Volume 9 (October 25, 2022)
Volume 9 has 297 pages of testimony. 25 people spoke before the Commission, including 3 witnesses.
Very important disclaimer: testimony from this site should not be taken as authoritative; check the relevant public hearing for verbatim quotes and consult the associated transcript for the original written text. For convenience, testimony includes links directly to the relevant page (where a speaker started a given intervention) in the original PDF transcripts.
The testimony below is converted from the PDF of the original transcript, prepared by Wendy Clements.
Speakers, by number of times they spoke:
- Marcel Beaudin, Acting Superintendent (Supt) - Ontario Provincial Police / Government of Ontario (ON-OPP) (spoke 370 times)
- Russell Lucas, Inspector (Insp) - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 369 times)
- Frank Au, Senior Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 294 times)
- Robert Bernier, Superintendent (Supt) - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 292 times)
- Misha Boutilier, Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 146 times)
- Eric Brousseau, Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 132 times)
- Rebecca Jones, Counsel - Peter Sloly (spoke 83 times)
- Tom Curry, Counsel - Peter Sloly (spoke 65 times)
- Paul Rouleau, Commissioner - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 61 times)
- Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel - Government of Canada (GC) (spoke 55 times)
- Emilie Taman, Counsel - Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses (spoke 45 times)
- Anne Tardif, Counsel - City of Ottawa (Ott) (spoke 42 times)
- Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel - Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers (spoke 31 times)
- Jessica Barrow, Counsel - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 31 times)
- David Migicovsky, Counsel - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 18 times)
- Christine Johnson, Counsel - Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses (spoke 17 times)
- Hatim Kheir, Counsel - Democracy Fund / Citizens for Freedom / Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms Coalition (DF / CfF / JCCF) (spoke 17 times)
- Brendan Miller, Counsel - Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers (spoke 16 times)
- Lauren Pearce, Counsel - National Police Federation (spoke 16 times)
- Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel - City of Ottawa (Ott) (spoke 15 times)
- The Registrar - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 15 times)
- Stephen Aylward, Counsel - Government of Canada (GC) (spoke 14 times)
- Cara Zwibel, Counsel - Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) (spoke 11 times)
- Unidentified speaker (spoke 6 times)
- Stephanie Bowes, Counsel - Government of Alberta (AB) (spoke 3 times)
Upon commencing on Tuesday, October 25, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l’ordre. The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session. La Commission sur l'état d'urgence est maintenant ouverte.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Good morning. Bonjour. I think we're ready for another witness I take it. Who is leading this witness?
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Good morning, Commissioner. Misha Boutilier, Commission Counsel. And today, we'll be hearing from Inspector Russell Lucas from the Ottawa Police Service.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Inspector Lucas. Good morning.
The Registrar (POEC)
Inspector Lucas, will you swear on a religious document or do you wish to affirm?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I'll swear, please.
The Registrar (POEC)
We have the Bible, the Torah, the Koran available.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
The Bible, please.
The Registrar (POEC)
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Russell Lucas, R-U-S-S-E-L-L, last name is Lucas, L-U-C-A-S.
INSP. RUSSELL LUCAS, Sworn
EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. MISHA BOUTILIER
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Good morning, Inspector Lucas.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
We met in the summer when you were interviewed by Commission Counsel on August 19th, 2022. Do you remember that interview?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And I'd like to call up WTS00000024. Inspector Lucas, do you recognise this document as a summary of that interview?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And I understand that you've reviewed and adopted the contents of that summary; is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I have.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And are there any corrections you'd like to make to that summary?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There is only one part that wasn't -- I don't believe it was 100 percent clear, and it was when it refers to my first day as Incident Command was the 21st of January, which is correct, but I first became aware of the planning process on the 18th of January ---
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- which I don't think was captured.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And that's your only correction?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That is the only correction.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Thank you, Inspector Lucas. So at the time the Freedom Convoy arrived -- or at the time of the Freedom Convoy in January 2022, what was your role within the OPS organizational structure?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I recently moved into the Operations Support Inspector role, which oversees the Special Events Section as well as other operations support units such as Tactical, K9, Emergency Services.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Who headed the Special Events Unit? Who was the Staff Sergeant in charge?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was Staff Sergeant Kevin Kennedy.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And who did you report to?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
My direct supervisor was Superintendent Chris Rheaume.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And who did Superintendent Rheaume report to?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
He reported to Deputy Chief Trush Ferguson.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And could you give us kind of a 30-second elevator pitch, if you will, of -- about what Special Events’ responsibilities are in the context of a major event?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They manage the daily operations as the planning and most major events, and they also serve as a filter point for labour disputes, protest demonstrations, fairs, festivals, which all go through their office.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you told us earlier that on January 21st you became Incident Commander. How did you come to serve as Incident Commander?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was within the scope of my roles and responsibilities as the Inspector of the Operational Support Unit.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So is it fair to say that you assumed this role and were not directed by anyone within OPS to assume the role?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And what did you understand your role to be as Incident Commander?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So part of my role as Incident Commander was worked as an in-between between the strategic and the tactical level where the planning team would be doing a lot of the groundwork, the preparation and the building, and I would be providing some guidance, some oversight, providing feedback. And I would also serve as a conduit to the strategic level.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you mentioned you were supervising the planning process and the development of the operational plan. In addition, once the convoy arrived in Ottawa, would you also be in charge of making operational decisions on how OPS should respond to the convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So I was one of the duty inspectors. I worked every day from the time just before they arrived until the day they left, and through the rehabilitation process during the day shift. And we rotated four different Inspectors to cover the night shifts.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So is it fair to say that during your shifts, you were the Inspector responsible for making operational decisions?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And in your summary, you told us that Superintendent Rheaume was the initial Event Commander. What was his role and how did it differ from your role as Incident Commander?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So he had two different primary roles. One was to provide strategic direction to the management to the event that was taking place because of the size and scope that it had grown to, and he was to serve as the conduit between the actual operational side and the executive.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you mentioned in your summary as well that Acting Deputy Chief Patricia Ferguson also provided strategic oversight. What was -- what was her role and how did it differ from Superintendent Rheaume’s role?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So Superintendent Rheaume was more involved in the daily operational oversight, where the Deputy Chief Ferguson would be involved more in the bigger picture strategic, how it interfaces with the public and our roles and responsibilities as one part of the overall operations that were happening across the city because there was still regular operations that were still occurring.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So is it fair to say that both Superintendent Rheaume and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson were at the strategic level of command?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you mentioned that you learned about the Freedom Convoy for the first time on January 18th and that on January 21st you began to act as the Incident Commander. And I’d like to explore with you what your understanding was of the Freedom Convoy as of January 21st. So my first question is, what did you understand the Freedom Convoy’s goal to be as of January 21st?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was basically a protest that was driving across the country to raise awareness and to voice their displeasure with the current government mandates and what they believed was the overreach of the federal government.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I would like to pull up OPS00002876. So if you could scroll down to page -- yeah, that’s good. So Inspector Lucas, you can see that this is an email that Kevin Kennedy sent you on January 21st. Do you recall receiving this email?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then if you scroll down, you’ll see that Staff Sergeant Kennedy -- scroll further down, please -- was forward an email from Sergeant Sean Key. What was Sergeant Key’s role in the Freedom Convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So he was the one who was actually do the plan work, writing the plan and engaged in the - - basically the meat and potatoes of it. And Kevin Kennedy was providing the oversight and the guidance with his experience.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if you scroll down just a little further. Thank you. So you’ll see that Sergeant Key writes, “This convoy is to come from all” -- and this is in the first paragraph, Inspector. Sergeant Key writes: “This convoy is to come from all parts of Canada with the intent of disrupting Ottawa and specifically Parliament Hill in an attempt to force the government to repeal the COVID measures.” Does this align with your understanding of what the convoy’s goal was at this point in time, Inspector?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So there was -- yes. There was talk about disrupting, as a protest would, as you would normally see with the protests that we see every day. But the context at this point is no convoys had departed at this point and we were still gathering information about the size and scope of the event.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you mentioned disruption. Was your understanding that disrupting downtown Ottawa and Parliament Hill was the means by which the convoy hoped to achieve its goal.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
At this point, I don’t believe it was 100 percent clear. There was discussion on protests which, again, most protests that we see on a daily basis have varying degrees of disruption in the city.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Would you -- and so if you could -- let me ask a follow-up question. At this time, how long did you expect the Freedom Convoy to stay in Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So they were still doing the background work and so when I first became aware of it when it came up at a meeting on the -- on the 18th, the initial feedback that was provided to me by the members of the planning team that have already been involved in two prior truck protests in as many years here in Ottawa, which -- with the same mandate, the same intent, but they were local groups, not coming from out west, that were successfully managed and mitigated, included parking trucks downtown.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so if we go to the paragraph starting with “In the fall of 2021”, it says: “The vaccine mandate is a clear target of their anger. The goal of the convoy is to remain in Ottawa until the restrictions were repealed.” Is -- does this align with what you understood to be the goal of the Freedom Convoy as of January 21st?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was part of their -- their messaging that they were sending out, but that is a common theme that we’ve heard before and, as I said, with the previous truck protests that did occur, that was the same message they had delivered but were gone within -- I believe one was gone only after a day and the other one was an overnight.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So is it fair to say that at this time, you did not expect that the convoy’s messaging about their intent to stay would align with what would actually materialize when the convoy arrived.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Actually, what materialized exceeded all our expectations, the size and scope of it.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we scroll further down, we see that in speaking with the OPP, they had stood up two analysts who will be dedicated to this event. Do you recall learning around January 21st that OPP was going to be collecting intelligence on the Freedom Convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Basically, by what was shared with me on this, I knew that there was work that was being done by OPP analysts.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And further down in the paragraph it reads, they, OPP, have declared this a high- risk event as they effect -- expect traffic disruptions and illegal activity. Do you recall being aware as of January 21st that OPP had designated the Freedom Convoy as a high-risk event?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do by this email, but the context of what a high-risk event has not -- was not clearly defined either.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I'd like to pull up OPS00002878. So if you could just scroll down? Keep scrolling. So we see here that -- and just a little more down - - on the 21st, you forwarded this email chain to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. Do you recall forwarding the email chain to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And why did you forward the email chain to her?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I think it's important that there's communication within the organization and sharing of information so that they can make -- be aware and make strategic decisions and be aware of things that are coming.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So it's fair to say you thought this was a significant enough event that the executive of OPS needed to be appraised [sic] at an early stage?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if you could just scroll up a bit? So we see that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson shared this email with Chief Sloly and then Deputy Chief Bell. Did you have any kind of direct interactions with either Chief Sloly or Deputy Chief Bell during the Freedom Convoy outside of meetings or team meetings or briefings?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, it was primarily through meetings and interactions through my role as it pertained to this convoy.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you were aware though that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, that it was her role to relay information that you were providing to her up to Chief Sloly and to the extent it pertained to Intelligence to Deputy Chief Bell?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
She would manage -- my assumption, she would be managing the information to determine what he needs to be advised of.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. You can take that email down now. So I'd like to turn to the role of intelligence in planning. Was it your understanding that planning for the Freedom Convoy should be intelligence led?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was the direction that was -- they've been pivoting to over the last few years, and they were -- the Planning Team was working with members of the Intelligence Directorate.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you mentioned that was the direction we'd been pivoting to. Who gave that direction?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I can't say for sure. As I said, I only returned into that role at the beginning of the year. I'd worked in that directorate before in prior years, but three years prior to that, I'd been working on the road.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so we've heard evidence at the Commission during the past week of hearings that intelligence-led planning was something that was important to Chief Sloly. Were you aware that the former Chief wanted planning to be intelligence led?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So how did the Intelligence Directorate share intelligence with you and your special events planners?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the -- it was moreso at the working level. So the Planning Team members would work with the constables and sergeants in the Intelligence Directorate to make sure that they're getting mutually supportive information for their respective roles.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Do you recall if the Intelligence Directorate shared documents titled threat assessment with the -- with you and your Planning Team before the Freedom Convoy arrived?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Not with me personally, but I know there was discussions. They may not shared the full reports. They may vet them before they share the salient information with the Planning Team.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So could we pull up OPS00003085? So if you could just scroll down. So we see this is email from Sergeant K to you on January 26th, and it says, "Attached is the Intelligence report from OPS." And then if we scroll up, we see that you forwarded that report to Superintendent Rheaume and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. Do you see the title of that report as "Convoy Jan 22 Threat Assessment V1"?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Does seeing this email refresh your memory that the Intelligence Directorate shared threat assessment documents with you before the Freedom Convoy arrived?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They did.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I'd now like to pull up OPS3086, which is the threat assessment that you forwarded to Superintendent Rheaume and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson on the 26th. And we see here that this is dated January 25th. To the best of your recollection, did you receive this on the 25th, or did you only receive it when it was sent to you on the 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I would have received it on the day it was sent to me.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if you could -- and do you recall reviewing or reading this document?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I remember reading different versions of this one. I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if we could scroll down to the top of page 3? Right there is good. So in the second paragraph, we see, "Therefore, we expect to see a huge volume of vehicles and large transport trucks clogging city roads..." Was it your understanding from this threat assessment that there would be large numbers of vehicles arriving in Ottawa as part of the Freedom Convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I did -- so the intelligence was stating that -- I want to provide a little additional context. So we knew the convoy was going to be arriving. At this point, I believe it was only the western convoy that was en route. The other convoys were not yet started. And we were monitoring the actual size and their behaviours and their actions, which was included as part of our building our plan.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And in your summary, I think you referenced a previous truck protest in Ottawa with somewhere around the range of 20 to 30 trucks. Do you recall that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I wasn't involved in it, but the information that was relayed to me by the Planning Team was that they had experienced this before, and we had experienced with other similar vehicle protests downtown as well.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So when you saw that the Intelligence Directorate was saying we expect to see a huge volume of vehicles and large transport trucks, and keeping in mind that you didn't have an exact number, were you expecting it would be more than the 20 or 30 trucks that you'd seen in the past?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, because the core that started out from B.C., I believe, was around 50 with vehicles that would join it and then depart at various parts of the leg.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could just scroll down to page 5 of the document, right here, the section what this means for event planners, and I'll just give you a bit of time to review this before I ask some questions.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So from your understanding of this section, what this means for event planners, did you think the Intelligence Directorate understood the Freedom Convoy to be similar to or unlike previous events that Ottawa had experienced?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Well, it was going to be larger than what we'd experienced before, but again, the intelligence is only one piece of the puzzle that they're using towards the planning process as well.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So specifically here, the first bullet reads: "This event is going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more disruptive." So would you have understood from this that the Freedom Convoy was likely to cause more significant disruption than other significant events that Ottawa had experienced before?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So on the -- around the 25th, 26th, the primary focus, we originally planned this as a - - main portion of our planning was focussed on how do we manage... Because the number of vehicles that were potentially going to arrive you were not going to stop. So it was how do you work with them to mitigate the risks and the impacts to the community? So with this, that statement that a lot of our -- the challenges and disruption would be around traffic, but we also had to focus on the -- as well that -- the fact that the convoy organisers were actually cooperative and were not demonstrating disruptive behaviour on their way there, the ones that were already -- the one that was already under route.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you mentioned the number of vehicles was such that you were not going to stop them, and I'm going to circle back to that number later. But before I do, I just wanted to close off this piece. The bullet starting with "In 6 years" reads: "In 6 years of working large demonstration events from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action..." Did you understand the Intelligence Directorate to be saying that the level of mobilisation and support for this protest across Canada was unprecedented?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So part of the context to this, and knowing the writer and knowing the people involved, is part of the challenge is the topic of mandates, the restrictions, vaccinations is an extremely divisive topic. I've seen it in my own family, and you see that those challenges arise and it becomes a polarising topic of discussion. So yes, it does have the potential to create language and debate amongst people who are normally cooperative.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Right. And if we could just scroll to page 3, the bottom of page 3. Further down, just slightly. So we read in the last paragraph, the writer says: "These conditions create grounds for passionate emotions." Is that consistent with what you were just describing about the divisive nature of mandates?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I'd like to circle back now to the topic of numbers, since you mentioned it. As of January 26th, how many convoys did you understand would be travelling to Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So on the 21st, I was aware of five potential convoys, and by the time we got to the 28th, we were at 13 confirmed convoys.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Do you have a specific recollection of how many convoys you were aware of as of January 26th, which is the date you received this threat assessment?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, I don't recall top of my head.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Could we pull up OPS14540? Sorry, it should be OPS00014540. So Inspector Lucas, do you recognise this document as your notes?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It's my duty book, yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could go to page 7. So we see these are your notes for January 26th, and scrolling down further down the page, we see there's a statement at 9:30, "Conference call with OPP, RCMP and PPS." Do you recall participating in this call?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And what was the purpose of this call?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
To make sure that we were sharing information about the developments of the convoys across the country.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And the second bullet reads, "OPP - now 11 convoys". Does this refresh your memory that as of January 26th you knew that 11 convoys would be travelling to Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So there was 11 convoy groups that we have identified. Not all were enroute, and they were looking at information about where they were coming from and who the leaders were, yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And what was your understanding of how many vehicles were in the Western convoy at this time?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So it constantly changed. So as they were travelling, they had -- the core group that originally left, they would pick up people that would join in with them in support through their areas where they resided or their province, and then they would break off. So the number was inconsistent.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we scroll down just a little bit further, we see a statement. Actually, could you read the statement that starts with "West Group" to me, the last bullet?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes. "West Group staying until mandate lifted."
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And who told you that West group was staying until mandates were lifted?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It would have been addressed by somebody else on the conference call that I made a note of.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So that was the intelligence you were hearing as of January 26th, that the Western convoy were staying until mandates were lifted?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And could I just pull up OPP3058? Sorry, OPS00003058. So you'll see, this is an email that Peter McKenna forwarded to you, and it's titled ERPLT: Convoy for Freedoms. Do you recall that before the Freedom Convoy arrived you were receiving updates from the Ontario Provincial Police police liaison teams that were monitoring the convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Most of them are getting to me.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we just scroll down a bit. A little further. Right there. So we see: "Quick update...for West convoy from...officer who counted 480 [vehicles]. It spans 50km's..." Does this refresh your memory as to how many vehicles you understood to be on the Western convoy as of the afternoon of January 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
And I said, there was the core group, and they would have people who would join them for parts of their route, and then would disperse and wouldn't be staying with them for the whole way.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So that's where -- that's how many people that were associated to that section of the convoy at that point in time.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And did you have a ballpark estimate of how many people might arrive in Ottawa as of January 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
As of this date?
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the original information that came back was saying that we could see upwards of 100 vehicle per province. We knew that it would be -- those numbers would average out. It would be based on we may not see as large numbers from some of the smaller provinces but we would see larger ones from West and from Ontario.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So that's in trucks.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Could you scroll down to page 3, please? A little further down. Just a bit further. All right. So we see there’s a bullet in this email saying: “OPS/PPS are expecting 10,000 ppl for the event Sat[urday] 29th at 12pm.” Does this refresh your memory as to how many people the Ottawa Police Service was expecting to attend the Freedom Convoy at this point in time?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That’s how many people that they thought would show up for the events on the Saturday.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So fair to say that 10,000 people you were expecting would attend on the Saturday, and you weren’t sure how many people would stay on the Sunday and going forward?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct. But those are also local people as well, and local supporters are coming from the neighbouring area. Like, Canada Day is, you know, 100,000 people at any given time. Ten thousand (10,000) people of a group that is demonstrating behaviour as peaceful and cooperative is not a concern at this point.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And in your summary, you mention that by January 25th or 26th, your concerns about the Freedom Convoy were becoming heightened. Do you recall that statement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do. And there was concerns. And the concerned weren’t necessarily about the convoy, it’s about who is attaching themselves to the convoy and some of the online rhetoric that we were starting to see that was arising.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So is it fair to say that your heightened concerns were about the potential for violence or, for instance, for people attempting to storm Parliament Hill?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There was a lot of references that were popping up on social media saying this was going to be their January 6th, and this was the -- I believe this was the same day that we started reaching out to have other public order units from other police services to be in town to support us.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And as of the 26th, did you also have concerns or heightened concerns that convoy participants would remain in Ottawa beyond the January 29th/30th weekend?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I knew that there was a potential for a group of them to remain behind. The size and scope of that, it exceeded what we were anticipating.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so I’d like to just briefly pull up OPS3215. Sorry, four zeros 3215. So we see this is an email sent to you on January 26th from an INTERSECT account, and it says it’s sent by Kim. Do you recall receiving this email from an INTERSECT officer on the 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so we see that you replied to it. And if you just scroll down a bit? Further down. So do you see the text: “Do we want to commit to dates, it could last much longer” Do you see that that’s in a different colour from the other text?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Is that because you wrote that text in a different colour as your comments?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes. And because I’m not sure who is getting those Intersect, there are different levels of Intersect messages that go out. So it depends on, is that a general public one or is that one that’s going to policing partners?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay. And so the bullet you commented on reads: “…this will be a significant and extremely fluid event that could go on for a prolonged period (January 28[th] to 30[th]).” And you wrote: “Do we want to commit to dates, it could last much longer” How much longer did you think the Freedom Convoy could last, as of the 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
As of the 26th, I anticipated the vast majority would leave after the first weekend. And as a matter of fact, I would say between 60 and 70 percent of them did leave after the first weekend. The unfortunate part was the footprint remained the same. And then we thought maybe a week or so for the remainder.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So a week or so. That would be up until February 4th, 5th, 6th? Is that about right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
And to provide clarity to that, again, we weren’t expecting the numbers that actually attended.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so I’d like to pull up OPS00003403. And just for the record, this document was not in the list that went out to the parties because it was only posted to the party database this morning. But I understand that my colleague, Mr. Brousseau, has circulated it by email to the parties so that they have notice. So this document is titled: “MEETING NOTES Intelligence Directorate/Intelligence Services Branch January 27th, 2022”. And do you see your name in the line that starts with “R. Lucas”?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So do you recall attending a meeting with the Intelligence Directorate at 12:30 on January 27th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I believe so.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So scrolling down further down the first page, we see a comment by M. Patterson. Is that Supt. Mark Patterson?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And so he says: “Mentioned on INTERSECT call and would be prudent to bring to JIG - peaceful friendly convoy demo has become Project Bear Hug.” What did you understand him to mean by that statement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I don’t recall.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Is it fair to say that around this time, there was concern that the Freedom Convoy was morphing from a peaceful, lawful protest, to an event that could result in an unlawful occupation of Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Well in hindsight, yes. But at the time of this, I would say no, because, again, we’re fully engaging PLT with the various organizers, convoy captains. The demonstrated behaviour of the convoys through their transits has been peaceful, compliant, and working with police, not against.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we scroll to page 2 in the “TRAFFIC” section? So we the “R. Lucas: ‘Higher level’”. I think the second paragraph in this section. Do you see that, Insp. Lucas?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So you say: “Our message to [everyone] is that there will be traffic chaos in the city for Saturday and Sunday for sure. Then it will come down to how many people actually leave or stay.” And you write: “I am praying for really, really cold weather.”
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I said that, yeah.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So fair to say at this time you weren’t sure how many people were going to stay?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. We -- to me, at that time, we believed the highest risk would be the core group that was coming from the furthest distance from out west.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Right. And that was the group that, as of January 26, had 480 vehicles?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
With a core group of about 50 ---
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- in the convoy.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And if we could just scroll down to page 3, the “MISCELLANEOUS” section? And further down. Further down. Yeah, that’s good. Could you just take a minute to read that paragraph to familiarize yourself with it?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you wrote: “The main group may leave, but we will hundreds of trucks if not thousands who will stay here, they don’t have jobs to go back to, they have a $5M kitty to draw from.” So Inspector, as of January 27th, you were expecting hundreds of trucks to stay and you thought that thousands of trucks might potentially stay beyond the weekend?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
What I -- what we worked towards and how -- you also have to be aware of worst-case scenario, and that’s what we were discussing, what is the worst- case scenario, what do we do as we go forward. And when we cover the operational plan, I’ll cover more of that off.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so by worst-case scenario, do you mean -- do you mean violence or the potential for violence?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. It’s about the fact that they may stay.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then if we scroll down to the top of page 4, it says: “...our number 1 priority is public safety. We will not put our members at risk as we have a finite number of resources.” What did you mean by this statement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So we were still -- at this point in time, we were still having the initial discussions with the other services about what resources from Public Order Units can be sent, and that’s what we’re looking at. So until I know what we’re going to have for firm resources that are going to be available, we got to make sure that what we do have is sustainable to achieve the public safety, which is our first and foremost goal.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And at the of the page, it says, “We will not be arresting people for breaking windows.” Is it fair to say that as of the 27th, you did not think that OPS had enough resources to safely conduct enforcement activities once the convoy arrived?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So there’s two parts to that. The first part with regards to the broken windows, so one of the standard practices that we push out for demonstrations that have the potential for violence, so if somebody is -- if they were having a crowd that is very volatile and somebody breaks a window, we’re not going to rush officers in to try and make an arrest that’s going to agitate the crowd and escalate the event. We will document, we will investigate and we will lay the charges at a later time. It’s about the timeliness and how we’re going to maintain public safety. That’s what the reference for the broken window is. With respect to our resources, we were already short staffed. We have a hard time meeting our current mandate with the staffing levels we have in this organization and we were already pulling from all different directorates to be able to staff for this event. And as has been previously mentioned by my Deputy Chief and the Chief, it’s been a long hard two years for them.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So was it -- is it fair to say that as of the 26th and the 27th you were concerned that OPS would be overwhelmed by the Freedom Convoy and that it wouldn’t have enough officers to staff the response?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
At this point in time, it wasn’t about being overwhelmed. It was about if we ended up where violence does erupt, are we going to have the resources to quickly regain the safety and bring order back in to the city.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If I could just briefly pull up OPS0003088. So this is an email you sent to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson on the 26th attaching -- or including draft speaking points. And if we just scroll down, we see there’s a bullet that states that: “The sheer number of vehicles yet to be identified. May still overwhelm." Inspector Lucas, does this refresh your memory that you were concerned about OPS being overwhelmed as of January 26th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Well, there is -- yes, but again, context. So depending on the convoys if they arrive on their schedules and they remain cooperative, it was not -- and they go to the places where we work locations out for them, then we would not have been overwhelmed. Then we would have been able to manage it with the framework that we have in place. But if they didn’t stick to their schedule or they all tried to come at the same time, then there was a potential for our resources to be stretched too thin.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So just so I understand, are you saying that if convoy organizers and the convoy participants honoured the agreements they were making with the Police Liaison Team, then OPS could manage, but if those agreements were not honoured, then OPS could be overwhelmed?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There was a potential, yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I think now is a good time to turn to the operational -- January 28th operational plan, which is OPP00004262. And just scrolling down to the first page, the bottom of the first page, it says -- the write’s name is Staff Sergeant Key, so he’s the -- he’s the author of the plan. Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And did you receive this plan on the 27th or the 28th? I see that it’s dated the 28th.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There was an email attachment on another document where it actually provided feedback and that will tell you the date that I received it.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then if we just scroll down to page 2 of the plan, we see that it lists you as an authorizing authority. So did you approve this plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
With a few minor amendments to it, yes, I did.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And in your interview summary, you stated that it was made clear to you that Chief Sloly’s approval of this plan was required. Do you recall that statement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
How was it made clear to you that Chief Sloly’s approval was required?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was told that by the -- to me by the planning team, that that had become the standard practice that they would go to the Chief for final approval.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I think you said in your summary you -- that was a new requirement, to your understanding. Is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I’ll just put it to you, if you scroll down just a bit, so there’s no line for Chief Sloly’s signature here, is there?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, there’s not.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And do you know why, if Chief Sloly needed to approval the plan, there’s no line for his signature?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I’d like to turn to pages 7 through 8 of the plan. And scroll down to the threat assessment section. So it says OPS SIS. Do you recognize that as the OPS Security Intelligence Section?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And who drafted this threat assessment? So what I’m trying to understand is did the planning team just copy/paste material that they received from the Security Intelligence Section or did they kind of read what they received from that at that section and include the points that they thought were relevant?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Usually my understanding is the practice is it is a collaborative effort between the two.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I’d just like to give you an opportunity to briefly read the bullets that appear here. If you could just scroll down so the Inspector can see all the bullets. And just further down onto the next page. And so I think -- sorry, Inspector. I’ll just give you a moment to review those bullets.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So Inspector, I think you had said earlier that, in your mind, a prolonged occupation by the Freedom Convoy was the worst-case scenario for you. Am I remembering that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And does the threat assessment section mention that risk?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, it does not.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
When you received the threat assessment, were you concerned that this risk was not recorded?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, because it was built into the other components of the plan and how they were approaching it.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But you would consider the -- let me -- would you consider the worst-case scenario to be a significant case?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, because it did happen.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And would you normally expect significant risks to be reflected in the threat assessment section of an operational plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, it should have been there.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so I’d like to ask how many days of operation did the operational plan address?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
The initial plan, I believe, was three days, and it primarily rotated around the scheduled events that they learned was taking place with the protest organizers.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could just turn to page 12 at the top of the page, please? So there’s the paragraph that reads: “The event will commence on Friday the 28th of January. [And] Current intelligence is not clear on the duration of the event. This plan will address the first two days of operation and is adaptable so that it can continue into additional dates.” Is that consistent with what you were just saying; that the plan covers the first three days?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So part of the ISC model, when we send it to the Incident Commander, is a planning and stocking contingent. On the Friday the 28th, we stood up our service Command Centre, to start looking at resourcing, planning, and succession planning to go forward for this event as of the Friday.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. What were OPS’s contingency plans if participants in the convoy events remained in Ottawa beyond the January 29th, 30th weekend, and if an occupation materialized?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It would depend on the size and scope and the footprint. So as I said -- as I stated, at the end of that first weekend and into that Monday, two-thirds or more of them left and we had an opportunity to shrink that footprint, which didn’t take place. And in -- we would have been able to rearrange our traffic plan to mitigate that. Similarly we’ve seen to other protests that have occupied Wellington Street in the past, if there was no volatility with crowd dynamics, you create a traffic plan and provide a robust police presence to ensure public safety.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you mentioned that it would depend on how many people stayed and how many people left. Was OPS -- sorry. Is it fair to say that OPS was waiting to see how many people would stay or leave, and would then develop a contingency plan on the 31st once it had that information?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. So part of that discussion was already taking place about where would we be diverting traffic if there was an extended presence. It’s not included in this plan, no. The plan was -- again, you have to look at the short timeline. This was the 27th, 28th, and the event was arriving the 28th. We can’t wait till we have 100 percent solution to have a framework up so that we can get troops on the ground to make sure that we’re responding to the needs of the public, and that’s why the Service Command Centre was stood up to ensure that we were building succession planning to be able to go forward. You have to work off of -- you can look at different speculations on what could or could not happen, and -- but at this point you have to take a look at if two-thirds left and we did compress and we were Wellington Street only, it would have been a very -- much more easier to manage with the resources that we had.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Or if they stayed where we asked them to park.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I just want to make sure I understand. So is it accurate that the contingency plans were not included in this document but were being developed, primarily by the Service Command Centre?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Based on dynamics of what was happening at the time.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so when Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson testified to the Commission last week, she told us that the operational plan did not contain a contingency plan beyond the January -- if the protesters stayed beyond January 31st at noon. Is that consistent with what you were just saying; that those contingency plans are not in this plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
This plan does not have it.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And Supt. Bernier, Robert Bernier is going to be testifying later today, he told us in his interview that he was concerned about a disconnect between Intelligence and Planning before the Freedom Convoy. In your view, does the absence of contingency plans in this operational plan reflect such a disconnect?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
As with any event, there could be improvements. I think there was good communication between the two. Was it robust enough? Obviously we did not have as much as we needed in advance. But I also want to point out that the context of this is a little different as well. This is something that was very fluid, that they were planning in a week. If I were to use my previous planning experience working in the 2016 North American Leaders Summit where I was the lead planner for the Ottawa Police, which was about the same scope, maybe even a little bit smaller for a head of state visit, we had months to plan and prepare. And months to get resources into place. This was less than a week.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And Inspector, in your summary you told us that starting on January 29th, so this is when the convoys are starting to arrive, OPS became progressively overwhelmed and that you and the National Capital Region Command Centre were drinking from the firehose as additional Freedom Convoy vehicles arrived in Ottawa. Do you recall that statement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I certainly do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Could you unpack that for the Commissioner, just to help us understand?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Sure. So on the Friday, for the most part the arrivals were actually very -- for the most part were orderly. People were -- the convoys were going to locations that were predesignated, and areas that we -- again, it goes back to we were expecting a few thousand and it still exceeded what we were -- what we actually, truly expected. And my personal opinion is it probably exceeded what the organizers were expecting. But on that Friday, people were going to places we designated, where we were actually -- if you look at those -- on the maps, on the Parkways and on Wellington we were doing everything we could to keep them out of the residential areas. The analogy I use is I have one load of sandbags and we’re building a wall, but you see the waters are rising faster and you know you’re going to get overwhelmed with the water that’s coming. So you use your sandbags to divert them to minimize and mitigate the damages and the impacts to the area that it going to be the recipient of those floodwaters. And that’s what we were trying to do. But what happened was on the Saturday, the Western convoy arrived. Unfortunately, they’re the ones that created this event and they didn’t get the locations downtown. It was other people that raced downtown to get that. So what had happened was people who were frustrated that were individual operators who wanted to take part weren’t complying with the directions and we were redirecting them, trying to keep intersections, emergency roads clear. And -- but they would start to weave through different side streets, so that would -- in those individual vehicles that were going off the planning and the agreements that were in place originally with the various leaders and organizers of the convoys, we’re creating one-offs; we’re drawing one more resource here, one more resource there. And it got to the point it was, okay, we have to stop responding to those individual, smaller ones on the Saturday and indicate where are we going to get the biggest bang for our buck by deploying officers to go back to what is our key primary goal of public safety.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Commissioner, could I just request an additional minute or two to conclude?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Fair.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So Insp. Lucas, I would like to jump ahead by 17 days, in the interests of time, to the February 13th, 15th period. Do you recall that on February 13th there was an agreement between City and Freedom Convoy leaders to relocate Freedom Convoy vehicles from side streets to Wellington Street?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I knew there was an agreement; I wasn’t part of the conversations.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Do you recall if OPS assisted in implementing that agreement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I know we -- at that point in time, I was still at the National Capital Region Command Centre. Basically, I was providing command for live operations, and we were doing what we could to facilitate some of those moves through the Police Liaison Teams, but to one point in time it stopped because it was not having the intended affect.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And as of February 15th, do you recall if there was still space on Wellington Street to relocate convoy vehicles to?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There may have been. I don’t recall.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Could I just pull up OPS00014410? (SHORT PAUSE)
Sorry, counsel; OPP00014410?
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
OPS00014410. Or, sorry, 11410. I think that was a typo on my part. Yes, that's the document. Could you just go to page 14? Yeah, but then just scroll down a bit on page 14. So do you recognize -- just up a bit, sorry. Do you recognize this as the notes of a meeting of then Event Commander Bernier's Command table on February 15th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It says me, I was there, but participating on Teams.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could just go to the top of page 19? We see there's a comment by Drummond, Superintendent Drummond, "Do we still have room left on Wellington?" And then we see that you say, "I think there is, but we'll check cameras and assess." Do you remember making a statement that you thought there was still room on Wellington Street at this meeting?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I remember there was numerous times where we were asked about what the status was, and I would have provided an update of wherever we had all the cameras. So if I said there was -- if there's notes in there that say that there was room, then there was room, but these aren't my notes so.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could just scroll down to page 22 to the bottom of the page? So we see this is a statement by you, "gaps on Wellington" and then you list four intersections. Do you recognize this passage as you providing an update that you had checked and there was still space on Wellington to relocate vehicles to?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, that would seem logical.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Thank you, Commissioner. Thank you, Inspector Lucas. Those are my questions.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. For cross- examination I believe it's first Counsel for former Chief Sloly.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. REBECCA JONES
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Good morning, Inspector Lucas.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
My name is Rebecca Jones, and I am Counsel to former Chief Sloly. Inspector Lucas, you are very well trained as an incident commander; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I've been an incident commander and then a critical incident commander as well.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. And you have served as an incident commander many times for huge events and protests?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I have.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You were the lead planner for the 2016 North American Leader's Summit?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And so the OPS's executive team, including Chief Sloly, would have every reason to have confidence in your leadership of incident command for this event; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I would hope so.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And you took the steps that you felt you needed to take as Incident Commander; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Most of the time.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Well, why don't we focus on planning for the convoy to begin with.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You were confident that your team of planners was working with the Intelligence Directorate to get the appropriate information to input into the plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And this is what your executive team would have expected you to do?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I would assume so.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And the note, we saw the document -- we don't need to pull it up, but just for the record, OPS3403, which was the meeting of the Intelligence Directorate on January 27th that my friend took you to?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Recall that document? That was a meeting with the Intelligence Directorate and Assistant Deputy Chief Ferguson; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Is she on that call?
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Yes.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay. Sorry, I didn't look at the list.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And that was -- in this -- in the context of the Incident Command System, it would be on the responsibility of Assistant Deputy Chief Ferguson to pass on any sort of important information to Chief Sloly from that meeting; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We all have a role to play, but, yes, it would fall to her.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Now still sticking, Inspector Lucas, to the period of time up to January 28th, the strategic oversight for this period of planning was coming from assistant -- or Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And she was acting as the Major Incident Commander?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, with an event commander between her and I.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. And Superintendent Rheaume was the Event Commander in between?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And it's fair to say that in that period, up until the convoy's arrival, former Chief Sloly did not take steps to assume responsibility for planning from the Incident Command System?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Not to my knowledge at that point.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And Chief Sloly, not to your knowledge, Chief Sloly, to your knowledge, was not assessing intelligence on his own; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Not that I know of.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And one could not say, for example, that Chief Sloly failed to take adequate steps with respect to gathering, assessing, or disseminating intelligence in relation to planning for the convoy; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, I was focussed on my role. I can't say what his role and his responsibilities were overall.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right, but you understand what the ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- role of a Chief is?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
He's got his hands in everything.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
But it's not his role to do the intelligence assessment; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And throughout this planning period, I understood from your evidence that you were given the level of autonomy that you felt you should be given?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes, in the beginning.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. And again, I'm sticking to the period of time up to the arrival of the convoy.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And my friend asked you some questions about approving the plan and it was you who approved the plan; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I was one of the approvers, yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. And the other approver was Superintendent Rheaume?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And my friend pointed out to you that Chief Sloly didn't have a signature line on the plan; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
He did not.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And in terms of your understanding that he needed to approve the plan, you testified that came from the people below you, the planning group.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
And above.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And above. Okay. And that came from, I'm going to suggest to you, Superintendent Rheaume?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And you had been working in Incident Command with Chief Sloly since he began -- became the Chief; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. In different sections but ---
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
In different sections ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- in the role.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- but he had, I'm going to suggest to you and to your understanding, a lot of confidence in you as Incident Commander; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I would hope so.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And he had never sought to approve your operational plans before; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
On the road, no. I had only recently started in that section at the beginning of the month, so I'd only been there for three weeks.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
But you had been the Incident Commander before?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And he had never sought to approve your operational plans?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So to clarify, the -- my role as the Duty Inspector on the Road are, for the most part, unplanned events that I would respond to that wouldn't necessarily have formal written plans. If I was assigned to come in for a planned event to provide support as an Incident Commander, I would not be involved in that Incident Command planning process. That would be -- I would be just coming in to fill a role. And so there would be, like, planned protests in the past where I would be coming in, and those plans would be written by the events section up through the chain of command, and then I would be available should there be a critical incident during those events.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. So fair enough. My question's a bit simpler though.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Up until this point of time, you had never been told or expected that Chief Sloly had to approve any of your operational plans?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And I take it you didn't pick up the phone and ask Chief Sloly, "Do you really need to approve my operational plan?"
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. You just took it from what you were hearing that that's what he wanted to do?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And he didn't actually ultimately approve the operational plan; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I don't know. By the 28th, it was game time, and my role and my priority was making sure that we had people doing what they needed to do.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Well, you know because you've looked at the document and you know he never signed off on it; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
On the document there, no, he did not.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. In terms of the first weekend, and the -- going into the first week, when your team realized -- and the OPS as a whole, not just your team, realized that you were facing what was an occupation, right? People were not leaving; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
I suggest to you that the atmosphere at the NCRCC was chaotic.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. You did not have the resources to deal with the information that was coming in?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That’s part of the problem.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. You were understaffed, and you were struggling to maintain sufficient officers just for foot patrol?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And things were tense, right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They were.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. We heard evidence from Supt. Abrams at the OPP that he was hearing, or heard, that you had been yelling while at the NCRCC.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There’s a difference between raising your voice to get somebody’s attention across the room, and yelling at somebody.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And things were tense for everyone at that time, right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They were.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And people were perhaps not always at their very best.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They were not.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Now, I want to talk a little about the PLT. The PLT plays a very important role at -- in major events?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Critical.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. But the PLT may not be perfect for every situation. Is that fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They are not a silver bullet, they are not.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And so, for example, here, the PLT had difficulty negotiating with the participants at Rideau and Sussex?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They did. And it varied throughout that. So to provide context -- so part of the negotiations -- and I think it’s important to realize, that from the time of the arrival to the time of the departure, the crowd dynamics and the crowd composition evolved. And the longer that they were there, and the number -- and the people who -- that were participating changed, which changed the dynamics for -- but negotiations.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay, sure. But just to come back to my question, specifically. You state -- and I can pull it up for you -- in your interview summary, which we had up, that the: “...OPS had problems negotiating with the protester group at the Rideau- Sussex intersection.”
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And you have given evidence, less today and more in your interview summary, but I’m going to deal with some of it, about your view that the Executive Team was not respecting the role of the PLT to the extent that you thought they should; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And one of the examples we keep hearing about, in terms of the PLT, is the situation at Coventry Road, right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
One of them, yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
One of them. Okay, so lets just stick with that one for now. And this is the situation where there had been negotiations with protesters to remove their fuel, right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
This is around February 6?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the OPS ultimately arrested those, or some protestors when they approached downtown with that fuel?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They did.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And in your view, that event, in a very real way affected the relationship between the PLT and the process, protestors.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It did.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And you’re aware of the fact that that action was directed by Supt. Patterson; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And we heard evidence from current Interim Chief Bell yesterday that he was the one who approved that action.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. I take it you didn’t know that before?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And this is not a decision, to your knowledge, that reached Chief Bell’s level; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
The -- to, which decision?
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Chief Sloly, I apologize.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Chief Bell.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know. I said, my focus was maintaining live operations of what was happening on the ground.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. So -- and I apologize, I get my names mixed up there. I will repeat the question, just to be clear for the record. This was not an issue that you have any evidence to suggest that former Chief Sloly was involved in?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know who made that decision.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Thank you. I want to ask you some questions about changes to the incident at Command. You state in your statement that it was your understanding that Chief Sloly: “...that Superintendent Rheaume was removed because Chief Sloly wanted to take a new strategic direction...”
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was my understanding.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And you did not get that understanding from Chief Sloly?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And if we put up, please, WTS23, this is the Interview Statement of Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, and we go to page 11, okay, and we see under, “Switches and Event Commanders”? If you take a moment to look at that.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
This is, again, the Interview Summary of Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And what Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson’s evidence is, is that Supt. Rheaume needed to take some time off, and so it was for that reason that Supt. Dunlop was put into that position.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay? And you have no reason to disagree with that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. So your understanding, from whatever source, that it was Chief Sloly who wanted to take a new strategic direction and replaced Supt. Rheaume, that’s incorrect?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Based on that statement I would say it is.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And you have no other basis to suggest that that’s the case?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And in terms of Supt. Dunlop, you’re familiar with the events at the Panda Bowl game that had occurred prior to the Freedom Convoy here?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And that was a very difficult event?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And Supt. Dunlop was involved in the Command for that event?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You’re not aware of that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. I was, actually on a day off.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. So I’m going to suggest to you that Supt. Dunlop was aware -- was involved in that event. And I’m going to ask you to agree with me that there’s nothing improper for Chief Sloly to have some concerns about the people who are going to be leading the Event Command for the Freedom Convoy.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
At the end of the day, the Chief owns the Service and the decisions that come out of it, so ---
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Thank you.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- he needs to do what he needs to do.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Sorry?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
He needs to do what he needs to do.
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
We’re about out of time, so if we could wrap up, please?
Rebecca Jones, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Those are my questions. Thank you.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. Next we have the City of Ottawa.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANNE TARDIF
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Good morning.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
My name’s Anne Tardif; I represent the City of Ottawa. So I’d like to start with pulling up, Mr. Clerk, OPS00002990. And while that’s coming up, Inspector, you were asked a series of questions -- I don’t intend to go back there -- about the intelligence that you had going into the first weekend of the Convoy, so on and so forth. I take it you’re aware that the Mayor and City Officials were briefed by the Service on January 26, before the convoy trucks arrived?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And would you agree with me that the decision was made -- and I don’t mean to suggest this is inappropriate, by any stretch, but would you agree that the decision was made to only provide high-level detail to the City about the upcoming convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct, because at this point the operational planning and what was -- what we were learning and how we were adopting was consistently changing.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So thank you Mr. Clerk, I think we can take that down. And so regardless of the information that the Service had and when it had it, leading into the convoy, the details of that were not shared with the City; fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. The high-level speaking points were provided and then it was left to the Executive to decide what they would share.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. Thank you. Can we turn up your witness summary, please, Mr. Clerk? It’s WTS.00000024. I'll ask you to go to the top of page 3, please. Thank you. The last sentence, Inspector, "He", being you: "...stated that if he had known that thousands of vehicles would be arriving in Ottawa he would have requested larger numbers of reinforcements from police services across Canada in advance of the convoy's arrival." Do you see that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. I thought I heard you say this morning that you did expect thousands. And I just -- I'd appreciate some clarity from you on this.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So if they go -- if you go back, one of the statements was in intelligence reports that I was provided was assuming on an average of a hundred vehicles per province, so about a thousand vehicles. We ended up with, I would say, close to five thousand vehicles, of which we still diverted on the Saturday thousands out of -- not -- out of the downtown by keeping them on the Quebec side thanks to our great partners, Sûreté du Quebec and Gatineau. The original group, and what it was, it wasn't necessarily the trucks, it was actually all the associated vehicles that joined in that were creating the chaos that all wanted to be downtown.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So you expected hundreds or perhaps a thousand, but not thousands; is that fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. And the reason I wanted to put that to you is that Superintendent Abrams of the OPP, I take it you know who he is?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
He testified on Friday that OPS indicated to him on the 27th that they thought they could handle three thousand vehicles.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the context is we had -- if the vehicles went to the locations where we designated spots for them, they actually plotted it out, including maintaining emergency lanes on those roadways, we could host up to 3,000 thousand vehicles on those designated spots.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. Thank you. I want to switch tracks a bit and talk about the support provided by the City to the OPS response during the convoy. If we could start with OPS00004219, please, Mr. Clerk. Now, I believe there are one set of your scribe notes, Inspector, when they come up, and they should be for January 29th. Perfect. You see that there, Inspector?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And I'm going to ask the clerk to turn to page 4, timestamp 9:26. Can we scroll down a little bit, please? Thank you. And you'll see there, it's a communication from Traffic Hull. I take it's Denis Hull ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
--- at the Service? He's in charge of the traffic planning for the response?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And he's communication to the City, and it says: "Requesting Bylaw maintains static positions...[assists with] parking..." Do you see that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
I think there's a dash "City will advise" if I'm reading that correctly.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So that was the direction or the request I guess I would say from the NRCC [sic] to the City on that date; fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Fair.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. And if I could now go to page 5, timestamp 9:57. Thank you, Mr. Clerk. Again, this is Denis Hull, traffic -- in charge of traffic planning, to IC. That's you, correct, the Incident Commander?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. "Intel from SQ".
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Yeah, that's not what I wanted. Just give me one second. My apologies. Oh, just one up, 9:53. I can't read my own writing. My apologies. "City to Op Sup." Who's Op Sup?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That's probably the Operational Support person that was working in there. So there is multiple OPS members that are in there providing different roles.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So -- but it's police; fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It is police.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay: "Bylaw will tow convoy vehicles without police for safety." Do you see that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. And then it's -- "for safety reasons", pardon me, and then it's, "Op Sup officer will be there." Correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. And that was the communication at that time. And if we could go to page 10 of this document, please, and we're still on January 29th, and if we could go to 12:05, and just scroll down a little bit. Perfect. In the interest of time, I'll just jump ahead to 12:17. Do you see where it says "City" there at 12:17, Inspector?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So the City reported to NCRCC at 12:17 on January 29th that: "Bylaw officers [were] reporting they are being threatened and feel unsafe." Do you see that? And then it says, "OPS pull them back."
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
What time are you talking?
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
12:17.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Oh, sorry, I was looking at the wrong one.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Do you see it there? City: "Bylaw officers reporting they are being threatened and feel unsafe."
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Or, sorry, "they are being threatened and feel unsafe." And then I think that's OP Sup Police ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
--- "pull them back." Is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
So that was the request or the instruction given at that time?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Thank you. If I could now ask the clerk to pull up OPS00004879. And it may not be necessary to go through this, through the documents, though I appreciate a lot happened during this time period. I want to talk about burn barrels. Do you recall the issue with burn barrels in the downtown core, Inspector?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And my understanding is that Ottawa Fire was available to assist, but needed approval from the lead agency police in order to actually go and put out burn barrels. Is that accurate?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So if they were going into the inner core, right in the middle of the crowds, they would need us to be there ---
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- and then we'd have to assess. So when those actions -- and again, it comes under context. What is the dynamics? I am not going to allow somebody to go in to achieve a minor action and put their safety at risk or risk inflaming the crowds.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. Thank you for that, Inspector. I don't think we need to turn up the documents. I appreciate your assistance with that. I'm going to ask you to pull up OPS00008424, please, Mr. Clerk. Now, you said in your witness statement, just while that's coming up, that you spoke with, I think it's Superintendent Brookson, the Acting Director of Parliamentary Protective Service ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
--- before the convoy, and it was their preference that no trucks or vehicles be on Wellington at all. That was your understanding of their preference.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Right. And that's obviously not what the Service did.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. So -- and in all respect to Superintendent Brookson and the PPS, their role is protecting Parliament. My role is to protect the city, and I have to weigh the options and where my risks are, and you have to say is that actually necessary, is it risk effective, and is it acceptable? And I will never get 100 percent solution, I know that, and I will make the best decision I can at that time that's going to ensure public safety and the safety of our members.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And you got exactly where I wanted to. You're worried about the residents of the city, your concerns are not limited to the security of Parliament Hill; fair?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. And to provide context to that, we do take their concerns -- they weren't completely disregarded because we did maintain access to Parliament and we still were able to get their vehicles into there.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay, thank you. If this is 8424, and we've got this up now, could we please go to, I think it's page 7, page 6, pardon me, bottom of page 6. Right at the bottom there. If we could just pause there, Mr. Clerk. Do you see the timestamp 11:57?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And these are your scribe notes for February 8th, just so you're aware, Inspector.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
And you see, it says: "[D]iscussion [with] PPS in regards to the risk factor of moving Rideau/Sussex." And I want to pause there. My understanding is that PLT was negotiating with the truckers at that intersection to get them to move westward onto Wellington and closer to the Hill.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So to provide clarity, the PLT were negotiating since day one.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Sorry, yes, but that was what they were trying to achieve?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. Keep going. "They are" -- I'm getting the look. I'm almost done I promise, Commissioner. If I could just have a moment's indulgence: "[T]they are in agreement [with] plan as long as they do not pass 'load safe'..." A few other specificities around tractor trailers staying on the northbound side of the road and westbound lanes lonely -- lanes only, pardon me. So that's correct, the PPS were in agreement with that plan provided those conditions could be met?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. So this "load safe", though, is the one lone rogue truck driver that put his vehicle on an angle, and the Load Safe was the name on it. And it was actually closer to the Chateau Laurier, and they were concerned about not only Parliament but access to where -- the centre of the city.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Okay. And the only point I want to make is they were agreeable to an increased number of trucks on Wellington West at this time?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Begrudgingly.
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
Begrudgingly, fair enough. Do I have time for one more question, Commissioner, or have I exceeded my indulgence? If I have I'll sit down.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
If it's necessary go ahead, but...
Anne Tardif, Counsel (Ott)
I can -- I appreciate it. I can put it to Superintendent Drummond tomorrow. Thank you very much, Commissioner. Thank you, Inspector Lucas.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. The OPP, please.
No questions. Thank you, Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Oh, well, I could have been more generous. The Ottawa Coalition?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. CHRISTINE JOHNSON
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Good morning, Inspector.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
My name is Christine Johnson. I’m one of the counsel representing the Ottawa Coalition of Businesses and Residents. I have a short time with you today, so just a few questions. So just a couple of questions about the early planning that you told us a little bit about this morning, Inspector. You mentioned that it was your view and your knowledge that the OPS had dealt with two previous trucker protests involving the same sort of mandate or issue. And you mentioned that they were gone fairly quickly. I believe you said that one protest group was gone over night, one was gone the next day. Is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I know there was two. That was my understanding of how they transpired.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Okay. You did acknowledge, however, that these previous protests involved local groups, and I think I heard in your testimony this morning, there was an acknowledgement these weren’t groups coming from far away out west; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So you would agree that this time around, given that you knew the convoys were travelling quite a great distance across the country, it could have been anticipated that they were perhaps planning to stay a while?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There was always a risk that some would be staying longer, yes.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
I think we heard earlier in this process from a layperson, the Executive Director of the Vanier Business Improvement Area, Nathalie Carrier, that to her, as a layperson, it was quite obvious that these trucks weren’t, you know, travelling, packing up their kids, packing up their supplies, driving all the way across the country just for a weekend. Is that fair to say that was the police’s understanding as well?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. My understanding was that -- and again, like I stated, the evidence shows that between 60 and 70 percent of them at least left on that Sunday, into the Monday morning. The size and scope of the vehicles that came in exceeded everyone’s expectations.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right. And you said that around January 25th and 26th, you developed heightened concerns about the convoy. And you told us this morning that those heightened concerns were pertaining to the online rhetoric that you were seeing, concerns about who was attaching themselves to the convoy, and concerns that this could lead to a potential for violence. Is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So would it be fair to say that, and you noted, that even though the convoy may have demonstrated peaceful behaviour while moving across Canada, OPS was concerned that this might not be the case, this peaceful behaviour might not continue as they reach Ottawa, given the rhetoric that you were seeing online?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There were never any guarantees.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Can I just ask you to slow down a bit in your questions? Because the interpreters, I think, are going to have a lot of trouble.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Absolutely.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
I know there’s not much time, but.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Thank you, Commissioner. I will. And sorry, sir, your answer to that question?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
You’ll have to rephrase the question, sorry.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Sure. So you had mentioned that it was your understanding that the convoy, as they made their way across Canada, had been cooperative, had been peaceful, however, in light of these heightened concerns that you had from what you were seeing online, did OPS have a concern that that peaceful behaviour might not continue as they entered Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
And that’s why we brought in the public order units from other police services.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Great. And that leads into my next question, Inspector. How does the community impact fit into the planning that you were undertaking in light of these heightened concerns? When you talk about the Public Order Unit, is that where community impact would have been assessed in planning?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, so the community impact was actually -- was part of the consideration right from the beginning. So if you actually were to go to the original plan and take a look at where they were diverting the trucks to, they were away from residential areas. And if you look -- like, put them along the Sir John A. MacDonald Parkway and onto Wellington, we were trying to find places where they were trying to go that we would actually minimize the impact on that. There was no plan to put them down the length of Kent Street to double and triple stack on Kent and block Kent and things like that. that was never part of the original plan. And on the Friday, that’s not what took place. And again, like I state, when we look at alternate locations, we can’t put them on to people’s private property. So the City, being a great partner, provided RCGT, and those trucks that actually arrived on Friday night that went there, they actually carpooled to go downtown to actually minimize the impacts to downtown. So there were a lot of wins, but what happened was the size and scope, and I know I’ve said this numerous times, and -- but it exceeded everybody’s expectations, and I would probably say even that of the organizers weren’t expecting the volume that we ended up -- and what happened was, when we got that volume, it just pulled our resources too thin to address those concerns.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Thank you.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
But even diverting the trucks to an area such as Wellington Street, for instance, was there any consideration of the residential areas that are just south of Wellington, or the businesses in that area? What was that consideration?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the -- when we’re doing the planning, it’s like I stated, where are you going -- we’ll never get to where it’s not going to impact anybody. So it’s about how do we manage -- they are going to Parliament Hill. That is the focus of their event. So how do we minimize and control, in the planning process, as much as possible to mitigate those impacts on the local community? And, you know, we’ve learned a lot of good lessons. And again, if we had put barricades up, we would have pushed them further into the communities, which is what we did not want in the planning process.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So it’s fair to say even in light of these heightened concerns, the possibility of blocking access to Wellington was not revisited?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
In the early planning stages?
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
In light of the heightened concerns that you had January 25th and 26th.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Moving on to contingency planning for a moment, you told us this morning that there were contingency plans being developed, although they were not reflected in the pre-arrival operational plan that we looked at.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And the pre-arrival operational plan, and we don’t need to pull it up, but there is a threat assessment section that noted that the convoy trucks could pose safety and logistical hazards because of their size and weight and the convoy could shut down movement if it wanted to. So I’m curious to know, sir, what were the contingency plans for the possibility of the convoy shutting down movement?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So our concern was, when we talk about them shutting down movement, is what if they blocked off certain intersections? And if you look at the first weekend, it’s about mitigating it, managing it with traffic officers and our Police Liaison Teams. So again, first weekend, I know it doesn’t look like a success, and people are -- the end results are going to look at everything that went wrong, but there were a lot of things that went right. The intersections were kept open, the emergency lanes were kept open. We had busses still running on that first weekend. So there were a lot of wins. And I know people don’t see that. We -- with the amount of officers and the resources we had, and the amount they were overwhelmed, they did a phenomenal job. And I will always give them the credit for the work that they did to try and mitigate the impacts to the community.
Christine Johnson, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Thank you. Those are all my questions, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. Next up is the Government of Canada.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. STEPHEN AYLWARD
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Good morning, Insp. Lucas.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
My name is Stephen Aylward. I’m one of the lawyers for the Government of Canada. In your witness statement, you noted that there was an issue with misinformation and disinformation and its impact on the policing of the Freedom Convoy. Could I just ask you to expand on that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes. And there’s a couple really good examples. So the -- I’ve learned a lot. and the power of social media has evolved and it continues to evolve. And when we look at -- when somebody sends out, I’ll call -- we try to put out information from legitimate sources and you try to make sure that they’re verified. So we always refer people back to our website to look for true information. Misinformation comes when people are sending out unintentionally wrong information, and then it gets shared, and then you’re trying to put that genie back in the bottle. And then the other issue was the disinformation, where people are knowingly putting out false information, which is drawing on resources or creating a different narrative that you’re trying to deal with. So, like, for example, the wooden fence that’s protecting the construction site on Parliament Hill was being shared repeatedly, over and over again, saying they’re fortifying Parliament Hill in advance of the arrival of convoys. And it was enflaming people. But you’re trying to get the information out through your PLTs. It’s there. There’s construction. There’s a big pit on the other side. We don’t want people to get hurt. And that was a big challenge to try to stay ahead of.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Mr. Clerk, could we please turn up OPS00002961? Insp. Lucas, are you aware of an issue with protest organizers claiming that the police supported or backed the Freedom Convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I know that there was messaging going out, and what happens is things start because they get taken out of context. So one of the pillars of policing response to events that have the potential to be volatile, whether they’re a regular call for service from 911 or going to a protest, is about de-escalating. You want to -- if people are running at a nine or a 10 emotionally, you need to bring it down a level. So if that means being friendly with them and having a chat with them and taking a picture with them so that people are getting more relaxed and it doesn’t turn into a confrontation, that’s what, traditionally, we have encouraged our officers to do. Then what happens is, it gets twisted and gets shared as, as I said, disinformation or misinformation.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
And so if we just look at this document, the third email in the chain is an email from you. And under the fourth bullet that begins, “It’s difficult for everyone to differentiate fact from fiction”?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There’s my example, yes.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Yes. And then at the end of that paragraph, there’s a reference to social media posts and receiving some direct messages from protestors -- sorry, from members of the public and it continues there. So is the issue here that there was social media messaging online that the police were not only supporting the right to protest here but were actually backing the protestors?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We -- they have a right to protest. We are not supporting any cause. And part of it -- if you go back to our operational plan, it tells them, “you can’t wear symbols”. We tell them they cannot overly support or not support an event. They’re there to be neutral.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
But the issue here that you’re identifying is that there’s confusion that the police are, in fact, supporting the protestors.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Because they were taking -- allowing selfies to be taken with protectors, correct.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
So would you characterize that as an instance of misinformation on social media?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
If we could call up OPS00010498. Inspector Lucas, do you recall there being an issue with protectors drawing up arrest warrants for health care workers?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I remember that Tweet being shared, yes.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
And can you tell us a bit more about that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I don’t remember the full details. I do remember that there was a concern that these -- that some of the participants were drawing up arrest warrants. There was also another one where they were actually swearing themselves in as peace officers. Those -- the one for the warrants was forwarded to our Intelligence to review, to validate, and then assigned to investigators as applicable.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Thank you. And Mr. Commission, if I may just have one moment’s indulgence.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
So in your witness statement, you refer to there being a Farfaada contingent at Rideau and Sussex. Can you just tell us who Farfaada are?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They’re -- my understanding for the most part is that they are focused on anti-government, anti-mandate group based out of Quebec.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Okay. And then if we could turn up OPS00012285. Are you aware of an issue with the convoy organizers offering to compensate truckers who were issued tickets?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the email that you’re referring to, I am aware of that email. So what happens -- this is an important part about, again, having our officers that are on the ground being engaged not only with local residents, but with the truckers. And so when they get that information, we provide it and send it forward to Intelligence to validate what -- is it -- is that information valid and is it reliable. So there was rumours, but whether it was validated, I can’t confirm.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
But it was sufficient -- it was enough of a concern to include in this email, which is providing instructions to officers who are conducting briefings.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was -- yes, because it was -- they have a $10 million war chest. Is it plausible? Absolutely. It needs to be further investigated.
Stephen Aylward, Counsel (GC)
Thank you. No further questions.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Next if I could call on the Convoy Organizers.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. BATH-SHEBA VAN den BERG
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Good morning, Inspector Lucas.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
My name is Bath- Sheba Van den Berg, and I am counsel representing Freedom Corp and the protestors. You would agree that there was misinformation on social media being provided by those opposed to the protest; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
You would agree that there were people in the OPS that supported the protest; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Personally, but they should not be doing it professionally.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
And that there were quite a few OPS officers who participated in the protest. Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I can’t say for sure.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
You were just asked about your expectations regarding how long the trucks were to stay in Ottawa, in particular, the ones that drove from the west and that would take five days -- that took five days for them to drive from the west to Ottawa. Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
And you expected them to leave after two days being in Ottawa after the five-day drive from the west.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We anticipated the vast majority would leave.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
You said in your examination in-chief that you would not be charging people for broken windows. Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
And I believe I explained that in my earlier testimony.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Could we explain it for the record here for our audience is that you’re not actually talking about broken windows but instead of the broken window theory? Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. So what I’m referring to is, for example, if we have an emotionally-charged crowd that is marching and protesting and going through the city and somebody breaks a window in that crowd, we are not going to rush in to arrest them right away for that event because it has a high volatility to escalate the crowd to more violence or cause injury to the people that are going to make the arrest. We will document, we will investigate and we will lay charges as applicable for that broken window. It just won’t be an immediate action.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Do you mean an actual broken window? Because what you’re just defining right there does sound similar to broken window theory where there’s - --
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, broken window theory says if you continue to ignore the broken windows that nobody will care any more.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
So are you talking about an actual broken window?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, you’re referring to broken window theory. That’s not applicable in this case. Broken window theory’s complete -- is not the same theory as this. This is about timing your investigation and your charges of when you actually make an arrest. There is no requirement for us to immediately rush in to arrest somebody who breaks a window or spray paints something. That’s something that can be investigated, followed up, and the applicable charges can be laid after the fact. Now, if somebody were to pull a knife, we are going into that crowd and that person will be arrested because we have a responsibility to ensure public safety.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
That’s right. So just to be clear, you’re not talking about actual broken windows.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Thank you, Inspector. From February 10th you switched from operation level to tactical level; correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was my personal interpretation, yes.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
And do you agree that tactical level means managing day-to-day tactical operations?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Last week, Mayor Watson testified that a senior OPS official was assigned to be on the ground on Wellington to coordinate the implementation of the February 12th deal with the truckers. Do you know who was that OPS officer assigned to coordinate the deal on the ground to go on February 14th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I believe it was Superintendent Drummond was assigned to do the follow-up with respect to the negotiations.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Is it correct that Kelly Cochrane is a coordinator of Emergency Management and Business Continuity for the City of Ottawa?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I know she works in that office, yes.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Do you recall communicating with Kelly Cochrane on February 18th, 2022?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
She was in the NCRCC almost on a daily basis, so.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
And do you recall Cochrane referring to the arrested protestors as “detainees”?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Do you recall what the weather was like on February 18th, 2022?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
The first day of the arrests?
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
That’s correct.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was cold.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Would you agree that it was minus 24 with the wind chill or thereabouts?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was cold because I actually remember watching the video of them lining them up and the officers giving up the -- their own personal hand warmers to the people waiting in line to be processed on the bus.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Would you agree that if one was inadequately dressed and didn’t have those hand warmers and were exposed to the cold element one would be at risk from getting cold injuries such as hypothermia, frost nip or frostbite?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There is a risk.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
You’re familiar with the POU tactical plan, which is a sub-plan of the February 17th plan that was referred to earlier today. Is that correct?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I’m aware of the plan. I did not see it.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Did you not see any of the plans, then?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So at that point, the Integrated Command and Planning Group were planning and coordinating, and my focus was on getting our officers through the next 3 hours or the 12 hours that they were working under my command. Those actual operations were -- would be planned and coordinated by a separate group.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
But those plans would have been shared with you, the mission, the objectives ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
The concept of operations - --
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
--- processes ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- but not the minutia or the details.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
That being said, would you agree that there's nothing that you heard of that was in those operation plans, including the tactical plan, that after police arrested protesters and told them that they were not begin charged that the police were permitted to drive protesters outside of the city core in the dead of winter without access to shelter or transportation or telecommunications?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I know nothing of that. I can't speak to it.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
On February -- I have one ---
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
You're out of time at the moment.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Can I ask one final questions, please?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Go ahead.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Thank you. On February 18th, do you remember Kelly Cochrane raising the issue to you on how protesters, or as she described detainees, would actually leave after being arrested and transported and you replied, "Well, they will find a way to leave"?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Don't recall.
Bath-Sheba Van den Berg, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Thank you, Inspector Lucas, and for your service. That's all my questions. And thank you for the additional time, Mr. Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. Next is the National Police Federation.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. LAUREN PEARCE
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Good afternoon. My name is Lauren Pearce. I'm attending via Zoom. Can you hear and see me, Inspector Lucas?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I can.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. Great. So my name is Lauren Pearce. I'm here for the National Police Federation. I'm just going to ask you a few questions, primarily around the role of the Parliamentary Protective Service or PPS; okay?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
So first of all, my understanding is that they're responsible for the physical security of Parliament Hill and the buildings on Parliament Hill ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
--- is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And my understanding is that that kind of extends to the gates of Parliament and then, thereafter, it's primarily Ottawa's responsibility; is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
For the security, correct.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And I also understand that during the convoy protests, I guess Parliament Hill has been undergoing some construction, so there was some construction cladding in that area; is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That's -- you're talking about the fencing in front of Centre block, correct.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And so -- and I also understand that, generally during the convoy protests, PPS officers were primarily located behind that construction cladding; is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I couldn't say. They weren't under my command or control, but there was a PPS element that was working with us in the NCRCC ---
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. But ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
--- which is the Command Centre.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
--- to your knowledge, were - - are you aware of PPS officers responding to the convoy protests on Wellington Street?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
On Wellington? No, I know that they were dealing with the spillover that was coming onto their -- the grounds.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. Okay. Great. And so you were part of the spillover. My understanding that there wasn't a high degree of spillover of protesters onto Parliament Hill, maybe because of that construction cladding or fencing; is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No. That's correct. Most of them stayed on Wellington.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And had there been a significant presence of protesters on Parliament Hill, and that protest activity had been unlawful, there'd been unlawful protest activity on Parliament Hill, do you agree that it's likely that PPS would have required support from the Ottawa Police Service or other police partners?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. Is it fair to say that it's virtually certain that PPS officers would require that assistance?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We would not leave them alone, no.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And my understanding is that the Ottawa Police Service had to actually plan for the possibility that there would be an unlawful protest activity on Parliament Hill that PPS could not handle on its own. Is that a contingency that Ottawa had to think about?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct, yes.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. And my understanding is that that plan was that the RCMP had a Public Order Unit that was available to support PPS should a conflict escalate on Parliament Hill?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So on the first weekend, the RCMP were allocated to one in reserve, one at Harrington Lake, and one at Rideau Hall. The -- we brought in, I believe, six Public Order Units, which -- and ours, plus ours, and the two from the OPP were reallocated strictly to support PPS operations on that first weekend.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. Okay. So it sounds like RCMP, OPP and then I think also Ottawa Police Service Emergency Services Units were available to PPS?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. As well as any of the -- there's the rotating and Public Order Units, so we had support from a lot of services, London, York, Durham, and that, Toronto, and we -- they were rotating, they were available to provide support on Parliament Hill as required, but we were not sending officers up there as a routine basis.
Lauren Pearce, Counsel (National Police Federation)
Okay. Okay. Thank you very much. Those are all my questions.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. And next I call on Alberta.
Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)
Good morning. Can the Commission hear me right now?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Yes, maybe speak up a bit more, but ---
Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)
All right.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- we can hear you.
Stephanie Bowes, Counsel (AB)
My name is Stephanie Bowes. I'm Counsel for the Province of Alberta. We have no further questions today. Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Thank you. And now for the Ottawa Police Service.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. JESSICA BARROW
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Good morning, Inspector.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Good morning.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
For the record, my name is Jessica Barrow and I'm Counsel for the Ottawa Police Service. I just have a few areas that I want to quickly chat with you about, Inspector. So, first of all, we heard from both you and other witnesses that initially the planning for this event was primarily traffic focussed; is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct, on the early days.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Correct. And in this respect, I want to circle back to something you said earlier in your examination. You said that the reason OPS initially focussed on traffic management was because the number of vehicles that were going to come you were not going to stop them; do I have that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Can you tell us what you meant by that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It's just the sheer number of vehicles that had the potential to arrive, if we set up road blocks, we're going to set up on the basis of the fact that we think they're going to engage in criminal activity. The original arrival was to come to protest. They've been cooperative, demonstrated behaviour, and if -- we want to make sure we're working with them, because as this event grew, it would have been impossible to stop them. So, like, I use the water analogy. It was about how do we divert them to places to minimize the impacts on the community.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
If you had wanted to try to stop them, and we look at sort of the resources and the logistics that would have been involved in that, what would that have looked like from your perspective?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It would have been substantial, because part of the problem is, with the number of vehicles that were coming, where do you stop them and where do you prevent them from going to because they're going to be displaced, and where is that displacement going to be to. Are we going to be pushing them all the way out to Orleans, or into Kanata, and those are things we can't answer. So it's about how do you minimize the risk with the resources you have.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
What is your perspective on what the impact could have been on other communities had you tried to stop them?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I think we would have pushed the -- my personal belief is we would have pushed the trucks further out into the community, and the impact would have been significant for a larger part of the population, and it would have even been more difficult for us to contain and manage.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And why would it have been more difficult for you to contain and manage?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We were already spread thin. We would have been spread thinner.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Great. I want to just get some clarity on two plans. We've seen two plans as it relates to the early period, and I just want to make sure that it's clear what the purpose of those plans were and how they relate to one another. So could we please pull up OPS4221? So this is the plan that's dated January 28th, I believe; right? If we could scroll down? It's difficult to see.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It says January 28th.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Right. Okay. And so I think you testified that this was the overall plan that you went into the weekend with; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
This is the one the Special Events Section under Support Operations wrote.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And one element of this plan was traffic?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct. That was a separate plan that served as a supporting document or an annex to this overarching plan.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
So just to clarify, there's another plan that speaks to traffic. Is that a completely standalone plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, it's a supporting document to the overarching plan. So this overarching plan has three components that I recall the top of my head. One is the Traffic Management Plan, a Tactical Plan, and a Public Order Plan.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. To what extent did this January 28th plan evolve in the week leading up to January 28th?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Daily. As the information and the intelligence changed, we were trying to adapt the plan, and really it came down to is at one point you have a put a plan out so that the people on the ground know what they're doing and what the framework is, and then we adapt.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And so we heard quite a bit of evidence, both through you and others, about the intelligence that was available throughout that time period. What other sources of information is your team and the Intelligence Team relying on as we get to this final plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So a lot of it will be the -- getting a lot of information dialogue with our partners, through our PLT, having a conversation with our police organisations, watching the impact, seeing what their plans and their schedules are. As you said, their schedule of events ran until I think Monday morning, and then there were no other planned events. They would reach out to interactions of what their behaviours were along the way, what's the dialogue happening between the Police Liaison Teams and the convoy organisers. Looking also as well, what's the past history been? What's been our best approaches for managing these types of events?
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
So you would say it's sort of multi-dimensional?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Multi-dimensional.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. And we heard a suggestion earlier in -- with another witness that essentially OPS dusted off a template plan that it implemented for this event. What would you say to that suggestion?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Completely -- that's not correct. So what happens is people look at the cover and they think it's the same plan, it's not. We follow a template, but the data and the information is constantly changed for that specific event. We use a template to ensure we are not missing things, and it helps cover off the planning process. Those with a military background or even at Ad Hoc Incident Command is -- we call it SMEAC: Situation, Mission, Execution, Administrative Support, Command and Control. And those are -- that's a planning standard that's been used for 50, 60 years as the natal standard for planning, and the reason is for interoperability to exchange information and the people know where to find that in a plan right away. The template is the same; the data is different.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
So did you use a SMEAC template for this plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. Something you said earlier... We can move away from this document, thank you. Something you mentioned earlier is that, as it relates I believe specifically to the meeting that occurred on the 27th, that your concerns with respect to resources related to making sure OPS had the resources to restore safety if the tides were to turn from a violence perspective. Is that correct what you ---
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. And one of the subplans you indicated to this plan was a POU plan; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. What's the purpose of a POU subplan in this context?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So the Public Order Team is a trained group of police officers that we would use. The worst case scenario is in their full tactical gear where they're basically what you've heard, of the, you know, the riot control officers in shields and the padded uniforms. We try to -- and then they can go to a lower level of just the uniform presence as well. But they're training cadre dynamics. And after that meeting, the more we started reviewing things, that's where we really started doing the reach out, and that's where I said we brought in, I believe, it was five or six Public Order Units from outside of OPS to supplement us on that first weekend.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Well, perhaps we can just get a little clarity on the numbers that would be associated with that. And to that end I'll pull up OPS3324, please. If you could just scroll down to the email -- right there. It looks like to be an email from Chief Sloly to a number of people on the 27th that lists the POU that was obtained in relation to the event. Is that right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
So we see OPP, YRPS, DRPS, LPS, and then obviously OPS as well. Can you give us a sense of the number of officers that we would be talking about when we combine all of those sections together?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So a full Public Order Team would be anywhere between 80 and 100. I am not a Public Order member, so I can't say for certain, but -- so even at the low end we're looking at two from OPP, one from York, one from Durham, the one from London, we had one from Toronto, and we had ours. So we had the seven, so even that we're, you know, close to 500 officers.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And did those officers all arrive prior to the commencement of the convoy?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
They did.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And did we use them?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We did.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Did we use them for the, quote, "worst case scenario" that you were referring to earlier?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We mobilised them. So we rotated them to deploy in large groups through the crowds on the -- for the first weekend, knowing that they also have a limited shelf life of how many hours they can work as well, to ensure that we had a -- one on -- at least one or two on standby, and then we would rotate the others through the -- to give the appearance that we had a very robust police presence.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
But in terms of the violence that you were associating with this worst case scenario, did that ever occur on that first weekend?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
We did not see any of that come to fruition.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Great. So we talked earlier in your earlier testimony in relation to the level of cooperation that you had with protesters as the weekend unfolded; right? And you testified that in the early or early hours, I guess, they were cooperative and then ultimately that shifted; right?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And why were OPS officers not able to control the behaviours to make them comply with the traffic plan?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
There was just the volume, and them wanting to get to a specific point. The original people that arrived, and even on the Saturday, there was still a good percentage of them that complied. There was frustration between the two groups, which led to some disputes, which -- and then -- but again, our focus was to keep intersections clear, keep emergency lanes open.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
I think I'm almost at the end of my time so I'll only ask maybe one more question. You indicated earlier in your testimony in relation to the shift in the level of cooperation and the footprint that that then created as a result, sort of the unintended footprint. You indicated that there was an opportunity afterwards to shrink the footprint but that that did not occur. What did you mean by that?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So right after the -- I said that, when the first weekend was wrapping on -- you know, into the Monday, and we're looking at two-thirds that had left, they -- were holding the same footprint with not enough officers, and there was an opportunity to compress as many of those people into a smaller footprint onto Wellington. There was an engagement with PLT working with the organisers. The request went up through the chain of command, and the direction came back is we're not giving them one inch.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Who did you understand that direction to have come from?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
My -- I was told it came from Chief Sloly.
Jessica Barrow, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay, those are my questions. Thank you very much, Inspector.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay, any re-examination?
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Yes, a brief re-examination, Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
A brief re-examination, Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
And you'll re-identify yourself for the record?
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Yes. I'm Misha Boutilier, Commission Counsel.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. MISHA BOUTILIER
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Inspector Lucas, in the context of pre-arrival planning, counsel for Chief Sloly asked you whether Chief Sloly gave you the autonomy you'd needed as Incident Commander. Do you recall that question?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And you answered -- well, I think your answer began with "In the beginning". Do you recall giving that answer?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I do.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Why did you say "In the beginning"?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Because it started to change after the first weekend. And they were -- we just had the question about shrinking the footprint, was -- I knew there was a strategic and a political impact from that, and that's why -- and it wasn't time sensitive, and that's why that consultation, what I thought was going to be a consultation piece, took place, but it turned out that it -- we -- I didn't have the autonomy to make that decision. And that was the first of a number of incidents where I realised I was more the -- just managing live Operations.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And what areas of -- what specific areas of Operations did you feel that you lost the autonomy to manage?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
It was -- there was draw on our resources. There was -- again, and I appreciate the numerous demands on the police service as a whole, but in the Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday time period, when we were trying to build a stability plan, and then what happens is where we think we have the rsources to get us through that day and we find out a bunch of the officers are being pulled to do community engagement. So we rebuild -- we have the Planning Team that's sectioned off from our ICS model at our Service Command Centre, so it's rebuilding and redrafting the staffing and planning model for the next operational period, and then we get into the next operational period and then our traffic officers are pulled. Well then, now we have to rebuild and look it up because they want strategic -- or the strategic direction was they needed to do -- go do traffic enforcement.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
And what level of autonomy did you enjoy over the work of the Police Liaison Team during the week of January 31st?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
I would -- so the Police Liaison Team, to me, and I don’t think they get enough credit for the work they do. So they successfully deal and they manage dozens of successful wins every day during the protest that don’t make the news. But what happens is when -- they need the flexibility to make concessions, because you can’t -- it can’t be a one-way conversation, otherwise you’re not having those negotiations in good faith. So they need the autonomy -- a bit of autonomy to be able to do stuff that’s not going to affect the overall operation to make those -- a certain level of decisions, which they just didn't have. And -- but when they started getting some of it back, for example, at the Confederation Park, they saw phenomenal success. It was slow, but it was great success. And that’s really what PLT does.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I’d just like to explore one last point with you arising from counsel for the Ottawa Police Service’s re-examination. Do you recall stating, in response to a question from counsel for the OPS, that you deployed Public Order Units on the January 29th/30th weekend to project the appearance of a strong police presence or words to that effect?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Could we pull up WTS00000024? And just go to page 8, please. The second paragraph on page 8. And Insp. Lucas, this is your interview summary. I’d like to take you to the statement: “He sent POU officers stationed on Parliament Hill to patrol the protest site in teams to project a strong police presence and attempt to conceal OPS’s staffing shortages from protestors.”
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
So was that the purpose of sending the POU teams out? To try to hide from protestors that OPS was understaffed?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
That was one of the benefits, but that wasn’t the only role. The role is you need to ensure that the people feel that there is enough of a presence that we are -- that police are out there. The problem is, we’re not going to be asking -- Toronto Police, or York Police, or any of our partners that are there have the ability to intercede on something, but it’s going to -- if they do, the investigation is going to be turned over to the Ottawa Police. So it’s about ensuring the presence to mitigate and intervene at the earliest stages to prevent things from getting worse.
Misha Boutilier, Counsel (POEC)
Thank you, Commissioner. Those are my questions.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Insp. Lucas, I just -- thank you for your evidence. I’m just trying to understand one piece. And the record may be clear, but I’m not quite clear. As I understand it, the plan, which we saw, did not encompass any plan for the post-weekend stay of truckers. That was something that was discussed and worked on, but there was no document at that time?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
No, not at that time.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
And I’m just trying to understand. You said there was a plan or discussion of how you would deal with that, but you also said that there was a lost opportunity to reduce the footprint. And I’m just trying to understand the play between those two, and specifically what you meant by what would have been done if you had been left to your own devices?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So there’s two parts to the that. So the first part is, under the ICS model, there’s a planning, logistics, finance, and what happens is we pull them out away from the operations in the incident command and let them work offsite with information we’re feeding them of what those operations and preparing our next planning cycle and things like that that’s going to exceed. And that’s what we’d be looking for, because we’re -- at this point, the plan has changed multiple times based on the changing dynamics. And again, once we realized the size and scope of what we had was substantially larger than what we anticipated, then we’re adapting and we’re trying to flex through that. When we get through the first weekend and we’re looking at options -- because one of the -- what we’ve done before is we have had people stay behind and we go back to, I believe it was the Tamils had their protest. You close -- you compress your footprint. So what happens is I only need to block off two ends of the street, and they’re only on that one street, where when we had that opportunity, and even if it was 500 trucks, and say it was the full length of Wellington, three lanes, but we could have blocked it at Wellington, and maybe out to Bay. And we would have been able to get the vast majority of those people in there. And what happens is, instead of having all those vehicles that were pushed further out, Rideau/Sussex, Sir John A. MacDonald, and other places, they would have been where they wanted to be to get their message out and we would have had -- instead of spreading our resources so thin to manage all those traffic points, because as soon as Rideau/Sussex closed, your traffic point -- traffic perimeter has to be larger to divert people from getting caught at a road block. So it just was a significant draw on resources, and when we didn’t get that opportunity to use PLT to shrink that footprint, we would have reduced it to a smaller size and I wouldn’t have needed all those officers all through the ByWard Market and on Rideau Street, and I could have pivoted them into other proactive engagement activities in the downtown.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
So the lost opportunity you say is because you could not use PLT? Because I’m just trying to understand what was the lost opportunity and what caused it?
Russell Lucas, Insp (Ott-OPS)
So again, when they had that first -- again, this is the earliest days of the protest, with Rideau/Sussex, if they had the opportunity to bring them out of Rideau/Sussex, it would have freed up that whole side of the canal. And the direction that came down was, “We’re not giving them one inch.” So that’s what we worked with. And then again -- so again, we’re spread thing. And now we’re -- the next few days, it’s just about building a stabilization plan so that we’re not burning our members out and getting enough rotation and food and things like that before we can get into the next phase of an operation.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. So that terminates your evidence. Completes your evidence. Terminates sounds a little negative. So we’ll -- so that completes your evidence. Thank you very much. So we’re going to take the morning break. It’s a little late, but I think it’s still necessary. And when we come back, we’ll go on to our next witness. So 15 minutes, please.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes. La Commission est levée pour 15 minutes.
Upon recessing at 11:51 a.m.
Upon resuming at 12:09 p.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l'ordre. The Commission is reconvened. La commission reprend.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Good afternoon. Bon après midi. So we have another witness?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
We do, Mr. Commissioner. Eric Brousseau, Commission Counsel, and I'd like to call the Commission's next witness, OPP Inspector Marcel Beaudin.
The Registrar (POEC)
Inspector Beaudin, if I can please confirm for the record that you'll be affirming using the Eagle feather?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, ma'am.
The Registrar (POEC)
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Marcel Beaudin, B- E-A-U-D-I-N.
ACTING SUPT. MARCEL BEAUDIN, Affirmed
The Registrar (POEC)
Thank you.
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Good afternoon, Inspector. Just to clarify, you pronounce your last name Bodin (ph) not Beaudin?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Bodin (ph).
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Bodin (ph). Okay. Good to know. Can you tell us your current rank with the OPP?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Currently, the Acting Superintendent in the Indigenous Policing Bureau.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And was that the same rank that you held in January and February of this year?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It was not. I'm doing a temporary assignment right now and will be back to an inspector shortly, I'm sure.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. What was your rank in January and February?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Inspector.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I'm showing you - - or I'd like to pull up your witness statement, WTS00000037. And you recall sitting for an interview with myself and my colleagues this summer?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you reviewed this interview summary -- a draft of this interview summary when it was prepared?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I did.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And the contents of that summary are accurate?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, they are.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
DO you have any corrections or changes or additions to make to it?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, they're all good. Thank you, sir.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Can you just briefly describe for us your background and your role at the OPP?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
As far as my role in policing right now, or ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Correct.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay. So my role in policing right now is the Acting Bureau Commander for the Indigenous Policing Bureau, which oversees four areas. So those areas involve the Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women and Girls Implementation Team, the Ontario First Nations Policing Agreement, which oversees the administration of 18 police services, and the Indigenous Awareness Training Unit, and then also the PLT, which is, I'm sure, what we'll be speaking about today.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
We will be speaking about PLT. I'd like to show you a document, if we could pull up OPP00004566? This is the OPP's Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents. Can you tell us what this document is?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, this is 1 of 19 critical policies for the OPP, and it ultimately works through a conflict cycle when it comes to Indigenous critical incidents or non-Indigenous related conflicts.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so when and why was this policy created and adopted?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So this police was created as a result of Ipperwash. So in 1995, obviously, there was the shooting death of W. George in a provincial park, and, obviously, lessons learned there was communication strategies, the importance of gathering mediators or people that could liaison or people with influence that would have influence on outcomes, as well as correcting misinformation is probably the big takeaways. For us, obviously, it didn't necessarily start the PLT, but it definitely contributed to the part of the average All-Relations Team Program.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I think you mentioned that this is one of 19 critical policies. Can you tell us, what is a critical policy and why is this 1 of 19 of them?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so it's interesting when you talk about police language, right, because sometimes people will say, "Oh, like, this is critical." And to me that's bad as far as a community member, but when it comes to policing, critical to me means it's of high priority, it's something that we take very serious, and it has tremendous ramifications if it's not followed.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And I think there's 19 of them out of how many policies across the OPP roughly?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I'm not certain, sir.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
But is it -- are critical policies a sort of subset of ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- sort of important policies? Does that mean that every OPP officer is sort of aware of them, is required to sort of read ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- them and know them?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
If we go down to pages 5, starting at page 5, the policy is divided into 3 stages, or it refers to sort of 3 stages: pre-critical incident stage, critical incident, and then post-critical incident. So I'm wondering if you can for a few minutes just explain what each of those stages are?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so when you look at pre-critical, right, so we have an analyst, or I think we've heard from Intelligence talking about, okay, this is a potential conflict that's coming up; right? So the number one predictor of conflict is real or perceived inequality, so that's something that we look for; right? And when you look at the Province of Ontario right now, you have potentially, you know, roughly 50 land claims up for negotiation. And sometimes -- I remember Inspector Morris saying it's interesting that, you know, PLT sits within IPB, but -- or Indigenous Policing Bureau, sorry, but the reality is, it's extremely important for us to have relationships with Indigenous communities as a result of that number one predictor of conflict. And so in that, what our job is and what the PLT member's job is, is to when they -- when we see that there's going to be potential conflict, our job is to reach out, build relationships. And by relationships, you know, sometimes people just say the word relationship and they don't necessarily break that down. But to us, it actually means something. Like, it means something to build a relationship. So in there, obviously, you need trust. So for me, when I talk about trust, I think it's really important to recognize the person knows that I have their best interests in mind, you know, I'm competent, I'm able to -- and then, ultimately, I do what I say I'm going to do; right? And so we build relationships and then we also get into agreements or ideas of what the protest, demonstration, occupation may look like. So we have those not verbal contracts but pretty much; right? Like, okay, so this is the law. This is what you should avoid doing. This is some alternative options to ensure that it's lawful, peaceful, and safe. And then if there's any deviation from that, here's the potential consequences associated to that. And the reason that we have those up-front conversations is because, typically, emotions and intelligence work as a teeter-totter. So if someone's emotional in times of crisis, typically, intelligence gets low. So when there's no emotion involved, ultimately, it's a great opportunity for us to have conversations that are meaningful and to understand what the objective is, what people are trying to achieve, and how we can facilitate that lawfully, peacefully, safely.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
And so that would be pre.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. I was going ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
And then ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- to say that falls into pre-critical?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, for sure. And then during critical, so, ultimately, when protests are happening, you know, I think during the Freedom Convoy the OPP PLT took part and I believe from January to February 222 protests provincially. So when protests are happening, we're trying to ensure that they're lawful, peaceful, safe. And so our job is to make sure that we are having open and transparent lines of communication with people, to ensure that they know that they're -- can be trusted with what we're saying, and they can trust what we're saying to be true, and then, ultimately, working through to ensure if someone's doing something that's not lawful, peaceful or safe, obviously, we would have to have some sort of police intervention and we would try and facilitate one that is lawful, peaceful, safe. So, ultimately, if they're on the roadway, hey, off the roadway; right? This is a better spot for you ultimately.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so and then the third stage or the post-critical incident stage, what does ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- that involve?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- it is ultimately what -- I think what we're doing here, right? Like, we're debriefing, we're trying to learn best practices, we're trying to understand what went well, what didn't go well, deconflict areas and perceptions that may be different, and then just discuss it and take lessons learned from those and try and do better next time, and then also, restore, rebuild relationships. And, you know, sometimes, you know, you have people that don't necessarily get along, and it seems interesting that the police would be such a contributing factor of that, but that's what we're called for is for safety. And so in there we would basically, you know, try and mediate a strategy for people to co-exist, right, recognizing the intersections with liberties that are out there.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If I could pull up COMM0000666? What I'm pulling up on screen is the Canadian Associations of Chiefs of Police's National Framework for Police Preparedness for Demonstrations and Assemblies. And so to start, if you could just tell us how this document relates to the OPP's framework that we were just talking about?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. There's a lot of similarities, obviously. So when this was created, there was -- it came from the Policing with Indigenous People's Committee for the CACP. And one of the ideas or areas where the Policing with Indigenous Peoples, so I'll call PWIP, just for the sake of time. So we're concentrating on was for, you know, a consistent measured approach to large-scale demonstrations. We recognized that there was demonstrations that happened in British Columbia that had demonstrators at, that happened in Quebec that had the same demonstrators, that happened in Ontario that had the same demonstrators. And, you know, there's no jurisdiction for protest, demonstrations, occupations, but there certainly is for policing, and a consistent, measured approach is obviously something that was a priority to the Policing with Indigenous People's Committee as well as the CACP. And so I was asked to take part in just kind of being one of the people that kind of put this together in 2018. And then with the Policing with Indigenous People's Committee, went through a variety of different steps. So, ultimately, doing an environmental scan, so document review, issue-based review. There was a questionnaire that went out to stakeholders, whether it be people that had been involved from the community at large with demonstrations, protests, or whether it was police officers, people that had been protesting in the past, and police leadership, just to come up with common tenants [sic] or themes that would be a priority to that group, recognizing that we all have to, you know, work together. We live in Canada. We have, you know, Charter of Rights and Freedoms allow people to peacefully demonstrate, right, and to assemble. And, ultimately, Section 1 has limitations to those, but it's something that the police are continually having to deal with in a regular basis; right?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And so can you just clarify for us, is this document intended to apply only to demonstrations and assemblies that touch on Indigenous issues, or is it for any sort of mass demonstration ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, any sort of mass demonstration; right? Like, I think, you know, we looked at the way things were kind of growing when it came to demonstrations on a global scale internationally, and then, you know, within North America and now in Canada they're happening quite frequently; right? I think you look at the numbers associated to Provincial Liaison Team in 2012 compared to 2022, and they're tremendously higher as far as the OPP's area goes. And I, you know, only imagine that that would be reflective with other police services as well.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could go down to pages 5 to 6, there's -- there are 7 foundational principles here, and I wonder if, again, in sort of 30 seconds per each, you can just walk us through, and particularly, starting with the measured approach. What is that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, the measured approach is probably the most important piece within here. The most important piece for liaison people is relationship building, I would say, in my professional opinion. But when it comes to the measured approach, we're talking about -- and I'll just read it for everyone just because I think it's pretty important; right? Is an, "...operational philosophy that guides the strategies and tactics of the police in the measures to employ and the prevention of disorder or to achieve timely restoration of order.” This policy emphasizes deliberate employment of proactive engagement, communication, mitigation and facilitation measures while preserving the option to employ a variety of tactical responses as necessary and seeking to respect the lawful exercise of personal rights and freedoms. And so to me, it means it’s almost like the use of force continuum for a major event, right. So we go, we have officer presence, we communicate, communicate, communicate. As things escalate and we’re no longer able to communicate, then obviously there’s tactical responses as necessary that would come in. And it’s kind of on a floating scale, right, like. So it’s not like, okay, negotiations are here, they stop and then Public Order is here and there’s no communication with them. They actually co-exist and there’s pretty quick ability to do both, right. And then -- so when it comes to relationship building, we talk about trust between police and citizens remains essential, ongoing communication, right. And so we look at a few things, so respect, right, rapport, reciprocity, trust. But we spoke just briefly at the beginning about trust. But at the end of the day, it’s a matter of ensuring -- so this is the only unit that really is out there making sure that we are open, transparent and we are -- we are trusted with what we are saying to be true, right. And so it’s so important for us to ensure that these -- you know, these relationships are made a priority, these relationships continue to happen. Like it’s not as if, you know -- so can I fast forward to like something that happened in the Rideau, or no? You just let me know.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
We’ll get into what -- the sort of specific examples.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
I just want to finish this sort of separately.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sure. And then facilitating lawful, peaceful and safe demonstration, so we recognize that obviously there’s limitations to protest, right, demonstrations, occupations.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Can I just stop you there just to say, you know, some people might be surprised to learn that the police are involved in actually facilitating protests. Why -- so why is sort of facilitating a protest an important part of this?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Well, I think because you’re managing it, right. So if you have a protest that’s coming to your area or if I’m -- if I know a protest is coming to my street, right, so I would say, okay, what is your intention, what are you trying to do, okay, you can achieve this by doing this, this and this. And if you deviate from that, then obviously there’s an issue. So we don’t facilitate protests. We don’t facilitate any protest. We facilitate lawful, peaceful and safe because it’s our responsibility to manage.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then -- so yeah, the next point, number 4, Impartiality.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. And impartiality is so big, right, because a lot of times, you know, especially in the past, police have been seen to be providing two-tiered policing so the big thing is -- for us, is to say, okay, regardless of what the protest is, it’s our job to ensure that we are impartial, that we’re treating all people with respect. It doesn’t mean neutrality. Neutrality is you don’t have any skin in the game. Obviously, police, our profession has tons of skin in the game and our job is to ensure that we are just doing what’s beset to ensure that the outcome is lawful, peaceful and safe.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And the stage of conflict, we spoke a little bit about that.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, we did. And then -- so -- and then the next one is interoperability. So interoperability is really what we saw here, right. So we can go and we can -- ultimately, the Ottawa Police Service, RCMP, SQ, OPP, whoever can all work together, know that we’re on the same page, increase consistency of response and, ultimately, do it as seamless as possible.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then the last point, Education Before Enforcement.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So this one’s a -- this one was a big one when it came to the return on questionnaires for people that were involved in protests, wanting education, right, because quite often people will come to a protest and say, “Well, I’m here to protest and this seems to be going on good and I didn’t realize it was unlawful or unpeaceful or unsafe”. And so in the absence of communication, you know, you could have people that are stuck in there recognizing they’re -- you know, that they’re thinking they’re doing something that is okay because it’s been going on or whatever. So one, we do issue and incident based, right. And this is for our police education. So we’ll make sure that our officers are educated on all of that. And then we do -- sorry. Can you scroll it back the other way? And then framework, so just so that everyone knows about the framework itself, and how we work within it and how the measured approach fits, how we try and reduce the footprint, how we -- you know, what we’re trying to achieve and the strategies associated to it and then the culture based if it involves indigenous protests or a variety of different other protests that are out there. And then public education, obviously, to educate the public on lawful, peaceful, safe demonstrations and activity, you know, how injunctions basically work in enforcement activities that the police would be responsible for in that, and then messaging the difference and consequences of being arrested versus being charged because some people will say, “Well, if I got -- if I didn’t get arrested, I’m off, right. I’m good”. But the reality is, is that there might be charges that come as a result of your behaviour even though you -- we may not, as we -- I say we as the police, the police may not be able to deal with that at the time because it’s not safe to do so or there’s a variety of contributing factors as a result.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. And I just want to ask you one further question about the measured approach. You sort of described it as being on a continuum. And how quickly or how much time do you need to kind of work your way from one end of the continuum to the other in the context of a protest?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So like if I were to say to someone, “Okay” -- because these are questions that typically the team would ask, right. So what are you trying to achieve? What does success look like to you? And what can I say or do to get you to do something that’s lawful, peaceful, safe, right, whether it’s get off the road, get off the rail line, whatever that looks like? And so if someone says, you know, like this is what I’m really trying to achieve and it’s very attainable, then it makes it really easy, right. Like I’ve seen roadblocks where people say, “I want something” that’s very attainable and then it gets done and people leave and everyone’s happy. And it was very -- you know, nothing to it. But then I’ve seen some where people say, “I’m not leaving until something”, you know, unrealistic happens, like Marcel Beaudin has to leave the country and never come back. So if that’s the case, we have nowhere to go with that, right. So if that’s the case, then obviously it’s very easy to work through, right. And really, when there’s that negotiation piece and there’s opportunities, then they should probably be explored.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. And page 11 has a section on the Role of Liaison Teams. And that’s what we’re talking about when we’re talking about PLT, which is Provincial Liaison Team with the OPP, Public Liaison Team with the OPS, and then the RCMP have their own. DLT for some divisions. But briefly, if you can just describe for us sort of what role liaison teams across police services play in implementing this national framework?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So the -- I think the big thing when it comes to liaison teams is really the socialization of them. And sorry, I’m talking with my hands. But you know, the socialization of them. So there’s always been people that try and talk and get things done in a non-structured format, right. Like that’s always been the case. Police have always tried to mediate or negotiate successful, safe outcomes, but this is really to structure them so that you have people that are trained, so people that have an idea of interest-based negotiation, mediation techniques, crowd psychology, so you have experts that can say, okay, if we do this, this and this, potentially, you can end up getting to a successful conclusion. And in the overall idea of the framework itself is really these officers are there to ensure that if there’s a - - a time where Public Order has to come in, there’s the least amount of people there that would potentially cause harm to people, the public, to officers and it becomes as safe as possible, really. So like their job is to -- and you know, if their job is done by saying, “Hey, guys, get off the road” and everyone goes home, that’s amazing. That’s a 10 out of 10, home run. But for the most part, some people want to stay there, exercise their rights to do different things, and so it may take a little bit of time or some people will say -- some people will just stay longer and some people are willing to leave. So it’s important to recognize that, you know, in a -- in a crowd, and I think this is Eli Sopow’s work out of the RCMP. He’s a doctor. And you know, he said in a basic crowd, he was -- you know, a crowd makes up 80 percent is law-abiding, right, and would probably, you know, listen to the police, be manageable, all that stuff. You have 15 percent that are on the fence, and five percent that potentially are criminal in nature, so -- and would be hard to deal with and dig their heels in. And so when you look at that, PLT’s work isn’t to make sure that everyone’s out of there. Like if that happens, that’s great. But our job is to make sure that the 95 percent or those 15 percent don’t swing over and turn into 20, right, because those people are on the fence and it makes the Public Order job much more dangerous and harder. And those 15 percent end up recognising that the police were reasonable, these were reasonable asks, and we end up leaving; right? And so that's really the -- the key function of the PLT is to reduce the footprint so when Public Order ends up going in, if they -- if and when they do, it's the least amount of people that are there, and it sets them up for success. The other thing that it does too, is -- so like when we're asking for a small concession and stuff like that, you're also recognising leadership within the group; right? So you're testing resolve, you're testing compliance, you're testing leadership. Because if someone says, "I'm the leader of this group", but they don't have the ability to move anyone, then it certainly -- you can see that right away. You wouldn't want to wait until the last minute to try and get someone to do something, recognising that they don't have any juice in the group to actually move people.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
One term we've heard in evidence, and I'm hoping you can explain it a little bit, is the concept of PLT logs. What are those, and why are they important?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so PLT logs are created so that that way everyone has a general sentiment of what's going on on the ground, the conversations that are being had between PLT, protesters, protest organisers, the community at large; right? That's a huge component as well; right? So when I talk about the community at large, it's people that aren't directly involved with the protest. So the citizens of Ottawa, businessowners, restaurant owners, people that are around there. And that's such a priority to find out, you know, what's the whole story there, and what are the potential landmines that we'll have to navigate through this? What are potential -- you know, if you concentrate on the community at large and explain things to them and try and work within the community at large as well, then you're less likely to have counterprotests, we'll say, that would potentially, you know, put us back or bring violence to a group, and also put the police in harms way. So anyway, those logs are extremely important just for gathering information and making decisions when it comes to Command decision-making.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And so they get shared, not outside of just the PLT group, within the OPP or the OPS?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Yeah, yeah. So we would -- any partner that would be involved in a protest would be getting, you know, our OPP PLT logs so that way we're all kind of working on the same page, everyone kind of knows what's going on with the people that are involved in the protest, and then also, everyone's -- everyone just kind of has an understanding of what's happening. Like, so, in the PLT logs you may see, okay, there's still no exit strategy; right? So if you see that, then you know, okay, there's still no plan to leave; right? So what do we have to work on moving forward so that that way there is a plan; right? And so those are the things that basically would be essential to consider when it comes to interoperability as well as people working together, and when people end up going off, because we need rest as well, then when new people come in it's really easy to see what the sentiment on the ground is.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Can you briefly describe for us the relationship between the PLT team and Public Order Units, or POUs? How do PLT work with POU?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So to me, like -- so Public Order obviously has a job to do; right? And so they would be the people that come in, move slowly, methodically, push people back, gain ground, whatever, and our job would be to communicate, you know, I think day of like basically would be "Okay, guys, like obviously Public Order people are here. If you want to egress and leave, go this way, there's a bus waiting for you, it's warm, get on it, please we encourage you to do so. If you want to be arrested peacefully, please walk forward, and you know, if you don't want to do any of those just stay there and we'll get to you at some point."
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And the last sort of conceptual piece I want to talk about before we get into what happened in Ottawa is the concept, and Inspector Lucas testified a little bit about it this morning, is the concept of PLT autonomy and sort of the role that being able to negotiate and make enforceable kind of agreements with protesters plays in the PLT's work.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So -- yeah, PLT is definitely essential when it comes to negotiating, mediating, all of that stuff. It's a matter of not necessarily autonomy in a sense where, you know, we're working independently and PLT needs to be the people in charge of their own stuff, it's a matter of we need to see it at the decision-making table, and our -- what we're saying should probably be valued at some point. I think that's probably the whole autonomy thing.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. But -- and so in a typical situation would you sort of have to go up the chain of command to get sign-off on ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. Yeah.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- decisions? Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So you would be like -- so it would be like no other, or every other program in an integrated response; right? So the Incident Commander is in charge; right? So ultimately, PLT would say, "These are seven things that I can do here today." Right? And "This is what I would like to do." "Cool. You can do this, this, and this", right, or whatever it may look like. And ultimately, the autonomy would just basically be, you know, "We are the ones doing the negotiations. I can never explain every single word, look, head nod, whatever to the Incident Commander, but this is a great idea to help reduce the footprint, get us closer to our successful outcome, and carry on with our day."
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so now I want to move into sort of talking about PLT's role in the Freedom Convoy events. And leaving sort of what happened in Ottawa aside, can you describe for us the role that the OPP's PLT teams played as the convoys kind of traversed the Province of Ontario?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So the OPP PLT team was ultimately responsible for gathering numbers, reaching out to contacts. I believe it was United We Roll in 2019 that came across with some of the same players; right? So there was already existing relationships from 2019, so it was really easy to just reach out from a PLT perspective or a liaison perspective and ultimately say, "Okay, I understand you're coming. What's the plan of attack? What do you plan on doing?", and then if -- and then looking at numbers as they come across. Because I think, you know, normally you can look at Facebook and see there's some numbers that are happening, but in this case, there was a lot more people that were, you know, jumping onto it than Facebook would normally say. So we just had PLT members, a couple of members, going in checking on hotels and different areas as they came across Northwestern Ontario, and then there was areas coming from the south as well, and just kind of giving an idea of what those numbers were, passing them over to Ottawa Police Service, PLT. I think there was a sheet of numbers that basically said "These are the leaders that we've been working with, talking to. This is what it looks like now." And I think there was -- I shouldn't say this, but I believe that there was a meeting even set up where people ended up going out to Russell parking lot and meeting with some of the leaders of the convoy from OPS as a result of the PLT work. So that was kind of it, like setting up the scene. And then in those -- like, as we were learning stuff in Northwest Region about how the convoy worked, as we were learning stuff from the West Region, we were sharing that with our policing partners as they were coming into their areas, as well as sharing it with OPS. And you know, I think on every one of Diana Hampson's, not every one but most of them of Diana Hampson emails they would say, "No, there's still not an exit strategy"; right
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
You mentioned the OPS PLT. What -- can you tell us about their sort of team as of the end of January 2022?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so I don't really know the OPS PLT team intimately; right? Like I help facilitate a CACP policing with Indigenous peoples course for large scale protests, which is a liaison course; right? And I would say probably there was 20 members on there. I would say that the OPS PLT members were very driven, they had unbelievable characteristics when you look at what we're trying to look for when it comes to a PLT member. So in 2019, I sat as the Acting or Interim Commander for Emergency Response, so I oversaw a true ERT, canine, tactical, paramedics program and explosive disposal, and in there, like there's a lot of men. And I was asked by a doctor to say, "You know, what are some barriers impacting women and policing?" And I didn't make the connection, but they said, "Well, in here there's hardly any women and in PLT there's lots of women." And I said it's really a value system. And when I looked at the OPS members, they were really following the same value system. They were community- focussed, they were compassionate, they were empathetic, they were unbelievable communicators. They were everything that you would want in someone to represent an organisation in a time of crisis. I thought that they were really well-chosen.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, I understand you arrived in Ottawa, I think it was February 2nd, so sort of after the first weekend of demonstrations and protests. What was the sort of state of PLT work as of when you first arrived in Ottawa?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I believe I arrived on the 3rd. On the 2nd I was engaged in a conversation with Superintendent Mark Patterson surrounding the PLT logs and their use for evidence for an injunction. And to me, I didn't think that that was a good use of PLT logs, and it would obviously, potentially damage relationships that are out there too, because there's always this thing where people, you know -- there's this thing where people think that potentially we're spying on them, and that's not the case. We're there to make things safer, and we have a long road to go. And I definitely didn't want it to look like we were spying on people, right, because that's not our job. And so I just -- I cautioned him as to the use of the PLT logs, and he said that he wouldn't use them. And then as I was talking to him, I recognized that they didn't necessarily have a good understanding of what PLT did. We went through what PLT does, how they do it, what are some strategies, whatever, and he was very thankful for the conversation, and he was an absolute gentleman at that time as well. And so but on that it just showed me that maybe we needed to assist with some leadership there for PLT, and I was also getting grumblings from our membership saying, you know, things just aren't going as well as they probably could. So on the third, I had said to our command, you know, is this something that would be beneficial having someone in leadership over there to help support that, and they agreed to that. The unfortunate part is I -- in my mind I thought just Gisselle Walker was going, who was the PLT Provincial Coordinator, but she had a province to take care of, and so I ended up coming. So inadvertently volunteered myself for that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And I want to ask you about a couple of specific incidents, and so the first one is the PLT's role in clearing the encampment at Confederation Park.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, so -- yeah, so when I got to Ottawa, there was a couple key pieces of real estate that had been identified to get back. One of them was Confederation Park. The PLT in Ottawa as well as OPP had great relationships with the Algonquin leadership here as well as the Algonquin leadership in Kitigan Zibi. And, ultimately, they had reached out to try and mediate or negotiate a safe exit of that park. And I believe that was on the 4th of February that the leaders and leadership and elders and community members ended up coming down. And they ended up meeting for a long time. On the 5th of February was an unbelievable day for me. It was a day of great pride and the encampment actually cleared out as a result of those negotiations. It took a little bit of time, some nudging in the afternoon, but ultimately, the camp ended up clearing on the 5th as a result of that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. Without the need for any POU enforcement?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That's correct.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Now we've also heard about the sort of Coventry Road fuel depot.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
We've heard a lot of evidence on it, so, you know, we don't need to go through sort of -- through it in detail, but from a PLT perspective, what can you tell us about what transpired and why that might have been an issue?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So ultimately, in the morning, I believe, of the 6th, there was 2 priorities, I believe, for Superintendent Patterson who was the new Incident Commander as of the 5th evening, I believe. And so on the 6th, there was 2 priorities. One was Rideau and Sussex, the other one was Coventry Road. And so the idea was to do some sort of public order hit on Rideau and Sussex and then potentially Coventry Road afterwards. And then as the day unfolded, the messaging turned into we weren't doing Rideau and Sussex anymore, and it was a matter of go to Coventry Road, tell them that they have to leave without -- or get out of there, take all the gas with them or they're going to be arrested. And I know there was some concern when it talks to tough messaging. Like, I know my one sergeant reached out and said, "You know, it's going to be tough because we don't really have rapport there." Well, at the end of the day, it doesn't -- like, that doesn't matter if you have rapport for that. This is just messaging to get them out of there, so that that way, we establish the strategy of what's to go on. And then ultimately, if they don't, then they know we've educated them before the enforcement; right? And then so while that was going on, I ended up getting back, and someone had said to me in the Command -- not in the Command Post. It was, like, a tactical planning area for Public Order people. I think it was Mike Stoll, who was a Staff Sergeant at the time. And he had said to me, "You know that there they're going to do a Public Order hit on Rideau and Sussex", which I never did, and I think Diana Hampson called me at the exact same time and told me -- or around that time and said that they were going to do that and that would be problematic. And so, you know, I'd reached out to Mark Patterson and told him the consequences associated to that, because, again, when you look at PLT, there is one unit that's built for open, honest, transparent lines of communication; right? And so we have just told them if you don't leave, you're going to be arrested. And then what ended up happening was going to be they were going to be arrested anyway. And so to me, I thought, one, that would damage PLT in the City of Ottawa; right? Like, you would have -- because here's a place that I believe was supplying gasoline for a bunch of people or diesel for a bunch of people. So you're going to damage PLT or the efficiency of PLT as being trusting. And then also, you're going to damage relationships with all the other trucker convoy leadership, right, because they're probably connected with everyone. And the next time we say you better leave or you're going to get arrested, I would probably imagine there would be some doubt associated to that. So if someone heard PLT in the future say, hey, if you don't leave you're going to be arrested, like, my concern would be, okay, well, I'm staying because I know I'm getting arrested anyway; right? Like, that was my biggest concern there. The relationships were something different, but the big thing was to ensure that we remained with that trust and confidence in what our role was there. And, ultimately, I think he said to me that's not fair. And I thought that that was a really interesting response to something that when we're talking about tactics or strategy or an operation that that's not fair, because that seems to certainly personalize it. But anyway, they ended up doing it, and I had then sent him -- I had called him, said, "You know, I didn't realize that that was such a big thing as far as the gas." And I said, "You know, obviously, this was a miscommunication. My captain is going to come in and replace me," because he was replacing me that afternoon and I was going back home to Orillia. But because of this stuff, I ended up staying around. And ultimately, on my departure -- or in that conversation, I said I would send him an email that would probably help him out just with some structure with five points on it that you should consider and it's probably some pretty sage advice. And then I sent that email and went about my day just trying to clean up the emotion that was attached to it. There was some people that had some pretty hard feelings, they're emotionally invested. I ended up sending basically one person home, talked to another person, nothing was salvageable that night. So I said, "Go home, rest and get ready to work tomorrow morning."
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And so did you observe or were you told about any negative effects on the PLT's work as a result of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like, right away, there was people calling -- or reaching out to Andrew Rozbicky (ph), some of our PLT members from the OPP, and saying, you know, this isn't great. This is you've escalated this. This is horrible and, you know, there's going to be potential consequences as a result ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Inspector Lucas testified this morning about sort of changing crowd dynamics throughout the sort of three-week period. Did that -- was that something that the PLT Team observed in terms of who was there, how many people, what it was like on the ground, and did that affect the PLT's work at all?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so the -- like, obviously in any crowd, like, on the weekends crowds would become a lot bigger; right? People would come in, they'd have days off, they'd want to support. And then during the weekdays, things were a little bit -- you know, not as many people there as there would be on weekends. But, ultimately, you know, there was ebbs and flows with conversation. There was -- you know, certainly towards the end, there was a lot more, you know, heels digging in and people, you know, in a more defensible position. But leading into it, there was a lot of people that wanted to work with police in how to -- you know, how to -- how could we safely reduce the footprint, easing some tension from the City of Ottawa, while recognizing, you know, that we have to put the Public Order people in a successful position to potentially at some point take down an occupation within Ottawa.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
You mentioned earlier part of the concept of PLT is you will test leadership and find the leaders and get them to assist you in disseminating messages. One thing we’ve heard is that there were -- you know, that was maybe a challenge here. There were multiple groups, no clear leaders who had control over the entire protest, obviously. You know, is that something that PLT observed and how did you deal with that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. And so I -- you know, the unfortunate part was, there wasn’t a pile of really strong testing of leadership and resolve and compliance. You know, I think you have two relatively large events that end up happening when it comes to Confederation Park, which you tested leadership and resolve there and compliance, to which people -- someone obviously had the leadership and compliance to move a crowd of people out of Confederation Park. You have Coventry Road where some people are leaving. I don’t know the exact details of all of the stuff that happened there outside of the emotion. But that day, like that afternoon, I walked into the PLT office to introduce Mike Acton to people because he would be replacing me and have a little meeting there. And you know, in that meeting with those guys, I was -- I walked in and I was shocked because there was all PLT people in there. And to me, PLT people in a time of crisis should never be sitting in a room together, right. Like there’s enough people to go and talk to, there’s enough opportunities for negotiation, there’s enough opportunities and, really, what I saw was a bunch of wasted opportunities in that room. So I said, “Like why are you guys here?”. And they said they hadn’t had any direction or any permission to go and do anything right outside the Coventry Road. And so I said, “Okay. So if you guys were let loose, like if you guys were unhandcuffed and able to go out and do your work, what could you do?”. And you know, I don’t know the exact numbers, but the one gentleman who’s an OPS member says, “I could probably clear Rideau and Sussex by Monday or Tuesday”. And then another guy says, “I can take care of this many people. I could probably get this many people to leave”. I could probably open up a roadway, but we’d have to move them to a curbway. I could probably do this. And so that was a common theme around that room, and so I ended up reaching -- and you know, like we’re in middle management, right. So there’s an Incident Commander. I reached over to John Ferguson and I say to John, “So like you’re the Staff Sergeant here”. And John’s, you know, been put into a really tough spot, right. Like John’s not a PLT trained member. He’s a crisis negotiator. And he’s an absolute gentleman, too. And so I said to John, “Like so you’re middle management. You’re in charge here. You’re hearing all this. What are your thoughts? Do you think that this can be done?”, whatever, because really, John’s in charge of that team, right. Like I’m there for guidance, advice, suggestions, learned experience over -- you know, since 2016 to current, and then 2005 I was dealing with protestor civil unrest, and so I had that to draw on. And so I was trying to get John to give me his opinion on it and he was saying, “Yeah. You know, I think this is really good”. So we tried to call Mark Patterson, tried to Mike Stoll because I thought they were together, and there was no answer. And so in the absence of any direction, I said, “How safe do you feel letting these people go?”. And he said, “I feel good about it”. And then we got into the other room and then he didn’t feel good about it. And you know, good on him, right, like, because, really, they needed to have -- ensure that it met with the strategic direction of OPS Command, but there was just so many opportunities that were there that were unexplored. So when you talk about, you know, testing compliance, resolve, whatever, you know, we had very minimal opportunity to do that, I would submit.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And can you just clarify, when you’re talking about this conversation, were you in the room and a number of OPS -- or sorry, PLT members were telling you what they thought they could get done? Like what day it this?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
This is the day of Coveny Roady. So we’d just cleared Confederation Park on the 5th. This is the 6th. I’m doing a handoff with Mike -- sorry, Mike Acton, and then just brought him down there. And then there’s this group of PLT members that are sitting around all together waiting for direction.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. Commissioner, I’m about to move to a new area and I see it’s three minutes to 1:00. I wonder if now is an appropriate time for the break.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Thank you. We’ll take the lunch break till 2 o’clock.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess until 2 o’clock. La commission est lever jusqu’a 14h.
Upon recessing at 12:58 p.m.
Upon resuming at 2:00 p.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l’ordre. The Commission is reconvened. La commission reprend.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Are you ready to continue?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Whenever you are ready, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Go ahead.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Good afternoon, Commissioner. For the record, Eric Brousseau, Commission counsel.
ACTING SUPT. MARCEL BEAUDIN, resumed
EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. ERIC BROUSSEAU (cont’d)
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
So Inspector Beaudin, I'm going to ask you now about your involvement in the Freedom Convoy, and I'm going to take you to some documents. But before I do that, I just want to asak you one quick question. At one point you raised or someone on your team kind of raised a concern about the role that someone named Dr. Peter Collins was playing in Ottawa. Can you just tell us who Peter Collins or Dr. Peter Collins is and what his role was and what the concern was?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, Dr. Peter Collins is a psychologist that works with police forces across the province. He typically deals with crisis negotiation, is my understanding. He's a great guy and a tremendous asset for policing in a crisis negotiation setting. And there was one meeting that I happened to be in where he had said in the presence of Chief Sloly and some other senior level members in the -- for OPS, and I happened to be virtually just in the room, in this planning room, and he had said something about to the effects, and I think it -- you know, we had talked about it afterwards and he said it was a bit of a misunderstanding, but he said, "The PLT had taken it as far as it can go and really moving forward we need a negotiation aspect to this." And this was like February 4th, maybe, February 5th, like around that time; right? And to my understanding at that time, from the members on ground, was PLT hadn't been utilised appropriately to date and there wasn't any, you know, as far as an integrated command structure there was no integration to date. And the other thing that the other thing that was mentioned was PLT would gather intelligence for this negotiation team. And so when PLT isn't gathering intelligence, one, that's fundamentally against the role of PLT is; and two, it provides me a -- you know, an overview of a general lack of understanding of what the role of PLT actually does. And so for me, it wasn't necessarily -- like I liked the idea of having Peter Collins engaged and involved and all that stuff, for me it was a matter of kind of a scope of practice issue as well as a confusion issue when it comes to okay, who's dictating what a negotiation looks like with a crowd, because there's certain fundamental crowd psychology principles that you would typically manage, and I'm not saying that I know more than Peter Colins, but there's some proven methods in policing that work, and I just don't know if, you know, that's the right avenue when you haven't explored options yet.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. If we could pull up OPP00000080, please. I think this is an email that you may have told us about this morning, earlier this afternoon, kind of a hand- off email as you were leaving Ottawa, or the plan is that you would leave Ottawa, and you were handing the reins over to Mike Acton. So if we can go down. I think you've written an email to Superintendent Patterson. If we can just scroll down. And so can you just clarify who Mike Acton is and what his role was with the OPP?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Mike Acton is a West Region Police Liaison Team coordinator. So West Region for the OPP is typically, like, west of Toronto; right? And -- so he's the coordinator there. And this was a extremely large complicated event, I think, you know, people have said unprecedented; right? So we just wanted the right structure in place so that we would be able to achieve success from a liaison perspective. So I had asked Mike to come over. I believe in the work that he does and his capabilities. And I'd originally sent it to Mark Patterson on the top of this, and I ended up sending it to Diana Hampson, just because I wanted to assure her that, you know, it's not like I left Ottawa and didn't provide guidance or direction or some sort of support to get things on track for the Liaison Team Program so that that way we didn't lose confidence in OPP management on ground. Right? like I want to be in a position where I can support the people that are doing the work.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. And so was Mike, then, the most senior OPP PLT person once you left Ottawa, like on the ground in Ottawa?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Well, Diana Hampson was there ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- and then Mike was there to support because Di had a pile of things going on. Right?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So Mike came in and filled my role in just trying to give sage advice and guidance, direction. With his experience with West Region, there's obviously a lot of larger scale events that happen around Caledonia that he has been involved in.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
The second paragraph, I just -- this refers again to the PLT logs for evidence. And so I just wanted to clarify that to your knowledge, none of the OPP's PLT logs were used in evidence for any sort of injunction; correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. That's -- yeah.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
If we go down to the next paragraph, the one that says "As discussed", the last sentence there, it says: "I believe the overall goal at this time is to minimize the current footprint on ground, while building trust and confidence with stakeholders, which the team has displayed they can do many times." And so the date on this email is February 6th. So by this date, which is nine, ten days in, had the PLT succeeded in minimizing the footprint of the protest?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So Confederation Park, yes, and then no other otherwise. Coventry Road, obviously, is successful when it comes to looking at, you know, testing compliance, seeing that people are actually listening to police, stuff like that. So yes, they have reduced the footprint a little bit, but not to the extent that, you know, I would've liked to have seen at that time, and probably everyone in this room would have liked to have seen.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And then the next paragraph: "A common theme on the wall in the PLT room is that the truckers want to be heard. Any efforts for communication with MP's, DM's or ADM's may allow the group to save face, get a win and go home. Many people are tired and probably looking for an exit strategy. Hopefully you can find some." So again, as of February 6th, what was the status of discussions about bringing in political leaders, MP's, DM's, ADM's, and making them part of a PLT-led conversation?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So there has been an increase in interest, in my experience, when it comes to political people, especially at federal level, becoming engaged in protest talks with people that are involved in a protest. And so if you look at the Wet'suwet'en solidarity demonstrations in 2020, we had two federal ministers that became involved. So in -- if you are looking at negotiation mediation techniques, obviously you would want to, you know, get ahead. Instead of ministers inserting themselves within a police setting, you would want to see, "Okay, if you are planning on doing this, please let us know so that way we can maybe leverage this so that that way we can end up having a win of sorts for the protesters, as well as an opportunity for them to be heard, and then hopefully carry on with, you know, their day." Right? And so to me, I just thought if there's an opportunity there where government is willing, wanting to come to the table, then we should probably capitalise on that opportunity.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But as of this point, February 6th, that hadn't happened yet?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, no. No. And so there was conversations I had had in the planning room, but nothing to -- of any concrete that I was aware of.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But you were involved in that -- in a sort of conversation that went down that road, so I want to take you to some of those documents. But I guess before I do, just if you can explain very briefly kind of how you got word that there might be some government interest in participating in that, in a negotiation?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So I don't exactly know what date it was, it might have been the 10th of January, somewhere, or sorry, February, somewhere around there, but I had been called a Deputy Commissioner DiMarco, saying that the Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada was looking to reach out to me, and then I don't know how that came to be, but ultimately that's how that came through. It's from Deputy DiMarco to msyself, a call at night, and just saying "This is going to happen. Is this something that you would be interested in assisting us?"
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could pull up OPP00000108, please, and go down to page 2. I think this is an email. I think you were -- your witness statement says you received that call from Deputy Chief -- Deputy Commissioner DiMarco on the 9th, and then you got this email the morning of the 10th, which will be up on the screen. If we go down to page 2, the first email. So this is... If we keep scrolling down, I believe there is more. This is an email from Rob Stewart. Who is Rob Stewart?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Rob Stewart is the Deputy Minister of Public Safety.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And -- so this is the sort of the reach out that Deputy Commissioner DiMarco had given you the heads up on the day before. And did you meet with or speak with your team after receiving this email?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And just tell us about that conversation.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I just wanted to make sure that we were in a good area as far as, you know, what are some opportunities for us to achieve success? How can we capitalize on this opportunity if it comes to fruition? And what are some ways where we can have a win for everyone and, you know, basically, denounce criminal activity, and set up a meeting under certain conditions where people go home.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could scroll up to about the middle of page 1, looks like Leslie Jean sent you this list here. Who is Leslie Jean?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Leslie Jean was the Program Analyst for PLT for multiple years, and does incredible work on everything she's ever done, and someone that I consistently trust with work -- in this practice or scope.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. The last paragraph that's showing on the screen, there's a final bolded sentence, "In Ottawa specifically, police have identified several leaders who are willing to engage with police." Who were those leaders?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I'm not exactly sure the names that they had identified, and I think there's an email afterwards that I had asked Giselle Walker, the Provincial Coordinator, to determine what that list would be.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But it was your understanding based on information from your team that there were people who were prepared -- people on the protester side who were prepared to have this type of meeting?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like, I'm assuming, like, Tom Marazzo was one name that came forward, Tamara Lich was one name that came forward, so there was people that had stepped up as being leaders and had people following them.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. The next -- the first bulleted point under governmental considerations, that, "Police are unable to solve the underlying issues. There is very limited capacity for police to solve this situation, without some movement by government to allow demonstrators to have a "win" of sorts." Now I expect that former Chief Sloly will say that that's what he meant when he said there may not be a policing solution to this on February 2nd. So, you know, is this sentiment which is being expressed by your team member about eight days later, did you agree with it, and did you sort of agree with Chief Sloly or former Chief Sloly that police -- there wasn't a policing solution to some of the grievances?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So there's been one time -- excuse me -- there's been one time in my experience with protests where I've said the underlying issues that they are craving are police related and that was during the Defund Police, Police Reform Protest in 2020. And other than that, typically, the protests have grievances to do with government, the grievances have different -- anyway, it's out of the realm of police to solve those issues as to why people are protesting demonstration -- demonstrating and occupying places. So, yes, I agree with that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But that doesn't mean just -- again, to get back to it, that doesn't mean there's no role for police to play, it's just that the police aren't going to deliver on the protesters' demands.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I can't stop vaccination -- you know, like, all the grievance and supports that were there is beyond my control as far as an inspector in the OPP. Right.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Did you speak directly to Commissioner Carrique about this email from Deputy Minister Stewart?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, I didn't speak directly to Commissioner Carrique about this email. I briefed him after our meeting.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
And, yeah, a couple times about different considerations around this.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Did you understand that the Commissioner was supportive of you meeting with the Deputy Minister?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I believe he was.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
If we could pull up OPP00000142, please? I think this is an email exchange between you and the Deputy Minister. And at the bottom of page 1, it's clear that you've sent the Deputy Minister an email and you've said, "As promised, from our brief meeting." And so if you could just describe for us what happened at that meeting?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, we just kind of gave a lay of the land of, you know, what potentially could take place, how things work in there as far as negotiations stuff, and some of the considerations that he should be aware of coming into this conversation as a stakeholder.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So who -- was it just you and the Deputy Minister or who else was there?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Jeff Hutchinson ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- from Privy Council I believe.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And what did you understand his role to be?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Honestly, I don't - - I'm not sure what his role is.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think he was probably there to support Rob Stewart is kind of how I took it.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
And what was the ask? What did you understand Deputy Minister Stewart was trying to achieve or trying to get from you at that meeting?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think Deputy Minister Stewart -- like, I don't know. I'm not in his head, but I honestly thought that he had great intentions of how he can try and help have some sort of safe resolution to a relatively -- I would say very chaotic event in Ottawa. I think he was there for the right reasons to try and support an exit of the protests to alleviate pressure on the residents of Ottawa.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And did you understand, again, at this meeting, that the government was interested in becoming involved and they were coming to you to find out how to make that happen?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I believe -- yeah, a hundred percent.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
If we could scroll up, there's a response from Deputy Minister Stewart, "As discussed, for your review and comments. Trying to keep it simple! Note that I dropped your last bullet point as I do not think the government would want police to be making public the commitment." What was the commitment and what did you understand the concern about making it public was?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I'm not exactly sure, to be -- like, I don't have that great of a memory on every bullet point, but I suggest that, you know, there was something probably in there about us delivering a letter, or saying to the protesters -- at some point we would have to tell people, you know, this is -- this could potentially be coming Is this something of interest to you? How can you see this working as an exit for everyone; right? And so I don't know exactly, but obviously, it was something around that communication piece with protesters, I'm assuming.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could just scroll up to the very first email in this, this is a response from Leslie Jean to you after you forwarded the chain. And so I think she's expressing a concern here at, "This piece "The deal would be: leave the protest and denounce unlawful activity and you will be heard"." She says, "I think the ask should be for the leaders to facilitate having people leave, but I wonder if asking them to leave themselves will be met with resistance." So can you tell us about that concern and how that got worked out?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, and I -- you know, at the end of the day, this didn't get worked out; right? Like there was nothing that came to fruition from it. It was just a matter of trying to find resolutions where there weren't any. And so on this though, you know, like, we're basically trying to find how is the -- what is the best possible outcome and solution for a potential meeting with protesters, leaders, whatever, and how do we get that to go forward, recognizing that, you know, there's going to potentially be some people that stay around, there's going to be potentially, okay, how do we get people out of the city and get people to basically buy into this meeting.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. Okay. If we could go to OPP0000143? These are another series of emails connected to this. If we go to the middle of page 1 -- there we go. So this is you to, again, to Deputy Minister Stewart, Jeffrey Hutchinson and Deputy Chief Ferguson is copied on this email. "Good afternoon attached is a few considerations for the proposal. It is the opinion of [Deputy] Chief Ferguson that the letter go to her and she will ensure the letter is disseminated to the proper people within her organization..." So what conversations had you had prior to this email with Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I'd reached out to -- like, obviously, this is OPS; right?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I'm there to support my sister, and so I'd reached out to her. We'd had conversations in the past about PLT, how is it basically working, whatever, so I was trying to support her. I understood that she oversaw the portfolio that PLT ran within, and so I had reached out to her to talk to her about this, if she approved it, and if there was -- basically, you know, if there's anything else that I can do to support. And she just told me to run with it kind of. I think it's in an email, but basically, I just continued to go and on the understanding that I was supporting - - sorry, supporting OPS.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. In the letter, what was the contemplated sort of scope of the letter or shape of the letter?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Like, at this point?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Yeah.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I'm not exactly sure what it looked like, like, word for word, but it was the general idea would be -- there would be an opportunity for a meeting, if there could be an announcement of illegal activity, an exit from Ottawa and there would be a meeting with Ministers -- or sorry, Deputy Minister or someone of their choosing, ultimately.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Was it ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Like the actual people hadn’t been worked out. I just want to clarify that. Sorry for interrupting.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
No, no. That’s exactly what I was going to ask. Was it Deputy Minister Stewart who was going to be meeting, was it -- there were no names being sort of thrown around.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we could pull up OPP00000150. This is an email thread with RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki as well as OPP Commissioner Carrique and yourself. And so the RCMP Commissioner has reached out to you, essentially, and said that I’ve heard from Deputy Minister Stewart. So what can you tell us about your discussions directly with Commissioner Lucki at this point?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I just had email conversations with her, right, so I -- so on this, I think she ends up sending me like a piece where it’s got red in it and there’s some different considerations. But I ultimately look at it, have my own opinions on that and then I ask the Commissioner if I’m good to go to respond back, kind of deal.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And Commissioner Carrique authorized you to sort of deal directly with Commissioner Lucki on this?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I believe so. Yeah.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, Commissioner Lucki’s email says: “I’m not the SME [subject matter expert] in this area, but my folks are a bit worried on a few items and needed to get your thoughts.” What were the issues that the RCMP was concerned about?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It’s in another email. I actually can’t recall what specifically it was, sir. And I’m not trying to be -- like I just can’t remember.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Well, let’s pull up the engagement proposal, and that might help. It's the next one, so it’s OPP00000151. Do you recognize this document?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And is this something that you drafted for discussion with the Deputy Minister Stewart the previous day?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I’m not exactly sure, to be honest. I don’t know -- like I know this is kind of our discussion. I’m not sure if it came from me and my team or if it came from him based on our discussion, but this is representative of what our -- you know, our spit balling of ideas kind of looked like.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. This was the proposal that was ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- going between you, the Deputy Minister and Commissioner Lucki.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Under the principles, the second point says, “Listen and explain the government’s position. No negotiation.” Can you unpack that for us? Was that something that -- again, if you can remember, that you had -- you or your team ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- had put in there?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No. So that was something from government where they said that they would not have the ability to have negotiation authority. So like they can’t go there and meet with people and come up with a -- you know, how -- to negotiate an agreement at that meeting, but they would go there, listen, be heard. Whatever the outcomes were, that was all up to them and the group, but ultimately, there was no negotiation authority for them.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right, okay. So the no negotiation was going to apply to PLT’s discussions with protestors?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It was going to be the government’s ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- my understanding is the government’s meeting with protestors, would be that the government would have no negotiation authority, authority within that meeting.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Got it. Okay. And that’s what -- I wanted to clarify that. What -- you know, what was your view on that -- that’s a -- the no negotiation aspect in the proposal, was that going to make it difficult to sell to protestors?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I don’t necessarily think so. I think there was people there that wanted to be heard, wanted an opportunity to have a meeting with people in power and I -- I don’t know. Like you would have to ask the protest group if that would have flown with them, but you know, putting ourselves in that position, we were trying to explore opportunities to ensure success, right.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then just on the issue of timing, the last bullet point, “In Ottawa target Sunday, February 13”, which was two days after this draft, “is the expected surge date.” Why was that timing chosen?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Because during the weekends there would be large influxes of people and people would naturally be leaving the city on the Sundays, Sunday evenings, Monday mornings.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And were you sort of generally supportive of this proposal as something that might work?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we could pull up OPP00000171. And if we can go to the bottom of page 4.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I want to just qualify that “yes” for a second ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Sure.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- just because -- so when I met with my team -- or not my team. I met with the PLT team and we talked about, you know, what is the potential of this working, whatever. I think someone had said, you know, Tom Marazzo could potentially -- you know, have 60 percent of the people would potentially follow Tom Marazzo, right. And there’s -- you know, and this is just people that have been talking to people on the ground. There’s no analytical run-through of, okay, these are the numbers here, right. There’s no equation to this. This is social science and we’re best guessing, right, on this point. And ultimately, you know, Dinah Hampson had said to me that day, “Regardless of how this goes, there’s still probably going to be protests that we will have to deal with”. Like the police. When I say “we”, the police will have to deal with, right. So yes, it would work, I’m assuming, to reduce the footprint, get some people out of the city, which would then leave other people that would still potentially be there. Like I don’t think the -- you know, every single person in the city is leaving as a result of that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right. But it would have reduced the footprint, as you say.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, hopefully.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we can go to the bottom of page 4. This is an email exchange -- so now we’re at February 12th, the morning of Saturday, February 12th. And you wrote to Deputy Minister Stewart again, “We should have another quick conversation tomorrow morning.” And it says, “I will have additional follow up ... after consulting police partners.” Had you -- other than Commissioner Lucki, had you consulted any other police partners?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No. Like -- sorry, Deputy Chief Ferguson, obviously, and then John Brewer, who’s the Chief Superintendent in British Columbia. Him and I typically talk on a regular basis as a result of just mutual friendship as well as our portfolios. His is similar to mine in B.C. Much bigger, of course, as a Chief Super, and you know, I have the luxury of learning from his experiences in B.C.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could scroll up on page 3. I mean, essentially Deputy Minister Stewart didn’t want to wait until the next day because time was sort of of the essence. So you wrote him back later that morning, and you’ve sort of laid out some of the considerations and concerns that had arisen. And so the first one there, “It may cross the line between church and state”, I wonder if you can explain that for us.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. So in the recommendations, one of the big things is political interference or political direction to the police. And so that’s always a big issue when we look at protest demonstrations, occupations for obvious reasons and there needs to be a division between incident command and political direction, right. So that’s why, you know, for a variety of reasons, but when there’s an incident in OPP detachment areas, an Incident Commander or Major Critical Incident Commander will come from another area so that way the Detachment Commander can run his office and work with Police Service Boards and other people that potentially may influence something. So it’s just this layer of insulation, right, from political interference. And so that’s obviously that we wanted to make sure that that wasn’t the case. Rob Stewart never directed me, never gave me -- in fact, he went there asking for help. He was by no means in any way politically interfering and he was there to try and see and find ways to support.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. The next paragraph, page 1, principles, second bullet, “No Negotiation”. I asked you about this before, but just maybe this refreshed your memory. “Negotiation should never be ruled out... From past experiences with you, your team would not have negotiation authority. It should be expanded as ‘negotiation authority’.” And so I take it there was an issue with just putting “no negotiation” in the document. You wanted to see that language softened.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. And that wasn’t necessarily me that brought that up and caught that. That was the RCMP’s team for catching that, and great job by them.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then on the last point there: "Second - ‘coordinated police messaging and action should occur in a unified manner’. While ideal, this is unrealistic, particularly this weekend." Why did you think that was unrealistic?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That was something that was sent from Commissioner Lucki to me.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you were passing on ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I was just passing -- yeah.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- the RCMP’s concerns?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Just, “Please remove this portion,” is ultimately what I was ---
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we could to the top of page 3, Deputy Minister Stewart responds to you and raises a number of questions, essentially, in those bullet points at the bottom. And if we could just go through those briefly and if you could tell me whether those were ever sort of addressed in a conversation. "Would the signatory of the letter or the person who goes to the meeting be putting themselves at risk; is that a big concern?"
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That wasn’t a big concern for me.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Why not?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So -- well, like, we never -- I think, you know, Insp. Morris -- or Supt. Morris spoke to it as far the violence and stuff in the group and so, to me, there wasn’t a pile of risk there. I personally wasn’t concerned but I know that there would be, obviously, some sort of assessment from someone before that would happen, right, as far as who’s identified from the protest group that would be in there. And I’m sure there’s people that the government probably wouldn’t want to be with as well, right.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Right, which -- that takes us down to the sort of third point about POI sheets, and there was a concern about who was going to be involved in that negotiation. Did it ever get to that point where you shared a list of names with the government and they raised any issue about that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, because I think the next day, he called me in the morning. Is this Saturday, do you know?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
The 12th is the Saturday.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
This is Saturday. Yeah, so he called me in the morning the next morning and said that he was not able to make this happen, ultimately.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay, and why? Where did the -- because I understand you were on board on behalf of the OPP; the OPS was on board; it seems like the RCMP was kind of provisionally on board; so what was the issue?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I definitely was not involved in the conversations that stopped that from happening so I don’t know.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, sorry about that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
No, no, so -- but, as far as you know, you got a call from Deputy Minister Stewart ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
--- the next morning?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, and he just said that he was not successful, ultimately, to getting this going forward.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Did you have any further discussions with Commission Carrique or Commissioner Lucki about this negotiation -- this proposal, this strategy after that call from Deputy Minister Stewart?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, I’m sure that there was emails. I know I talked to Patricia -- or Deputy Chief Ferguson and there were some emails. I know, in his response to me, it was a matter of if we still wanted this to go forward, there would have to be a letter from Brenda Lucki to the federal government requesting this, and that was on this day. So I explained that Deputy Chief Ferguson.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And as far as you’re aware, that letter wasn’t sent?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
As far as I’m aware, it wasn’t sent.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we could pull up OPP00000164. This is -- we’re going sort of back in time by a day or two. This is an email from Deputy Chief Ferguson to yourself on February 11th in the afternoon. If we go to the bottom of page 1, she says: "Good afternoon, Inspector Beaudin. In light of some of the challenges and miscommunications that have occurred thus far, I would like to provide you with the direction I received from Chief Peter Sloly yesterday afternoon as I believe it will assist to reduce such issue moving forward." And then the next two paragraphs talk about integrating the PLT team and sort of more -- I guess to summarize, more effectively using the PLT team. Do you know what prompted this email at this point in time?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think it was just the conversations about Rob Stewart -- or Deputy Minister Rob Stewart and me working on behalf of OPS to come to this resolution.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then -- so, after this date -- this is the 11th -- did you observe a change in the way that PLT was used in Ottawa?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I wasn’t there on the 11th in Ottawa. I’m not exactly sure what that posture looked like, what -- you know, basically, what it was like there.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Was it reported to you that they were being used differently?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I can’t recall. I’m not sure if there was an Integrated Response Team or Commanding -- like, I don’t know when Dave Springer kind of hopped in there because then, when Dave Springer hopped in with Rob Bernier -- or Supt. Bernier, there was -- so if you would help me with that day, I could tell you that, at that point, there was a change, when Rob Bernier came in as and incident commander. And ultimately -- you know, from my experience, when I first got there to Ottawa, I started calling people before 7:00. Like our PLT members, I just -- because I just assume the city is in chaos and, as a liaison person, if you’re awake, you should be talking to people, right? And so I started calling OPS members, Tyandaga Police Service liaison member, as well as OPP PLT members just to say, “How’s it going,” whatever, and I was told that, you know, people really didn’t start getting assignments until 10 o’clock or after. And so when Bernier and Springer, one of the considerations that I said to them is, “You have the” -- you know, I think I said “the world” but, “You have the Province of Ontario helping you here and we should be working longer hours and with purpose on an every-second basis, right, and so if we can increase those hours.” So, at that point, when Dave Springer came in, I know the hours increased in some of the identified issues decreased.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then, again, I know you weren’t necessarily directly involved but what can you tell us about how PLT was used in the sort of enforcement action towards the end when the POU Plan was being put into place?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so I’d been sent back to Ottawa on the 15th of February to assist with that messaging and I know there was conversations about, “Well, is this messaging really too hard?” We’re telling people to leave. In my experience, I was, you know, telling members, you know, “We should be saying, ‘It’s time to leave. The time to leave was yesterday,’” right, because the posture had changed. We had a public order on the way and it was time to identify the people that it -- there’s going to be a movement coming; it’s coming soon; and we would be highly criticized, I think, if we didn’t allow people to get out of the city, right, to get -- to leave, to pick up their stuff and go and really reduce that footprint. So, for me, it was extremely important, as well as Gisele and the rest of the team, to ensure that we were providing the most clear, accurate information as possible to ensure that people were on their way out.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And even in those -- that sort of final weekend, did that work? Were people leaving as a result of that PLT messaging?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like, there was some -- definitely some, you know, hostility towards the messaging and stuff like that. I know we had, you know, some people that were -- like some officers that were assigned to our PLT members to ensure that they were safe while delivering the message, right? And so it was extremely important to have those frank and very succinct messages for people to leave, ultimately, right? And if they wanted to stay, then there would be consequences associated to that.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Okay. The last document I want to take you to is OPP00000337, and it’s an email shortly after the events in Ottawa conclude on February 25th that you sent to Supt. Morris, Alakas, and McDonell. And if we could scroll down, this is -- I guess you set out two ideas and so if you can sort of tell us why you sent this email and just summarize the two thoughts that you included in this email.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, so one was protests for senior command, and ours included. And there’s no criticism whatsoever on anyone in this. It was a unbelievable event but I’d found that, you know, there was a lack of understanding where we separated liaison work from public order work. When I was on the Hostage Rescue Team, we had negotiators on the Hostage Rescue Team because it’s vitally important to create opportunities where you can resolve stuff with communication. And so in this, it was ultimately an opportunity to say, “Okay, guys, we should probably take a look at streamlining the measured approach, socializing it, and policing as an actual something that we do, so that that way we can get to the bottom of stuff quicker." And like, so you look at some of the stuff that happened on February 6th, right? So there was a PLT request for Rideau and Sussex, right, so we were going to go and -- or we, the police, were going to go with public order unit potentially and go and remove people from Rideau and Sussex. I expedited an email to Mark Patterson to say, "If it was me and this was going to happen, this is how you should use PLT right now," right? So a communication strategy built in to stuff so that people are aware that they can leave and that we're not just running in there putting people in harm's way. And so for this, there's opportunities where we could do a better job as senior management or senior commanders in policing on a national level to better understand the measured approach and how it can impact outcomes for the better. And then the second one was, I look at the CACP policing with Indigenous People's Committee and you know, there's John Brewer, who's the Chief Superintendent that sits on that with tactical background. I'm not sure the tactical background of everyone that’s on there. We have an emergency management committee, which Mike Nelson, I think, co-chairs or chairs and sits on. And so you have all these merging CACP commands. And maybe it's time to look at okay, this is a relatively big event. I would say it's a huge event, right? It impacted this -- our Nation's Capital. And protests have just got bigger and bigger and bigger in the last few years, right? Like, I focus on 2012 with Idle No More, right, and some of the stuff there. I think there was, you know, roughly 200 peaceful protests in the Province of Ontario in 2012. And then in 2020 we had, you know, multiple, 200 type events in the province, and then we had the largest display of public order in the history of the nation in 2022, and there's no slowing down. So I just thought collectively, as a group, it might be a good idea.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Thank you, Inspector, and those are my questions.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. First, I believe it's counsel for former Chief Sloly.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOM CURRY
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Thank you, Commissioner, Superintendent.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
I'm Tom Curry for Chief Sloly. Could I just pick up something you said to us at the end about the nature of the event that you have been describing in 2022 here in Ottawa? I think you said it was unbelievable, what you experienced ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- what you witnessed.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And did you say it was the largest public order operation in our country's history?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I believe it was, yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the -- Chief Sloly has -- and probably others involved in this have described it as a -- "representing a paradigm shift in public protest", a significant change in the way that public protests have been expressed up until that time; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Like, I want to agree with you. I want to clarify a couple of things. Like, obviously, there's been movements in the last five years. I think this is probably the most centred in a very publicized area that involves government and all that stuff. But there's been similar movements, but this one was definitely the biggest and had the most impact.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. You have been involved, as you've told us, in attempting to resolve public protests in many other circumstances. Can you give the Commissioner a sense, from your experience, of the -- of what made this different? First of all, is it the scale of the protest that you observed?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the -- would you say that the scope of it, in terms of its affecting an urban area outside of paralyzing the city in the fashion that it did, would that represent a reason why this was an unprecedented occurrence?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, it was scale and scope, and it was -- you know, it impacted a lot of people, right? And so like, when you look at some of the different things that are happening, I always think, okay, if this is going to impact people negatively, how many people are going to be impacted? And I can tell you, there's some stuff that I'm -- that’s coming up that I would be concerned about.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Well, then I'd want to come to the -- my friend, Mr. Brosseau, has already taken you to the App for Action memorandum that you sent, I think, February 25th in which you flagged for your command some issues that they should be thinking about -- we should all be thinking about -- as directly relating to this new experience that you had.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the -- in addition to that -- just go back to the -- to your experience and this protest. Would you say that the demeanour or attitude of the protestors was different than you had experienced, having regard to the scale and the scope?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No. Their -- like, their demeanour wasn’t really, to be -- so to be fair, like, there's certain things in crowd psychology or dynamics that you can do to prevent certain things, right, like, me looking at -- or like, human decision making processes, you look at risk, reward, effort, provocation, excuses. You know, you have the same outcomes when it comes to those five things, it's just a matter of I think, the scale and the scope, but as far as the dynamic and that, I don't think it was too far different than other instances. Is that clear?
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Sure. It is, and maybe I can get your help with this. We have learned from other witnesses that this protest featured a lot of people protesting about different things. That’s new for you too?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay. So ---
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So there's typically divisions in protest groups. Like, that’s something that we actually teach on the course is, it's hard to -- because people in a hijacking protest -- I don't know if that’s the right word -- but people will come in and hijack. And sometimes when you ask people, "What are you protesting?" on Day 1, and then on Day 12, you're like, "Okay. What is -- " you know, if you ask, "What are you here for? What does success look like? What can I say or do to get you to leave?" sometimes that ends up morphing, right, because you have these -- you know, you have people that are dealing with each other. You're dealing with a human capacity, right, so things end up changing as a result as things evolve. But there is -- you know, there is division within protest groups on a regular basis. This one was just so -- like, I think the scale and the scope magnified that.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Got it. So then in your experience, this one featured -- although I take your point or we all take your point about the idea that people might come to a protest with different things in mind as grievances -- this one amplified and magnified that phenomenon?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Now, the -- in advance of the protest, the Commissioner has heard that the OPP and other police services were monitoring the convoys as they crossed their various geographic regions, and your PLT team was involved in that in some fashion?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, they were.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
I think you call it "pre- planning"?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And were you personally involved in any of that pre-planning or was it your team?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, it was the team. Like, I would have updates and obviously check in and be as engaged as I need to be, recognizing I have an unbelievable team.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Got it. Is it fair to say that when you were looking at the briefings that you were seeing from the folks out in the field, that you did not anticipate that this would be -- what was coming would be the country's largest public order event in its history?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I did not think the largest public order event in the nation's history was happening ---
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- at that time.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the -- and we've learned from others -- the Commissioner has learned from others that it was fluid, people have used the word "volatile". There are a number of ways to describe it. But it was very hard to get a bead on this event; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So like, in my experience, any time anyone says, "I don’t have an exit strategy," I would be concerned, right? So I would -- I talked about the five decision-making processes, right, so I would increase the effort, I would harden targets, I would do a bunch of stuff. If someone was coming to my house and they said, "I don’t know when I'm going to leave," I would buy an uncomfortable bed, right? So -- and I'm just saying that jokingly, but in all honesty, like, I would make sure that I knew when they were leaving and what would happen. And if I didn’t know, I would put something in place to harden the target or at least control or manage what was happening.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. The uncomfortable bed, in this -- sticking with that metaphor, ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- you would not welcome them to the community; you would try to make certain that they were -- well, you used the language of “Hardening the target”?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You would make it less pleasant, rather than more pleasant; fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I would probably -- you know, if you were looking at it, I would probably find a location where large trucks with beds -- you know, those things that people live in -- are parking somewhere outside the downtown core. I would allow -- you know, like, this is all spit-balling, but I think when you have information or intelligence or whatever -- and everyone’s guilty of this, right? You want to trust the best interests of the people that are protesting to do something that’s right and not, you know -- how do I say that? Not inconvenience a city, and ultimately, you know, there’s rights that they have but then, you know, it’s balancing, which sometimes turns into a juggling act, as we saw here.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And one of the things that was -- getting back to your team, and the best information you had, nobody predicted or could have predicted that the protesters would get that balance so badly out of whack; that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Like, with them just not having an exit strategy I would be a bit concerned, as far as what that looks like. I think that there was conversations with PLT members with some of the protest people around the 21st of January’ish that said, you know, “I’m going to come there and paralyze the city,” and that was shared with OPS at that point for them to take into consideration.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. Shared by OPP PLT or up through ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
OPP PLT to their individual meetings because they have that group within Eastern Region that basically share information with each other.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. Got it, okay. Now, when you got to Ottawa, I think you told us it was the 3rd of February.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Third night, yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And you participated in the events that you’ve described to us. You had a chance virtually, I think, to meet Chief Sloly and other people in the command?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I never met with Chief Sloly, sir.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Were you present at meetings with Chief Sloly?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I was -- I was in this planning room and so I was sitting off to the side and then there was meetings happening and I was off to the side.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
I see.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I never once saw him on screen. Like, I’m ---
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Got it.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- kind of like this.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. So from your -- from the information that you have directly, your own direct knowledge, you would tell the Commissioner that Chief Sloly didn’t interfere with any of the OPP PLT operations; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Nothing that I saw.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. You wouldn’t -- were you told at any time by your team, or I suppose it would be the OPS PLT team, that Chief Sloly had included them in those meetings that you’re talking about having attended when you got there, for example, starting February 1?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I was told that Chief Sloly had talked to the OPS PLT sergeant, or sergeants, maybe, before I had arrived.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. And in terms of the -- what you learned from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson -- can I just show you, get your help with one document? And this would be, please, Mr. Registrar, OPP171. So I think that comes to five zeros. Just get your help with one thing. I think you -- you were asked, just while this is coming up, Superintendent, I think you were asked by -- that’s the 12th. If we could just stop there for a sec. Just go down a little bit, sorry, please. And one more scroll down, just to set the context. You’ve reviewed some of this with us earlier -- or that the bottom? Then please -- there we go. So there you are, February 12th, you see that 11:47 to the Commissioner of the OPP among others, Deputy Commissioner, “...please check the list of leaders.” This is the chain, of course, from Minister Stewart that you talked about: “Commissioner, for the sake of time I am going straight to you for the below confirmation that you are approving of the following with [Deputy Minister] Stewart through conversation? I will call...[for] your approval. Note the quick turnaround. Respectfully,...” And now please just go up. That’s the 12th in the morning. Commissioner Carrique says: “Thanks...good advice to me. It does not bind the police to anything. Is the [Deputy Minister] aware that it is subject to Ottawa Police supporting the overall strategy.” And then please just a little further up, and you write back to him. “Yes he has been told...” -- that would be Mr. Stewart has been told that.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And you described you were: “...in continual contact with [Deputy] Chief Ferguson who has sent...an email I will forward to this group for awareness.” And then you did that. Please, could I show the witness OPP163, with all of the preceding zeros? I just want to get your confirmation, Superintendent, that what you did was you showed -- you see that in the middle, right -- just there. Thank you. At 12:06, just after that conversation electronically that you had with the Commissioner, you said, “From OPS” and you forwarded Deputy Chief Ferguson’s email of February 11th at 2:44. Do you see that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And that’s what you were saying to the Commissioner, “Yes, I’ve been in touch with OPS”; ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- “it’s covered.”
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Scroll down, if you don’t mind, please, just to confirm one thing. What you learned from Deputy Chief Ferguson was that to the extent that there had been any doubt about anything as to PLT, Chief Sloly had confirmed that, in the second paragraph, Chief Ferguson writes: “I was directed by the Chief to ensure our PLT team is fully integrated to a level of my satisfaction. In order for that to happen, I needed an understanding, from you - the Subject Matter Expert, on how that could be done.” And then -- and you had continuous dialogue with her. So the issues about the federal government’s possible negotiation with protesters was run through OPS through Deputy Chief Ferguson; correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And I expect Chief Sloly’s going to say he had nothing -- didn’t know about it until now, but didn’t need to know about it because that authority had been given to Deputy Chief Ferguson. You didn’t engage with Chief Sloly?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, I didn’t. No, I saw the one briefing, you know, where -- or I cited earlier where he said, “Negotiate, negotiate, negotiate” right? Like, that’s -- you know, I was one other call with him. I was on another call, I believe on the 12th of February, or the 13th, so ---
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And these events in Ottawa about which you’ve been speaking, affected other parts of the country, is that true?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Not only in our province within your authority, of course we had Windsor going on, right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You were speaking to your command team or involved, at least, in PLT issues in Windsor at the same time, right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Did you get down to Windsor?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I did not get down to Windsor.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Did you also get involved in considering how this protest in Ottawa impacted other infrastructure in Ontario?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That’s always something that I’m concerned about. I’m always concerned about -- like, so when they were doing the Windsor stuff, right? So I’m always concerned of creating a movement out of a movement, right? So, like, you look at certain settings. So say there’s a protest in Ottawa and then this protest goes up and they say, “We’re in support of Ottawa,” and then you get another group that says, “I’m supporting Windsor in support of Ottawa,” and then you have all these mini movements. But I’ll tell you, I had a conversation with C/Supt. John Brewer, and he was saying, you know, “With some of the restrictions ending in some of the other provinces, and ours aren’t ending in British Columbia,” he had some serious concerns as a result of protests in relation to this.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
I was going to say; we had issues -- the OPP was managing issues outside of Ottawa in Ontario.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Bridges, highways, other installations; correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Correct.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Worried for one thing, that perhaps if this convoy were to leave Ottawa, it might just settle into -- in on another bridge, or it might settle on a highway. You’ve got a thousand trucks, or however many you had to try to manage across the entire geographic area of the province; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Yeah, for sure. And I guess that’s the importance of making sure that you have had that great relationship with people and outline, you know, this is the expectation and whatever, right?
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
So that they agree that when they leave they’re not going to cause another obstruction.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. And another really important thing, too, is really that off-gassing, right? So as you have the ability, when people identify that they want to leave, to immediately provide that opportunity for them to leave so they’re leaving in groups of eight and not in a thousand.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Were you made aware -- the Commissioner heard evidence from C/Supt. Pardy that there were -- I believe it was C/Supt. Pardy, that there were protesters within the group who wished to leave but could not leave because convoy captains, or however they were organized, were not -- were requiring that they hold the line. Did you become aware of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I was aware of those conversations, yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
A significant problem.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And the -- beyond Ontario, you were -- I think you just told the Commissioner you became involved in assisting or at least in discussing with RCMP officials how this Ottawa protest was impacting British Columbia and other areas within our country that are ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- patrolled by RCMP. Is that true?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. And the Ottawa protest wasn’t impacting British Columbia, but the general grievances and support would have -- you know, like obviously, when this stuff starts happening, right, then people say, “Man, that’s something I can get behind”.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Significant drain on resources.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I would say so. Yeah.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And in terms of this -- back to this one, it was obvious to you when you got here into Ottawa that the Ottawa Police Service had no possibility of managing this event with its own resources. Is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, for sure. I would say, you know, in the absence of the ability to do Public Order, right, so -- you know, there was so many plans to do Public Order intervention, right, and in the absence of doing it -- because we never had the ability to do it up until the 17th or 18th. So in the absence of that, you have to have an unbelievable negotiation and mediation strategy until that happens, right. Until you’re able to muster people to do something, I believe everyone has a responsibility to that safety to ensure that that gets completed.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Right. And the -- a couple of things. You told us that you were involved -- you came back up here to -- or across to Ottawa and you were involved in the Public Order operation at the level of the PLT to give protestors the messages that this is coming and you should leave.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. I was being - - I was -- I came here to support Giselle Walker, who’s the Provincial Coordinator, and was asked to come here to support her.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And part of the messaging that you gave was that the Emergencies Act had been declared. Is that true?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I’m not sure.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I’m not -- yeah. Sorry, I’m not -- I don’t ---
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You didn’t take part in the drawing of the -- the drafting of the message that was being handed to protestors or ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Oh, yes, sorry. Yeah, yeah. So on that, that came across to PLT at some point to say, “Does this make sense?” because basically we just wanted consistent messaging to go out, hand it out so people were aware and also go out on social media.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Got it. And one of the consequences that you told the Commissioner, you explained to protestors about the consequences of not leaving would have been all of the consequences that he’s learned about concerning the Emergencies Act.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sorry. I don’t -- sorry.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
That was a terrible question. You told the protestors -- and the worst part of that is it counts against my time.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Oh, no, sorry.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
You told the protestors that the consequences of the Emergencies Act would be applied to those who did not leave voluntarily.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I believe that’s in the messaging.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Got it.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
There’s a bunch -- sorry. Go ahead.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
No, no, no. I didn’t mean to interrupt you. Last question. Your interview summary refers to OPP Superintendent Dan -- I’m hoping I’m pronouncing it correctly -- Alakas ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Alakas, yes.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
--- who advised you on the 8th of February that -- words to the effect, you said, that the OPP would be taking over operations in Ottawa. Do you recall him telling you that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
And now, you -- did you know anything about how that was meant to happen or anything more about it than that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No. Like reflecting on it, like looking back, maybe it’s Carson Pardy’s team that came -- went to assist or whatever.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Got it. And you were part of those -- you did appear at some of the Integrated Planning Cell meetings. I think there are minutes that show ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, yeah, yeah. I went in and I think I spoke at two of them.
Tom Curry, Counsel (Peter Sloly)
Okay. Superintendent, thanks very much.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Thank you, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. Next, call on the Government of Canada.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Thank you, Commissioner.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ANDREA GONSALVES
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Good afternoon, Superintendent Beaudin. My name is Andrea Gonsalves. I’m one of the lawyers for the Government of Canada. And I just want to first begin by confirming a few things around the role of liaison teams. This may be a bit of a simplified version from what you’ve testified to. But the role of PLTs is to work with event organizers to ensure that events are lawful, peaceful and safe; fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And they may do that through a variety of strategies, including, where appropriate, negotiation, de-escalation, trying to identify win/wins; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And where demonstrations are not lawful, peaceful or safe, PLTs may have a role to play in trying to steer them back in that direction.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
PLT strategies can also be helpful in reducing the footprint. We’ve heard you say that several times; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And by reducing the footprint -- again, perhaps this is simplified -- but we mean using techniques to encourage as many people as possible to leave the protest zone voluntarily without ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, or ---
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
--- police enforcement.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, or -- or -- like, to me, put people in a tactically advantageous position so that way if there is a police operation that there would be a better opportunity for success that would be safe for all the people that are there and for the police officers that have the responsibility to go and enforce that.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Right. And success in that respect meaning defuse it, bring it to an end with no or minimal risk to officer or protestor safety, minimal damage being done, that sort of thing.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, ma’am.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And reducing -- I think we’re agreeing here that reducing the footprint is especially important when Public Order units will be engaging in enforcement action to bring a demonstration to an end.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And sometimes that may be necessary, for example, when a protest has become illegal and there’s a need to restore the rule of law.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And so PLT involves an element of negotiation, but also, you spoke about communication and education, ideally education before enforcement; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
PLTs build messaging around the potential consequences if they don’t -- if protestors don’t leave voluntarily because those consequences can act as an incentive to leave.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, for sure. Like what I was talking about, like obviously the risk, you want to increase risk, right, to remove people from doing so, right.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Right. The stronger the deterrent, the greater the effect it’s likely to have in getting them to go home.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Typically.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And for those who might be thinking of joining an ongoing protest, messaging negative potential consequences can also act as a deterrent to joining; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, ma’am.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Now, in questions from my friend, Mr. Curry, you spoke about the scope and scale of these protests being quite unique in our nation’s history; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Others, and I think you, too, have used the word “unprecedented”.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, probably. Yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And there are several features of the Ottawa demonstrations that contributed to the unprecedented nature and presented challenges for the liaison teams. You’ve spoke about a few of them, but I’ll try and summarize them all. It includes the size of the protest zone and the number of protestors.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sorry. Like is that something that would -- what are you saying? Sorry.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
One of the things that created challenges for the PLT teams ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
--- in successfully going about their role in getting people to go home, I think there are a number of them that you spoke about. I want to take them one by one. Is it fair to say that the size of the protest zone and the number of protestors contributed challenges for the PLTs?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It did and it didn’t, and I’ll just qualify that for you. So when you look at it, really, you’re just -- like you have 35 Block Captains, I think, at one point, so you have a certain amount of leadership. You have the ability to manage that in individual pocket size groups, right. And so, you know, if you’re able to work through a process with mediation, whatever, and there’s a group of people that are willing to work with you, then, really, the size is -- the size is really bad and it looks overwhelming, but the -- you know, the tenets of negotiation, mediation, whatever don’t really necessarily change. And the work of PLT, if done appropriately and given the ability to do it properly, can still manage that regardless of the size, but it does add complications as far as you're not -- you know, you're not being aware of what exactly is in that crowd, and potential conflict as a result.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And when you've got that sort of a scenario, the PLTs may be able to achieve some success in one area, but then the protesters there could move to another site, for instance?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
If you're doing a hard -- like, so if you're doing hard tactics, right, like so if you're taking over streets, right, taking them -- and then you have to kind of own them a bit; right? And so when you're looking at hard tactics, cool. Yeah, for sure, people would have to potentially come back there, or whatever, but if people voluntarily leave on their own through mediation, negotiation, like, and that's my -- that's our world, right, so if they leave on their own the odds are they're not going to come back to that space.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
In this case, though, we also had more protesters, more trucks coming in every week. It wasn't a static crowd the entire time. And that presented a challenge as well; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Correct. Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Described as a volatile, fluid situation. You spoke about the dynamics changing and evolving over time; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. Yeah, they were fluid, for sure.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Over time, the protesters become very entrenched; right? This is one of the challenges that were faced by the PLTs.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like at the very end they were entrenched. I think at -- you know, throughout the protests themselves we didn't really actually test compliance or resolve a pile; right?
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
You're aware of OPP reporting about one Farfadaa member saying he will leave only once he has regained his freedom or when he is dead?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I didn't know that, but there was definitely some very strong ideologies within the group.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And that certainly suggests ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
That kind of messaging suggests entrenchment; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, for sure. Yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
You spoke about where demands of the protesters, what they're hoping to achieve, where it's unrealistic, that presents a PLT challenge; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And some of the demands here would be unrealistic?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, very much so.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Not only outside of the OPP's authority to grant, but in some cases inconsistent with our constitutional structure; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Oh, absolutely. There's limitations to the Constitution for sure.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
It was a disorganised group with different factions. That was another challenge; correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Like they were pretty organised in the sense that they got across the country to get to Ottawa. Like it's not like it was an unorganised group. I think there was a lot of different people in groups there; right?
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And we've seen some reporting about the organisation going so far as getting them to Ottawa, but once they got to Ottawa there wasn't that same degree of organisation; you're aware of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I guess, yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Not all members of this crowd had the same objectives or had a common view as to how they would achieve those objectives; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sure.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And I think I saw in the OPP's institutional report that there were 10 PLT members that were contributed by OPP? Does that sound right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Yeah, I think there was one -- yeah, I saw one day where there was 10 for sure, so that's pretty consistent.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And there were thousands of protesters that needed to be dealt with, and so resources were stretched thin?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, and that's the importance of identifying leadership.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
You spoke about the interest that Public Safety Deputy Minister Stewart had in consulting with you about potential federal level engagement with protesters. You recall that evidence?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And you understood that he was looking to you for this consultation so he could provide informed advice to ministers; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
It wasn't his decision to make, you understood that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And in fact, no decision was made at the time he approached you about whether there would be this kind of engagement?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And when you're looking at the idea of engagement or liaising with protesters, you're doing that from a police perspective?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, ma'am.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
You spoke about the importance of not having government interference in these police operations?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That's correct. Yeah, it's happened before in the past, right, where we were surprised by government becoming involved in police operations. So if you can head that off that's probably the best way to do that; right?
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And by the same token, you, as a member of the OPP, would not be trained in or fully understand the perspectives of the governmental decision-makers?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely. Yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And you're aware, sir, that on February 13th, Mayor Watson of Ottawa had come to an agreement with one of the convoy organisers, Tamara Lich, to move trucks from the residential areas of Ottawa up to Wellington Street?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
You're -- I take it then you're also aware that that agreement, and if that had been followed through with, then they would have had a meeting; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I don't know the intricate details about what the plan was there, but...
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
But you're aware that that fell through?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
The meeting?
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Yes.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Or? Okay. I am, yes, now.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
At least in part because some of the protesters who were parked on those streets did not want to comply with the agreement; right? Sorry, I didn't hear your answer. You're aware of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I'm -- no, I'm -- like I'm aware of it now. I just -- yeah.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And that suggests that there was a problem of the purported leaders of the protest getting that buy-in, getting that compliance from the group; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
By February 15th, according to the OPP's Operational Intelligence report, there was no clear pathway toward reaching a satisfactory resolution that would see the protest group voluntarily end their action and depart the Ottawa area. You're aware of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. I believe on February 15th, for sure that would be the assessment. I think after February 13th, with the Mayor's stuff, and then it not happening, there would be obvious... You know, like that's the issue with not testing resolve, compliance, whatever at the beginning, right, because if, you know, if you go to a group and you say, "Hey, guys, just for the sake of it can you move to a bus lane?" And then you watch and you see how much juice people have within the group, what this looks like, whatever, you have that ability to actually see if there's leadership there, if they're a unified group. And then you have the ability to tactically deal with the people that are not in compliance, or, you know -- and it just kind of separates people. Right? And so what you're trying to do is have focussed, targeted, strategic enforcement as opposed to a blanket enforcement of everyone that's there.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And I said the date February 14th, I don't -- we don't have time to pull it up, but I'll just note for the record, OPP00003427 is where that appears in the report. Chief Superintendent Pardy testified to the Commissioner on Friday that by February 13th police had exhausted all negotiation, that negotiation with the protesters had reached the point where it was proving to be futile. And you wouldn't disagree with the Chief Superintendent on that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Well, him and I have different backgrounds when it comes to negotiation, mediation, whatever. Like I would say there was opportunities beforehand. I think those opportunities weren't, you know, captured. But ultimately, yeah, at some point there needed to be some sort of intervention outside of mediation, negotiation.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And so by the time the federal Emergency Act measures come into place, the PLT role shifts from negotiation, et cetera, to communication and education regarding the consequences of the -- of protesters sticking around Ottawa when the enforcement activity begins; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, that's on, I believe, the 15th, 16th, something like that.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And you've told us you were involved in reviewing the notice to protesters to make sure that it was serving that function of education to get people to go home; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And my understanding is that it was important, not only to message the potential criminal offence consequences, but also measures that were specific under the Emergencies Act, like the prohibition on bringing children for instance, that was part of the messaging?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I believe it was. I'm sure that it's -- like I don't have it in front of me, but it was -- tried to make it succinct, clear so that people understood it. It wasn't like this gives you this authority, this gives you this authority, it was a very broad I believe document.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And I see the Commissioner looking at me telling me my time is up. If I may, Commissioner, one last question. Superintendent, you're aware that there was another convoy headed to Ottawa on February the 16th?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I know it was in those dates but yeah, there was another convoy from west region coming to Ottawa.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
And one of the things you wanted to be sure of is that the information was communicated to that convoy about the consequences under the Federal Emergencies Act if they were to travel to Ottawa at that point?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I wanted to make sure that they weren’t coming. There’s obviously tactical considerations for members on ground. You know, one of the important ones is 360 defence and I didn’t want anyone coming in on the backend.
Andrea Gonsalves, Counsel (GC)
Okay, those are my questions. Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Next, I’ll call on the convoy organizers.
CROSS-EXAMNIATION BY MR. BRENDAN MILLER
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Good afternoon, sir. For the record, my name’s Brendan Miller. I’m counsel for Freedom Corp, which is the organization representing the protesters that were in Ottawa on January and February of 2022. I just have a few questions for you. And thank you for your service. So, if I may, I’m just going to refer to the documents that the Commission has already brought up earlier. If I could have brought up OPP00000151. So, sir, just to clarify for everybody here and the folks at home, this is the proposal, engagement proposal that was worked on between yourself, the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and Commission Brenda Lucki of the RCMP; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. Like, there was -- yeah.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Okay. And this engagement proposal was essentially approved by the Deputy Minister of Public Safety but, of course, it wasn’t his decision whether it was going to be carried it, but he approved it; is that fair.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I don’t think that he approved it. I think he was taking it as, like, for consideration to the Minister. Like, that’s how -- like, he was looking for advice to forward.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Okay. But he never indicated to you that it was something that he thought was a bad idea?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
He never said that it was a bad idea.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
And he never indicated to you that anything but taking enforcement action was a bad idea?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
What’s that, sorry?
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Anything but taking enforcement action against the protesters in Ottawa was a bad idea; he didn’t say to you that you should cease engaging and that you should direct that there be enforcement actions taken?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, he never directed anything. Like, he didn’t -- he did not direct anything.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. And Commissioner Lucki of the RCMP, she reviewed this proposal as well?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, she had reached out to me.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. And she thought it was a good proposal?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
She had some issues with it.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. And those issues, though, weren’t with respect to the engagement issue; it had nothing to do with that; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, it was some verbiage. I think she talked about some people had some concerns, right.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. And so in this proposal, of course, it says that upon an agreement to the proposal, you’d provide a police liaison and writing a commitment to government engagement at a later date, and that could be shared in a meeting with the protest leaders, right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I believe so.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. So the plan was, and the recommendation was, is that, essentially, the Government of Canada, the political branch of the Government of Canada, would agree to a meeting with the protesters but there would be certain conditions to that and they would have to denounce anything unlawful and get out of downtown Ottawa; is that fair?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Okay. And in your interactions with the Deputy Minister and Commissioner Lucki after February 12th, 2022, did they tell you anything about what happened with this proposal?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think the proposal was kind of, like, dead in the water after the 13th when the mayor provided his letter ---
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- and then it allowed the ability to see the outcome of that.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Right. Could we bring up another document that was referred to by the Commission? It’s OPP00000172. Now, I understand this is an email from the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, Rob Stewart, to you, right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Okay. And in the third sentence on the top paragraph, it says: "We have a big meeting this afternoon where this will be discussed, so I really need your input." (As read). Right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
All right. Did you know that that meeting was at 3:30 p.m. and that it was with Cabinet, and it was the Incident Response Group of the Political Executive meeting and that your proposal was provided to them?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No.
Brendan Miller, Counsel (Freedom Corp / Convoy Organizers)
Okay. It was. I can tell you that. And then they invoked the Emergencies Act. Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay, thank you. Next, the Ottawa Police Service.
CROSS-EXAMNIATION BY MR. DAVID MIGICOVSKY
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Good afternoon, Superintendent. My name is David Migicovsky. I appear for the Ottawa Police Service. Superintendent, I understand from your evidence earlier that the PLTs came about after Ipperwash and an inquiry that was held at that time, as after Ipperwash; is that correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. I believe that the Aboriginal Relations Team was before the inquiry, like, the inquiry in 2007, but the premise of it came out and the recommendations to support the Aboriginal Relations Team was part of the recommendations.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And so that’s 1995; am I correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That’s 1995, yes, sir.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And as a result, the OPP is very experienced in the PLT program and has a very well- developed program?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir. I believe we have 25 full-time members and 100 part-time members.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And it’s recognized as one of the leaders in this area, certainly in Canada?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I believe so. Yeah, I believe the RCMP has an unbelievable program as well, especially in British Columbia.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And the OPP, as a result of its considerable expertise, provides support to other services, as well as training?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And is very -- the OPP is very experienced in the use of PLTs?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And earlier -- we don’t need to call up he document but I believe we looked at the OPP’s policy, and the policy provides for, after an event, discussing the lessons learned and then working to implement what we learned; is that part of the process?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And so the OPP continues to learn after every event; even with its vast experience, it learns more?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, absolutely. Every event is different.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And not all police services, you’ll agree with me, obviously, have the same level of training and expertise as does the OPP when it comes to the use of PLTs?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And you’re aware that since this event, the OPS have augmented their commitment to PLTs?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sorry, say that again?
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
That since the -- this event in Ottawa, that the OPS have augmented their commitment to PLTs.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I understand that, yeah. Someone had said that to me.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Right. And they have a lot more of them, more training?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I’m not exactly sure of the intricate details, sir, but I had heard that.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. Superintendent, I noticed when I was reviewing the notes of various OPP officers, there was a S/Sgt. Lisa Nichols. “Nichols”, is that the name? You don’t know her?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I have no idea.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. And so what I noticed in her notes, and I just wonder whether you are aware of it, that she indicates that she reviewed OPS’ plans and that she met OPS regularly. Were you aware of that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I don’t know who she is, sir.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Okay. And if I could you to turn OPP0556, please. Thank you very much. So if you need to, this is an email from you, Superintendent, to Giselle -- to Gary Maracle and Giselle Walker and various other individuals. And I'll scroll to the bottom so you can get the context. So you'll see at the bottom -- if you could keep scrolling please -- yeah, sorry, if you could just go up to where Chief Sloly -- sorry. Yeah, stop. Sorry, if you could go down? You'll see this is an email from Chief Sloly and he talks about the purpose of the command briefing that morning and what he wants to happen. And then if you scroll up above that email, you'll see Jason Younan sends an email to Superintendent Alakas and Abrams about the plans to address Chief Sloly's message below, and says: "I'm very concerned at the scope and intensity of the chief's messaging and his impact on Ottawa Police members and supporting agencies." (As read) And then if you go above that, you'll see you've indicated some potential concerns about that.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
And so I guess you had some concerns about Chief Sloly's messaging and what he wants to happen at that time; is that correct?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Well, I see I will attempt to expedite the PLT package, so ultimately, I was just trying to provide -- I believe it turned out to be an eight-or- nine-page document. So that way, OPS had a better understanding of how to utilize PLT, recognizing that Dr. Collins will be putting together a negotiation plan, right?
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Right. And so you indicated that you had some concerns about what was happening, and your concerns, I guess, were with respect to what involvement PLT would have in that process?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, basically how it would roll out for PLT. Yeah.
David Migicovsky, Counsel (Ott-OPS)
Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Thanks.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. I'll call on the City of Ottawa.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. ALYSSA TOMKINS
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Good afternoon, Acting Superintendent. Alyssa Tomkins for the City of Ottawa. Luckily for everyone, most of the issues I was going to canvass with you have already been covered, so I'm just going to take you to one document, and it's OPP I think five zeroes 529.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
So we see at the top that you're sending an email complimenting Diana Hampson, and I'll obviously go down to the email of which you're compliments refer to. But if you could just perhaps explain to the Commissioner who is Diana Hampson?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Diana Hampson is a retired PLT member probably watching at home, probably really happy with you right now. And this is from Dave Springer, actually, to myself, Giselle Walker, and I believe -- or Giselle might have forwarded it to me, but just talking about: "The email Diana sent earlier this afternoon serves as an example of her dedication and pride to ensure the right thing is getting done whenever possible. I shared this with our POU leads and Staff Sergeant Gauvin made a point to inform our POU commanding group (Ottawa, Durham -- whatever) of its contents, which proved to be pivotal in our discussions." So I'm just passing this on to Superintendent Maracle, who's our bureau commander ---
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Yeah.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- making sure he's aware of all the great stuff. And I'm not surprised, because Di's a dedicated officer.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Excellent. So I wanted to look at if we scroll down further, we'll see the actual email that -- is it -- I don’t want to mess up the rank -- Inspector Hampson or Staff Sergeant?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
That’s Sergeant Hampson.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Sorry. I did the best with ranks.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It's Diana Hampson.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Okay, Diana. So we see here right at the top of the page -- so it's January 31st of this year, and she's sending thoughts, it looks like, to two persons of the Ottawa Police. Is that -- do you see that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
And she provides advice based on experience. And I just wanted to take you through some of them and get you to confirm whether it's consistent with your own experience.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Sounds good.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
So if we can just go down to the second bullet, and it deals with injunctions. And she notes that: "Recent academic literature shows why injunctions are not the best solution in resolving civil unrest, and negotiated solutions provide more sustainable solutions. It puts the court at the centre of political conflict and puts us in a position to implement enforcement clauses which in this case, may not be feasible (towing, numbers arrested). Judicial will impede ability to mediate and negotiate towards resolution." So is this consistent with your own experience?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So when it comes to injunctions, sometimes there is issues when it comes to enforcement and all that stuff. I don't know the academic literature and what she's citing. I -- sometimes in more complex situations, I really like the idea of injunctions as it really takes the guesswork out of what's too far and what's not too far, ultimately, and then it allows us to do our job with clear direction.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Yeah. And just to go to the fifth bullet: "Our experience in civil injunctions serve to inflame the group. They burn them on delivery, ignore them, and force police to contempt arrest authority where charges are eventually dropped. RCMP in BC at the Wet'suwe'ten event have had some success with conditions imposed. I suggest they can provide suggestions. Kyle Freissen, (now Surrey) legal counsel, has vast recent experience with solidarity demonstrations and injunctions, and I suggest he would be happy to be consulted." So that’s something that she suggests to OPS. Is it consistent with your experience as well?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Kyle Freissen's a great lawyer, and he's taught on our PLT course, and going to legal for legal advice is never a bad thing.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Yeah. So you'll agree though that there's complexities around injunctions that go far beyond the legal issues and they take in a whole socio ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
--- dynamic?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
And these were concerns that the OPP was expressing to OPS January 31st?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, that Di was expressing for sure.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Diana, yes.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
And that you said deserved to throw in her file in a commendment.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, for sure. I'm going to give here one now. Thank you very much.
Alyssa Tomkins, Counsel (Ott)
Thank you for your time, Acting Superintendent. Those are my questions.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. Now for the Ottawa Coalition, please.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. EMELIE TAMAN
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Merci, Monsieur le Commissaire. Good afternoon. My name is Emilie Taman. I represent the Coalition of Ottawa residents and businesses. I just have two areas I'd like to go over with you this afternoon, if I may, and the first has to do with something we've heard a bit about over the course of this inquiry to date, and that has to do with the -- what occurred at Coventry Road on February the 6th. And you indicated that the PLT had negotiated an agreement with protestors at Coventry Road to remove fuel from that location, right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, ma'am.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And that you were frustrated or disappointed that the OPS POU undermined that trust that was being built by arresting protestors who had left Coventry with fuel in accordance with the agreement that had been negotiated? Is that accurate?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I thought it was a mistake that could potentially impact down the road, yeah.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So what was your understanding of where the fuel would be going when that agreement was negotiated?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I didn’t have an understanding of where the fuel was going. The information that was relayed to me was that they needed to remove the fuel from the area or they would be arrested.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
But you didn’t understand that the convoy participants would be taking that fuel from sort of the periphery of downtown and into the red zone, did you?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
In your view, would it have been consistent with the agreement to take the fuel from Coventry Road and bring it -- essentially bring, like, literal fuel into a literal fire in the core of downtown Ottawa?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Would it be consistent with what I thought the agreement was?
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Yeah.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I wasn’t there for the agreement. My understanding of what the negotiated agreement was, was that they were going to -- they were asked to get them to remove the fuel, right ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
M'hm.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- or they would be arrested.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Okay. And would it be your view then, and I'm just trying to understand, like, if I can just be direct, kind of ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- where public safety considerations were being factored in to the negotiations that were taking place with the Freedom Convoy participants. And I'm just wondering, in your view, what would have been the preferred way of preventing that fuel from ending up in the core of downtown?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I'm not against preventing the fuel from going downtown. I'm against breaking trust when it comes to a program that's there to build trust and has a very important role in keeping trust for the safety of communities. And so if it was a matter of, hey, guys, just to let you know, people are coming here to take the fuel and they will be charging you as a result of whatever they've decided to charge them with, then that would be a more amicable solution and we could have easily done that. What the issue was, is was a miscommunication of we're not going to arrest you if you leave with fuel, and then we're going to arrest you when you leave with the fuel. That was the concern for me. So if it was a matter of the communication being clear, but, hey, you're not allowed to have this here, it's also impacting positively on the unlawful, unpeaceful protest that's happening in the City of Ottawa, I would have 100 percent said, yeah, let's support that, for sure; right? But the issue was that the communication wasn't clear as to what the objective was and then it damaged potential trust with the group; does that make sense?
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Yeah, it makes sense because building trust is key to resolving the matter more globally. It's bigger than any one particular incident.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right. But would you agree then that there was maybe a communication failure on a number of different levels, that perhaps the agreement that was negotiated with the convoy protesters itself was deficient in some way, if it actually permitted them to leave Coventry Road with fuel? Because the objective, I imagine, was to get the fuel out of the city. But if the consequence was that with impunity they could take the fuel from there and bring it downtown, that might have been a communication flaw in the negotiations themselves?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I think the flaw is the fact that there was a bunch of stuff happening quickly that day ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
M'hm.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- that a unified command table where people could actually understand the assignment and all the stuff that happened, and in the event that, you know, there's miscommunication, it's because people aren't there for the conversations; right? And so if an Incident Commander who is in charge of it, and he says, "This is what I need you to do," and then you go and do it, and then it impacts a program area, then there's a problem.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right. Right, and I think it's important for us to understand that, so that we can prevent making these kinds of mistakes in the future.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So I'd like to ask you a couple of questions about the framework that you discussed, the NACP framework, and it has an OPP kind of equivalent, I guess; is that right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And you'd agree with me that that framework contemplates taking a flexible approach to demonstrations?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, taking a measured approach, yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Okay, a measured approach. And I'd like to ask you some questions about that as well, but would it be fair to say that there's no correct way, you have to adapt your implementation of the framework to the particular circumstances that are before you?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I think I used flexibility and the word nimble very often in my ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- conversations.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And so I won't ask the document to come up, but we looked at it earlier and this is the National Framework document. And certainly, if you need to see it, let me know, but I'm just going to quote one part and ask for your comment on it. So it says, "Attention may also be paid to the community at large, who while not directly involved, may be impacted by a demonstration and assembly. The measured approach recognizes the need to balance individual rights and freedoms while also recognizing the rights of the general public, local residents, and businesses to a safe environment. Regular activities of the community at large may be periodically delayed or interrupted." (As read) Sorry.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
This is all being translated and ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- interpreted, so please, slow down.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Got it. "Regular activities of the community at large may be periodically delayed or interrupted and police should work to minimize those impacts when working with demonstrators." (As read) Does that sound accurate to you?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
But you understand that the residents of Ottawa didn't feel their community was peaceful -- excuse me -- or safe at pretty much any time during the Freedom Convoy occupation?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And you may be aware that the former Ottawa Police Interim Chief Steve Bell testified yesterday about how the community was used as leverage, a leverage point with the Freedom Convoy to have their voices heard. Do you agree with that assessment?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I don't understand. I didn't hear ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
M'hm.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- Deputy Chief Steve Bell.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So he talked about how, as I understood his evidence, and you can just tell me if you agree with this statement or not ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- that the community was used -- disruptions in the community were used as a leverage point with the government by the convoy to have their voices heard. In the sense that the more the community was inconvenienced or disturbed, the more leverage they felt they had with decision makers. Do you agree with that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I'm not really too sure. Like, I'm -- I don't have an opinion on that actually.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Okay. So do you have any sense of why, for example, the persistent honking of horns would have been a tactic used by the convoy in the core of downtown?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Oh, for sure. Yeah, yeah.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And would you agree that that was likely to disturb people that lived in the vicinity?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Is it -- okay, so you're asking me if I think that the citizens of Ottawa would be disturbed by all the stuff that's going on by the protesters?
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Yeah ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, a hundred precent. So the protest was unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe. I've made that extremely clear.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
M'hm.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
And this and, yeah, a hundred percent it would be horrible to be a citizen during that time.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And in your view, based on the information that you have, do you think that was a side effect of what was happening, or it was a deliberate tactic?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I don't know.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
You don't know.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I don't -- like, I don't -- no, I can't speak on behalf of the protesters.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Sure, okay. So you talked this morning about I think you described it as a continuum analogous to a use of force continuum ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- between negotiation at the one end, and if I understood you, tactical intervention on the other. Is that ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- accurate?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
And you're trained to move more towards the tactical intervention side when the negotiations are no longer bearing fruit?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
So when you're determining whether and how quickly to move closer to that tactical end, would you agree that ongoing harm to the community is a factor that should be given significant weight?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Absolutely. I think the issue here, right, so I think a lot of people probably would have been able to move in quicker had they had the means and the opportunity to do so. The issue was, is that in the absence of the ability to have Public Order intervention, we were left with options that would be miniscule in nature, whether it's charging people with jerry can offences ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
M'hm.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- or trying to negotiate blocks of roads, negotiate different areas, so that way there could be a tactical intervention that we had the capacity to do.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right. And do you think it's fair to characterize fuel canisters downtown, where there are open fires and fireworks being deployed as minor infractions?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
No, I'm saying in the grand scheme of things, I don't think charging someone with a jerry can offence is going to open roads or get people to leave.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right. And in this context, essentially, it's your view that, for whatever reason, be it resources or otherwise, it was a bit of an either or ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
What's that ---
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- as between enforcement of minor offences, as you said, and putting an end to the occupation?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It was and either or? No, no, no.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Let me rephrase my ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay. Go ahead, sir [sic].
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
If you're implementing the national framework or the measured approach in a properly resourced environment where you're able to do everything that you want to do ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
M'hm.
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
--- in dealing with a demonstration or occupation, would it be appropriate to deal with both the minor infractions and bringing an end to the negotiation -- or to the occupation, sorry?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, yeah, for sure. Like, so ideally, obviously, the protest would be lawful, peaceful, safe; right?
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Right.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
If I had a wish list, that would be one of my wishes for this; right? But that's not the case, and so at the end of the day, like, there was certain things that could be done by police, and obviously, there's an Incident Commander that definitely oversees a lot more than just PLT to take into consideration; right?
Emilie Taman, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Okay. Thank you very much. Those are my questions.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Okay. Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. I'd like to call on the JCCF and Democracy Fund.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HATIM KHEIR
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
Good afternoon, Acting Superintendent Beaudin. I'm Hatim Kheir. I represent the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms. So am I correct in thinking that negotiation is one of the tools that police have available to them when responding to a demonstration of civil disobedience?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And in fact, it's a tool that police should be using and prioritising?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I believe in it, yes.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And you talked about a measured approached, we've heard a lot about that today. You know, helping me out from a civilian perspective, is it fair to say that a measured approach is a strategy that leads with negotiation and then escalates to enforcement as necessary?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, hopefully getting that compliance; right? Like obviously people want to be heard, right, I think we've heard that a lot throughout this incident, and ultimately if there is opportunities to have them heard, while ensuring lawful, peaceful, safe protests that's obviously what we're trying to achieve; right?
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And you agree that had a measured approach been implemented the protest could've been ended much sooner?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I do.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And so we heard earlier about a proposal where a meeting with federal politicians would be offered, and then in exchange leaders would tell protesters to leave and denounce unlawful behaviour; right?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And this plan, if implemented, do you think it could've reduced the footprint of the protest?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think so, yeah. I think people, like probably would have opt in there. Like I talked to -- like I said before, I talked to Mike Acton, who I believe and trust in his craft, and he had said with Tom Marazzo, he thought 60 percent of people would be following Tom Marazzo.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And so placing that within the larger strategic goals, reducing the footprint would then reduce some of the challenges faced by officers undertaking enforcement efforts?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And -- so then, therefore, it would've reduced perhaps the need for the numbers of officers in engaging in enforcement efforts?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And would you also agree that it would've have reduced the need for enforcement itself to the extent that each protester who leaves voluntarily is one less protester who has to be taken away by force?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, the more people that end up leaving an unlawful, unpeaceful, unsafe event, the better off it is for a police intervention.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
Sure. And you know, looking back at what actually happened, would you agree that negotiation was a tool that was actually underutilised in the response?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I thought there was missed opportunities there. When I walked into rooms and there was several PLT people sitting in a room, I felt they should -- I think I said this earlier, right, they should probably be out speaking to people and trying to find the sentiment of on ground conversations, what's going on, how do we manage people from moving, getting out of different areas.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And to the extent that negotiations did actually take place, would you agree that they were undermined by misguided enforcement efforts, for example, the incident at Coventry Road?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Coventry Road we definitely had a miscommunication issue, and in my professional opinion I think, you know, had we have had some sort of structure in place that probably would've been avoided. With that being said, when I -- like so talk about Confederation Park, you know, that was a negotiation that went extremely well and people ended up leaving as a result of their respect for the Algonquin Nation.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And within this measured approach strategy, part of the idea is that smaller concessions are then the foundation to build up to larger concessions?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like hopefully; right? Like there's also the ability to ask for large concessions right away; right? Like, "Hey, time to move everyone here", or "time to for this to happen", or whatever. Like there's -- yeah, there's opportunities for wins along the way that are small for everyone, and then obviously it provides you an opportunity to look at the outcome and the leadership and the resolve of the group and who's willing to work and who's to not, right, and who's defiant or whatever. But ultimately, yeah, like the more opportunities for engagement and testing that trust and building it, the better off at the end.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And would you agree that the failure to properly engage with protesters, including some of the missed opportunities you talk about, led to an unnecessarily heavy-handed enforcement measures after the federal declaration of emergency?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think the -- like when you look at how professional the officers were that did Public Order, right, like no one was running in, I think that it wasn't heavy-handed in any way. It was an ability to respond to the numbers in front of them that actually were overwhelming, right, as a result of the scope, the scale, size of the protest. And when you look at it I don't think it was heavy-handed, I think it was very professionally done from a policing tactical perspective where you have very clear messaging before, very clear messaging during. And I was a little bit disappointed in a sense that that many people wanted to come out and intervene with police when they're trying to clear streets knowing that that was the outcome.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
And Commissioner, I see I'm out of time. If I could just ask one more question?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Yes, go ahead.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
Thank you. But just in terms of those numbers of people that were still there and willing to then face the police, you'd agree that had negotiations up to that point be handled differently that number could've been smaller and ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It could've been smaller, yes.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
--- that situation could've been different?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
It could've been, yes.
Hatim Kheir, Counsel (DF / CfF / JCCF)
Okay. Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you. I'd like to now call on the CCLA.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. CARA ZWIBEL
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Good afternoon, Superintendent Beaudin. I'm on Zoom. I don't know if you can - - can you see me?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, I can.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay. I just have a few questions for you, and I only have five minutes to ask them, so I will be brief. Hi my name's -- I'm sorry. My name's Cara Zwibel, I am counsel for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. You mentioned in -- when you were being questioned by Commission Counsel, you talked about the so-called separation of church and state. So the interference, you know, the concern about political interference. Can you just expand a little bit about sort of the specific concerns that you have around that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
So I didn't have specific concerns about church and state. I think in the document itself, Commissioner Lucki had concerns with the appearance of the government directing police; right? And my conversations with Deputy Minister Stewart, he did not direct me in any way, he was not ---
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Sorry. I'm sorry. My question wasn't clear. I didn't mean political interference in this instance, I mean generally what is the concern about the -- about political level individuals interfering in police operations?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, like, obviously it just shouldn't happen. Like it looks like -- for example, look at Ipperwash, right, and the issues that happened there as a result of comments made by government to that point.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay, so there's a concern about the politicisation of something that should be a matter between police and community? Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Now, you were asked about the negotiations with the City of Ottawa. Did you have concerns there that there was -- sorry, negotiations that the City of Ottawa was engaged in with protesters, that, you know, there was this potential deal to try and move some cars out of the residential areas. Did you have concerns about political involvement at that level?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think they were asked by OPS PLT I believe.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay. So it was in a sense ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I believe. I think it was ---
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
--- where the police ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah, I think it was like, "Okay, like we aren't -- like we are in stuck position here or a stalemate and how do we get some traction with negotiation"; right?
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay. And so I know we've covered the correspondence that you had with the Deputy Minister Stewart at the federal level. Did you have any contact with provincial political officials or deputy ministers related to negotiations with protesters or, you know, anything that might be offered by a provincial government that could be seen as a win for protesters?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I did not have any conversations with anyone that would be a deputy minister or a minister. I had a conversation at one point, I believe it was a Friday night, around the Windsor Bridge, offering basically a letter. Not exactly sure how that came to me, but I was invited to a meeting. It was someone in the provincial government, and they had ultimately asked for a letter to go out to the protesters. And it was coordinated through Carrie Vanbeek, and so an inspector in the OPP ---
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
--- and ultimately what that letter may look like, and then it went to the protesters the day before or the night before the police action or intervention in Windsor.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay. So there was some provincial involvement in terms of the Windsor Ambassador Bridge blockade, but nothing that you're aware with respect to the situation in Ottawa?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Nothing that I was aware of in the City of Ottawa, no.
Cara Zwibel, Counsel (CCLA)
Okay. Thank you so much. Those are all my questions.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay, thank you. Next is the OPP.
On behalf of the OPP, I have no questions.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Any re-examination?
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
None, Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
None. Okay. I just have one question, and you may not be able to answer it, but you were involved in the, if I can call it, the end piece when they ended the protest and police involvement. And you were involved with the PLTs at that time?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Was there any option offered at that time for continued, lawful demonstration? In other words, if people, and assuming there were demonstrators who wanted to continue a lawful demonstration because their aims had not been yet achieved, was there an option made available to them somewhere, some way to do that?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
I think during it, sir, like there was opportunities every day for people to take part in lawful and peaceful, safe demonstrations, and throughout there was not people saying, "Okay, let's go and we're going to go here." And so when people were leaving, right, so not everyone got arrested; right? "Like you can go anywhere, but you just can't be on the street here"; right? "So if you'd, like, walk that way, go over there, whatever." And if someone wanted to set up on a -- you know, wherever, I'm sure there would potentially be an intervention or whatever, or a conversation or whatever. But as long as it was lawful, peaceful, safe, I don't really know if anyone would've done anything about it. But that being said, I understand that it was such a dire need to clear and regain those streets that they needed to return it to a state of normalcy.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Yeah, I'm just trying to understand, and I appreciate what you say about the ongoing, but I'm -- and you may not know the answer. But as I understand there was a, sort of a exclusion zone created ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- and people couldn't go in except certain individuals.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
And what was the final direction to people? Was it "you have to leave the zone"? I'm talking about the final days when ---
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yes. So ---
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- there was action. Was it at that point there would be action, you had to leave the zone, the protest was over, or was there an offer of something?
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Yeah. It was basically you had to leave the zone. So there were stronghold areas, right, like areas where they were indefensible positions where there was a variety of different trucks, cars, whatever parked; right? So the objective I believe for that day, and the Public Order guys will probably be able to tell you more, was to ensure that that was all cleared and take back that space and return the city to a state of normalcy. There was no -- like I don't know exactly where people were directed to go, but they just couldn't be in those areas that were being cleared; right? And so my concern for that day was minus 22, we we're in a windstorm, and you know, from a humanitarian perspective I was hoping that we had a warm bus for people to go on to so that that way no one's freezing to death if they slip around the corner; right? And so outside of that, I don't exactly know what considerations were put into place other than providing an egress route for people to leave.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Thank you, that's very helpful. Thank you for your testimony and for coming to the Commission, and thank you for your work. We're going to take the afternoon break. You're free to go.
Marcel Beaudin, Supt (ON-OPP)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
And we'll take 15 minutes and come back with I believe it's a new witness. Okay.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes. La Commission est levée pour 15 minutes.
Upon recessing at 4:05 p.m.
Upon resuming at 4:19 p.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is reconvened. La Commission reprend.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay, good afternoon. I just -- I’m sorry to be coming back always sort of quickly. I know everybody’s trying to cooperate but we’re -- obviously, we all want to get out early so I’m trying as much as possible to keep the schedule. Okay, so we have a new witness.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good afternoon, Commissioner. It’s Frank Au for the Commission. Our next witness is Supt. Bernier from the Ottawa Police Service.
If we could, perhaps, just identify for the record that Supt. Bernier, as you can see, has a few documents in front of him. It’s just his scribe notes, the Institution Report, and a clean copy of his witness statement.
The Registrar (POEC)
Supt. Bernier, will you swear on a religious document or do you with to affirm?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I’ll swear on the Bible, please.
SUPT. ROBERT BERNIER, Sworn
EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernier.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Good afternoon.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We met in August when you attended an interview with the Commission?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And after the interview, we prepared a summary of your interview, which you reviewed and made some changes?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I'm showing you a copy of the finalized version, WTS00000030. It'll show up on the screen. So this is the document that you've reviewed and approved. If you like, we can scroll down a little for you to confirm.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Could you scroll down a bit, please?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
If you can go back up? A little bit more, please? Okay. A little further down, please. Some more down. That's fine.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Is this the final version?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you adopted the contents of this summary?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. Now let's start with your policing background. I understand that you are a trained Incident Commander?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You've attended training of various levels of the Incident Command System?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Both in Canada and abroad?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us more about your training.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
My initial training from a commander standpoint started as a Public Order Commander through the RCMP here in Canada, which further then I progressed into initial incident Critical Incident Response Commander training. That was at the Canadian Police College. I furthered my command experience and training and certification in order management by going to the UK, where I was certified as a bronze and silver Commander. Continuing on, I took the next level of Incident Command training with the OPP as a Critical Incident Commander, and that was a four-week course. And that would be, in a nutshell, the different levels of Command training that I've received.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. Now you've served for over 28 years with the Ottawa Police?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And during that time, you have been responsible for many large-scale events. Could you tell us about some of those?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I responded to the -- a tragic death and shooting at the Cenotaph and subsequent shooting in the Parliament Hill. I responded as a -- and took over as an ad hoc Commander on the ground during that incident. It was protracted throughout the day and quite complex. I have also been involved with the North American Leadership Summit that took place in the mid-2016 time period, whereas the Public Order Commander and Planner for that event here in Ottawa. I've also -- after being certified as a Critical Incident Commander, I would be in a position of a Duty Inspector in charge of police operations on duty police operations on the road, which would result in me having to go take command of critical incidents, could be armed barricaded person, hostage taking, those type of thing. And I've -- over the period of four years that I was a Duty Inspector responded to approximately 48 critical incidents as a commander. I subsequently as well upkeep my training by attending Public Order training, tactical training, negotiator training, scribe training on a yearly basis to stay current with all the best practices and that interoperability with all the assets that I would be commanding during those various events.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now I understand that your role during the Freedom Convoy event evolved over time in January and February; am I correct?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So in mid-January, you were the Inspector in charge of the Information Unit at the OPS?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
At that time period, I was the Inspector of the Communications Branch.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Was that part of the Information Directorate?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then you became the Commander in the Service Command Centre?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Into February I was asked by Superintendent Drummond to go into the Service Command Centre to support Inspector Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing the Service Command Centre, and we jointly took that role of overseeing that centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now I'll be taking you through those roles later on, but as an overview, I understand that on the 10th of February, you became the Event Commander with the responsibility and authority to oversee the operations that ended the protest or occupation in Ottawa; am I correct?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So let's start with what you were doing as the Inspector in charge of the Communications Unit. What were your responsibilities back then?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I was responsible for the Communications Centre, 9-1-1 Dispatch, the Police Reporting Unit, as well as the Command Centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was it during that time around mid-January that you first came to know about Freedom Convoy?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, during the -- on the 18th of January.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about the circumstances in which you came to know about the convoy.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
As the Administrative Inspector overseeing the Command Centre, I periodically would go onto various functions that they would do. And one of those functions is every week, every Tuesday, they run an eight-week demand for service outlook for events, demands for proactive duties that police officers would need to do. There would be internal stakeholders that would attend this meeting, and they would ensure that the different demands are assigned, and appropriate actions are taken for upcoming events.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I want to ask you about this meeting on the 18th of January. Who attended?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There were multiple members, either from the Command Centre, from Special Events, and in this particular case, the Duty Inspector, the Platoon Inspector who would normally be responsible for that call was tied up on a critical incident, so they were not present on that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if we look at your summary at the bottom of page 1, which is ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- shown on the screen, there's some names there that you provided to us during the interview. Does that refresh your memory?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely. Would you like me to read them out?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So this morning we heard from Inspector Lucas. So was he there at this meeting?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Wouldn't be physically there, but it was a ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- conference call.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
He was in attendance ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- remotely. There's also references to Staff Sergeant Kennedy, and we know from examining Deputy Chief Ferguson that he was in her planning team.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then if we go to the next page? Sean Kay, who was Sean Kay?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
He would be part of the Special Events Team.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Also reporting to Deputy Chief Ferguson?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Through ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Through ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- through multiple ranks, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That's right. So was there anyone from the Intelligence Unit who attended that call?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There does not appear to be.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And do you know why?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I do not know.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now at that meeting, as we know from this summary, at some point, you intervened, but perhaps you can give us more about the context. What was discussed during this meeting?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It takes a format where there is a spreadsheet where there the Command Centre Sergeant reads through the various events, ensures someone's assigned or it's just assigned as situational awareness. There was one element that was read off by the command centre sergeant, which indicated trucker convoys were planning to be coming into Ottawa to take over the Capital. And this was for situational awareness. As the command centre sergeant moved on to the next item, I requested that he go back to the previous item and ask a couple of questions.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you said that there was information that the truckers were coming to take over the Capital. I want to show you a document OPS00014928. I think we'll see that the title of this document says, "Command Centre Eight-Week DFSS Review." And I'm going to ask you what that means.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
DFS is the Demand for Service and review of the Demands for Service coming up in the next eight weeks.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh. Okay. Is there a way for us to rotate it? Okay. So that’s what this document is. If we go to page 5, please? So at the top of page 5 -- can we zoom in, please? Do you see the reference "Intel from Alberta Sherriff's Department"? Can we go -- make it bigger, the section under "background", so to the right? Sorry, scroll down. That’s right. So intel from Alberta Sherriff's Department. Some truckers planning to slow traffic on Canadian highways." Some of the messaging relates to attending Ottawa by January 31st to shut down the Capital, special events monitoring. Is that what you were referring to?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what did you do as a result of listening to this information?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Normally, it would be the duty inspector who would be on the call who would be making this call to -- or make an inquiry, but I requested that the command centre ensure that the intelligence unit was aware of this. Special events need to be speaking with the intel unit as things were to evolve. Given this was, perhaps, anywhere from 20 plus days away, it would be prudent to get a line of sight as to start making decisions and perhaps planning, if required, for this event, and that to ensure that all the platoon duty inspectors were aware of this even that was potentially coming.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, if we go back to the -- your summary, WTS00000030, did you talk to anyone else after this meeting?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
If I may refer to ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
After that meeting, no.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So let's take a look at the summary. During the meeting, you ---
I'm so sorry, to my friend. Might we just know what the witness is referring to when the witness is referring to something from the stack that he has? If that was the witness statement, that’s fine. If it was the scribe notes, could we know that? When the witness just refreshed his recollection, Mr. Commissioner, he looked at something. I just wouldn't mind knowing what that is.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Yeah.
Thank you.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I have an actual hard copy of what's up, and my apologies. I'll try to refer to the screen and ask for the screen version.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Yeah. You can look at your own based on what are told you have, but just say, "I'm looking at my notes," so that it's clear for the parties, okay?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if I could take you to this passage here, the second paragraph on page 2: "During the call, the presenter stated that the Freedom Convoy was travelling across Canada." And then if we go to the fourth line: "Bernier intervened and stressed that OPS needed to start preparing for the Freedom Convoy and making decisions now. He asked that the OPS Intelligence Directorate knew about the -- what the OPS Intelligence Directorate knew about the Freedom Convoy, stated that the Intelligence Directorate and a Special Events team needed to become engaged in planning for the Freedom Convoy." Does that refresh your memory?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So now, we looked -- we saw from an earlier document that Sergeant Kennedy was at this meeting. Are you aware of any actions that Kennedy took after this meeting?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I would leave it in the hands of the people who were on the call and the command centre to follow up with the direction as well. It would be now in the hands of the people who take care of those duties.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, at some point, I understand that you came to learn about what's called "Hendon Reports".
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When did you first learn about the Hendon Reports?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
January 27th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And how did you come to know about them?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The first time I attended a Hendon conference call and then further received the Hendon Report.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did you read the report dated January 27th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was your reaction upon reading that report?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It was the first time that I had seen such a report. It's quite comprehensive with input from -- and I'm combining a bit of the two, because I attended the Hendon call first and then had the ability to see the report. There's a lot of people from officer law enforcement agencies from across the country who would be feeding into this report.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I want to take you to the Hendon Report now, the 27th, which you said you read, OPP00001331. Is that the report you read?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It appears to be, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in your summary -- in the interview you attended, you told us that you became concerned after reading this report, that the Freedom Convoy could cause serious disorder in the city. Specifically, you observed that the Hendon Reports indicated that protestors were planning to stay in Ottawa until their demands were met. Was there anything else in this report that caused you concern?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It's the totality of the report. There's various elements that it was very -- like I mentioned, this is the first time that I ever saw such a thing as a Hendon Report, and around demonstrations, usually, we would not get such a comprehensive report regarding demonstrations. So the information that was contained in here is -- was something that was relatively new to me, and caused me to be concerned.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we go back now to the summary, WTS00000030, can we go to page 3, please? If we go down to the paragraph starting with, "Superintendent Bernier was not surprised." Now, you told us that when the convoy ultimately arrived, you were not surprised by the number, and that was not only because of what you read in the Hendon Report, but what you also knew about farmers clearing out massive tracts of parking space. Could you tell us more about that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So obviously, the information that was contained in the Hendon Report, although the numbers were not necessarily fully clear and fully determined, the large number of vehicles that arrived was not a surprise. I had the opportunity to be informed that there were farmer fields that had been cleared out in Vars, in which case I notified at the time -- and this is in the week of the 24th at some particular time. I don’t have the exact date that large areas, farm fields, were being cleared out.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, did you talk to Inspector Lucas on the 27th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It would have been in the week of the 24th, so on or about the 27th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So let me show you a document, OPS00003410. So this is a chain of email. If we go to the bottom. Okay. So maybe up a bit to the text. So we start at -- as an email from Michael Cudrasov to Steven Williams. Who is Steven Williams?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Steven Williams is an officer that works in the Command Centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If we go up. Following a request -- so this is an email now from Steven Williams to Russ Lucas and you as well as replying to Louis Carvelho -- sorry, not replying, but included in the recipients: “Hi. Following a request to confirm that land was being cleared to allow trucks from the Freedom Trucks Convoy to park up near Ottawa, I asked Cst. Alden to check 37 zone for this and he sent the below information and photographs.” So when we were -- further down below, we saw some photographs. “I submit this for your information and detention as required.” If we go up -- oh, that’s the top. Okay. So can you tell us about this?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely. So there were various notifications that were made, and the Command Centre was also to support to be able to coordinate some officers to validate and verify where exactly the farm fields were cleared.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so this was on -- this email’s dated January the 27th. Did you speak to anyone else about your concerns after reading the Hendon Report?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did in passing by. And once again, I have to say it’s probably in or about -- on or about the 27th where I had, in passing by, a conversation with Inspector Lucas.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No. I mean in addition to Lucas. Anyone else?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, with Superintendent Drummond.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When was that; do you remember?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It would have been on the 27th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what his role at that time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
He -- I was reporting to Superintendent Drummond as the Superintendent of the Information Directorate.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was the nature of your conversation with him?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Obviously, the concern that -- the context of my concern is that -- was for our service for what we might be faced with in the very near future. It would be concerning for our service and that, obviously, of concern for our teams that have to be prepared for that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How did he respond?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
He seemed to share the concern.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, did you eventually receive the plan, any kind of operational plan or traffic plan before the arrival of the convoy?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I’m not 100 percent sure whether it was before because I believe they arrived slightly earlier, but it was on the 28th that I did receive one of the first plans that I received on that day on the 28th of January.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Yeah. So you received a plan on the 28th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let me show you the document and see if that is the plan you received. OPP00004262. So that’s the title page. If we go down, you see that it was prepared by Sergeant Sean Key on the 28th of January. Was that the document you received?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I don’t believe this is the first document that I received.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let me show you another one, then. But did you, at some point, receive this?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you remember when?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It would have been into the evening hours of the 28th. I did not see it till I woke up in the morning. As the Inspector for the Communications Branch, when they send me this document I want to make sure that the units that I’m responsible for and may require it for operational reasons receive it, so that’s the Comm Centre, Communication Centre, as well as the Command Centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
so let me show you another document and see if that’s the first document you received. OPP00004261.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
From the cover page, without seeing the full content, this appears to be the first plan that I would have received.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So when did you receive this first plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It would have been later in the day on -- on the 28th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was your -- how did you react when you first saw this plan? Did you read it?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I reviewed it as -- to see if there was any implications to any of my sections or my cell. And it appeared to be a traffic plan, what I would refer to as a traffic plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And were you expecting a traffic plan at that time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It is not uncommon that as part of various events that there would be a traffic plan that would be accompanying a more overarching plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So that was the first plan you received, and it was a traffic plan. Were you expecting something else?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I didn’t know at that time. I did make an inquiry with Superintendent Drummond if there was another plan that would be coming. He did not know at that time.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Then what happened?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I forwarded this plan to the Comm Centre and to the Command Centre so that they have awareness of this plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And how did you come to receive the earlier document that we showed you?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
As I mentioned, that came later in the evening, in which case I was asleep when it came in. But as soon as I woke up in the morning, around 6:00 a.m., I realized that there was now another plan from the Special Events Section that was more of an overarching plan for the event.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if I could take you to the second document that you received, the one that was dated January the 28th. The document number, again, is OPP00004262. If I could take you to the Threat Assessment section. So when you read the document -- which I believe you said was the next morning after it was sent to you?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you have an opportunity to read this part?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was your assessment of this?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It is a standard section that you would find in one of our operational plans consistent with what would be there as part of the threat assessment from our Intelligence Unit.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did you have any concern?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The concern was that having, a day before, viewed the Hendon Report, which was an information intelligence report containing a lot of detail, there didn’t seem to be elements of the Hendon information as part of the threat, or more so, risk assessment.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, if I could take you back to your interview summary? By now, Mr. Clerk, we know the number well. And I want to take you to page 4 of your summary. So page 4, in the two paragraphs that we see here on the screen, you describe what you just told us about the sequence of events and how you came to receive these two plans; right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
If we scroll back up? And so there’s also reference to your conversation with Supt. Drummond on the 27th. I want to ask you something that you told us during the interview. On the 27th, when you spoke to Supt. Drummond, you told him that there seemed to be a bizarre disconnect between the intelligence contained in Project Hendon Reports and the OPS preparations. What did you mean by that? The bizarre disconnect?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So on the 27th, I participated in a conference call with the Hendon group, which was something I’ve done for the first time. That has never been part of my experience in the years of policing. It was quite an interesting experience being -- having the collaboration of intelligence to that magnitude and the sharing of that information. Second of all, having received the Hendon Report, which was a comprehensive intel or information report specific to what we were -- might be facing in Ottawa. And finally, there was a Teams meeting between Intelligence, Special Events, and the Information Directorate, myself, and Supt. Drummond were invited to attend to listen to. So that all took place on the 27th. And there -- when there was -- that’s an overwhelming amount of information for myself. There seemed to be a lot more than we often get regarding these events. So that’s where that notation of a bizarre disconnect is that there seems to be so much of this intelligence going around. How is it going to tie in to our planning?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if I -- we scroll down the page to the last paragraph on this page, around the middle there, do you see: “Superintendent Bernier was concerned that the plan appeared to be planning for a two-day event because the Project Hendon reports indicated that protestors were indenting to stay until their demands were met.”
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Right.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Could you explain your concerns?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
At the point, and not being privy to all the planning from the planning team, as that is not the section that I’m working in. And perhaps other plans that may exist. That was the sentiment that I had at that time as to the what-if.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When you read the plans, both documents that you’ve received on the 28th and that you read on the 29th, did you see any contingency planning?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So I didn’t actually see contingency plans, but there was indication that plans existed.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What were those indications?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Appendix plans that would be attached to the overarching plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Were they actually attached?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did not see them.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So when you said indications, do you mean, like, the index or the table of contents referring to the existence of those plans?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let’s move on to -- well, so you got these on -- you read them on the 29th. And that would have been a Sunday; right? Sorry, a Saturday?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you said you were looking at the documents with a view to determining whether there was any references to you or your role?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why did you do that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It’s good practice to do that, to make sure that there wasn’t any requirements from either myself or any of our sections.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And was there a role for you?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
No.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Then what did you do?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I was off for that weekend. I did have plans for the weekend.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What were your plans?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I was skiing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Did you go skiing?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I wouldn’t ask you how the skiing went, but when did you come back?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The Monday.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what did you find when you came back on Monday?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
At this point, the convoys that did arrive in town, although some may have left, there was a large quantity that had remained on the footprint, Wellington and the cross streets.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So at this time when you were the inspector, who were you reporting to?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Supt. Drummond.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What, if anything, did you say to him when you came back on the 31st?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I offered if there’s anything I can do to help.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There wasn’t a need for me at that time.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So now on the 31st, did you ask again?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, all subsequent -- I came back on the 1st, I believe, is the date ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, sorry.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- I came back.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So the first would have been -- was that a Tuesday?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Tuesday. Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you came back on the 1st and you asked if there was a role for you and he said no?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you just carried on your regular work?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
My apologies. I did come back on the Monday. So the 31st there was a conversation, as well as the 1st, which was the Tuesday.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And did he give you the same answer both times?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you asked on the 31st and the 1st. what about the 2nd?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes. Same.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You asked again?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you got ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
As I’m reporting for duty, ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- “Is there anything that you require me to do with the event that’s going on?”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Were you eventually asked to do something?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I was.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When was that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
On the 3rd.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was the ask?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The ask was for me to attend the Service Command Centre to support Insp. Debbie Palmer, who was overseeing that Centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So that’s your new role during this convoy period that you told us a little bit about. Let’s talk about the Service Command Centre. What is it?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The Service Command Centre is more so of a support centre that supports the organization when we’re dealing with extraordinary circumstances, such as a big event that has either become protracted, and that we -- it supports the event, but also supports the rest of the business continuity of the organization to ensure that we maintain policing in the rest of Ottawa.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what was your role going to be now that you’re assigned to the Service Command Centre?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Insp. Palmer had been working very long hours. They had been having to -- they’re faced with challenges of staffing the continued event that protracted for days beyond the actual event. And she needed some relief. So at the start, we both worked together so that I would have some time to get familiar with what was happening in there. And my role was to support her at the onset, with the expectation that we would be able to spell off and have a little bit better sustainability and able tog et some rest.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, I understand through the interview we had with you before, that while you were at the Service Command Centre, you took a number of steps to try to improve the organizational response. And we can see those at the next page, but can you tell us what some of those steps were? So we can go back to the top of the page. Yeah. No, sorry, the top of page 6. Yeah. You can also tell us from your memory what you did.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Certainly. To put into context, though, the Service Command Centre, the various functions that it takes care of, is it has a team of staffing officers, it will have a team of logistics officers, a team of planners, a finance element, a team of briefers briefing -- people who would brief resources going out on deployment. When I arrived, and this is by no fault of anybody. Their main focus was staffing, trying to staff a relatively large-scale event that was continuing on a 24-hour basis. That was their biggest challenge. So I started to implement some -- as a new, fresh person into the -- to that position, adopted some structure into their staffing and started breaking off people to work specifically on logistics, people that specifically are going to be focusing on if there’s plans that are going to be required as well as bringing in a finance officer. Due to the magnitude of various expenditures that we were going to be facing, it was time to bring a finance officer in to support and track that element.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. If we scroll down to the next paragraph, so the -- the end of the first sentence starts: “When he arrived, there were numerous plans in circulation, but many of them were not signed and it was unclear which had been approved. There were also delays in locating plans due to the lack of a filing system. Supt. Bernier observed that the Event Commanders were not aware of what plans the SCC...” Is that Service Command Centre, SCC?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Service Command Centre, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Some lawyers would know that as the Supreme Court of Canada. “...Bernier was not aware of what plans SCC had prepared. He noted that during Supt. Patterson’s service as Event Commander, he was based at...” And then you went on and talked about the different locations. But let me ask you about these plans. When you referred to the numerous plans, what kind of plans were you talking about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There was a request and, in that position, I would report to the Event Commander. And at the time when I first came in, there was Superintendent Rheaume, who was the Event Commander. There was a transition through that period where it went to Superintendent Dunlop and then, finally, the point that I’m talking about with regards to the plans, I was reporting to Superintendent Mark Patterson, who is coming to the Service Command Centre to request what plans exist. So as in my role, I tasked the planning team to find what plans are in existence and that had been approved. Because we have a new Event Commander, it would be prudent to be able to get them all together to present to the Event Commander for review. But I also noticed that there seemed to be a lot of plans. It was time to implement a File Coordinator to be able to manage that -- the intake of the plans, the delivery to the Event Commander and the filing of it so that we’d have a structured filing system.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So since we’re talking about plans, I want to take you to the next page of the summary, the third paragraph where you said: “Supt. Bernier stated that he was not aware of any overall operational plan with various supporting plans between February 3rd and February 10th.” What did you mean by that? First of all, what’s the overall plan and what are the various supporting plans that you had in mind?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So the initial plans that we received was specific to the event on the weekend. I was not aware of any other plan that was developed that would now take us into the next phase, if I could call that, that now they are remaining and not leaving. There was no overall plan in place on, if I could use the term, end the occupation of that -- of the protestors in that area.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you spoke earlier about the changing Event Commanders, so I want to take you to another document, OPS00007898. I believe these are scribe notes, your scribe notes, but you can confirm whether that is the case. Are these scribe notes?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What are scribe notes?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So generally speaking, it is best practice and I’m going to say actually critical to when you’re in a command position that you have a scribe, which is a person who’s trained to be a specific scribe, for an Incident Commander, whose responsibility is to keep your notes. The scribe notes, although written by another person, are the Incident Commander’s personal notes. It allows the Incident Commander to have decision-making information, whether we have to do an assessment through an NRA process, is it necessary, risk-effective, acceptable, that it could be all captured. Very difficult as an Incident Commander to be doing all of that and being able to write it down. It creates effectiveness and efficiency in being an Incident Commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So we’ll be referring a fair bit to these scribe notes. And just to understand the format, there are two columns reporting names and on the left is the -- is who gave the information; right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Right.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
If it’s a conversation, it’s the one speaking, I assume, and then the next column is who is receiving the information. So on this page, we see that the date is February 7th. By this time, who was the Event Commander?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Mark -- Superintendent Patterson.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if we go to the next page. Do you see the reference at 10 o’clock, “Creating new command model”? What is that about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So as the Event Commander, at this particular stage in his involvement, he wanted to adopt a new -- a command structure under him.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then if we go down further, there are references to “Strategic operational technical levels need to be managed”. Was there some discussion about the command structure employed previously and what the OPS wanted to move to?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
You would have to speak to Superintendent Patterson to understand what he was doing at that time. My role at this time was not involving command of the event.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I see. Okay. So -- now, we saw earlier your statement that between the period of February 3rd and February 10th, there was no overall operational plan. Were you aware of any attempt to create such a plan during this period between the 3rd and the 10th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
At the tail end, I was privy to being -- participate on a Teams meeting with the Executive where there was some direction from the Chief to develop an overarching plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So do you recall what date that took place?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That would have been the 9th, I believe.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let me take you to a document and see if that refreshes your memory. OPS00008420. And I’m going to take you to page 6. So if we go down to 1530, is this -- okay. So do you see the reference: “D/C Ferguson expressed plans to create an 8 point plan and SMEAC based on Chief’s comments to media and command and present this SMEAC tonight to outside agencies.” So a couple of things. Sorry. Did we look at the date? Maybe we scroll back up a bit to ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The 8th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So now, when you refer to an attempt to create something like an overall plan, was this the date when the meeting took place?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I would need to read through, if I could, a little bit ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Of course.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- further.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But before we do that ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- we a notation that Incident Commander, I/C, stands for Bernier; right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
These are standard Incident Command scribe sheets ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- so I was not the Incident Commander for the event.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But just so we understand, when we read the notation in these notes, when we read ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- “I/C”, can we take that as a reference to things that you said?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if we go back down to 1530, take a look at the contents.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So this was a phone call between myself and Deputy Ferguson.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that phone call.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
If I can just review to fresh my -- so, at this particular point, she was calling to look to have a plan made up. And my recommendation to the Deputy -- Deputy Ferguson, who at this point would be the strategic commander, I recommended that she go through Supt. Patterson, who was the event commander, and they should have that discussion, and then the event commander could provide the direction for making up that plan through the service command centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Just to put this in context, we have heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that February 8th was also the day when the Integrated Planning Group arrived in Ottawa, and they had a meeting that day and the following day. And so here there’s a reference to an “eight-point plan”, right? Now, there’s also the work SMEAC; what does that mean?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is a term that’s used in both planning and plan writing. SMEAC stands for Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration, Command and control.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So these notes suggest that Deputy Chief Ferguson wanted to create this eight-point plan and it was based on the Chief’s comments, right ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- with a view to presenting it to the outside agencies. Why did you recommend something else?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It was not necessarily recommending something else; it was recommending that this request should be coming from an operational command level, that if that was requested, that conversation should be going to the operational commander who will figure our the “how to do it”.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So just so we understand, was she asking you to do something at this time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That was the impression from the phone call that she was going directly to me to attempt to get a plan written with her comments that outside agencies that are wanting to come and help us need to see this plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you redirected her to the event commander, who was Patterson at the time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Reason being, it’s best that the strategic and the operational level are aligned.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why were you so concerned about who should be developing the plan? And I take it it’s your view that Patterson was -- the operational commander should be doing that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So the request for the plan should be coming from the event commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
All I was trying to do is ensure that the proper flow of discussion from the strategic level to the operational level takes place and then, from the event commander at the operational, will come to my support element to deliver what the event commander requires.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was that something you learned from all those incident command training, that this is what was supposed to happen?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did they teach you as to why would have been important?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It’s an understanding of what the difference is between strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic establishes what needs -- in the simplest terms, what needs to be done. The operational level determines how it’s done. And the tactical level does it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Okay. Let’s go to the next document. Actually, staying at the same document, let’s go down a few pages to page 9. And if we go to the time, 19:03, do you see the notation: "Met with big 12 commanders. They’re asking for our plans, asking what the plan is to use these resources in Ottawa." And then we continue to the next page: "OPS Chief went public asking for 1790. Commanders need plan for Phase 3. Commanders asked why 1790. Where will they be deployed? What are they expected to do?" Tell us your understanding, what this was referring to.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
This is very common, especially when you’re dealing with large-scale event, multi- agency response. When the requests are made for services of another agency to come and support, whether it be the Ottawa Police Service, there should be a plan that outlines exactly how many of what type of resources you need to somewhat justify ho is going to go and why they’re going to be there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
There are many questions here. Were these your questions or questions that others put to you? Like, “Where will they be deployed? What are they expected to do?”; who’s asking these questions?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
This was -- could you scroll back up, please? So this Supt. Patterson that’s speaking to me -- or in the group to the group of us with what is -- he’s explained what he’s learned. So I would imagine that following my conversation with Deputy Ferguson, she has had now a conversation with the event commander, and now the event commander’s coming to make the ask.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So they’re asking for a plan. Was there a plan in existence at that time to show them?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
If we go back -- this is what date again?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
This is the eighth.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
This is the eighth? There would not be one that I would be familiar with except for the original plan for the weekend event.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now I’m going to take you to another plan, OPP00001889. This is something that -- this is a document that we’ve shown to other witnesses and we’ve been calling it “The February 9th Plan.” Let’s zoom out and take a look at the cover. Sorry. Sorry, go back up to the title. It says, “Version 3.0”. Are you familiar with this document?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I’m familiar that it exists, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So tell us more about it.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
As I mentioned, there was various direction given that a plan needed to be developed that was an overarching plan that was going to support the numbers that were required from the ask from the Chief, as well that was going to align with what he publicly announced as being his “eight-point plan” to resolve the situation. There were people who were requested to attend our central station at 474 Elgin where they were to work on and develop a plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I want to take you to the Mission Statement, which is Section 2.1. I believe it’s page 6. Take a look at the mission statement: "To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore safe and open neighbourhoods and businesses." When you eventually became event commander on the 10th, I understand that you rewrote the mission statement; am I right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what is your view about the adequacy of this Mission Statement?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It is a Mission Statement and the purpose of a Mission Statement is to give clear direction to everyone who is going to be engaged on this, and every activity or action that they do need to align with the Mission Statement. It -- there are -- they are -- it is supposed to be short and concise. It is short and concise. It would not be a Mission Statement that I would write.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why not?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There would be elements in there that I would want to make sure that are very clear, as you will find in the Mission Statement that I wrote.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. What -- apart from the Mission Statement, what else, if anything, in your view, was missing from this plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Could you please scroll down a bit so I can just kind of review again?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Continue down, please. Continue down. Continue. Continue down. If I could please ask to go to the Index; I believe there was an Index on here?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let’s go back up. The Table of Contents.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
A couple of things that I would be including in a plan would be a Commander’s intent.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The Commander’s intent?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct. So that usually comes from the Event Commander, who explicitly sets out expectations based on the mission. What -- the expectations of all the people. So that is missing. Without dissecting it too much there were -- there are elements that maybe are not in the right category.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. Can we go to the -- this witness’s summary, please? (SHORT PAUSE)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And if we go to page 8, that’s right, the second paragraph. Sorry; go back up. “Superintendent Bernier received a copy of this plan on February 9, which was titled ‘Phase 2.1, [version] 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo’ 22’ (the February 9 Plan) The February 9 Plan incorporated the organizational chart that Superintendent Bernier prepared.” Did you prepare an organizational chart that went into this plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay: “It also included tables listing the numbers required for maintenance staffing, enhanced staffing, and interdiction and enforcement staffing.” So are these things that you have provided input into as they were organizing this plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did not personally but there were certain staffing elements based on our experience in the Service Command Centre doing the staffing for the various support elements, the maintenance elements, whether it be these static points or Quick Response Team elements, that they were in a good position to provide to the group that was developing this plan, numbers for that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. It goes on: “Superintendent Bernier and his SCC team supplied these numbers in response to a request for how many officers OPS required to maintain its response to the Freedom Convoy on a 24-hour basis. Superintendent Bernier [maintained his response -- sorry] indicated that the tables in the February 9 Plan did not include a tactical support element, and that it was unclear to him whether there was a mass arrest and processing plan.” What’s a “Tactical support element”?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
They’re -- it would be more -- better to say all the specialized elements that you would need. So in a public order operation you need Public Order Units, you need Tactical Team supports, perhaps a CBRNE team, which CBRNE stands for Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive Unit, which would make up all the true numbers that you would need for a significant operation of this magnitude.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you told us earlier that between the 3rd and the 10th you were not aware of any overall plan, and since you received this on the 9th, did you consider this to be an adequate overall plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So this was being developed, and I don’t know what time I received it at and at what point it was actually completed. This is, I would say, moving in the direction and an overall plan. I would like to go back to the plan again to, once again, look at what elements were still missing in it, because in the execution piece, that would be telling me whether there was an actual plan on how they were going to carry out the removal of the occupation.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you not review this plan ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- in preparation for this?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I would like to, if I could, please review it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let’s do that. Mr. Clerk, do you still have the number? Thank you. (SHORT PAUSE)
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So if you can scroll down, please? If we can go to the execution? (SHORT PAUSE)
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Please scroll down. (SHORT PAUSE)
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Please scroll down, next page. Again to 3.2. Three point three (3.3). The next point, please. A lot of this information in this is really more of a situational element versus how you were going to execute the plan. So if you were to ask me about whether this is an overall plan, there are missing elements. We talked about appendix plans or additional plans to support the overarching plan. At this point there would be requirements for multiple public order plans, arrest, detention, processing plans, what’s the PLT plan that’s going to be -- when I say PLT, Police Liaison Team plan. There’s a lot of elements that would be required to be, say, on the 9th we’re ready to go with something.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let me ask you, then, if we go back to the witness summary, what is the impact on the OPS response to the convoy event, because these elements that you are now telling us were missing from this plan; what’s the consequences? If we go to page 7, during the interview you told us -- so, sorry; go up a little bit. So this paragraph that starts: “Superintendent Bernier also observed that, in the absence of an overall plan, OPS prioritized low-level enforcement activities such as ticketing and fuel seizures during this period.” First of all, just to be clear, “This period” does it refer to the earlier paragraph as between the 3rd and the 10th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So here you said the OPS lacked an overall plan and was prioritizing these other things. Was that an accurate description of what happened during this period?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That, amongst other smaller operations that were being attempted or tried to be planned for, but the overarching was the ticketing, seizure of gas, and various levels of enforcement.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So let me ask you first about ticketing, because there is at least -- there seems -- there is at least a perception that the OPS did not encourage ticketing because of concern about volatility and so on. So how much ticketing was actually going on during this period?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
In my role at that time, that was not in my purview. That would be within Insp. Russ Lucas, Supt. Patterson to be monitoring and tracking that. But I knew, based on our conference calls in our updates that there was a focus on that. I'm not aware of whether they were having issues at the tactical level of what you just explained.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what other kinds of enforcement activities did you have in mind when you made that comment?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Whether it be the bylaw, honking, the open fires, maybe liquor consumption, which is all more so either in the municipal or provincial offences.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we go down that paragraph: "He characterized OPS's focus on enforcement and messaging about enforcement as an emotional response to public sentiment that OPS was not doing enough to address community concerns. He noted that he felt the enforcement messaging was counter-productive because the public realized that enforcement efforts were not causing the protestors to leave." Can you explain what you meant?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Pretty much what I -- what's outlined there is that our strict messaging that we were putting out was surrounding how many tickets, what enforcement measures were being done. Unfortunately, from day to day, that was not showing the community that it was resolving the issue. That’s somewhat my sentiment on that. And then when was it going to be enough? How many tickets do we have to lay? How much enforcement do we have to do that will actually result in them going out, leaving? And at this point, it seemed very apparent that day after day after day of enforcement, albeit that you're seeing it may be limited, it was not having the desired effect.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. So if I can move now to a different document, OPS00008850? So can we go down -- I'm not sure if this is the right document. Let me check again. Let me preface this next line of questioning with this. In terms of enforcement efforts, we've heard from other witnesses including Deputy Chief Bell yesterday that some of the things that happened during this period included what was done at Coventry Road. Are you familiar with what happened at Coventry around this time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Generally. In my role at that time, I was not involved in tactical level command, public order command, or event command. My role was still as that support element within the Service Command Centre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I believe this is your notes or the scribe notes, OPS00007898. I believe the date is February 7, at page 1, if we go to line 41. That’s right. Do you see information from Bernier to Patterson, information from NCRCC, "POU are planning on attending Coventry." What was that about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So they're at -- as you can see, the scribe was coming in at the -- while I was participating on a conference call, so information must have been received that I received on that conference call that public were -- are planning on reattending Coventry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let's go down, I guess, to the next page. Can we go further down and see what's there at 11:05? Moments. Okay. Let's move to another area. Can we go to your summary at -- sorry? Okay. Let's try again. OPS00008858, okay. Page 2. Now, at 11:05, do you see a reference to "Patterson has decided that --- " Can we enlarge it? "Patterson has decided that Coventry is to be emptied out." And then if we go down to 11:16, "Patterson did not know that info, that OPS directed them to go to Coventry." Do you remember what this was about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, which line are you referring to?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So 11:16.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then you go down, there was information from Patterson, right, that starts with, "Did not know that info."
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I'm not quite sure.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Do you know something about the Rideau Sussex operation?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I'm familiar with that as well, of the similar nature, because at the time, my role was not at the tactical or operational level command. I was a support element in the same fashion.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can we go the witness summary at page 10, please? So it says here: "On February the 7th, after 4:00 p.m., Superintendent Patterson informed Superintendent Bernier that OPS was planning to use POU officers to clear the Rideau Sussex intersection." Do you remember having that conversation?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was your involvement at that time, if any?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
The request came from the event commander to me that he was going to require various plans in order to affect this. Although I would not have any involvement with the public order plan, that’s taking place elsewhere, there was a request to develop an arrest traffic and towing plans for that specific operation.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Were you involved in requesting a traffic plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let's go to OPS00008575. So if we go down -- I believe this is an email you sent to Denis Hull. Who is Denis Hull?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Denis Hull worked in the traffic as Staff Sergeant for the traffic enforcement section.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what was your request to Denis?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
"As per our discussion tonight, I have two requests in relation to potentially planned operations set for later this week. Could you please assign a sergeant to work with Andy Jasiak for a "Removal of Vehicle plan"? That would be similar to like what we would refer to as a tow plan. "This is time sensitive. Your team will need to liaise with Kevin Kennedy who has started something on this but will be the planner[s] for...POU..." So what I'm trying to do is get all the different groups that are trying to make a plan for this operation at least talking to each other.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
And then the second request is to develop a traffic plan in order to, whether it be close down streets to support the Public Order plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What did you think of the Rideau/Sussex operation at the time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
At this point, I would not be fully privy to all the discussions from the strategic level and at the Event Commander level. It would be hard for me to make a judgement on that not knowing what their -- what the strategic direction was, and what the -- how they were going to do it and what the intended outcome was going to be.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, in the witness summary you stated that the contemplated Rideau/Sussex operation was a typical example of the lack of proper structure, command and control that characterised OPS Operations up until February the 10th. Do you still -- are you still of that opinion?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So when you're asking about at this particular time in the event, that was my answer to the specific event. If you're talking about the various situations that we saw, whether it be the Coventry Road operation, the multiple attempts at Rideau/Sussex, and somewhat, not necessarily a wholesome approach with all key internal stakeholders for all these plans, that's what I was referring to in my statement. It was a totality of the circumstances, not the specific event.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Explain the totality to us, please.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I believe that's what I was talking about. How I was saying all the different events that were going on, whether it be the -- we have to enforce, we have to ticket on one level, coming, perhaps, from executive level; and then various -- and I cannot speak to where the directions being given, where I would imagine I would -- that from a strategic level that something -- actions needed to be taken either at Coventry or Rideau/Sussex from either the Strategic or the Event commander, where they were not all aligning and it did not appear as if it was going to have a successful overall resolution to having this end. There is risks with implementing various plans without knowing the cause and effect.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I'd like to talk to you next about the kind of communication within the OPS at the time, as well as communications between OPS and its external partners. Starting first with internal communications. What do you remember of the kind of communications challenges or successes around this time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So communication happens on multiple levels, and if we're talking about communication at briefings to ensure that everyone is aware of what's going on and what's expected of them, we were working very hard at trying to get that right because there was different groups of officers with getting different information. We have to be realistic in this. This was a unprecedented situation that we were in, and everyone was doing their best to try and do what we needed to do. So it's not laying blame or fault, it's just those were some real challenges that we were experiencing. There were so many things that needed to be thought about and implemented. There was also a communication piece internally to our members in general as to what's happening, and that was something that we heard very loud and clear that there wasn't a lot of internal messaging within the organisation to understand what we were trying to do, what's the objectives, what do we need from our members.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let me take you to your summary and see if that's something that you said at the interview reflects what you just told us. If we go to page 12. The very last sentence: "He stated that they were demoralized because they were not informed..." Can we go -- carry on: "...they were not informed that there was an overall plan and were not provided clear instructions, such as instructions concerning their authority to seize fuel and what to do with seized fuel. He stated that members in the OPS had limited knowledge on what was going on, [and] what was happening next, or who was in charge or who was in charge." Is that accurate?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Does that relate to what you were just telling us?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you went on to say: "He had been informed that Chief Sloly confused members by going down to the OPS parade room and telling members to get out onto the streets to deal with problems. Superintendent Bernier observed that many of OPS officers were attempting to do the right thing and come up with solutions, but that they may not have had the proper background and training to do what was needed." Well first of all, you said you had been informed. Who informed you about what you said about Mr. Sloly?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Word does get around in the organisation. So that is something that I had heard that had transpired.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You don't remember who was the person -- who was the ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, I don't.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was the context, do you remember, in which this -- like what's the parade room?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So every division, we have three divisions with the Ottawa Police, every division and station within the division has something called the "parade room" where officers are briefed at the start of every shift and given their instructions for the shift, what they'll be assigned to, and any taskings that they have.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What about communications between the OPS and its external partners?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I cannot speak to that. I'm not -- I don't know what communication was happening externally. I don't have any particular access to that information.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can we go to page 6 of the interview summary? Do you see the paragraph under OPS Use of RCMP and OPP Officers? "Superintendent Bernier observed that between February 3 and 10, OPS was using RCMP and OPP officers to relieve OPS officers who were exhausted, and not as part of a plan to end the occupation. He stated that he was aware that OPP officers were often not receiving instructions or assignments from OPS during this period." Was that an example of a communication issue?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So -- yeah. There was a bit of a breakdown, and that's something that we had to adjust even within my purview. That we -- the Service Command Centre in liaising with whatever agency was coming in, as part of that briefing element, that was something that we had to -- we recognised and had to adjust to ensure... Once again, this is quite extraordinary circumstances where we had officers coming from maybe a handful of officers from various municipal services, we had OPP officers who were going to different locations, we had RCMP officers who were briefing out of another location. So it took us quite a while to get that coordinated piece to ensure that the messaging that they were getting was consistent for all officers that were being deployed. It unfortunately was a reality at the early onset of this, and we made every effort to correct that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So up to now we've been talking about events before you were appointed Event Commander, and that happened on the 10th; am I right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
In the evening.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you told us during the interview that there was a condition to your acceptance of this appointment. Can you tell us about that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes. The one condition is that I wanted to have some separation between myself and the Chief and to just be directly liaising with my -- the Strategic Commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why did you make that a condition of your acceptance of this appointment?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Through observation and experience that I had been seeing throughout, some challenges with both at the tactical level, and the operational, the event- commander level, that the -- albeit intending to try and resolve the situation, it was causing a breakdown of the incident command structure. I wanted to ensure that I was going to go into a model that was going to respect the incident-command model that I’ve trained under, that I know, that I recognize, and tried, tested, and true.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you referred to “observations and experiences”. Tell us more about those observations and experiences that caused you concern.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So throughout the period in my involvement in the Service Command Centre, I was able to be privy to various conference calls, different direction being given where there was the involvement of the chief in a very operational level and even to the point of tactical-level directing, which somewhat caused challenges within that incident-command model.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can you give us any examples?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Redirecting groups of officers to do particular taskings such as in the community enforcement teams, redirecting traffic officers to do something different. These are -- once I said -- I tried to explain the difference between the strategic, operational, and tactical. The event commander’s role is to ensure that the entirety of the plan or the entirety of the operation is somewhat all in cohesion and working in an effective way. If there’s different people who are drawing different things or assigning different things, it will cause the rest of the operation to go off the balance. So that’s somewhat what I’m referring to.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So with whom did you discuss your concerns?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Deputy Ferguson.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was she the one who approached you to be the event commander?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
She did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When did that conversation took place?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
In the afternoon of February -- I’m trying to think -- February 10th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So she came to you and asked you to be the event commander, and you said what?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I had -- I asked to think about it and I just wanted to ensure that I was going to be in the right mindset and that I’m prepared to do this. I didn’t want to hastily jump into something if I was not prepared so I had to quickly do a self-check and ensure that I was ready to do this because I understood the magnitude and the complexity of what I was embarking on, but I advised her that I would do it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So when did you reply to her?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Later on in the afternoon.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did you get any assurances from her about your concerns?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes. And I also made a couple of other requests from her as well.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What other request?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
One of the requests that I wanted to have is that, given the -- as I mentioned, the complexity and magnitude, I wanted to have a deputy event commander working with me given the -- what I knew was going to be needed to get us out the other end. In which case, I requested a specific person.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Who was that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Insp. Dave Springer.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why him?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
He’s from the OPP. He is a major critical incident commander that I know, have worked with before. He was actually one of my instructors for the Critical Incident Command course in Orillia, the OPP, and I knew that I would be able to have a valuable support element with Insp. Springer.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What did Deputy Chief Ferguson say?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
She said she would ask to see if that would be possible?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Any other request from you?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, that I would need to some autonomy with regards to decision-making and implementing plans, and that to trust me that I was going to find the solution and lead us out the other end of this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What did she say?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
She said she’ll do he best to provide with what I needed.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So there were quite a few conditions that you made. Any others?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
They’re conditions but I really did want to line this up for success. I did see that we’d gone through multiple event commanders and I just did not want this to be the next one.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. So before you were appointed event commander, I suppose you made these observations, and did you make any attempt to correct anything that you saw problematic during the earlier period?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It’s somewhat difficult to do that. I would offer any advice or recommendation, no different than as we reviewed in the scribe notes; when the deputy was asking me for something, I tried to realign that to follow the proper channels so that the right people are informed and making the decisions and making those requests. There were odds and ends that I would have provided recommendations but, at the end of the day, to not undermine the autonomy and authority of the various levels of command. We respect that ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- and allow them to do what they feel is what’s needed.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did you feel sufficiently assured by Deputy Chief Ferguson to take on the job?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So when did you accept the appointment? Did you accept it on the same day?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct, on the 10th in the late afternoon. That was with Deputy Ferguson.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what became your immediate priorities?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So what I requested was that I needed to take some time the following day -- I needed to get some rest and then take some time the next day with -- if I was able to get Insp. Springer, I would need some time with him to sit down, evaluate everything that we had and re-establish a Mission Statement, a main action plan, objectives, and a command structure.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So let me take you to the scribe notes again, OPS00010050. So we go first to page 3. Now, you see the part where it says: "Also expressed concern about taking on that role…" And then it goes on and talks about some of the concerns you just told us about, right? If we go further down to page 4, the next page, you advise her that you: "… would consider taking this on but would need to discuss rest period, assign a proper command/control model." So you told us about the command/control model. What about the rest period?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I did go home and I did sleep that evening -- that night, and came back in the next morning. So I got some rest that night.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. And then further down: "…as well as building a proper team." Is that what you talked about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct, so establishing that command and control, I had a vision as to how I would want to set up an Integrated Command Table team and who I would need around it, and I wanted to discuss a little bit more wholesome with Insp. Springer to ensure that I was not missing anything or get his input as well to this as we were going to be a team moving into this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So it may be -- I wonder if it’s earlier on the page. You talked to us about wanting some distance between yourself and the former chief, the Former Chief Sloly. How was that concern in particular addressed?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I requested -- at this particular time, I requested that Deputy Chief Ferguson be the go-between.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And that would be appropriate. If she’s the strategic commander, the Chief would be dealing with the strategic commander for any of his wishes or direction and it’s up to the strategic commander then to filter to the event command level, the operational level, as to what is needed to be done. And when I’m saying what, it’s a very high level. What are the high-level objectives.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so you started by saying “At this time” that she was the go-between.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did that change at some point?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes. As we built out -- and once again, I talked to you about that structure, we incorporated an executive liaison person to -- there was a lot of meetings and a lot of requests to attend meetings, which as long as I have the strategic direction, I need a lot of time to get the job done to do the work. And having an executive liaison as a go-between would create that efficiency and effectiveness that the executive would still be informed and have an avenue to be able to be in touch with me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And who was that person?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Supt. Drummond.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When did that happen?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It happened relatively quickly. It would be within probably somewhere between the 11th and the 12th. I would say maybe the 11th or the 12th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let’s see if this will help refresh your memory. OPS00010371 at page 4. Actually let’s stay there. We’ll note the date. February 12th. And then we go to page 4. Do you see the first line?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
“Drummond to keep the position of executive Liaison” Is that what you told us just now?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so he would become the new go- between, so to speak?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, because I’m wanting to quickly align the people. If Deputy Ferguson was going to be the Strategic Commander, ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- that is her role. So I wanted to ensure that I wasn’t having her in a position where it would not allow her to do her function as well.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you accepted the appointment, you had a good night of sleep, I hope, and then the next day, what happened?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I went to my office, which I hadn’t been to in quite some time, and arranged to meet with my scribe, and as well as with Insp. Springer. This was around mid-afternoon. I met with my scribe around noon just to set some ground rules, expectations, of what we were going to be embarking on. And I’d lined up a meeting with Insp. Springer for mid-afternoon, which we met in the COMS Centre board room.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I want to take you to your notes, where you set out a whole list of priorities. This can be found at OPS00010050. At page 7, please. So we see a list here: “we agreed that Command Post would be set up in The NCRCC objectives of today…” So I’ll let you take a look at the list. We can scroll down when you’re ready.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So would you like me to say what they are?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sorry?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I agree that these are the objectives that I ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah. I’d like you to take a look at the whole list, and then explain to us what they are and why they were important to you. Can we scroll down? I think there are six listed there. So there’s more than ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There’s quite a few there. Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So tell us about these objectives. Why -- and did they -- did the number suggest their importance?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Level of importance, I’m going to say they were all very important. And this is -- what I was doing was somewhat trying to do a bit of a reset and setting up a solid foundation that we were going to be based on to move forward.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
All these elements are key elements from an Incident Command standpoint that is required that needs to be in place and formalized and adhered to to promote success in your mission.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was this an attempt to course correct when you said reset?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So why did you start with the mission statement, which was number one?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
For any operation, a mission statement is that foundation piece that everything is built off of. Everything that you do, everything that you -- when you’re making the decision whether to take action or not action, it needs to align with the mission statement. That’s why it’s a very important foundational piece.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what about the second one? The new command control structure?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can we go back up to the number two? Yeah.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
In order to have success, it is not one person that is going to be bringing you success. In an incident command model, you do have to surround yourself with some key subject matter experts that are going to be able to properly inform you and to make proper decision making.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was the third point?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
We ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We can scroll down.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
We were going to pick who we needed at that table to have success and then pick incident commanders. Because of the protractedness of this, we wanted to make sure that whoever was running the NCRCC from an operational to tactical level, that there’s a rotation of people who will be effective in maintaining that level of operation day to day until we come up with our ultimate solution to end this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So let’s talk about some of these priorities. First, with respect to the mission statement, it may be the same document, if we go down to page 11, ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Should be in my notes there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Page 11. Fifteen oh one (1501) I think is the time I’m looking for. So is that what you decided upon as the mission statement?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That is correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Could you read this to us?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
“Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, inforce [sic] legislation, maintain pubic [sic] safety for the duration of the Ottawa truck demosntrations with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights, to peacefull [sic] assembly, freedom of speech, officer and Community safety and well being.”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we might have seen the same mission statement before on what we call the February 13th plan. Do you know the one I’m referring to?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So we may look at that a bit later, but this statement, as currently phrased in your notebook, or your scribe notes, was it the same as what was put into the February 13th one?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So it’s definitely, I would say, very accurate. If there might be a word here or there, if we want to do a comparison, I’d be happy to do a comparison with the plan as to ensure, if you’d like to. I’m quite satisfied that the gist of everything that I was trying to outline in this is there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So given the importance you attach to mission statements, let’s unpack this a little bit. If we go back up to the beginning of this statement. First you said: “Using an integrated response”. Why -- what is an integrated response and why was that important to you?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So integrated is meaning that we’re going to be depending on various different speciality elements to come to a successful resolution. It's not going to be necessarily one particular section that’s going to resolve this. In other words, it's just not public order, it's not just PLT. It's going to be an integration. But it even goes beyond that. It's going to be an integration with many of our policing partners that are going to be part of the solution.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the next element I want to turn your attention to is the utmost respect to the individuals' Charter rights of protest, well, freedom of speech and freedom to assemble, and so on. Why is that important?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
We can never lose sight as to lawful protests that may be part, or lawful peaceful assemblies, and we have to respect everyone's Charter of Rights with everything that we do in the operation.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So and then the third element -- I think if we go -- scroll back up, there's a reference to enforce legislation, right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But to do so in a way that ensure to keep the peace and safety and so on. Tell us the importance about that.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
They're all high-level guiding principles, keeping the peace; enforcing legislation, and that comes at legislation at multiple levels, right up to the federal level, provincial, and municipal; maintaining public safety. so everything we should be doing should be moving towards ensuring public safety for the duration of this event that’s taking place.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we know that you also developed a main action plan, right?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was that about?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So the main action plan is a high-level statement of where do we want to get to?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in the interests of time, I won't take you to another document, but it's found in your witness summary and it basically say to de-escalate and negotiate a peaceful resolution and demobilization of the Ottawa truck demonstration. Am I correct?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can you elaborate on that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Ideally, the best resolution is a peaceful resolution and have everyone leave peacefully. But in the event that that’s not going to happen, it is going to be demobilized at the end of the day.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, so that was your priority number one, to develop the main -- the mission statement. You also mentioned the importance of verifying command and control structure. So I want to take you to OPP00002162. I believe this is an organizational chart. So if we go further to the right. Now, is this what you developed on the 11th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I'm seeing parts of it, but the parts that I'm seeing is yes, accurate.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So explain this to us. Why did you -- how did you come up with this structure, and why did it make sense to you then?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So I don't know if you're able to reduce it so you can see the ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you want it bigger?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- bigger picture. So it starts to delineate who's at the strategic level and who the strategic commander is.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can we go to the very top? That’s right. So at the top, the OPS command team, who's that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That would be your chief, deputies, CAO.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So he would be at the strategic level?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
He's at the highest strategic level that would be reporting to the -- or who would be responsible for the strategic commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Between the former chief and the Deputy Chief Ferguson, there are these two boxes, the legal and the communications. What's the significance of putting them there?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So that is fed through the strategic command and belongs at the strategic level with regards to legal advice. Not to say that corporate communications doesn’t exist down at the operational level, but those are the key support elements that are found up at the executive level.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, when you were working on this organizational chart on the 11th -- and this chart suggests that it is only the OPS command team at the top -- there's no reference to the OPP or the RCMP. So when we read earlier in your notes and your mission that it's supposed to be an integrated approach, did integration, to your mind then, refer to integration with external services such as the OPP or the RCMP?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There's a difference between integrated and unified.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Explain the difference to us, please.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So in this particular case, this a single event commander with an integrated command team, command table that’s supporting it. When you're talking about a unified command, is that you're going to have multiple commanders of equal value forming the top event command positions. That’s what we did eventually move into with the RCMP and the OPP, but this is the model that was implemented upon me taking command and for the next few days.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, you told us that based on your observations and experiences in the earlier part of the convoy events, there were issues that you observed, and when you are now the event commander, did you make any attempt to -- like, when you said reset, what was that reset? Like, how were you correcting what you thought was not working before?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Once again, as I mentioned, I think there's a lot of people trying to do a lot of good things. So what I'm trying to establish here is getting all those people around the table to work together to come up with the final plan, because it will not be successful without those elements around the table with me. And that’s why, as you can see, my command table has key elements to ensure that everyone has the voice and feeds me right information to be able to make informed and proper decisions.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I apologize. I realize I wasn’t specific enough. So for example, taking the Coventry or the Rideau Sussex incident, how would this command structure be able to improve on what was problematic, as you've described before?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So we're going to be getting feedback from whether it be the police liaison team, it could be the public order commanders, it could be a resourcing piece from the service command centre liaison that we would -- everyone would be able to feed into. This is what we were wanting to do. We're trying -- this is how we're going to try and do it, who has what to say about this. And this is where we might find where there's risks or issues that need to be -- well, I'll use the term again, NRA'd. Is it necessary? Is it risk-effective? Is it acceptable, what we're going to do? Have everyone around the table, from the investigations, from the intelligence, feeding us all the proper information we need to make quick and proper decisions.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So for example, we see at your command table POU chief, right? Is that Public Order Unit?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And now, next to the POU, there's a small redaction.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. I'm not quite sure why that’s redacted, and it should be PLT chief.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So Wallace?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So Wallace was a mistake in spelling.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But Wallace was ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It's Walker.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, okay. And -- I see. And Walker was part of the OPP ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- PLT team?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So -- and then we see further to the left, executive liaison, Acting Superintendent Drummond?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And that speaks to your concern about keeping some distance with the former ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It's -- there's a combination of things. It's establishing a healthy communication channel, so to ensure that the executive had been properly informed, properly kept up to date, as well as an avenue to be able to feed something to me if I needed to know something from that level.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the intelligence part is also represented at this table by Inspector Bryden.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now going back to the blue box near the top, how does putting the communication piece there help ensure or improve communications?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
So communications is -- and if you want to scroll down, there's another piece to it that's down at my level, the far right with the media. And media chief was not necessarily a proper term. It's more of a general corporate kind of communications that assisted me with all messaging. All, anything that would go out to the media would be drafted up and sent to me for approval before it was to be sent out, because -- and similarly, messaging internally, messaging to partners would be all -- and messaging with PLT would be worked in unison with that piece.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then for both you and for your Deputy, there are scribes who record things while you are busy doing things?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. Now so this is what you achieved on the 11th of February. We've heard that this Integrated Planning Group has arrived in Ottawa since the 8th. And when did you first have a conversation with anyone in that group about your new plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I'd have to refer to my notes to know exactly, but it would be either the following day -- either the following day, so this is the 11th, so I'm thinking it's the 12th. Could be the 13th that I actually had a conversation with a member of the Integrated Planning Team.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Perhaps before we talk about your work with that group, let's first talk about what you did with this plan that you started to develop yourself on the 11th. What was your next step, once you had this command structure clarified, your mission statement and main action plan at least outlined, what else did you do?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
There was a check-in that wanted to -- that needed to take place, and it's my understanding that Deputy Ferguson was taking some time off and that Deputy Bell was taking over. So I felt it probably appropriate to brief up to my strategic commander, who Deputy Bell was taking that position while Deputy Ferguson was off, to provide an update as to the work that had been achieved that day in establishing the foundation that we're talking about here.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So did you touch base with Deputy Chief Bell on the 11th?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you know what time?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I would have to refer to my notes if ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you ---
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
It was later in the afternoon. It was ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
--- around dinnertime.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you also meet or talk to the Chief?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
My recollection says that there was a conversation with the Chief.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Let me take you to your notes. OPS00010050. I'm going to take you to page 17. If we go down to 18, looks like 1820 -- actually, go up a little bit. So 1814 reported information from you to the Chief just to point out -- can you read that to us, please?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, "just to point other services are sending but with strings attached."
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What did you mean by that?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
From what we were getting from the Service Command Centre Team is that there were requests for if they were going to come, they would like to have static positions, not necessarily want to get into other quick response teams, and there was sometimes challenges with getting them to do enforcement pieces that would be required if that was the case. That was historically what we were seeing in my previous role.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So during this discussion with the Chief, were you talking about this new plan that you're trying to develop?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you see at -- I'm not sure what time it is after 1814. What's the next entry?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
1815.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
1815. And there's a notation that the Chief said to you, "I'm okay with everything you said/requested - with your email add org chart and mission." Tell us your best recollection about that conversation.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I presented the whole background and reasoning of what I was doing and why I was doing it. This affirmed to me that the Chief was understanding what I was saying and that we were doing that reset, so to speak.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now when you call it a reset, how much of what you were doing was based on or derived from the February 9th plan, the 3.0 plan?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I'll have to be honest, I did not necessarily, at this particular point in time, know what portion of it is, what portion I perhaps would use or adopt. This was quite in the infancy where there is going to be a bit of work to be done over the next few days, not discounting any good ideas that may be out there and analyze everything, because at this point, I wasn't aware that there was an Integrated Planning Team. I was preparing myself to have to put together a strong planning team to come up with an eventual final plan to get this done. So at this point, as I mentioned, that was -- I was going to be directing somebody to start based on clear expectations, developing a plan, but perhaps not discounting some good elements that would have been in there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now let me take you to the next document, OPS00014454. I believe these are notes taken by legal counsel of the OPS, Ms. Huneault. If we can go to page 160, please? Can we go down a bit? So we see a reference to the Chief saying want LS. Is that legal services?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
I can only assume. You'd have to ask Christianne, but I would say that that would make sense.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you recall having a discussion with the Chief about this, that the Chief expressed a desire to have legal services to look at the new proposed mission statement and whether we need to change the current one?
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
No.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Can I take you to -- moments ---
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Do you know when will be a good time to break? Because as I understand this witness, you're going to be quite a bit longer, so it's going to carry over in any event?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That is true. It may make sense to break now and to carry on tomorrow.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Is this a convenient time?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
As good as any.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Well, I'd suggest then we break until tomorrow, if that's agreeable with you also.
Robert Bernier, Supt (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
I'm sure you're happy to end the day at 6:30. Okay. So, we'll break until tomorrow morning at 9:30, and we will complete the in-Chief and then go to cross-examinations. Okay.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you, Your Honour.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Thank you.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is adjourned. La commission est ajournée.
Upon adjourning at 6:32 p.m. Ottawa, Ontario