke 921 times across 2 days of testimony.

  1. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’ll swear on the Bible, please.


  2. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Good afternoon.


  3. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  4. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  5. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you scroll down a bit, please?


  6. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If you can go back up? A little bit more, please? Okay. A little further down, please. Some more down. That's fine.


  7. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  8. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  9. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  10. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  11. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  12. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    My initial training from a commander standpoint started as a Public Order Commander through the RCMP here in Canada, which further then I progressed into initial incident Critical Incident Response Commander training. That was at the Canadian Police College. I furthered my command experience and training and certification in order management by going to the UK, where I was certified as a bronze and silver Commander. Continuing on, I took the next level of Incident Command training with the OPP as a Critical Incident Commander, and that was a four-week course. And that would be, in a nutshell, the different levels of Command training that I've received.


  13. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  14. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I responded to the -- a tragic death and shooting at the Cenotaph and subsequent shooting in the Parliament Hill. I responded as a -- and took over as an ad hoc Commander on the ground during that incident. It was protracted throughout the day and quite complex. I have also been involved with the North American Leadership Summit that took place in the mid-2016 time period, whereas the Public Order Commander and Planner for that event here in Ottawa. I've also -- after being certified as a Critical Incident Commander, I would be in a position of a Duty Inspector in charge of police operations on duty police operations on the road, which would result in me having to go take command of critical incidents, could be armed barricaded person, hostage taking, those type of thing. And I've -- over the period of four years that I was a Duty Inspector responded to approximately 48 critical incidents as a commander. I subsequently as well upkeep my training by attending Public Order training, tactical training, negotiator training, scribe training on a yearly basis to stay current with all the best practices and that interoperability with all the assets that I would be commanding during those various events.


  15. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  16. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At that time period, I was the Inspector of the Communications Branch.


  17. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  18. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Into February I was asked by Superintendent Drummond to go into the Service Command Centre to support Inspector Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing the Service Command Centre, and we jointly took that role of overseeing that centre.


  19. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  20. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was responsible for the Communications Centre, 9-1-1 Dispatch, the Police Reporting Unit, as well as the Command Centre.


  21. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, during the -- on the 18th of January.


  22. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As the Administrative Inspector overseeing the Command Centre, I periodically would go onto various functions that they would do. And one of those functions is every week, every Tuesday, they run an eight-week demand for service outlook for events, demands for proactive duties that police officers would need to do. There would be internal stakeholders that would attend this meeting, and they would ensure that the different demands are assigned, and appropriate actions are taken for upcoming events.


  23. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There were multiple members, either from the Command Centre, from Special Events, and in this particular case, the Duty Inspector, the Platoon Inspector who would normally be responsible for that call was tied up on a critical incident, so they were not present on that.


  24. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  25. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Absolutely. Would you like me to read them out?


  26. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Wouldn't be physically there, but it was a ---


  27. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- conference call.


  28. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  29. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  30. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He would be part of the Special Events Team.


  31. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Through ---


  32. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- through multiple ranks, yes.


  33. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There does not appear to be.


  34. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I do not know.


  35. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It takes a format where there is a spreadsheet where there the Command Centre Sergeant reads through the various events, ensures someone's assigned or it's just assigned as situational awareness. There was one element that was read off by the command centre sergeant, which indicated trucker convoys were planning to be coming into Ottawa to take over the Capital. And this was for situational awareness. As the command centre sergeant moved on to the next item, I requested that he go back to the previous item and ask a couple of questions.


  36. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    DFS is the Demand for Service and review of the Demands for Service coming up in the next eight weeks.


  37. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  38. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Normally, it would be the duty inspector who would be on the call who would be making this call to -- or make an inquiry, but I requested that the command centre ensure that the intelligence unit was aware of this. Special events need to be speaking with the intel unit as things were to evolve. Given this was, perhaps, anywhere from 20 plus days away, it would be prudent to get a line of sight as to start making decisions and perhaps planning, if required, for this event, and that to ensure that all the platoon duty inspectors were aware of this even that was potentially coming.


  39. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If I may refer to ---


  40. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    After that meeting, no.


  41. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I have an actual hard copy of what's up, and my apologies. I'll try to refer to the screen and ask for the screen version.


  42. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, sir.


  43. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  44. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would leave it in the hands of the people who were on the call and the command centre to follow up with the direction as well. It would be now in the hands of the people who take care of those duties.


  45. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, sir.


  46. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    January 27th.


  47. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The first time I attended a Hendon conference call and then further received the Hendon Report.


  48. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did.


  49. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It was the first time that I had seen such a report. It's quite comprehensive with input from -- and I'm combining a bit of the two, because I attended the Hendon call first and then had the ability to see the report. There's a lot of people from officer law enforcement agencies from across the country who would be feeding into this report.


  50. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It appears to be, yes.


  51. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's the totality of the report. There's various elements that it was very -- like I mentioned, this is the first time that I ever saw such a thing as a Hendon Report, and around demonstrations, usually, we would not get such a comprehensive report regarding demonstrations. So the information that was contained in here is -- was something that was relatively new to me, and caused me to be concerned.


  52. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So obviously, the information that was contained in the Hendon Report, although the numbers were not necessarily fully clear and fully determined, the large number of vehicles that arrived was not a surprise. I had the opportunity to be informed that there were farmer fields that had been cleared out in Vars, in which case I notified at the time -- and this is in the week of the 24th at some particular time. I don’t have the exact date that large areas, farm fields, were being cleared out.


  53. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been in the week of the 24th, so on or about the 27th.


  54. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Steven Williams is an officer that works in the Command Centre.


  55. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Absolutely. So there were various notifications that were made, and the Command Centre was also to support to be able to coordinate some officers to validate and verify where exactly the farm fields were cleared.


  56. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did in passing by. And once again, I have to say it’s probably in or about -- on or about the 27th where I had, in passing by, a conversation with Inspector Lucas.


  57. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, with Superintendent Drummond.


  58. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been on the 27th.


  59. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He -- I was reporting to Superintendent Drummond as the Superintendent of the Information Directorate.


  60. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Obviously, the concern that -- the context of my concern is that -- was for our service for what we might be faced with in the very near future. It would be concerning for our service and that, obviously, of concern for our teams that have to be prepared for that.


  61. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He seemed to share the concern.


  62. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m not 100 percent sure whether it was before because I believe they arrived slightly earlier, but it was on the 28th that I did receive one of the first plans that I received on that day on the 28th of January.


  63. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  64. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t believe this is the first document that I received.


  65. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did.


  66. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been into the evening hours of the 28th. I did not see it till I woke up in the morning. As the Inspector for the Communications Branch, when they send me this document I want to make sure that the units that I’m responsible for and may require it for operational reasons receive it, so that’s the Comm Centre, Communication Centre, as well as the Command Centre.


  67. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From the cover page, without seeing the full content, this appears to be the first plan that I would have received.


  68. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been later in the day on -- on the 28th.


  69. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I reviewed it as -- to see if there was any implications to any of my sections or my cell. And it appeared to be a traffic plan, what I would refer to as a traffic plan.


  70. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It is not uncommon that as part of various events that there would be a traffic plan that would be accompanying a more overarching plan.


  71. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I didn’t know at that time. I did make an inquiry with Superintendent Drummond if there was another plan that would be coming. He did not know at that time.


  72. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I forwarded this plan to the Comm Centre and to the Command Centre so that they have awareness of this plan.


  73. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As I mentioned, that came later in the evening, in which case I was asleep when it came in. But as soon as I woke up in the morning, around 6:00 a.m., I realized that there was now another plan from the Special Events Section that was more of an overarching plan for the event.


  74. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  75. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  76. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It is a standard section that you would find in one of our operational plans consistent with what would be there as part of the threat assessment from our Intelligence Unit.


  77. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The concern was that having, a day before, viewed the Hendon Report, which was an information intelligence report containing a lot of detail, there didn’t seem to be elements of the Hendon information as part of the threat, or more so, risk assessment.


  78. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  79. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So on the 27th, I participated in a conference call with the Hendon group, which was something I’ve done for the first time. That has never been part of my experience in the years of policing. It was quite an interesting experience being -- having the collaboration of intelligence to that magnitude and the sharing of that information. Second of all, having received the Hendon Report, which was a comprehensive intel or information report specific to what we were -- might be facing in Ottawa. And finally, there was a Teams meeting between Intelligence, Special Events, and the Information Directorate, myself, and Supt. Drummond were invited to attend to listen to. So that all took place on the 27th. And there -- when there was -- that’s an overwhelming amount of information for myself. There seemed to be a lot more than we often get regarding these events. So that’s where that notation of a bizarre disconnect is that there seems to be so much of this intelligence going around. How is it going to tie in to our planning?


  80. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  81. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At the point, and not being privy to all the planning from the planning team, as that is not the section that I’m working in. And perhaps other plans that may exist. That was the sentiment that I had at that time as to the what-if.


  82. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I didn’t actually see contingency plans, but there was indication that plans existed.


  83. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Appendix plans that would be attached to the overarching plan.


  84. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did not see them.


  85. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  86. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  87. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  88. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It’s good practice to do that, to make sure that there wasn’t any requirements from either myself or any of our sections.


  89. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  90. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was off for that weekend. I did have plans for the weekend.


  91. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was skiing.


  92. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did.


  93. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The Monday.


  94. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At this point, the convoys that did arrive in town, although some may have left, there was a large quantity that had remained on the footprint, Wellington and the cross streets.


  95. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Supt. Drummond.


  96. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I offered if there’s anything I can do to help.


  97. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There wasn’t a need for me at that time.


  98. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Sorry, all subsequent -- I came back on the 1st, I believe, is the date ---


  99. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- I came back.


  100. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Tuesday. Yes.


  101. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  102. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    My apologies. I did come back on the Monday. So the 31st there was a conversation, as well as the 1st, which was the Tuesday.


  103. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  104. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. Same.


  105. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  106. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As I’m reporting for duty, ---


  107. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- “Is there anything that you require me to do with the event that’s going on?”


  108. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, I was.


  109. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    On the 3rd.


  110. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The ask was for me to attend the Service Command Centre to support Insp. Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing that Centre.


  111. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The Service Command Centre is more so of a support centre that supports the organization when we’re dealing with extraordinary circumstances, such as a big event that has either become protracted, and that we -- it supports the event, but also supports the rest of the business continuity of the organization to ensure that we maintain policing in the rest of Ottawa.


  112. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Insp. Palmer had been working very long hours. They had been having to -- they’re faced with challenges of staffing the continued event that protracted for days beyond the actual event. And she needed some relief. So at the start, we both worked together so that I would have some time to get familiar with what was happening in there. And my role was to support her at the onset, with the expectation that we would be able to spell off and have a little bit better sustainability and able tog et some rest.


  113. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Certainly. To put into context, though, the Service Command Centre, the various functions that it takes care of, is it has a team of staffing officers, it will have a team of logistics officers, a team of planners, a finance element, a team of briefers briefing -- people who would brief resources going out on deployment. When I arrived, and this is by no fault of anybody. Their main focus was staffing, trying to staff a relatively large-scale event that was continuing on a 24-hour basis. That was their biggest challenge. So I started to implement some -- as a new, fresh person into the -- to that position, adopted some structure into their staffing and started breaking off people to work specifically on logistics, people that specifically are going to be focusing on if there’s plans that are going to be required as well as bringing in a finance officer. Due to the magnitude of various expenditures that we were going to be facing, it was time to bring a finance officer in to support and track that element.


  114. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Service Command Centre, yes.


  115. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There was a request and, in that position, I would report to the Event Commander. And at the time when I first came in, there was Superintendent Rheaume, who was the Event Commander. There was a transition through that period where it went to Superintendent Dunlop and then, finally, the point that I’m talking about with regards to the plans, I was reporting to Superintendent Mark Patterson, who is coming to the Service Command Centre to request what plans exist. So as in my role, I tasked the planning team to find what plans are in existence and that had been approved. Because we have a new Event Commander, it would be prudent to be able to get them all together to present to the Event Commander for review. But I also noticed that there seemed to be a lot of plans. It was time to implement a File Coordinator to be able to manage that -- the intake of the plans, the delivery to the Event Commander and the filing of it so that we’d have a structured filing system.


  116. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the initial plans that we received was specific to the event on the weekend. I was not aware of any other plan that was developed that would now take us into the next phase, if I could call that, that now they are remaining and not leaving. There was no overall plan in place on, if I could use the term, end the occupation of that -- of the protestors in that area.


  117. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  118. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So generally speaking, it is best practice and I’m going to say actually critical to when you’re in a command position that you have a scribe, which is a person who’s trained to be a specific scribe, for an Incident Commander, whose responsibility is to keep your notes. The scribe notes, although written by another person, are the Incident Commander’s personal notes. It allows the Incident Commander to have decision-making information, whether we have to do an assessment through an NRA process, is it necessary, risk-effective, acceptable, that it could be all captured. Very difficult as an Incident Commander to be doing all of that and being able to write it down. It creates effectiveness and efficiency in being an Incident Commander.


  119. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  120. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Mark -- Superintendent Patterson.


  121. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So as the Event Commander, at this particular stage in his involvement, he wanted to adopt a new -- a command structure under him.


  122. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    You would have to speak to Superintendent Patterson to understand what he was doing at that time. My role at this time was not involving command of the event.


  123. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At the tail end, I was privy to being -- participate on a Teams meeting with the Executive where there was some direction from the Chief to develop an overarching plan.


  124. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would have been the 9th, I believe.


  125. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The 8th.


  126. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would need to read through, if I could, a little bit ---


  127. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- further.


  128. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  129. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    These are standard Incident Command scribe sheets ---


  130. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- so I was not the Incident Commander for the event.


  131. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  132. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  133. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So this was a phone call between myself and Deputy Ferguson.


  134. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If I can just review to fresh my -- so, at this particular point, she was calling to look to have a plan made up. And my recommendation to the Deputy -- Deputy Ferguson, who at this point would be the strategic commander, I recommended that she go through Supt. Patterson, who was the event commander, and they should have that discussion, and then the event commander could provide the direction for making up that plan through the service command centre.


  135. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is a term that’s used in both planning and plan writing. SMEAC stands for Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command and control.


  136. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  137. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It was not necessarily recommending something else; it was recommending that this request should be coming from an operational command level, that if that was requested, that conversation should be going to the operational commander who will figure our the “how to do it”.


  138. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was the impression from the phone call that she was going directly to me to attempt to get a plan written with her comments that outside agencies that are wanting to come and help us need to see this plan.


  139. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Reason being, it’s best that the strategic and the operational level are aligned.


  140. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the request for the plan should be coming from the event commander.


  141. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    All I was trying to do is ensure that the proper flow of discussion from the strategic level to the operational level takes place and then, from the event commander at the operational, will come to my support element to deliver what the event commander requires.


  142. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  143. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It’s an understanding of what the difference is between strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic establishes what needs -- in the simplest terms, what needs to be done. The operational level determines how it’s done. And the tactical level does it.


  144. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is very common, especially when you’re dealing with large-scale event, multi- agency response. When the requests are made for services of another agency to come and support, whether it be the Ottawa Police Service, there should be a plan that outlines exactly how many of what type of resources you need to somewhat justify ho is going to go and why they’re going to be there.


  145. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This was -- could you scroll back up, please? So this Supt. Patterson that’s speaking to me -- or in the group to the group of us with what is -- he’s explained what he’s learned. So I would imagine that following my conversation with Deputy Ferguson, she has had now a conversation with the event commander, and now the event commander’s coming to make the ask.


  146. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If we go back -- this is what date again?


  147. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is the eighth? There would not be one that I would be familiar with except for the original plan for the weekend event.


  148. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m familiar that it exists, yes.


  149. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As I mentioned, there was various direction given that a plan needed to be developed that was an overarching plan that was going to support the numbers that were required from the ask from the Chief, as well that was going to align with what he publicly announced as being his “eight-point plan” to resolve the situation. There were people who were requested to attend our central station at 474 Elgin where they were to work on and develop a plan.


  150. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  151. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It is a Mission Statement and the purpose of a Mission Statement is to give clear direction to everyone who is going to be engaged on this, and every activity or action that they do need to align with the Mission Statement. It -- there are -- they are -- it is supposed to be short and concise. It is short and concise. It would not be a Mission Statement that I would write.


  152. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There would be elements in there that I would want to make sure that are very clear, as you will find in the Mission Statement that I wrote.


  153. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you please scroll down a bit so I can just kind of review again?


  154. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Continue down, please. Continue down. Continue. Continue down. If I could please ask to go to the Index; I believe there was an Index on here?


  155. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    A couple of things that I would be including in a plan would be a Commander’s intent.


  156. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. So that usually comes from the Event Commander, who explicitly sets out expectations based on the mission. What -- the expectations of all the people. So that is missing. Without dissecting it too much there were -- there are elements that maybe are not in the right category.


  157. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did.


  158. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did not personally but there were certain staffing elements based on our experience in the Service Command Centre doing the staffing for the various support elements, the maintenance elements, whether it be these static points or Quick Response Team elements, that they were in a good position to provide to the group that was developing this plan, numbers for that.


  159. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They’re -- it would be more -- better to say all the specialized elements that you would need. So in a public order operation you need Public Order Units, you need Tactical Team supports, perhaps a CBRNE team, which CBRNE stands for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive Unit, which would make up all the true numbers that you would need for a significant operation of this magnitude.


  160. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So this was being developed, and I don’t know what time I received it at and at what point it was actually completed. This is, I would say, moving in the direction and an overall plan. I would like to go back to the plan again to, once again, look at what elements were still missing in it, because in the execution piece, that would be telling me whether there was an actual plan on how they were going to carry out the removal of the occupation.


  161. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  162. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would like to, if I could, please review it.


  163. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So if you can scroll down, please? If we can go to the execution? (SHORT PAUSE)


  164. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Please scroll down. (SHORT PAUSE)


  165. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Please scroll down, next page. Again to 3.2. Three point three (3.3). The next point, please. A lot of this information in this is really more of a situational element versus how you were going to execute the plan. So if you were to ask me about whether this is an overall plan, there are missing elements. We talked about appendix plans or additional plans to support the overarching plan. At this point there would be requirements for multiple public order plans, arrest, detention, processing plans, what’s the PLT plan that’s going to be -- when I say PLT, Police Liaison Team plan. There’s a lot of elements that would be required to be, say, on the 9th we’re ready to go with something.


  166. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  167. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That, amongst other smaller operations that were being attempted or tried to be planned for, but the overarching was the ticketing, seizure of gas, and various levels of enforcement.


  168. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In my role at that time, that was not in my purview. That would be within Insp. Russ Lucas, Supt. Patterson to be monitoring and tracking that. But I knew, based on our conference calls in our updates that there was a focus on that. I'm not aware of whether they were having issues at the tactical level of what you just explained.


  169. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Whether it be the bylaw, honking, the open fires, maybe liquor consumption, which is all more so either in the municipal or provincial offences.


  170. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Pretty much what I -- what's outlined there is that our strict messaging that we were putting out was surrounding how many tickets, what enforcement measures were being done. Unfortunately, from day to day, that was not showing the community that it was resolving the issue. That’s somewhat my sentiment on that. And then when was it going to be enough? How many tickets do we have to lay? How much enforcement do we have to do that will actually result in them going out, leaving? And at this point, it seemed very apparent that day after day after day of enforcement, albeit that you're seeing it may be limited, it was not having the desired effect.


  171. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Generally. In my role at that time, I was not involved in tactical level command, public order command, or event command. My role was still as that support element within the Service Command Centre.


  172. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So they're at -- as you can see, the scribe was coming in at the -- while I was participating on a conference call, so information must have been received that I received on that conference call that public were -- are planning on reattending Coventry.


  173. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Sorry, which line are you referring to?


  174. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  175. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm not quite sure.


  176. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, I'm familiar with that as well, of the similar nature, because at the time, my role was not at the tactical or operational level command. I was a support element in the same fashion.


  177. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  178. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The request came from the event commander to me that he was going to require various plans in order to affect this. Although I would not have any involvement with the public order plan, that’s taking place elsewhere, there was a request to develop an arrest traffic and towing plans for that specific operation.


  179. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  180. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Denis Hull worked in the traffic as Staff Sergeant for the traffic enforcement section.


  181. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    "As per our discussion tonight, I have two requests in relation to potentially planned operations set for later this week. Could you please assign a sergeant to work with Andy Jasiak for a "Removal of Vehicle plan"? That would be similar to like what we would refer to as a tow plan. "This is time sensitive. Your team will need to liaise with Kevin Kennedy who has started something on this but will be the planner[s] for...POU..." So what I'm trying to do is get all the different groups that are trying to make a plan for this operation at least talking to each other.


  182. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And then the second request is to develop a traffic plan in order to, whether it be close down streets to support the Public Order plan.


  183. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At this point, I would not be fully privy to all the discussions from the strategic level and at the Event Commander level. It would be hard for me to make a judgement on that not knowing what their -- what the strategic direction was, and what the -- how they were going to do it and what the intended outcome was going to be.


  184. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So when you're asking about at this particular time in the event, that was my answer to the specific event. If you're talking about the various situations that we saw, whether it be the Coventry Road operation, the multiple attempts at Rideau/Sussex, and somewhat, not necessarily a wholesome approach with all key internal stakeholders for all these plans, that's what I was referring to in my statement. It was a totality of the circumstances, not the specific event.


  185. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I believe that's what I was talking about. How I was saying all the different events that were going on, whether it be the -- we have to enforce, we have to ticket on one level, coming, perhaps, from executive level; and then various -- and I cannot speak to where the directions being given, where I would imagine I would -- that from a strategic level that something -- actions needed to be taken either at Coventry or Rideau/Sussex from either the Strategic or the Event commander, where they were not all aligning and it did not appear as if it was going to have a successful overall resolution to having this end. There is risks with implementing various plans without knowing the cause and effect.


  186. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So communication happens on multiple levels, and if we're talking about communication at briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of what's going on and what's expected of them, we were working very hard at trying to get that right because there was different groups of officers with getting different information. We have to be realistic in this. This was a unprecedented situation that we were in, and everyone was doing their best to try and do what we needed to do. So it's not laying blame or fault, it's just those were some real challenges that we were experiencing. There were so many things that needed to be thought about and implemented. There was also a communication piece internally to our members in general as to what's happening, and that was something that we heard very loud and clear that there wasn't a lot of internal messaging within the organisation to understand what we were trying to do, what's the objectives, what do we need from our members.


  187. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  188. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  189. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Word does get around in the organisation. So that is something that I had heard that had transpired.


  190. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Sorry, I don't.


  191. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So every division, we have three divisions with the Ottawa Police, every division and station within the division has something called the "parade room" where officers are briefed at the start of every shift and given their instructions for the shift, what they'll be assigned to, and any taskings that they have.


  192. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I cannot speak to that. I'm not -- I don't know what communication was happening externally. I don't have any particular access to that information.


  193. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So -- yeah. There was a bit of a breakdown, and that's something that we had to adjust even within my purview. That we -- the Service Command Centre in liaising with whatever agency was coming in, as part of that briefing element, that was something that we had to -- we recognised and had to adjust to ensure... Once again, this is quite extraordinary circumstances where we had officers coming from maybe a handful of officers from various municipal services, we had OPP officers who were going to different locations, we had RCMP officers who were briefing out of another location. So it took us quite a while to get that coordinated piece to ensure that the messaging that they were getting was consistent for all officers that were being deployed. It unfortunately was a reality at the early onset of this, and we made every effort to correct that.


  194. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  195. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In the evening.


  196. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. The one condition is that I wanted to have some separation between myself and the Chief and to just be directly liaising with my -- the Strategic Commander.


  197. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Through observation and experience that I had been seeing throughout, some challenges with both at the tactical level, and the operational, the event- commander level, that the -- albeit intending to try and resolve the situation, it was causing a breakdown of the incident command structure. I wanted to ensure that I was going to go into a model that was going to respect the incident-command model that I’ve trained under, that I know, that I recognize, and tried, tested, and true.


  198. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So throughout the period in my involvement in the Service Command Centre, I was able to be privy to various conference calls, different direction being given where there was the involvement of the chief in a very operational level and even to the point of tactical-level directing, which somewhat caused challenges within that incident-command model.


  199. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Redirecting groups of officers to do particular taskings such as in the community enforcement teams, redirecting traffic officers to do something different. These are -- once I said -- I tried to explain the difference between the strategic, operational, and tactical. The event commander’s role is to ensure that the entirety of the plan or the entirety of the operation is somewhat all in cohesion and working in an effective way. If there’s different people who are drawing different things or assigning different things, it will cause the rest of the operation to go off the balance. So that’s somewhat what I’m referring to.


  200. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Deputy Ferguson.


  201. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    She did.


  202. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In the afternoon of February -- I’m trying to think -- February 10th.


  203. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I had -- I asked to think about it and I just wanted to ensure that I was going to be in the right mindset and that I’m prepared to do this. I didn’t want to hastily jump into something if I was not prepared so I had to quickly do a self-check and ensure that I was ready to do this because I understood the magnitude and the complexity of what I was embarking on, but I advised her that I would do it.


  204. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Later on in the afternoon.


  205. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. And I also made a couple of other requests from her as well.


  206. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    One of the requests that I wanted to have is that, given the -- as I mentioned, the complexity and magnitude, I wanted to have a deputy event commander working with me given the -- what I knew was going to be needed to get us out the other end. In which case, I requested a specific person.


  207. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Insp. Dave Springer.


  208. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He’s from the OPP. He is a major critical incident commander that I know, have worked with before. He was actually one of my instructors for the Critical Incident Command course in Orillia, the OPP, and I knew that I would be able to have a valuable support element with Insp. Springer.


  209. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    She said she would ask to see if that would be possible?


  210. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, that I would need to some autonomy with regards to decision-making and implementing plans, and that to trust me that I was going to find the solution and lead us out the other end of this.


  211. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    She said she’ll do he best to provide with what I needed.


  212. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They’re conditions but I really did want to line this up for success. I did see that we’d gone through multiple event commanders and I just did not want this to be the next one.


  213. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It’s somewhat difficult to do that. I would offer any advice or recommendation, no different than as we reviewed in the scribe notes; when the deputy was asking me for something, I tried to realign that to follow the proper channels so that the right people are informed and making the decisions and making those requests. There were odds and ends that I would have provided recommendations but, at the end of the day, to not undermine the autonomy and authority of the various levels of command. We respect that ---


  214. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- and allow them to do what they feel is what’s needed.


  215. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  216. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct, on the 10th in the late afternoon. That was with Deputy Ferguson.


  217. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So what I requested was that I needed to take some time the following day -- I needed to get some rest and then take some time the next day with -- if I was able to get Insp. Springer, I would need some time with him to sit down, evaluate everything that we had and re-establish a Mission Statement, a main action plan, objectives, and a command structure.


  218. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did go home and I did sleep that evening -- that night, and came back in the next morning. So I got some rest that night.


  219. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct, so establishing that command and control, I had a vision as to how I would want to set up an Integrated Command Table team and who I would need around it, and I wanted to discuss a little bit more wholesome with Insp. Springer to ensure that I was not missing anything or get his input as well to this as we were going to be a team moving into this.


  220. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So it may be -- I wonder if it’s earlier on the page. You talked to us about wanting some distance between yourself and the former chief, the Former Chief Sloly. How was that concern in particular addressed?


  221. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  222. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  223. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. As we built out -- and once again, I talked to you about that structure, we incorporated an executive liaison person to -- there was a lot of meetings and a lot of requests to attend meetings, which as long as I have the strategic direction, I need a lot of time to get the job done to do the work. And having an executive liaison as a go-between would create that efficiency and effectiveness that the executive would still be informed and have an avenue to be able to be in touch with me.


  224. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Supt. Drummond.


  225. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It happened relatively quickly. It would be within probably somewhere between the 11th and the 12th. I would say maybe the 11th or the 12th.


  226. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  227. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  228. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, because I’m wanting to quickly align the people. If Deputy Ferguson was going to be the Strategic Commander, ---


  229. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- that is her role. So I wanted to ensure that I wasn’t having her in a position where it would not allow her to do her function as well.


  230. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I went to my office, which I hadn’t been to in quite some time, and arranged to meet with my scribe, and as well as with Insp. Springer. This was around mid-afternoon. I met with my scribe around noon just to set some ground rules, expectations, of what we were going to be embarking on. And I’d lined up a meeting with Insp. Springer for mid-afternoon, which we met in the COMS Centre board room.


  231. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So would you like me to say what they are?


  232. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I agree that these are the objectives that I ---


  233. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There’s quite a few there. Yes.


  234. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Level of importance, I’m going to say they were all very important. And this is -- what I was doing was somewhat trying to do a bit of a reset and setting up a solid foundation that we were going to be based on to move forward.


  235. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    All these elements are key elements from an Incident Command standpoint that is required that needs to be in place and formalized and adhered to to promote success in your mission.


  236. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  237. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    For any operation, a mission statement is that foundation piece that everything is built off of. Everything that you do, everything that you -- when you’re making the decision whether to take action or not action, it needs to align with the mission statement. That’s why it’s a very important foundational piece.


  238. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  239. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So ---


  240. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In order to have success, it is not one person that is going to be bringing you success. In an incident command model, you do have to surround yourself with some key subject matter experts that are going to be able to properly inform you and to make proper decision making.


  241. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We ---


  242. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We were going to pick who we needed at that table to have success and then pick incident commanders. Because of the protractedness of this, we wanted to make sure that whoever was running the NCRCC from an operational to tactical level, that there’s a rotation of people who will be effective in maintaining that level of operation day to day until we come up with our ultimate solution to end this.


  243. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Should be in my notes there.


  244. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  245. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    “Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, inforce [sic] legislation, maintain pubic [sic] safety for the duration of the Ottawa truck demosntrations with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights, to peacefull [sic] assembly, freedom of speech, officer and Community safety and well being.”


  246. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  247. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So it’s definitely, I would say, very accurate. If there might be a word here or there, if we want to do a comparison, I’d be happy to do a comparison with the plan as to ensure, if you’d like to. I’m quite satisfied that the gist of everything that I was trying to outline in this is there.


  248. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So integrated is meaning that we’re going to be depending on various different speciality elements to come to a successful resolution. It's not going to be necessarily one particular section that’s going to resolve this. In other words, it's just not public order, it's not just PLT. It's going to be an integration. But it even goes beyond that. It's going to be an integration with many of our policing partners that are going to be part of the solution.


  249. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We can never lose sight as to lawful protests that may be part, or lawful peaceful assemblies, and we have to respect everyone's Charter of Rights with everything that we do in the operation.


  250. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  251. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They're all high-level guiding principles, keeping the peace; enforcing legislation, and that comes at legislation at multiple levels, right up to the federal level, provincial, and municipal; maintaining public safety. so everything we should be doing should be moving towards ensuring public safety for the duration of this event that’s taking place.


  252. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  253. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the main action plan is a high-level statement of where do we want to get to?


  254. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  255. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Ideally, the best resolution is a peaceful resolution and have everyone leave peacefully. But in the event that that’s not going to happen, it is going to be demobilized at the end of the day.


  256. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, I'm seeing parts of it, but the parts that I'm seeing is yes, accurate.


  257. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I don't know if you're able to reduce it so you can see the ---


  258. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- bigger picture. So it starts to delineate who's at the strategic level and who the strategic commander is.


  259. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would be your chief, deputies, CAO.


  260. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He's at the highest strategic level that would be reporting to the -- or who would be responsible for the strategic commander.


  261. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So that is fed through the strategic command and belongs at the strategic level with regards to legal advice. Not to say that corporate communications doesn’t exist down at the operational level, but those are the key support elements that are found up at the executive level.


  262. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There's a difference between integrated and unified.


  263. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So in this particular case, this a single event commander with an integrated command team, command table that’s supporting it. When you're talking about a unified command, is that you're going to have multiple commanders of equal value forming the top event command positions. That’s what we did eventually move into with the RCMP and the OPP, but this is the model that was implemented upon me taking command and for the next few days.


  264. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Once again, as I mentioned, I think there's a lot of people trying to do a lot of good things. So what I'm trying to establish here is getting all those people around the table to work together to come up with the final plan, because it will not be successful without those elements around the table with me. And that’s why, as you can see, my command table has key elements to ensure that everyone has the voice and feeds me right information to be able to make informed and proper decisions.


  265. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So we're going to be getting feedback from whether it be the police liaison team, it could be the public order commanders, it could be a resourcing piece from the service command centre liaison that we would -- everyone would be able to feed into. This is what we were wanting to do. We're trying -- this is how we're going to try and do it, who has what to say about this. And this is where we might find where there's risks or issues that need to be -- well, I'll use the term again, NRA'd. Is it necessary? Is it risk-effective? Is it acceptable, what we're going to do? Have everyone around the table, from the investigations, from the intelligence, feeding us all the proper information we need to make quick and proper decisions.


  266. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  267. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah. I'm not quite sure why that’s redacted, and it should be PLT chief.


  268. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So Wallace was a mistake in spelling.


  269. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's Walker.


  270. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  271. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  272. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  273. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's -- there's a combination of things. It's establishing a healthy communication channel, so to ensure that the executive had been properly informed, properly kept up to date, as well as an avenue to be able to feed something to me if I needed to know something from that level.


  274. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  275. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So communications is -- and if you want to scroll down, there's another piece to it that's down at my level, the far right with the media. And media chief was not necessarily a proper term. It's more of a general corporate kind of communications that assisted me with all messaging. All, anything that would go out to the media would be drafted up and sent to me for approval before it was to be sent out, because -- and similarly, messaging internally, messaging to partners would be all -- and messaging with PLT would be worked in unison with that piece.


  276. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  277. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'd have to refer to my notes to know exactly, but it would be either the following day -- either the following day, so this is the 11th, so I'm thinking it's the 12th. Could be the 13th that I actually had a conversation with a member of the Integrated Planning Team.


  278. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There was a check-in that wanted to -- that needed to take place, and it's my understanding that Deputy Ferguson was taking some time off and that Deputy Bell was taking over. So I felt it probably appropriate to brief up to my strategic commander, who Deputy Bell was taking that position while Deputy Ferguson was off, to provide an update as to the work that had been achieved that day in establishing the foundation that we're talking about here.


  279. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  280. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would have to refer to my notes if ---


  281. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It was later in the afternoon. It was ---


  282. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- around dinnertime.


  283. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    My recollection says that there was a conversation with the Chief.


  284. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah, "just to point other services are sending but with strings attached."


  285. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From what we were getting from the Service Command Centre Team is that there were requests for if they were going to come, they would like to have static positions, not necessarily want to get into other quick response teams, and there was sometimes challenges with getting them to do enforcement pieces that would be required if that was the case. That was historically what we were seeing in my previous role.


  286. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  287. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  288. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I presented the whole background and reasoning of what I was doing and why I was doing it. This affirmed to me that the Chief was understanding what I was saying and that we were doing that reset, so to speak.


  289. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'll have to be honest, I did not necessarily, at this particular point in time, know what portion of it is, what portion I perhaps would use or adopt. This was quite in the infancy where there is going to be a bit of work to be done over the next few days, not discounting any good ideas that may be out there and analyze everything, because at this point, I wasn't aware that there was an Integrated Planning Team. I was preparing myself to have to put together a strong planning team to come up with an eventual final plan to get this done. So at this point, as I mentioned, that was -- I was going to be directing somebody to start based on clear expectations, developing a plan, but perhaps not discounting some good elements that would have been in there.


  290. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I can only assume. You'd have to ask Christianne, but I would say that that would make sense.


  291. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  292. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  293. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Good morning.


  294. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Good morning, sir.


  295. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  296. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  297. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  298. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don't -- I was not aware that they were in town at that particular time.


  299. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Inspector Palmer. She was the inspector who I was working jointly with in the Service Command Centre.


  300. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From my experience, I had an appreciation that if outside agencies were coming, they would be requesting to see the plans.


  301. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Outside agencies refers to all the different police agencies that were already assisting us in town, including the OPP and the RCMP, as well as other municipal services that were in town. I did not know that we were talking about an Integrated Planning Cell.


  302. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  303. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  304. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So during this conversation, I had my first interaction with Superintendent Lue from the RCMP, had an understanding of what their role was here to help us, and based on the conversations that I'd had, and gave them a briefing on the new mission statement, the steps that myself and Inspector Springer were taking as part of the command table, and understanding that it was going to take a day or two to get the proper people around the table that we were looking for. Some were coming from other parts of the province. That based on what I was proposing and telling Superintendent Lue that it was aligning with the framework that they were setting up at the RCMP Leikin building, which they're referring to as the NOK.


  305. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  306. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So in this particular case, language is very important, and I understand that the word "approval" is in there. My ask regarding the work that I had established with the mission statement, the main action plan, the objectives, once again, I wanted some oversight from the legal section to ensure that there was no risk to the organization. So the approval, I wasn't looking for an actual sign-off approval. I was looking for their advice and recommendations if there should be any concerns identified with that, if that answers your question.


  307. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  308. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is accurate.


  309. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's the Integrated Event Command Table.


  310. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And that represents that organizational chart that represents who's sitting at that table.


  311. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  312. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I may need to refer to my notes for specifics if you're looking for specifics, but he was starting to direct more operational and tactical level decision making, and I just -- I could appreciate where everyone was at. We were evolving into this new state. We're trying to do a reset. There's a lot of people who were in a particular frame of mind at that particular time. And I just wanted to reassure and instill confidence in everybody that I did have it at hand and to trust what I was going to be doing and what I was going to be putting into place.


  313. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  314. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is accurate.


  315. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Once again, the situation that we were in, it had been a long, drawn-out period where, obviously, people had been stretched to their limits. I don’t think Ottawa Police has ever been in a situation like this, so everyone was pushed to their limits. There also was probably an appreciation that we’re dealing with outside agencies coming in and starting to propose how we’re going to resolve this. That could be probably very strenuous on a Chief. Yes, there was tension on that call. Can I say specifically what happened? I was pretty much very focused on what I needed to do and I had to stay focused on that. No different in my -- the final statement in that -- final sentence in the previous paragraph. I was reasserting my autonomy again by -- with Sergeant Tetreault proposing something. It may be very valid and very good, but in due time I will process that piece of information and with the Integrated Command Table make a decision as to what will be decided on as far as moving forward.


  316. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  317. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I had not witnessed with any of the previous Chiefs that we’ve had at the Ottawa Police.


  318. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The level of involvement and direction at the lower operational and tactical levels. And I have not witnessed perhaps the intensity or the behaviours that Chief Sloly was showing amongst the command team.


  319. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  320. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    She’s in Legal Services at the Ottawa Police.


  321. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not particularly, but I could speak to its -- like it’s the improper term being used. If there’s one service that’s in the lead, then it’s an integrated command. If there’s multiple services that have come together to share the command, that’s a unified command.


  322. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    My recollection is when I did assert myself and essentially saying that I’ve got this and this is what we’re doing and this is how we’re going to be operating, I got the sense from the Chief that he was okay with that.


  323. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Once again, this is stepping outside the boundaries of regular Incident Command where there’s things that were taking place when I was not in the position that I was in that I’m not privy to and that I would not be able to speak to, but obviously there were other things going on behind the scenes that they would be referring to. They’ll need to speak to those pieces.


  324. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Oh, it would be part of the meeting, but the content of what they’re talking about, about “Chief gave approval 2 weeks ago”, “Need to get going on this”, it looks like by these notes -- and they’re obviously not my notes -- that Tetreault -- Sergeant Darwin Tetreault was saying that it will work. “Let’s implement the plan.” I don’t know who is saying that. That’s not me.


  325. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  326. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  327. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So if I can put everything into context with this, the Integrated Planning Cell, based on the information that they had, the conversations that we had had with the mission statement, main action plan and that overall phased approach had been discussed. I was very appreciative that we had that Integrated Planning Cell with some very experienced plan writers to be able to create a document very quickly, but there needs to be an appreciation that, although the overall strategy’s going to be a heavy PLT negotiations and communication piece, we have to prepare right now and start putting all the pieces together for a Public Order action if that was not successful. So in this comment that I make that the overall execution piece is missing, it’s a fair statement and it’s not any criticism on Phil Lue or C/Supt. Carson Pardy just because we had just put this team together and there was a lot of discussions that need to take place between all the people at the table, whether it be investigations from an authority standpoint, public order to what they need and propose as possible action plans, what this PLT need to do in the meantime to hopefully negotiate and communicate them out of the area. There’s a lot of pieces that -- but I really wanted to work towards a meaningful execution piece that’s going to layout, from start to finish, how we were going to return Ottawa to a normal state.


  328. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  329. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct. We -- my conversation with C/Supt. Pardy, we were very much aligned. He understood that although there may have been some planning and discussion with Darwin Tetreault, that he understood and appreciated that we were taking a pretty larger wholesome approach to this and that they will be supporting us moving on to building out that execution. So the plan that we agreed upon is how we are now going to be integrating everything moving forward, and that was going to be the concept of operation and the framework that we were going to be operating under.


  330. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  331. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the difference -- the main difference between the two, with the 3.0 plan, at the time that was developed under the event commander of command of Supt. Patterson, I am not aware that there was any sign off approval on the document that that document was adopted. The difference between the two is that this document is under the event commander, has the approval on this document, as we are adopting this.


  332. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, it was.


  333. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Probably speaking a little bit freely, with terms of “out the window”. The sense is is that Chief Sloly gave the direction of building that February 9th plan. So as a Chief, I would imagine this was very difficult, to have another organization come and develop a new plan. I am not fully aware of the Integrated Planning Teams use of the February 9th. They may have been aware of it, used it, took portions of it, and adopted it into their plan, which is completely fine, because at the end of the day, the plan that I approved for the integration piece was that 13th of February plan. But I think the Chief was challenged with, “Why was my plan not used?” And that’s what I’m referring to.


  334. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would characterize them as different plans?


  335. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In the structure, the content, how -- what was placed in that SMEAC format that we discussed yesterday. Things were aligning a lot more with the proper structure of an operation plan, as well as, as I indicated, that I had identified that we actually had to build out that particular section in execution because it was not to my satisfaction at that point.


  336. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  337. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. And I think in appreciation of where everybody was at on the 14th and the evolution that was taking place, there was a lot of changes happening and we were trying to develop the proper model, proper people in the right positions. A lot of transitioning was taking place. So I can appreciate where a team that would be at Leikin and, in this particular -- on this particular day, I was at the RCMP building, which we call the NCRCC, National Capital Regional Command Centre, which is in Orleans, and we were not actually collocated. Things were happening within our own sides. And as well, you have to hopefully also appreciate that we’re coming out of the period where there was that insistence on chief and legal approval. Those terms were terms that we were trying to transition out of and change that framework. My full intent, and may not have been fully communicated to C/Supt. Pardy, which no one is to blame, that my reason for asking for legal advice is to get a set of eyes on that just to ensure that I'm not creating risk for the organisation. There were a few things going on that day, and in the days prior, between a state of emergency and Ottawa, a state of emergency and the Province of Ontario, as well as some negotiation and some agreements being made from politicians at the municipal level. That's a lot of moving parts that I wanted to make sure that I brought some good people in to ensure that we're not putting our organisation at risk.


  338. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would be myself.


  339. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Once again, as I mentioned, we were coming out of a framework where that was what was happening within the Ottawa Police. Everything was escalating to that level. So it's probably very hard to break that framework and that thought process, and I was trying to change that to bring it down to the level that it needed to be at at the Operational level. So that's -- and if you continue on that I was frustrated with this continued attempt to try and have approvals up to the Chief level.


  340. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So in this particular case, Chief Sloly's referring to the plan. The review that I had asked was for the items that I had developed at that particular time. At the end of the day, on the 13th, I had approved the plan.


  341. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  342. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  343. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  344. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm sorry, where do you see it?


  345. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  346. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would not be an approval on this plan, it would probably be the approval for another plan that had been developed.


  347. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  348. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would have to agree. As you can well imagine, there was quite a bit going through my head, a lot of work that needed to be done, a lot of coordination, and a lot of planning, thought needed to go into our next steps. The frequency and the length of these meetings that were being -- that I was being called to was becoming very challenging, and not necessarily something that happens in normal Incident Command. Hence the reason why you have a Strategic Level Commander as well as an Executive Liaison to be able to mitigate that aspect. But there was still an insistence on the Event Commander to be present at this. So understanding that we're transitioning and trying to do this reset, it's hard to turn the switch right away, and it was kind of trying to steer it away from that model. But I can fully appreciate Chief Superintendent Pardy's frustration that because he was wanting to support me in moving this forward as quickly and efficiently as we could.


  349. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    P.M., that's correct.


  350. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  351. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There's quite a bigger picture to this, and once again, I will preface it with we were in a transition phase and we are not co-located. And I had met the -- that team for a brief moment that morning, and were contemplating and making decisions to transition our Command Post at the Operational level to Leikin to be co-located with that integrated cell. There was a lot happening between the 13th and the 14th that was unexpected, challenging, and we were trying to manage. The one piece that we have to remember is that yes, there is the Integrated Planning Cell, that is one component that's supporting me. We have to remember that I have an Integrated Command Table that I have set up. So it is not being done in isolation, it's not one person that is proposing or brainstorming ideas. Yes, the decision lies with me as the Event Commander, but you know, on this particular day, there was the Mayor's agreement that had transpired, which was resulting in potential movement of vehicles. Specifically sticking to the point that you're asking for, given the fact that we were potentially going to be having areas that protesters were going to be clearing the vehicles and leaving, my Command Table had some conversations between myself, Inspector Springer, Public Order, Police Liaison, Investigations, Intelligence with regards to figuring out if they leave how do we keep those areas from being reoccupied again. So when we're talking about the positive action, is that we wanted to, if those areas were freed up, we just wanted to make sure that they weren't going to be reoccupied. That conversation, that brainstorming took place at that Integrated Command Table at the Operational level. That's an appropriate conversation to take place, given the situation that we were in. Fully utilising all the resources at hand, we had to come up with a egress plan for any of the vehicles that wanted to leave as a result of that agreement to ensure that it was safe and non-impeded to get those vehicles out of the downtown core. We as a group discussed that what do we do with those areas that either get thinned out to maybe down to a couple of vehicles, and how do we hold it. At the time, and based on the infancy of our group, we brainstormed that it would probably be a good idea to try and implement some strategies to hold those areas. That was communicated to Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue by phone, and I definitely sensed concern on their part. They voiced their opinion and I took that away. Once that call was completed, we actually somewhat put a pause on that given the advice, recommendations, food for thought. I do have to say that Chief Superintendent Pardy, regardless of perhaps his strong conviction of maybe this was not a good idea, he still reassured me that I had his full support and that full team support on the decision that I’m going to make, which was very reassuring. But I was utilizing the integrated model appropriately and listened to the people who were talking to me. When we met face to face the next day ---


  352. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The 15th where now we have moved our command post and setting up our command post. We had a meeting with the strategic level and had a wholesome conversation with this, which resulted in a change in direction.


  353. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The change in direction is that we were perhaps utilizing resources not to the most effective use in order to preserve the right resources to have in place for the bigger picture action plan within the next set of days. Nothing determined at that point, but to refocus ourselves on that maintenance -- sorry, stabilization phase in order to get the focus on the communication, focus on the PLT action, getting our officers rested, getting other resources in town and develop the plans we need to if the negotiation- communication does not work.


  354. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  355. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At 1320?


  356. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Sure. City manager, basically stated that Mayor involved in negotiation to someone who has ability to communicate with core organizers.


  357. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  358. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  359. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So essentially, if I could put into context, what I’m being informed at this point is that the Mayor is wanting to develop a letter to present to organizers to say if you leave -- and I think there was some concession to remaining on Wellington for a period, that if they were willing to leave that he would have a meeting with the organizers at a later date. This aligned with what was taking place in other parts of the province and the country at the provincial and the federal level where the public safety Ministers were offering to draft a letter to protest organizers to denounce their protest and to leave. And if they did so, that they would have a meeting at a later date with them. So that’s somewhat very much aligned which was happening on the provincial and national level. And based on the information I had on the 13th at this time, that -- and having that plan in place with wanting to reduce the footprint and have -- negotiating protestors out of the area, it aligned with our plan. It was potentially challenges that come along with this when you’re talking about political agreements with protestors, however, I can only control what I can control. And if this happens and people leave, then that is a benefit to the operation and that I would be good with it because there’s nothing I can do about it.


  360. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. From this point on that I was not really aware that I was not really aware that the -- of that dynamic going on.


  361. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The optics of the police involved with politicians in negotiating with other parties, the optics would -- could pose challenges to us.


  362. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  363. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  364. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The plan that I was developing was based on existing authorities, whether it be under the provincial, federal or common law authority to act. This is what takes place on a daily basis on those larger type events. We have to leverage the -- those particular authorities that exist. The plan that I was building with my Integrated Command Table, and the advice that I was getting, and having the right people from the right backgrounds providing their input, I was satisfied that we were going to have all the authorities we need to take action if the communication and the negotiation piece of our stabilization plan was not successful in having that area cleared and the city returned to a state of normalcy.


  365. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would agree, although that we were planning under the common law authorities to create a zone where we could operate safely for both the police and the public, the secure zone options that were offered through the Emergencies Act was a benefit. It somewhat provided a framework, a legal framework that would be a lot more understandable for our members, for the community, and in fact the protesters as well, understanding what was taking place when we were going to put that secure zone into effect.


  366. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Anything that's going to contribute to mission success is a benefit.


  367. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Hard for me to say. I did not get to do the operation without it, so it would be very -- I don't know what complications I would have had, had it not been in place, and I utilized the common law. We have used it before. We have used it since without the Emergencies Act and it has been effective, but I cannot speak for this particular date or that weekend operation. Had I not had it in that fashion, what would it look like, hard for me to say.


  368. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is very accurate.


  369. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were.


  370. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Majority of the arrangements were all done by the 13th because they were actually in transit to Ottawa. That being said, there was some final, obviously, contract and finance work that needed to be taken care of in the days that followed, but to my knowledge, we did not have to adopt any processes under the Emergencies Act to compel any of them to follow through on their actions.


  371. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Are you talking under the Emergencies Act or the Emergency Measures ---


  372. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the provincial?


  373. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Emergencies ---


  374. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  375. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were.


  376. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were.


  377. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Well, I'm not quite sure - - I might not fully understand what a designation, if that means that the Public Safety Minister had to actually sign off on a particular area. We did have some discussions on a particular date. I'm going to say on or about 16, 17 -- 16th probably, where we had a meeting following the understanding of the Regulations and the availability of a secure zone, and the need to get the Public Safety Minister to sign off on a particular actual area. That may be what the designation means. After further review and discussion with the Minister's office and legal, it was determined that the police should have the flexibility to designate, expand or contract or move based on as the operation goes as opposed to have a fixed area which is no - - with no flexibility. So that decision was made in the subsequent 24 hours that there would not be an official document from the Public Safety Minister that this area, as per the Public Safety Minister, is a secure area. We were able to have the flexibility to, like I said, expand or contract, as the operation dictate, to minimize the impact on the community.


  378. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  379. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  380. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  381. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  382. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is appearing to be the one that I would refer to, yes.


  383. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s why it’s important to understand that there really is -- the dates to be -- on the cover page from the 15th on, it’s -- that’s including the four stages. The four stages are Stabilization; Actions On; Maintenance, and Demobilization.


  384. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So it was launched, as indicated by the plan, by the 15th. I have to explain somewhat a bit this plan, because we are under very -- a lot of duress and a lot of time constraints and a lot of moving parts. This was a massive undertaking; something that an operation this large would often take, perhaps a month plus to plan for. So we were having regular meetings of the Command table when it was the Integrated Command, when it transitioned to a Unified Command; we’re having meetings about this plan. We were meeting with the plan writer, Brad Taylor and Carson Pardy and their team, continually to be feeding them as we were evolving information from the Command table, from our subject matter experts on what we require. And that was evolving right up to Phase 2 of our plan. But it’s important to note that we were in agreement with the concept of operation, and we were in agreement that it was not realistic to actually have a completed, actual nice with-a-bow plan by the 15th. It was going to be evolving. But by the time that we got to the 17th night, that was what we pretty much were going to have to stick with as we went into Phase 2. So the maintenance period, as I mentioned earlier, involved stabilizing the operation; getting more resources in; allowing Ottawa Police officers to rest; enhance a communication and PLT strategy on the messaging. And the messaging was very clear; “It's time to go, it’s time to leave. No more talking here, it’s -- you have to leave. That’s the only options that you have here. It’s over.” And that messaging, during that stabilization period intensified to a set date where we’re determining that, if they have not left, we’re going to move on to an “Actions On” phase, which is now a more tactical Public Order, supported by tactical CBRNE, which I mentioned was Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive Team, with a very enhanced arrest plan; transportation, processing, housing plan, with many intricacies that need to be thought of, whether it be children that were going to be involved, because we knew children were on scene at the protest. We were aware of potential risks in vehicles, whether it be from unknown devices. We were aware that we were -- going to maybe be faced with people who are going to barricade themselves in vehicles. So it’s quite a complex plan with many moving parts that we had to focus on those key pieces. And that was the “Actions On” piece where we had multiple presentations from the various experts from Public Order, where the unified command had to make a final decision on, this is what we’re going to go with, with the integrated between Public Order and tactical CBRNE, plus the support from the arrest. Once that -- and we were going to go until it stopped; until it was over, until it was fully cleared. And we didn’t know if that was going to be one, two, three, four days, but we had to have the resources in place to sustain a long duration of the Public Order operation. Once it was cleared, we moved into the Maintenance phase, which was we had to make sure that it stayed clear of protestors, allow for rehabilitation of the streets, inspection of the streets. And then once we were satisfied that the protestors were not returning, and that we can start demobilizing resources, that meant that Ottawa’s back to a state of normalcy. If that answers your question?


  385. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  386. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Following probably one of the biggest snowstorms that we got in a while, we -- I gave the -- myself, and I should not be saying “I”; myself and my two co- commanders, Phil Lue and Dave Springer, did a final check, made sure that we had all the resources in place. And my hat’s off to all the officers that stood up that day, after very long days, long weeks, to put their best foot forward. From all the elements, we launched the initial -- if I can say phase again within a phase, of the clearing of the demonstration.


  387. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If I can refer to my notes, I think it’s around, sometime in the 0700 hours that we started.


  388. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    But I’d have to look on my day of notes for that.


  389. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  390. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Nicholas and Waller. The final decision, after many discussions on how we were going to proceed through it, we decided we were going to do a movement from east of the affected area, all the way through to the west, and then deal with some satellite areas at the tail end.


  391. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It took better part of the morning.


  392. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We were going to be moving to Rideau and Sussex.


  393. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were -- what was experienced was, there was some passive resistance, there was some active resistance, and there was some assaultive behaviour that we experienced at Rideau and Sussex.


  394. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So this is obviously happening at the tactical level with the Tactical Commander levels but I’m being kept very much informed with myself, Insp. Springer, and Supt. Lue, we’re being kept informed live as to what’s happening. We do have some video feeds from drones, and as well CTV and everyone else was providing us some good footage as well. But we could see that the cause and effect, that they had the resolve to stay. They did not -- they were either wanting to be arrested or they’re refusing to move, refusing to leave, and then being subject to being arrested for mischief.


  395. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah. So we -- the one that you’re referring to where we’re now somewhat increasing our presence and having to increase our presence based on the actions of the crowd, and that’s moving in to day 2 on the 19th and the -- sorry, no; this is still on the 18th in front of the Chateau Laurier once we had transitioned and holding the Rideau- Sussex area in front of the Chateau Laurier. The cause and effect was that we had the massive group, the larger group from Wellington Street now descending down onto that area. There was -- it was definitely an aggressive crowd, volatile crowd, where we had to make some decisions to increase our usage of force in order to protect ourselves and properly deal with the situation at hand.


  396. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The operation actually never ended.


  397. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It never did pause. We had to maintain public order action presence 24/7 until it was completely clear. So reduced, and a pause on movement took place later in the evening, and we held that spot in front of the Chateau Laurier in order -- and believe it or not, that part of the operation there was a lot of work to do. There was -- the towing of multiple vehicles from that site is very time consuming. Some of the vehicles were perhaps disabled or in a fashion that would be difficult to tow. So we had all the right resources in time -- in place; however, it took time to remove those vehicles. So we did not want to get too far ahead of ourselves; once again, slow, methodical. What was controlling a lot of the progression was how fast we can manage the arrested individuals, which we did get very overcapacity through that second portion, but it’s also the time that it takes to actually tow and clear those areas, and then install some fencing to ensure that area remained clear.


  398. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So that’s a decision that was made at the command table once again, in between Supt. Phil Lue and Insp. Springer and I. We had to realize that the effect of putting police officers on the line sometimes has an effect in the crowd to antagonize the crowd, and we were wanting to de- escalate the situation. If we can have the same effect with fencing, to keep them out of that area with minimal police presence to ensure and have reserves on hand, that will more than likely de-escalate the situation. And that’s, in fact, what took place. We replaced the officers with fencing, reduced the footprint of officers, and it actually de-escalated the crowd and a lot of the crowd returned back up into the Wellington Street area.


  399. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been probably in the midnight timeframe, give or take. At that point, if you can appreciate that I would not be able to -- neither could Supt. Lue and Insp. Springer -- operate for 24 hours a day for three days. We implemented a reserve Event Command to supplement a day and a night shift to have a sustained command and a functional command team during that period. So that part of the operation, which I am fully briefed on and know about, was under the command of three other Commanders during the night period. But my understanding was around the day.


  400. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We held those areas secure, and they were not taken over, and there was no major incidents to report.


  401. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  402. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Given the usage of -- at that point, we had 14 Public Order Units, and we had to utilize every single member. It was a little bit of a later start. Once again, I’d have to refer to my notes for exact times, but it was in the neighbourhood of the 0900 time period where we progressed with moving onto our next phase of trying to move Wellington.


  403. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Continuing with the east to west. And there’s a bit of a south movement too, through -- on Elgin Street.


  404. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  405. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Once again, after checking with the three Commanders and verifying that everyone was ready to go, made some adjustments on lessons learned from the day before. We progressed with -- and further, based on what we had experienced and seen, that the level of aggression towards the police, we increased our protective level to move on with that operation that day. And when everyone was in place ready to go with the full arrest, tactical, CBRNE support, Public Order was ready, we moved and progressed eastbound -- sorry, westbound on Wellington, slow and methodically, to clear the protestors. Once again, full messaging. Leave. Anyone who got caught there by chance or came to visit, they were clearly informed it’s time to leave. And anyone who wanted to leave was free to leave. There was no one boxed in during any of the operations.


  406. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were aggressive, as anticipated, and confirmed the reason why we increased our level of protection on our officers. They were met with confrontation assaultive behaviour as they progressed into the Wellington Street corridor.


  407. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There -- once again, that is elements that would have been used at the tactical level, sometimes in exigent circumstances. There were, at the onset, smoke that was used by the protestors.


  408. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There had to be the use -- there was the need to use some of those tools during this operation.


  409. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Different. We had cleared all the way westbound on Wellington, just the Wellington corridor, not the north-south -- north-south streets except for Elgin. We secured Elgin Street. And we progressed all the way down to clearing protestors that were remaining, were moving back, but were still staying in the area, but never met the threshold of being arrested. There was a large group that still remained on Banks Street towards the evening hours at the end of the day. It took the full day to -- for anyone who did not leave with their vehicle to clear and tow those vehicles. When I say “clear”, once again, we did not know what to expect in vehicles, whether it be devices or challenges with their vehicles being disabled. It took a long period for the teams to clear the remaining trucks from Wellington Street with our towing plan.


  410. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So that was now moving into the third day.


  411. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The 20th. That would be the Sunday.


  412. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We spent a good portion of the day clearing the remaining north-south streets and any of the other areas, but the actions of both the Friday and the Saturday, the 18th and the 19th, had the effect of clearing of those areas. Anyone who remained in those areas I think realized that it was over, and most left. We were just doing some various cleaning up of abandoned vehicles that may have been left there that were protest vehicles or illegally parked vehicles to ensure that that was -- once again, the vehicles are properly cleared and if they were disabled, that they were rendered able to be towed. Later in that afternoon, we were satisfied that we were prepared to finalize -- go the final phase of clearing Coventry Road, which is a large parking lot adjacent to a baseball field and a couple of hotels, where it was somewhat of a base camp for the protestors.


  413. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So we transitioned to the maintenance phase as of the 21st, which would be the Monday, where we maintained Public Order elements ready to respond. I’d like to note that we continued to have lawful protests in follow-up to this. We were perhaps securing the downtown core, but we were having daily protests at the War Museum of freedom protestors, but they were acting and they were present in a lawful manner. We kept a minimal presence, as we do in most demonstrations, but we had to manage that and keep an eye on that. Various convoys throughout that maintenance period, we would get intelligence or information that they were trying to come back to Ottawa and we would be preparing and staging in order to act on that to prevent them from coming back down with vehicles to protest. So that following week, as we progressed out of the Emergencies Act, out of all the states of emergency, which once again moved us into a phase of trying to assess what does this mean, what has changed, that by the end of that week, the Sunday, I was satisfied to go to a demobilization phase and turned over operations to regular Ottawa police operations and all external agencies had been demobilized.


  414. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’d be happy to answer any of your questions, sir.


  415. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  416. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not official yet.


  417. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah. Correct.


  418. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  419. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  420. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Superintendent Rob Drummond.


  421. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We do not have that rank within the Ottawa Police.


  422. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Police Reporting Unit and the Command Centre.


  423. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Within the whole Directorate or just my branch?


  424. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    My branch, I would have to say in the neighbourhood of slightly under 200 officers.


  425. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. Large portion civilians.


  426. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  427. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  428. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  429. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did not run. So I would have been a tactical ground commander for that. If you’re understanding, as I explained the tactical, operational, and I was an actual tactical level commander on the ground running hundreds of men and women who were on contact teams.


  430. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  431. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Would be -- so in this -- on that particular day, the strategic level would have been reporting up to the Chief.


  432. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The Chief, at the end of the day, is in command of all policing.


  433. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is very fair.


  434. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So autonomy in incident command, at a certain level, exist at all levels. So there is a certain level of autonomy at the tactical level that is bestowed by the event commander down -- or the incident commander down to the tactical level, that they have the authorities to act, and decide, and do certain things. They also have limits as to what they can do, where they may have to pause and go up to seek authorization. So those -- that level of autonomy exists at each level. And as an event commander, the autonomy that I was referring to is I wanted to ensure that I was given the autonomy of the decision making that is appropriate and in line with most incident command models.


  435. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  436. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  437. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  438. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, sir.


  439. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In operation, generally speaking, that interaction is somewhat quite limited because there is a strategic commander that anything, the wishes, or requests, or concerns, from the chief would be managed through a strategic level command or, in this particular case, at one point it was Deputy Chief Ferguson, that that was -- would be the avenue to go with concerns. What I’ve experienced previously in other larger scale events, you may get a visit from the Chief into a Command Centre, or to the operational level, is just to say, “Hi. Thank you” and that type of thing. Keeping in mind that there is a particular avenue for the Chief to exercise his authorities through that proper chain.


  440. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    He can, yes.


  441. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  442. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  443. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  444. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Are you referring back to October 22nd, 2014?


  445. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  446. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  447. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s accurate.


  448. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There are lessons learned after every event.


  449. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, in the capacity of a duty inspector, that platoon duty inspector role that I was talking about, which is the operational on-duty commander, and dealing with critical incidents, various other incidents.


  450. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is true.


  451. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I appreciate that.


  452. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, I didn't -- wouldn't - - I didn't have anything that's to the contrary.


  453. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There weren't many interactions that had taken place, but yes.


  454. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  455. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  456. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  457. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  458. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  459. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  460. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  461. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Direct? Maybe not face- to-face; however, through Teams meeting and some requests directly from him, towards the end he was requesting -- I was recommending that a organisational chart needed to be established to set clear command and control. And he was interested to hear what I had, and I presented it to him, and...


  462. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Minimal, with the exception of any Teams meeting that I would be participating in.


  463. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Superintendent Rheaume.


  464. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  465. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At that point, if we're going to be actually talking about Operational level planning, she would be accountable for it but responsible would be the Event Commander.


  466. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  467. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  468. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  469. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is accurate.


  470. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is who I got the phone call from, yes.


  471. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I will -- I don't know who made the decision to have Superintendent Patterson removed, but ---


  472. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- if you say so.


  473. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I've heard.


  474. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was not -- I have no direct knowledge of it.


  475. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct. That is the right sequence.


  476. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Superintendent Dunlop and Superintendent Patterson.


  477. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  478. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  479. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  480. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's accurate.


  481. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  482. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  483. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was aware of it, but in my role was just somewhat as a conduit to ensure it gets to whoever it needed to get to, in this particular case the Event Commander.


  484. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  485. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were written in a different structure or content.


  486. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And I would agree with you that there -- there may be some elements that were drawn out of it as good elements, as good pieces.


  487. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  488. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From the RCMP?


  489. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  490. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was not privy to that conversation, but I would assume, I would expect that that Integrated Planning Team would not discount existing elements in order to build the most effective plan.


  491. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This complexity, we're talking that if we had the opportunity to know the -- we had to compress a lot of work into a very short period of time. And in order to -- you know, it would be nice to have had a month to know that we were going to have something similar to the -- a presidential visit that's going to result in disorder, a G20 visit that we know that there's going to be protests and disorder, we would have that time to plan and have the resources in place.


  492. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We did not.


  493. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the actual -- the 10th, let's -- have to say that I was put in place the 10th at night. I slept through the night. The 11th, I had to get myself organized and establish that foundation piece with those points that I had outlined. And then by the 11th -- sorry, by the 12th, I'm now assembling my Command Team to get the people around me to be able to start feeding me the advice and the information and their subject-matter expertise in order to start building the plan. So I'd say by the 13th, we would be now in that plan- building mode.


  494. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you clarify your question, please?


  495. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  496. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  497. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would agree with that.


  498. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Are you talking about the subsequent element or the -- I knew that a group got together at Elgin Street to write that plan.


  499. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  500. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  501. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  502. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was not my take on what was transpiring.


  503. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There is an interaction that did take place between myself and Deputy Chief Ferguson, where the Chief was insisting that he needed to approve the plan. And I advised Deputy Ferguson if she could have the conversation with the Chief saying I don't think he needs to approve it. I have approved it. We're moving forward with it.


  504. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Please share it with him.


  505. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  506. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At that point, he didn't.


  507. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So this is referring to his February 9th plan that he approved.


  508. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I remember reading this email.


  509. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  510. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Are we talking from the point that I'm the Event Commander?


  511. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So there -- during some of those meetings, there were topics that were being brought up that were becoming more operational even tactical decisions that need to be made during those briefings. I just had to ask that trust be bestowed on us that we were going to be doing, taking care of those things, and that as a Chief, he did not have to worry about those level of things.


  512. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  513. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, there -- yes.


  514. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  515. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  516. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  517. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would agree.


  518. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would say yes.


  519. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would agree.


  520. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  521. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  522. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah, definitely not this type of situation, no, but I've been ---


  523. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- in stressful situations.


  524. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  525. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  526. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  527. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  528. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I agree with that.


  529. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I think the numbers were in the neighbourhood of in the 2,200 officers.


  530. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And that's going to be give and take because I'm sure there may be some inaccuracies with forgetting this little element, that element.


  531. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  532. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would've been verbal.


  533. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If I can maybe just correct that. The ---


  534. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- Operational Plans were not out yet. There were no plans out yet when that reflection was -- that was on the 27th of January, after I was exposed to the Hendon call, the Hendon report, and a meeting between -- in the -- with the Intelligence, Special Events, and the Information Group. That's when that observation is made. The plans only came out late on the 28th ---


  535. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- once the truckers had arrived.


  536. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I wasn't -- I didn't see all the plans. So the plans that we received, they spoke to appendix plans, which I had never saw and can't speak to if it was something that was going to be adequate to manage that.


  537. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the disconnect is I'd never seen the level of engagement of Intelligence Units, especially with the OPP, on previous events to this magnitude. So that's where it seemed -- we don't have the plan out yet, and what I was understanding that we were planning to have from the briefings that we had on the 27th was that there was going to be a two-day, and that there is nothing to indicate necessarily that they're going to stay, but there maybe some that's going to stay. That's where I was kind of wondering... They've ramped up a lot of resources from an Intelligence piece across the province, and at a national level for what -- how things were seeming to be developing in Ottawa. If that answers your question.


  538. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not being privy to all the information, all the plans, because not only is there Hendon, I'm sure that the teams were -- had access to a lot of other to inform their decision-making. I can tell you the right people from the right sections were engaged because I knew that Mark Patterson was part of the Intelligence Team with his team, and the Special Events Team were all engaged, and these are people who have been put in those positions for a reason. So the right people and the right sections were engaged to plan for this. I am not privy to everything. So I think I even said in my statement that the right people are engaged that need to be engaged to plan for this, and I had to leave it at that.


  539. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was away skiing, but I was not far. I was only about 45 minutes away. So I would be able to come back if I had to.


  540. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I believe it would've been under Deputy Chief Ferguson.


  541. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Oh, the Intelligence.


  542. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  543. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It is a policing solution.


  544. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Well it wasn’t seen as -- it’s not Ottawa Police solution alone. It was a policing solution. So when I say policing, there’s many times that a lot of operations currently going on, even this weekend, where multiple agencies need to come together to do that, that’s a policing solution.


  545. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So they’re policing tools. So no different than the Criminal Code of Canada, no different than the Highway Traffic Act, the various municipal -- governments put these acts in place as tools for the -- for policing to use.


  546. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I think -- are you referring to the letters that the Public Safety Ministers were wanting to draft?


  547. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I was informed. And I did speak to that, I believe, today, with regards to that I had knowledge through the OPP shared at one of my first meetings with S/Sgt. Giselle Walker, who informed that at the provincial level, as well as the federal level, that they were -- the Ministers were drafting letters, if they were to denounce their protest activity and leave, that they would honour a meeting at a later date.


  548. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is not a policing solution.


  549. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Thank you, sir.


  550. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  551. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Perhaps they have agreements on certain types of events that they would become involved with that.


  552. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I have no knowledge of that.


  553. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There were challenges in meeting the staffing needs.


  554. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don't have specific knowledge on that.


  555. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There were specific ones that you want to refer to that -- are you -- I don't know what you're referring to COVID-19 mandates.


  556. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    What was the change or that they went into place?


  557. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Are you talking about ---


  558. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- the internal policies, not globally on that. You're talking about Ottawa Police?


  559. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  560. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  561. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don't have exact numbers on that.


  562. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would be outside my purview responsibilities.


  563. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is accurate.


  564. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'd have to refer to my notes specifically if you would -- I could confirm if you'd like.


  565. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So it -- once again, you're referring to a specific date. That sounds right ---


  566. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- on or about that date. I would just want to -- I would have it in my notes.


  567. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  568. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I wouldn't say that the conversation would be that -- in the same effect. They're two different operations, two different styles of operations.


  569. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  570. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would be -- I -- on or about that day, I know that there was some operation, not involved in my responsibilities, but I was aware that something of that nature happened at Coventry.


  571. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm not privy to all the information of what PLT was doing at the time, what the arrangements were, what the integration was.


  572. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would be hard for me to have an opinion on that.


  573. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They each have their role, and integrated properly and used appropriately, they should be working in unison, if that helps.


  574. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm -- is this something that I was privy to, because I'm not sure I heard the snatch and grab term used.


  575. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Is there notes to this?


  576. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I did not.


  577. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So a term snatch and grab under what context?


  578. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So we -- I would -- the term snatch and grab is not a term that I am familiar with, but I do have extensive experience as a Public Order Commander and in charge of our Public Order Unit for five years, that there are arrest techniques that we use in a Public Order fashion that all Public Order Units utilize across the province for effecting a lawful arrest on a Public Order line.


  579. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There are techniques that are going to be arrest techniques that are going to be used. And like I said, the snatch and grab is not something that is something that I'm familiar with.


  580. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  581. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  582. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  583. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I implemented a measure to mitigate that well in advance where every officer who was deployed on the ground received a sticker that went into their notebooks prior to briefing that outlined exactly all this information with their authorities.


  584. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. So officers' briefing, there was various officers that would be briefed during the various stages of the operation, as early as the evening of, the 17th, and into the morning, and so on, so forth, 24 hours a day, where there were briefing periods where any new officer coming in for a briefing would receive a sticker that would go into their notebook that outlined the mission statement, main action plan, and their authorities.


  585. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Inspector Lucas would've reported to me directly ---


  586. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- with regards to the -- as the Incident Commander in the NCRCC.


  587. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you please repeat your question?


  588. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I can't speak for Inspector Lucas, but I had an Operations chief directly linked feeding all the information as it was taking place within our Operational level command, and fed Inspector Lucas with all the details of this plan. I even emailed out to every member of the Ottawa Police the mission statement and the main action plan on master distribution lists and kept everyone abreast of the -- of what was taking place through email.


  589. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As far as the executive goes, the Strategic Commander involved, which is Deputy Chief Ferguson, involved all the way along and fully informing.


  590. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  591. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Can you scroll down a bit, please? Some more. Some more, please. Again. Page 3, please. So from what I can see, this appears to be the plan. Without going into every single page to see, it is aligning with the plan that I would've approved.


  592. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  593. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Oh, sorry. I should qualify. We were in Unified Command.


  594. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So we were three Unified Commanders approving this plan and moving forward at this point. So ---


  595. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Inspector Springer, Superintendent Lue and myself.


  596. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There were multiple.


  597. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No. Because of the magnitude of the event, we had to have the ability to manage multiple situations, critical incidents, at the same time.


  598. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I would have to refer back to my notes if I could, but... Could I go back to my notes, please, on the 18th, probably?


  599. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Superintendent Mike Francis, or -- yeah, at the time he was Superintendent Mike Francis, OPP.


  600. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is a subplan. Everyone still has to adhere to the overall plan. So regardless, any member still has to adhere to the overall mission statement that I've set.


  601. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This plan is inclusive of the other plan.


  602. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This plan, as well as my mission statement, which is no different than all the other officers, would have both the overall mission statement and the Public Order mission.


  603. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would be a duplication.


  604. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Clearing the area ---


  605. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- as well as there is vehicles, and rendering infrastructure safe.


  606. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And any protester who refused to leave, or caused an action that resulted in an arrest, would be detained.


  607. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Those are -- that is a term that is used.


  608. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm not aware of that.


  609. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not the way I would explain it.


  610. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The plans that were put in place, which involved the ability to remove protesters who were arrested, detained, to a secondary processing site, there were two that were identified, one was approximately less than 10 minutes away from the arrest zone, the other one was approximately 15 to 20 minutes away from the arrest zone, where there were a full infrastructure of investigators in order to properly process, run, allow phone calls to lawyers, and where they were advised exactly of the next steps of what was going to take place. They were located in close proximity to, and when I say close proximity, maybe 200 metres from public transit, and even restaurants and gas stations to be able to find their way back to where they needed to go.


  611. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I authorised the plan and the secondary processing site. At the end of the day, the Unified Command between Inspector Springer, myself, and Superintendent Lue, we would have to be in agreement, and it was the Investigations Branch that, along with our Custody Branch, that came up with that arrest and processing plan.


  612. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  613. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not to my knowledge. I had no direct involvement with them.


  614. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you repeat the question again, please?


  615. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Following the 17th, I think the plan went as well as it could. And any operation comes with challenges. Operations of this size and magnitude and police services from across the province, and in fact, across the country, all come with their own structures, their own ---


  616. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- procedures ---


  617. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is a possibility, yes.


  618. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t know what you’d be referring to there.


  619. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    With regards to the ---


  620. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There’s only one set of 10 codes that we use to communicate on a radio.


  621. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. I didn’t have to use 10 codes in the United Kingdom.


  622. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  623. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They may have different terms that they use in the UK.


  624. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Which plan are you referring to?


  625. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There is a communications plan.


  626. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So are we moving away from whether there was a communication plan? Because there is a communication plan. We can pull that up, if you’d like.


  627. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It’s an appendix plan.


  628. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, a communication plan.


  629. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There’s a corporate communication, as well as communication with what radio channels and radio system that we would use.


  630. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  631. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  632. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was under the decision of a Chief of Police or Commissioner ---


  633. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- under the covid situation, ---


  634. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- where there was challenges ---


  635. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There potentially were officers who would be given an exemption, and if they had an exemption, that would still qualify.


  636. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  637. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t have that. we would have to then find those records from follow up from that. But the records were kept and Use of Force Reports were filled in.


  638. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Would you be able to pull up that email? Because it doesn’t seem to ---


  639. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Where is this picture taken from? Do you know when?


  640. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. This is -- what is your question? Which officer?


  641. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It is definitely a rifle. And I would say yes.


  642. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That appears to be it.


  643. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  644. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That appears right.


  645. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would not say that.


  646. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Not enough for me to see exactly what is going on.


  647. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There is not enough for me to see what is actually happening behind bodies.


  648. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I’m -- you said a lot very quickly. So ---


  649. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- I’m trying to figure out what is -- can you just ---


  650. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Too fast. Yeah.


  651. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At what point in February are you talking about?


  652. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, we were aware. So when I was involved, I was aware that there were multiple locations on the outskirts of Ottawa, and actually quite good distance from Ottawa as well.


  653. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I actually have no records of vehicles leaving. The footprint did not change all that much. There was movement up onto the Hill -- sorry; onto Wellington. But from the information that I was receiving on the -- it would have been whichever day the movement would have taken place, ---


  654. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- 14th, there was very minimal departure of vehicles.


  655. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We developed a quite robust, highly staffed with both our Police Liaison, and our Traffic Unit, and cleared egress routes that were going to be well-communicated with all the protesters as to if they wanted to leave, for a 24-hour period we had those routes clearly open and facilitating the departure of vehicles. They were not leaving.


  656. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    A very small ---


  657. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- a small number.


  658. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I agree, yes. That was the reports that I was getting.


  659. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They were.


  660. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  661. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is obviously a possibility, yes.


  662. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is something that was continually monitored, assessed, and keep leveraging our Intelligence teams with various information, or intelligence that was coming in that there were possibilities of that.


  663. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    On the 14th, I would have an Intelligence officer at my command table with the responsibility of reviewing and briefing a group on this information. So although not reading it, I should be getting key information from it.


  664. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  665. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, ma’am.


  666. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  667. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Smaller footprint would be easier to manage.


  668. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t know.


  669. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would have been a lot longer operation if we -- and, once again, it’s not necessarily the -- it wasn’t a speed thing; it was more safe, methodical, lawful, and ensuring that we took care of everything. So, in other words, if areas such as John A. Macdonald or Sir George-Étienne had to be cleared as well, it would just take a lot longer to clear.


  670. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  671. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Potentially, yes.


  672. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would agree.


  673. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  674. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  675. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  676. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, as well as putting flyers on every vehicle.


  677. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  678. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  679. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  680. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m not 100 percent sure on that. I don’t know if there was abilities. If you’re able to identify a driver within that it could be done retroactively. I just want to make sure that I’m not fully clear if it required the tow first.


  681. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Thank you, if you can, ---


  682. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- because there’s ---


  683. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There’s a ---


  684. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There’s a lot of information on ---


  685. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    If I could just take a minute to read through it?


  686. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I think this was somewhat of a flow chart to give instructions, but the fact that we were doing the towing and that they’re not, -- you know, we weren’t necessarily doing intervention action prior, this was part of our phased actions on portion. And just so that there was clear instructions of what was happening with the vehicles, and as part of the end part was that process that was going to take place. And once again, I’m not 100 percent sure if there was not the ability to do something with the CVOR, whether we towed it or not. In this particular case, part of the -- we were towing all vehicles.


  687. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  688. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’d have to do a little bit more ---


  689. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  690. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would hopefully discourage people to bring their children to this protest, yes.


  691. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would be the intended effect.


  692. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  693. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, it has not -- it was not.


  694. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So we placed a soft secure area in the evening of the 17th, and then it went in full operation at midnight from the 17th into the 18th.


  695. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  696. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  697. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. There are a lot of people, community members who live in that area who had been affected. We wanted to minimize the amount of impact and restriction that they would have had in their own community.


  698. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    There -- nothing under -- used under common-law or any other form of, how would you say it, authority to shut down an area.


  699. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, there were. If we needed to apply under common-law, we could have. But it was nothing that we actually utilized because we didn’t go into a police operation and maintaining public safety for restricting access to an area under the common-law authorities. So there was nothing in place until the 17th into the 18th at midnight.


  700. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the secure area, as the operation progressed and was met with success, we shrunk that area gradually over the days. And we maintained a very shrunken small footprint of restriction secure area to the Wellington area until the Emergencies Act was lifted.


  701. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Absolutely, yes.


  702. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t necessarily say it lacks clarity. It just comes down to the articulation of why and what you’re doing and for how long. So the auxiliary powers that exist, there needs to be certain things that exist and needs to stop as soon as that does no longer exist.


  703. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  704. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  705. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  706. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So there was a heavy police presence still. There was still a police operation going, but not necessarily that action on phase. So as of the 18th, 19th, and 20th, into the 21st, it was more of a security posture that we held so the -- from that point until the lifting of the Emergencies Act, which we’d shrunk down to the area just surrounding Parliament Hill. That’s the area that was maintained.


  707. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is part of the integrated group. We -- one of the first things we did was ensure that, and through Insp. Dave Springer and Kirk Richardson from the OPP, who is -- has a wealth of knowledge in that world, we focused at least a team working on that. Because that was a shortfall. That was a challenge that we were facing all the way through. And it was a big challenge because it was a big job to do, and we were having different challenges with tow companies not wanting to be engaged on this. However, through Kirk Richardson's work, and from across the province, we had success quite quickly with that.


  708. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  709. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, and Dave Springer.


  710. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Around that time, yes.


  711. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was not informed of that.


  712. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was not.


  713. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. I was not aware of that.


  714. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don't know what the process. I understand that there was a process that needed to be actually utilised with -- I know that the tow trucks were working with our Legal Services and our Financial Services for contracts and that type of thing.


  715. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct, but reporting back on the 13th that we had the... As I was told, and if this is inaccurate, I ended up seeing tow trucks arrive at the Leikin Station in the back parking lot with our OPS cresting and everything on. So I was not informed differently. And Inspector Springer, from the OPP, had not informed me about any of this, so I don't know if he was aware of what was going on.


  716. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  717. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is new ---


  718. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    This is new to me.


  719. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  720. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Concern that that could happen, yes.


  721. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Thank you.


  722. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  723. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  724. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  725. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was the sentiment that I think within OPS that those were big concerns.


  726. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  727. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At that point, correct.


  728. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  729. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m aware of that operation taking place.


  730. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m aware of that now.


  731. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  732. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  733. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    In my role at that time, I was not involved with operations either at a tactical or operational level. On February 7th, I would have been in the Service Command Centre pretty much removed for -- from what daily operations were going on. But you mentioning that, I had heard of that.


  734. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  735. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was aware of that -- that operation was in works.


  736. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It’s a very important intersection. It was impacting the Rideau Centre being closed and a lot of businesses that were affected in that area. So I would have to agree that shrinking the footprint and allowing some of the area to be able to open, yes.


  737. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct, yes.


  738. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  739. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  740. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  741. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No. Well, until you just told me.


  742. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  743. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Through this email?


  744. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. I will have to say that the flow of emails were quite abundant, and I really did count on my Command Table around me to be feeding them. But on the 12th, to be fair, I was somewhat in that transition phase where I'm trying to get things set up. So there were some emails that were perhaps not fully digested, but I acknowledge that this did come to me.


  745. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  746. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  747. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  748. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  749. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  750. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We would have to probably scroll down through to read to see if ---


  751. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- I -- because it doesn't show who's in attendance, so ---


  752. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  753. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  754. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  755. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  756. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  757. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  758. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  759. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  760. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  761. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  762. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  763. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you say that again, please?


  764. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's as if I was writing them.


  765. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    They're my personal notes.


  766. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  767. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  768. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  769. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  770. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We're to review them and make sure all the information's accurate and the signatures. And we try and do it progressively during to stay on top of it, depending on the momentum of everything, but as soon as possible that you can after.


  771. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah, you would have to do a notation, or you do a supplemental.


  772. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  773. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  774. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  775. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  776. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  777. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is my -- still my scribe, the same scribe.


  778. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yeah, so upon review of when we were reviewing it, I'm initially it and realizing, so I get to that page, I go to the next, it doesn't have the part that I'm looking for with regards to that comment. So it has to be placed in there at the time. Pen-wise, scribes will have different pens, but ---


  779. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- that's -- I can't explain why it's a darker colour.


  780. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    After I signed?


  781. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    To initial it?


  782. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  783. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm not saying that that's the case. What's happened here is probably the comment is missing. I need to have that comment put in, and then I'm initialling it.


  784. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  785. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  786. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would've been at that time.


  787. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    The same time, at the 1338 time period.


  788. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That -- my notation that I wanted to have captured was not there, so I asked my scribe to please put that notation in.


  789. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It ---


  790. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  791. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's my comment. It's my notation. It's not a verbal comment, it's a note that I'm making and an action that I would've taken. Keeping in mind, I'm not in the same room with them. We're having a Teams meeting I believe with that particular situation.


  792. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  793. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I can pull up my -- I'd have -- I can refer to my -- what day is this on?


  794. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    "Police can only be present for safety."


  795. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, this is actually witnessed and can be confirmed by the -- my whole Command Table who was present, including Inspector Dave Springer.


  796. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  797. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, this is at that same time, but it's a notation that we're having a conversation between Dave Springer and myself.


  798. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, but he is now the Deputy Event Commander in the position that he's in.


  799. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At the time, it was -- would not have been particularly at that time. I believe I did have conversations with Deputy Ferguson at some point of saying, "this is the risk with this."


  800. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Right, so it's a risk. So ---


  801. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- I support it ---


  802. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- and if it happens that's very good. There is always the chance, though, that that's not going to happen.


  803. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I think there are probably multiple factors that potentially led to that, but yes, that did not happen.


  804. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  805. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, because I believe there needs to be a good coordination piece from my standpoint with regards to logistics of ensuring that it can effectively happen. Yes.


  806. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Right. And of having full appreciation of everything that is going on, and the transition that I'm just coming into this new role trying to get things set up, there were some challenges, yes.


  807. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So from social media, we may be talking about gathering information at that point. But yes, I just wanted to clarify that it doesn't necessarily mean it's intelligence through social media.


  808. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  809. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    At the time, that was one of our only options to be able to gather that information is through the Command Centre. They had some capabilities to do that. We have evolved since then.


  810. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, I'm talking about how we look at social media within the Ottawa Police.


  811. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Post convoy, we've stood up a team of investigators who are assigned to that open source tasking.


  812. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, sir.


  813. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would say that's fair.


  814. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  815. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  816. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That's correct.


  817. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So my comments with regards to that surrounds the approach that I was taking when I came in at that time that because we’re going to be transitioning away from that type of messaging and being very clear on it’s time for you to leave and focusing the messaging around that this is over. And obviously, that, combined with our PLT approach, that is -- because it aligned with the plan that I was bringing to place. Unfortunately, prior, there was no plan to end it. So that would potentially lead to some frustrations within the community.


  818. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Messaging and PLT outreach.


  819. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  820. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. That was potentially an option.


  821. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  822. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  823. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We unfortunately, at that time, didn’t have a maturity level of that capability of open source monitoring, and that’s hence the reason why I said that we have made some adjustments since.


  824. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We were probably doing it in a very relatively immature level. It was not a great capacity to do that.


  825. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. Mind you, the information, whether it came from the citizen or another avenue, did get to us. I was aware of that.


  826. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    We were able to -- excuse me.


  827. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Through our media section, they were able to capture some sentiment, some -- because I did have a media person with me every day every -- the whole time that I was there. And every so often, I would be asking, “What is the sentiment? What are you seeing out there?”. So what that citizen would have been able to monitor, they would have been -- I would ask that our media person do the same thing to the best of their ability. There was a -- she had a lot of other taskings at the same time.


  828. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  829. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don’t know what impact this had. I don’t think there was necessarily a surge of influx of people in lead-up to our -- the 18th. But our investigative teams would be reviewing all this stuff now and doing a thorough investigation to find out if there are any follow-up action that could be taken on such. But at the time, it may have been nice to be able to track that information. We may have. I can’t say one way or another.


  830. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  831. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  832. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I wouldn’t exactly say that. Very hard to know what it would have been like without it.


  833. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct. The planning and the concept of operation was already in place and I didn’t have any knowledge that the Emergencies Act was going to be put in place.


  834. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  835. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  836. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Well, once again, I think it was beneficial.


  837. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  838. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  839. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  840. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Correct, myself and my whole command table.


  841. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was my belief at the time.


  842. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was the information that was provided through Insp. Springer from Kirk Richardson.


  843. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Definitely well before the 17th, before the -- our final day before going to action, they were arriving.


  844. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That would be my observation because I would look out and I’d see the trucks out there.


  845. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, however, with a caveat that we were having challenges. We were having a hard time up until that time on the 13th. So prior to the 13th, I would have said we could have used some help with that but, as things materialized on the 13th, I was satisfied that we were good.


  846. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  847. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Could you repeat that question again, please.


  848. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  849. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  850. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  851. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  852. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  853. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would say they were beneficial; but to say “necessary”, I would say no.


  854. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  855. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Good afternoon.


  856. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    As part of the command training, yes.


  857. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  858. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  859. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So once again, there’s a difference between information and intelligence. A lot of information can be gathered from multiple sources, from human sources, open-source social media, other police techniques of gaining information, and it’s the processing and analyzing of that information that will turn it into intelligence. And once again, intelligence can be gathered from multiple agencies and then all brought together to provide, hopefully, the most wholesome picture of what you’re going to be faced with, with risks and challenges and threats, that could help you in your planning appropriately.


  860. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So PLT is especially often used proactively early -- as early as possible to connect with groups that would be involved, organizers, to open the dialogue and share information from our side to ensure that they're well informed as to what is lawful, what's not lawful, and as well as hopefully garnish some information to facilitate those lawful event, a protest, or demonstration that they would like to hold. And it stands true to demonstrations as well as events, because not every event downtown Ottawa or in Ottawa is a protest or a demonstration. There's a very big benefit to engaging PLT to develop that relationship.


  861. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That’s correct.


  862. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Prior to the convoy arrival, not on the weekend, and upon the return back to work, I would be having a look at them when they came in.


  863. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, it's the first one that I'd received, and once again, it was something new. I did not know that this existed, so ---


  864. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  865. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, not in my role.


  866. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I would imagine it would be relatively the same because on the call that I -- you referenced on the 27th of the afternoon, the whole intelligence team was on that call with Inspector Lucas and Staff Sgt. Kennedy. So my sentiment was or my feeling was that they more than likely are sharing all that information.


  867. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  868. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From my involvement and my experience within the Ottawa Police, our intelligence unit is -- has been more focused on that higher-level terrorist threat, national security level of threat assessment versus a risk assessment. So it's -- I would believe that -- I would say the Hendon Report is an amalgamation of open source, a lot more information, as well as intelligence, a mix of the two. So that’s why it was somewhat a kind of a different perspective than what I'd been used to seeing in previous events at Ottawa.


  869. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I don't know.


  870. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  871. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  872. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  873. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So I'm going to think this is around the 12th, 13th.


  874. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Based on what I'm reading here, the fact that I'm in progress of setting up a command table, I would be the Event Commander.


  875. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  876. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So what it had to do is coming up with mitigation strategies because of the lawfulness of at the time of closing down a bridge. The -- we had a plan that we were working with our traffic section to reduce the flow in and control and divert away from the downtown core.


  877. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  878. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That he wanted the bridge closed.


  879. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  880. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So the different elements, did you want me to go through the different elements?


  881. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. So I know our -- the people who are in our service and within the different sections. And when I'm talking about the intelligence, when I'm looking at investigations, when I'm looking at public order, when I'm looking at media, I know people in the organization that are very effective and good in their job and have the ability, in a -- either in a position or through their own personal abilities to carry out what I'm going to be expecting from them. Some of it may require rank and some of them -- some others require just the KSAs and the abilities to do it.


  882. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Knowledge, skills, and abilities.


  883. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  884. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I was trying to get the best to be around, and at the end of the day, a police officer is a police officer, and we were doing an integrated model. So as far as I was concerned and the direction that I had -- or sorry, what I had requested in approval from Deputy Chief Ferguson was get who you need, hence, the reason the choice for the Deputy Commander that I had. I looked at the province for looking for who I'm going to need to have next to me.


  885. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    From the point that I had come in ---


  886. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- as Event Commander? It was obviously an adjustment period, but it was a very cohesive group and very well -- high-functioning group.


  887. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Thank you.


  888. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That is correct.


  889. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  890. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It's the Concept of Operation of the Tow Action Escort and Security and Identification of Vehicles.


  891. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  892. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes. Listed towing resource equipment, "12 heavy wreckers Ability to remove highway tractors 2 tilt & load Ability to remove farm tractors, utility trailers, equipment & materials 2 highway tractors (bobtails)"


  893. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    "Equipment "Prep truck" Contains equipment necessary for tow & recovery 3 Frontend loaders [this] Will assist with the movement and positioning of trucks for tow Ability to assist with loader equipment & materials"


  894. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And ---


  895. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, sorry.


  896. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Ready to go.


  897. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    That was my understanding. This was all prepared with Kirk Richardson and our Ottawa Police Traffic.


  898. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Is this having to do with the tow trucks?


  899. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. Then ---


  900. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- rephrase the question then, please?


  901. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  902. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    And -- sorry, go ahead.


  903. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  904. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Is this when I was testifying with counsel from former Chief Sloly?


  905. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  906. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I'm not quite sure I understand what your question is. Could you ---


  907. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Those are the sections that are responsible for doing those duties within the Ottawa Police. That did not fall within my purview at the time. So I believe in previous testimony I may have spoken to this that we have sections within the Ottawa Police that have the responsibility for these events, and I deferred to those sections, trusting that they have all the information, intelligence, and all the right people are in those sections for that.


  908. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would probably be best articulated by an Intelligence officer from the section, but traditionally, our Intelligence Unit is at the higher level of matters that they would be looking into, national security, organized crime, you know, threats of that nature, in the lines with ITAC and that type of thing.


  909. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, so I think what I was referring to is that it seemed to be a combination of open source, and I think maybe if I can qualify your previous question as well, is traditionally, our Intelligence Unit was not necessarily very much into the open source world; whereas, now, we've learned a lot, and we are moving more into that to ensure that we have that aspect. I found that the Hendon report was a more -- a broader source of information intelligence.


  910. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Yes, I do.


  911. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    So what I would be saying is that based on all the information and the situation at hand, that we would be operating in good faith and I would not have done it if it exceeded our powers. If we were doing it, it's because I felt that we were well within our powers to do it. I guess the conversation with regards to courts is that after the fact, it may come under scrutiny to determine if it was lawful to do based on all the circumstances. I would have a very big responsibility, and I would need to be accountable for articulating all the reasons why, so it could withstand review in court afterwards.


  912. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    It would defeat the purpose and bring us to disrepute, yes.


  913. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  914. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    No, I did not.


  915. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I’m not quite sure what they’re referring to. If it’s the week -- the week following the actual weekend event, initial weekend event, I’m not ---


  916. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    --- I’m not familiar with the window that would have ---


  917. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    I do not.


  918. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Thank you, Your Honour.


  919. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  920. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)



  921. Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)

    Okay. Yeah, that could be ---