Volume 12 (October 28, 2022)
Volume 12 has 273 pages of testimony. 8 people spoke before the Commission, including 1 witness.
Very important disclaimer: testimony from this site should not be taken as authoritative; check the relevant public hearing for verbatim quotes and consult the associated transcript for the original written text. For convenience, testimony includes links directly to the relevant page (where a speaker started a given intervention) in the original PDF transcripts.
The testimony below is converted from the PDF of the original transcript, prepared by Wendy Clements.
Speakers, by number of times they spoke:
- Peter Sloly, former Chief - Ottawa Police Service / City of Ottawa (Ott-OPS) (spoke 622 times)
- Frank Au, Senior Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 454 times)
- Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 181 times)
- Paul Rouleau, Commissioner - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 22 times)
- The Registrar - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 13 times)
- Paul Champ, Counsel - Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses (spoke 2 times)
- Eric Brousseau, Counsel - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 1 time)
- The Clerk - Public Order Emergency Commission (POEC) (spoke 1 time)
Upon commencing on Friday, October 28, 2022 at 9:30 a.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l'ordre. The Public Order Emergency Commission is now in session. La Commission sur l'état d'urgence est maintenant ouverte.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Good morning. Bonjour.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good morning.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. I gather we have a new witness? Okay, I think we're ready to go ahead, then. Go ahead.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We are. The Commission calls the former Chief Peter Sloly.
The Registrar (POEC)
Sir, will you swear on a religious document, or do you wish to affirm?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Religious document, please.
The Registrar (POEC)
We have the Bible, the Koran, or the Torah available.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'll take the Bible, please, thank you.
The Registrar (POEC)
For the record, please state your full name and spell it out.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Peter John Michael Sloly, S-L-O-L-Y.
MR. PETER SLOLY, Sworn
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good morning, Commissioner.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Good morning, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay, go ahead.
EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Good morning, Frank.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good morning, Mr. Sloly. You were the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service between 2019 until February 2022.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's correct, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You served also at the Toronto Police Service for 28 years.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's correct. Well, just 27 and change, but thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You rose through the ranks from being a Constable in 1988 to Deputy Chief in 2009.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You left the service in 2016?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then you spent some time in the private sector.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, I understand that when you first joined the Toronto Police Service there were relatively few members who had a university degree who were new recruits.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, that's correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But you had a BA in Sociology from McMaster University?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And later, you got an MBA from York University.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you were trained in the Incident Command System?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I was.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And tell us more about your training.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I received Incident Command System training from 100 to 400 levels. I received additional training here in Ottawa, I consider it 500 level, essentially it's a District Operations Commander, which allows you to command a multi-site major incident over a protracted period of time. So I had designations up to, I don't know if it's the right terminology, but a 500 level, and I had practical experience at every one of those levels in terms of being part of Incident Command. So either being an Incident Commander, what is now known as an Event Commander, Major Event Commander or Major Incident Command through to a District Operations Commander, mostly in my time in the Toronto Police Service and also during my two tours of duty in United Nations Peacekeeping Mission.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you also had training and experience with the Public Order Units.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Correct, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, I received Public Order Unit training, both through the Toronto Police Service. It’s a little bit fuzzy now because it’s going back to the early 2000’s, but there was also a provincial standard training course that took place out in a rural community that I can’t remember. And then there was national training sessions that we did from British Columbia across the country.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You also mentioned just earlier that you spent some time on a United Nations peacekeeping mission?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was fortunate enough to have been selected by then Chief Fantino to represent the Toronto Police Service. I think at that time, I was the first senior officer for a municipal police service to be part of a UN peacekeeping mission that had been organized through the RCMP. I was deployed to Pristina in August of 2001 and completed two tours, coming back home in 2002. I was the Canadian contingent commander. This was a mission where the police of jurisdiction actually had full powers of policing, including use of force detention while building up a local police service. It was also during 9/11 and a very significant and complicated and volatile zone.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When you attended an interview with us and my Commission colleagues, you described that experience as the best professional and personal experience you’ve ever had. Why was that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It just tested, and stressed, and challenged, and grew me in literally every single way possible: physically, mentally, emotionally. I’m a very spiritual person. It allowed me to see parts of the world I don’t think I’ll ever get back to see again. And to be involved in a unique, challenging, and often tragic set of circumstances, but one that opened my eyes to the conditions globally. I had a chance to work with 53 different police services from around the world, and so that was also an opportunity to learn the good, the bad, and the indifferent of progressive policing at the turn of the century.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
If I could just interrupt briefly? This is being translated and there’s sign language and you’re a little bit fast on the output. If you could try and -- -
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, sir.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- slow down?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Probably a little bit of nervous energy in there. But thank you. I will try to slow down.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
That’s quite understandable.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, speaking of interviews, you attended four interviews with me and my Commission colleagues between August and early October. You were very generous with us, with your time. And after those interviews, we summarized the contents of those interviews, and you’ve had an opportunity to review the summary? Is that correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I want to show you a copy on the screen, the final version of the summary. It’s WTS00000040. Now, is this the version that you approved?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I trust it is, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Is there any correction that you’d like to make to this summary?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So this will be adopted and will be an exhibit. Now, the reason that we’re here today are the events in January and February of this year, leading to the invocation of the Emergencies Act. As the Chief of Police in Ottawa at that time, you are uniquely positioned to give us your perspective and to help us understand. But to really understand, I think we need to go back further to when you started with the Ottawa Police Service.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
M’hm.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about the circumstances of the Ottawa Police Service in which you found yourself?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, when I was being recruited for the position, it was very clear to me through the recruiter on behalf of the Board that through their consultative process with service members and community members, that the Ottawa Police Service needed to be significantly changed. Operationally, administratively, from an HR standpoint, the usual sort of change processes that large organizations require on an ordinary basis, and very specifically, culturally. Internally, there was a culture that was less welcoming, less inclusive, less diverse, less equitable, and that had impacts on things like workplace harassment, member moral. Externally, that translated into a real or perceived level of trust in the broader community, but specifically in racialized and marginalized communities, that the service wasn’t, in some cases, appropriate enough and that there was a declining level of trust and confidence. Any one of those things would have been a major change agenda for any external chief coming in. All of those combined required a significant effort of changed management and changed leadership that I was asked, on behalf of the Board, as the incoming chief, to deliver over the course of my five-year contract.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. If I could call up your CV? The document ID number is COM00000759. If we could go to page 2? Scroll down. So you see under “Ottawa Police Service, 2019 to 2022”, your talked about how you were given a major culture organization change mandate. And that’s something you just outlined for us.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about some of the challenges you faced once you took the post?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m not sure the Commission has all the time in the world for that list. But, I mean, I think the most simple thing to say is any effort of change is going to be difficult, particularly in a large organization. In this case, I believe the Ottawa Police Service is over a century old. And these were long-standing structural deficit issues. Needed investment in recruiting through staff development training. Leadership development in particular was something that repeatedly our membership identified and external auditors identified. And those things just don’t -- that’s not a light switch you can turn on and off. It’s something that you have to build and grow and almost organically move through the organization. Operationally, while they were excellent in some ways -- I just want to be clear, Commissioner, the Ottawa Police Service, and one of the reasons why I came here, had a reputation, deservedly so, of being one of the best operational police services. We’ve heard about their expertise in planning, their ability through missing persons investigations was second to none. They had really advanced -- in some cases, advanced HR systems that were to be seen as a best practice. So this was not a deficit across the board, but there were significant deficits in very specific areas that was contributing to some of the cultural and morale issues. My attempt in the first three months was really to go around on a listening process in small groups, large groups, internally and externally, to identify those areas, bring a command team that was, even in the early days, a struggle, there was significant challenges at the command team level, but people were leaning in and doing their best. I would say, though, that the challenges really came in in March of 2020. Three significant events. The suspension of one of my two Deputy Chiefs, the culmination of a significant internal criminal corruption investigation where three of my officers were arrested after an extensive joint RCMP/Ottawa Police Service investigation, and of course, the declaration of the global pandemic, two months later, the death and murder of George Floyd, the Black Lives movement, and the Defund movement. I think that signalled the start, not just here in Ottawa, but across police services in North America, I suggest around the world, as a significant change in the level of public trust and confidence in policing and the broader justice system. It certainly had material impacts on police services here in Ottawa. The Defund movement put significant pressure on our Board and our Council to adjust the policing budget in regards to size and to change police service delivery in terms of integration. And these were real challenges on top of the significant challenge of change mandate that the Board had explicitly and expressly given to me as the incoming chief.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you identified a few challenges that are not unique to the Ottawa Police Service, such as the pandemic, such as the Defund movement, and so on. What about within the organization? You talked about earlier, challenges involving the command team. Tell us more about that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, the command structure, I believe to this day, but I might be wrong, is the Chief of Police, two Deputy Chiefs, and the Chief Administration Officer. Within my first three months in the position, I lost one of those Deputy Chiefs to a suspension. That then required me to accelerate a succession plan that truly wasn’t ready for acceleration, and bring in a series of three-month assignments to the rank of the superintendent. I had two very experienced senior officers at that time. Both superintendents had a lot of experience. And so I rotated them for the first year. But within that year, both of them retired. And after that, the rotation went further into the superintendent ranks. Some were really good fits, some struggled. But it was a very suboptimal situation. In 2021, in the early part of the year, the Board made the decision to end the contract of my Chief Administration Officer. That then required me to look at my command level, and the only person that I could put into that position was Deputy Chief Bell. So essentially, for the full -- almost the full year leading up to the events of the convoy, I had one full-time Deputy Chief who was in a civilian position as a Chief Administration Officer, and I was rotating two -- for the most part, two uniformed Superintendents through the Deputy Chief process. Again, full respect to those individuals. They stepped up, in some cases volunteered. When I asked, they stepped up and they did their very best in very, very difficult circumstances during probably the most difficult time in Ottawa Police history and in policing across Canada. And so I have nothing but praise and thanks for them, but it was a sub-optimal situation that everyone was struggling to make the best of.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, did that happen in 2021, you said?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, the suspension of Deputy Chief Jaswal was in 2020. The subsequent retirements of my two more -- two most senior Superintendents happened over the course of 2021 into 2021. The separation of the Chief Administration Officer was in early 2021. So for the majority of 2021, that circumstance of Deputy Chief Bell being in an administrative function and two Superintendents operating in the uniform function was the situation that I was managing with.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So at the most senior executive level, you were having rotating staff, so to speak. What impact did that have on the rest of the organization at that time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It has a cascading impact on down the way. As you move any officer from one level to the next on a temporary position, not a permanent promotion, you then affect the next level and the next level. I remember once in Toronto someone said every time we promote a new Chief, we have to change out seven positions below. I don’t know if it’s exact calculation, but that’s the ripple effect. So it not only destabilizes the executive level, it destabilizes, to a degree, the other parts. There are always benefits. I mean, people are given stretch opportunities or given leadership opportunities earlier than they maybe normally would have. And again, some rise amazingly to that. Others do an excellent good job, and others struggle. But it does create churn in the organization that was already in churn based on all the changes that were mandated by the Board and the massive external churn by the factors such as the death of George Floyd and the global pandemic. There was another factor that, for me, as a newcomer to the city, as an outsider Chief, I think we can all remember in the early days of the pandemic the lockdown and the requirement not to meet in public was significant. One of the most important ways that any leader can get to know their own members and the community or the clients that they serve is to meet in person. So much is lost on Zoom. Emails and text messages never cover it, as we’ve seen in testimony here. But I lost that opportunity three months into my mandate to actually sit down with my members in the cafeteria and have a cup of coffee with them, to have small group focus group meetings, which I did extensively in my first three months. And even when we could get together, we were masked up so we couldn’t see facial expressions and we were spaced out across a big gymnasium, so we couldn’t really communicate. We had to literally shout at each other. I think all of that, unfortunately, meant that we couldn’t build the level of cohesion internally or externally during a very critical, contentious period of time. A sustained critical and contentious period of time. But we did our best.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We’ve heard from other witnesses that notwithstanding the OPS excellent reputation in the past for planning for and responding to large-scale events, the pandemic itself has caused a lot of changeover and depletion of expertise. Tell us more about that situation.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think it’s actually been well articulated. I will only add, Mark Ford, who -- his father was the former Chief of Police here, an excellent Chief of Police. Mark was an excellent leader. He was one of those first two Superintendents I brought in on rotation along with Joan McKenna. Mark actually was the most experienced Incident Commander and one of the most experienced Critical Incident Commanders. Unfortunately, he retired some six or seven months before the events that we’re going to be substantially focusing on. So that would be one example of many where we had people who had, you know, gone past their pensionable time, had given their life blood, literally, to the organization and to the profession of policing and had made a decision, as many executives in many different parts of civil society, to take their well-earned retirement and go on with their life with their health intact. We celebrated his departure, but he was missing from our team and we really needed our best people to be in the best places possible.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you told us earlier that you came in to the Ottawa Police Service and you were given a change mandate. How was that mandate perceived when you were about two years into your job?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, there’s a -- there’s probably a not police saying about police officers. I suspect it applies to everybody. There’s two things that every cop hates, the way things are, and change, so it was going to be difficult no matter what. Nobody wanted things to remain the way they were and everyone was fearful of change to varying degrees across the full human spectrum, of course. And this wasn’t just a tinker around the edge change mandate. It was to go right to the heart of the culture and to the most difficult parts of that culture, the darker part of that culture, things like systemic racism, systemic misogyny. The trust factor between police and the broader community, but very specifically the racialized and marginalized and indigenous communities here in Ottawa. And those were the most contentious topics in policing for my entire career going back to 1988 in Toronto. Any Chief of Police or any command team that took on any one of those issues would be taking on a major, major challenge. Taking them on in the middle of a global pandemic, in the middle of the Black Lives Matter movement and the defund, abolish police movements just made it that much more complicated. But it was still necessary. It still had to get done. Not because it was my mandate. It was just the right thing to do for policing. It’s what our members actually wanted, and it certainly is what the community wanted.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if I take your mind back to January -- early January of 2022 before the Freedom Convoy event arrives in mid-January, how would you summarize the state that the Ottawa Police Service was in?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Committed to the direction, worried and tired from the effort to have travelled as far as they did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was the level of trust among the different members within the service and their trust for the leadership?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I mean, I could answer that in any great specificity. Clearly, there was a range. I think -- I don’t know which one of the witnesses presented -- I think it was Inspector Beaudin from the OPP that talked about the range of crowd dynamics. Human nature is human nature, so no matter what organization you’re in, you’re going to get some five percent that will adopt everything that’s said without questioning, five percent that will resist mightily anything that is said with all sorts of questioning and then some range in between of people that will move if they’re incentivized or if they feel there’s a sufficient altruistic value around it. I think those crowd dynamics play out in any crowd, including the group in this room here today.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, with that context, let’s talk about the beginning of the Freedom Convoy events. When did you first learn about the Freedom Convoy?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My recollection, sir, was a February 13th Hendon Report.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
February?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry. January 13th. You may need to check me on dates a little bit. I believe that was a report that came into my inbox for whatever reason that day, and it was an extremely busy period. We were still dealing with a multiple-death explosion in our city that killed some five -- four or five people. But I did have a chance to glance through the report. Certainly there was enough information for me to know that this could be a significant event in the near term. My recollection is that I forwarded that email to Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. I understand that there hasn’t been an email to show that, but that was my recollection. But irregardless, somewhere on or around February 13th there was a direction to Deputy Chief Bell to commence an intelligence review of all the circumstances around what was being purported to be a convoy coming to our city and to lead the over -- oversee the work of developing an intelligence threat risk assessment that would then inform Acting Deputy Chief Fergson’s assignment to develop the operational plan for the event informed by the intelligence threat risk assessment.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we’ve heard from the evidence of your Deputies that after you became the Chief of the Ottawa police Service, one of your priorities was to ensure that operations were intelligence led. Can you tell us more about why that was important to you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you very much. Just to take a back -- a little step back, all operations, not just Emergency Preparedness and Incident Command or Critical Incident Command, but all of our Operations, from traffic management order management, crime management that we would should be intelligence-led, information, best practices, evidence-based best practices should inform for the most part our systems, our policies, our procedures, our practices, and the evaluation of the outputs and outcomes that came from that. So that was an overarching theme. How it applied within Incident Command, Incident Command Systems, Emergency Preparedness was again, a weather report that says there is going to be rain tomorrow, well let's try to validate that to a greater degree. Is it going to be raining in a city this large? Is it going to be raining and flooding in one part, or is it across the entire city? Because that will then assess the amount of resources we need and the sequence of events we need to apply. That's an analogy, that's not meant as an actual example. So Intelligence-led as much as possible. Understand the nature -- the context of the situation, the factors involved, the nature of the threat, the risk of the threat, the likelihood of it actually taking place, and the resources necessary to mitigate in the first instance and respond to in -- at the back end. And then to recover from, the recovery period, which I suggest this is still a recovery period Commission, with the City of Ottawa and the Country of Canada. Does that answer your question, sir?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. And my next question is to what extent were you satisfied that that was in fact the case in -- at the OPS on or about January?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. I believe Interim Chief Bell did reference his own views on the advancements that we had made, particularly in the previous year, and he's absolutely correct. That we had made significant advancements around our Intelligence-led approach to our broader Operations, crime, traffic, order management. Order management is a subset, includes Critical Incident Command and Incident Command System. We had made significant strides in making sure our Information section and our Intelligence section were lined up with our Operational sections, and that we had sufficient crime analysis, administrative analysis to execute and continuously improve on those processes. We did not specifically take on Intelligence-led Threat Risk Assessments as a very specific product. Our priorities at that time were crime, traffic, order management was not at the same level. I think in 2021, we had our -- a very high level of gun and gang related shootings, and so crime, traffic was the number one issue in the community, always is no matter what jurisdiction. So those were really our one and two priorities, and order management was probably at the third level. Because we actually had up until that point a very good record, a very good record of planning and implementing plans and successfully ending a range of demonstrations, but we had made progress. I did make it very explicit, particularly, this one I'm not 100 percent sure on, but particularly around the events in mid-2020, when we started to see large events coming into the city, Wet'suwet'en, Black Lives Matter in June, Justice for Abdi in the fall. These are complex, volatile, political, trust factor events that were contentious and could have gone a thousand different directions. I was very, very strong at that point on the Intelligence Threat Risk Assessment driving the Operational Plan, and in that period I think we did make some significant moves forward around how the intel TRA threat assessment supported, enabled, enlightened the Operational planning.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, you mentioned that the first Hendon report you read about the Freedom Convoy was on January 13th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's my recollection, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And -- so I take it that you read it?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. I can't say I read every single line, it was probably more of a skim-through read, but I did read it, yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was your reaction upon reading it?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
This is potentially going to be a significant event, that we probably need to get some people working on the Intel side and starting at least to put the framework of a plan in place.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was that why you forwarded it to the deputies?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That was my recollection of forwarding it, but that's certainly why I assigned Deputy Chief Bell to lead the overseeing of the Intelligence Risk Assessment and assigned Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson for the Operational Plan. By the way, those were their functional areas of responsibility. Deputy Chief Bell, again, I think has testified that the Intelligence was one of his directorates, and that the Planning Section was one of the directorates that Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson had just inherited. She had just started as the Acting Deputy Chief in January 2022.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you expected the two of them to coordinate the information or intelligence that the Intelligence Unit received and incorporate that intelligence in the planning process?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you receive regular updates from your deputies?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I did, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How often?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
After that first week, that February 13th week, we may have raised it in discussion at -- I had a regular nine o'clock Command meeting, and whatever the deputies would lead their respective areas of command and talk about major projects, things that should come to my level, I have a general recollection that we would've have discussed it at least once or twice during that first week period. Coming into the second week, the week leading up to the weekend of January -- I'll just remind myself to slow down a little bit -- coming up to the weekend of January 28th, 29th, and 30th, I recall that being almost on a daily basis. And I think towards the end of that week, or middle to the end of that week, we had my nine o'clock meeting and then a separate Command briefing on the Intelligence and planning of the -- of - - around the convoy events.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When you refer to "that week", were you referring to the week before the weekend arrival of the convoy?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. Going into that first weekend before the weekend of the arrival, and then through that Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. And what did you learn as a result of these regular briefings about the nature of the convoy that was about to arrive?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My early impressions was there was, to some degree, some doubt as to whether or not this was actually going to materialise.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sorry, whether it was going to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Going to materialise. Whether this series of convoys, it was focussed I think mainly in the British Columbia area, but whether or not it was actually going to materialise. Clearly, as the days went on and Hendon reports came in, mainstream media, social media started to follow it more, there was certainly a sense that, no, there is going to be something that comes from as far away as St. John's, Newfoundland, and from Vancouver, British Columbia, and other parts in Ontario itself. The briefings that I was getting was that those two areas were working together. Our Intelligence Group were connected in with all of our policing partners, municipally, provincially, and federally. The Ottawa Police Service Intersect Program had been engaged early around information- sharing, intelligence-gathering, Operational Planning, deconfliction coordination. All of those things were sort of standard for any major event that had occurred under my tenure as the Chief of Police, and had been well-established going back some 15 years under previous chiefs of police. So there was nothing out of the ordinary. Certainly things from a process standpoint, I saw what I expected to be the level of communication, coordination internally, communication, coordination with our key partners in the National Capital Region, and even more broadly, given the national scope of what was unfolding, that we were engaged with a range of other police services across the country.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in that week leading up to the arrival of the convoy, what was your understanding as to the duration of the event?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, all of the reports, the briefings that I was receiving through my chain of command was that this was going to be a weekend event, some arriving the Thursday, more arriving the Friday, the bulk arriving for planned or at least scheduled events on the Saturday and the Sunday. That there might be some remnant that would stay behind, but that remnant would be similar to other demonstrations that had come through where people stayed in the National Capital Region for a variety of reasons, but in some cases, setting up small tent cities that would at some point over the subsequent days, weeks, and in some cases months, would be gradually, through a measured approach, with multi-agency involvement from NCR and the City, they would be eventually moved either to a better location or moved back to wherever they had originally come from.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, during that period, did you continue to receive regular Hendon reports?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was on the mailing distribution, so it came into my inbox. I could also see there were other Ottawa Police Service members on the distribution. And by that point I had explicitly asked and had been told that members within Deputy Chief Bell's command and Intelligence Directorate were receiving Hendon reports, were involved in Hendon-related briefings, and that those reports were informing the Intersect discussions, the Threat Risk Assessment.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you continue to read the Hendon reports when they landed in your inbox?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not every day, sir. I would -- if I had the ability I would, again, usually skim through a document. I do recall sort of, in the middle to the back end of that week, on a daily basis, doing a deeper, more full read. But at that point I was anything -- anything that was coming in, including emails from private citizens about this, I would try to skim read and if there was something relevant, I would usually just forward the email over into Deputy Chief Bell’s command, and copy in his Intelligence Directorate Commanders to make sure that they had the information and they could collate that into their larger threat risk assessment.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you spoke about your understanding during that period that it was going to be a two- day or weekend event. Was that understanding based on the Executive briefings that you got, or a combination of that as well as other sources, including the Hendon reports that you did receive or read?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, the latter. The sum total of everything that I was reading or being briefed on, that was the -- on balance, the assessment.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the totality of information or intelligence that you got did not change your view at the time that it was going to be a two-day or weekend event?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what was the nature of your role as the Chief at that time, as compared to the two Deputies who were assisting you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Maybe -- I’m not sure ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So let me be more specific; in terms of the collection of, or the analysis or the dissemination of, the intelligence within the OPS for the purpose of planning a response, what were the respective roles of you, as Chief, as compared to the two Deputy Chiefs who were assisting you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Every Chief of Police or Commissioner is accountable and responsible for everything in the organization. But I had delegated, specifically delegated those responsibilities to the two individuals, Deputy Chief Bell and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to oversee and ensure that there was an appropriate level of threat risk assessment and forming an appropriate level operational plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Would it be appropriate for you to ask questions, for instance, when you received additional information?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely. On any issue, whether it was an HR matter or a Professional Standards Investigation, if at any point there was a data point or a context issue, something that didn’t seem to make sense, I would always ask a question, just to make sure that I understood the circumstances that they were dealing with. And if appropriate, I could provide advice, or direction, as required.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did you direct Deputy Chief Bell to conduct, or have someone conduct the threat risk assessment?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s entirely the direction that he had; that was his responsibility.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was that something ordinarily done in response to this kind of event, or was that something particular to this situation?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just I want to be clear about something; Deputy Chief Bell, himself, wasn’t to sit down at his desk and conduct a threat risk assessment. But through the resources and the Directorates that he oversaw, to oversee that there was an appropriate threat risk assessment; yes, that was his directions.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But was it an ordinary process for a threat risk assessment to be conducted in response to any major event?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, that was a best practice that I had learned and developed over the course of my tenure in Toronto and other areas. It was something that was, to some degree already -- significant degree already in place here in Ottawa. But I wanted it at the highest level possible. And I think Deputy Chief Ferguson -- Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson gave that in her testimony, that that was a clear expectation that I had made coming in.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we’ve heard from Deputy Chief Bell that in this case a threat risk assessment was in fact conducted. So if I could take you to the document, OPS00003073. Actually, this is not the threat assessment, but this is an email you wrote after reading the threat assessment. Do you recall having read the threat assessment that was prepared?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’ve seen a document in disclosure that is titled Threat Assessment. I don’t recall receiving and reading that document. I did read the Threat Assessment that was embedded in the Pre-arrival Operational Plan that I received on January 28th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So now this one -- this email chain, the part that was sent by you, was dated January 26, so -- and if we go -- so you see that -- actually, if we go down further to see the origin of the chain. So -- not so -- not so far. Do you remember receiving an email from a concerned citizen about the potential violence of the upcoming event? And if we scroll up, you forwarded this email to your Deputies, and you outlined a concern. If we scroll down to the next page, you describe what the concern was and then you said: “Yet our briefing note as of last night says that there is no intelligence to indicate that this demo straying will be violent?”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you issue this guidance: “Please review all available information/intel/incidents and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment, and the most appropriate operations plan for the event.”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, it’s not entirely clear from this email whether or not you’ve read a threat assessment, but you were certainly aware that there was one, or ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, what I’m referring -- sorry ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, sir. What I’m referring to, I believe, is it just a briefing note. I don’t know what that would have been in the form of. It could have been an email that was sent around before, last night that had -- that that said there was no intelligence to indicate this was going to be violent. But it wasn’t the threat risk assessment document in any of its versions that I was referring to.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I see.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And I laid out a series of, I guess, it’s four points here of data that had come into my awareness over the course of the night into the morning, including the email that I forwarded, that would suggest opposite. So it was, again, just a reminder; there’s contradictory information, just make sure that that is incorporated into the overall threat risk assessment, and that is as optimal as it can be, so that the plan can be as optimal as it can be.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now -- so this is dated January 26. I want to show you an Intelligence Assessment, conducted by Sgt. Chris Kiez, on January 25th, and perhaps you can take a look and let us know if you have reviewed that document. The document number is OPS00003086. In the production we receive, we’ve seen a couple of different versions. I assume that this -- the assessment was updated as the week unfolded, but this is Version 1. Does this ring any bell, this ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s the first time I’m seeing the document, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If I could take you to page 5. So the third bullet, the author says that: “In 6 years of working large demonstration events from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action, which means three things for planners. [First, in the event] -- the event is likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more destructive. [Second] There is significant popular support for this event on a scale of not seen in recent years. This means the protest groups have access to larger protesters pools than they have ever had access to, which means there will be likely widespread disorganisation and confusion. [Third] Local area bandwidth for cellular/mobile devices will be impacted significantly, causing communications issues for both the police and the event organizers. Planners should be ready to have police radios on hand to avoid clogged cellular networks.” This is an example of the intelligence unit providing relevant intelligence to guide the planning of the events, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So it’s a -- it’s an example of how it’s supposed to be done. But there are suggestions here that this event is unlike some of the other recent events. There are signals here; do you agree that it may be unprecedented?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
At this point I wouldn’t say unprecedented. I think he’s -- actually, Sgt. Chris Kiez is one of our best Intelligence operators; I had a chance to interact with him quite a bit when I was at the Police Service. I think he actually uses some very important language here that caveats his comments. Talks about “recent” years, “not ever”. And he does that several times in here. The -- what he is describing is very accurate. We’re seeing, generally in protests, I’d suggest over the last 15 years, in the age of social media, a greater level of mobilization. And increasingly last decade, a greater level of -- a variety of funding and logistical support. This email took me back to Idle No More, the -- oh, my gosh, my memory's failing a little bit, Commissioner, sorry, but the Occupy Movement, where these sort of sentiments, crowd size, crowd dynamics, logistics, mobilization, larger disaffected populations, polarized populations that would give direct or indirect support, would directly protest or indirectly protest. I'm slowing myself down a little bit here. These were elements that we had seen. What Sergeant Chris Kiez is saying in here, my interpretation of it, is that the planners need to be aware this is likely going to be bigger than recent events. He didn't give a timeframe. Is that two years? Is that 10 years? And so we need to be cognizant. So it's a good alarm bell, but it's not a five alarm that he's ringing right now.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
It's a warning for ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
A very ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- trouble ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- very healthy warning.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the last line that was bolded in the last paragraph, "As a result, law enforcement is being met with numbers of people beyond the norm." That's what you're saying, a larger crowd size. What would you expect your deputies to do with this kind of warning?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, first of all, the deputies would ensure that this information is being shared amongst the planners, as was directed from an Intelligence operator over to the planners. I would want to know that they had sufficient systems in place, that when a briefing note like this was produced, that it would go from the Intelligence Directorate to the Planning Team, and that it would be, again, used in real time as they were developing plan in real time. And these are real time systems. It's not one first and then the other. In real time, information is coming in, very fluid, very fast moving, very complex situation. My sense from the briefings that I was getting was that that process was in place, and it was functioning sufficiently.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Would you expect your deputies to brief up and give you the warning?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
On a specific level like this, no.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So let's go to another document. Now, first of all, let me ask you, the -- since you were reading the Hendon report, do you recall if there is any Hendon report that you could identify that would suggest that it was a weekend event as opposed to prolonged events involving a week or month?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I saw Hendon reports that had elements of both, sir. Again, elements of both. And the totality of all of the Hendon reports that were specifically prepared on the topic of the convoy events prior to the arrival of the events themselves, I would literally have to go back through them all. And I think you and I have talked about this in previous interviews. A line in one report, unless you've read the entire report, can be misleading. One report, unless you've read all the reports, could be misleading. So it's the totality of the information. And even then, the Hendon reports, as excellent as they were, and, Commissioner, I want to be clear, I've expressed my gratitude to Commissioner Carrique on multiple occasions, even after my resignation, about the quality of the intelligence support that we received from the OPP and specifically around the quality of the Hendon reports. But in the totality, sir, I do not recall, and to this day, even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not have any clear impression or saw any clear conclusions that we were going to have anything more than what I was being briefed on by my team. This was going to be a Thursday, Friday, mainly Saturday, Sunday event, with the potential for a smaller group to remain behind, but in numbers that we had managed previously.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let me show you one example from the January 25th Hendon report and see how you may interpret this report. OPP00001108. We go to page 3, please? Go down. So do you see the section that starts with "intelligence gaps"? First of all, what do you understand intelligence gaps to mean?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Known unknowns. They know they need some information, but they do not have the information and therefore can't validate the other parts of the assessment and that there needs to be some effort to acquire that information and convert it into intelligence sufficient to close one or all of the gaps.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we look at the first few bullets, first of all, "Participant numbers - online indicators are unreliable." So this is a known unknown. They knew that they needed the number, but they knew that they didn't have the number; is that right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's how I interpret it, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then the next two bullets have references to specific dates. "Nature of activities in Ottawa by advance convoy participants. ([January 28th, January 29th])" So when these days are referenced in these reports, what do you take them to mean?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That we're going to have two days of activities. That they don't know what those activities will be on those two days.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That's right. They don't know what may happen on those days. Could we infer from this bullet that things were only going to happen on these two days?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What about the third bullet? "Events possibly scheduled at Parliament Hill on [the 30th of January]" The same; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So we know from this that the police didn't really know what would happen on that date, but we cannot infer from this bullet that these are the only dates when things would happen.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
You're absolutely right. In the larger context of all of the Intelligence information -- sorry, what was the date of this report again?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Twenty-fifth (25th) of January.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm certain that by the 25th of January, we were into the cycle of briefings where this is a 3, 4-day event, mainly the Saturday, Sunday, so even at the point where these known unknowns were being listed, while we couldn't tell you what the agenda of the activities were going to be, there would be some activities. There would be people demonstrating in the city. It would involve some level of vehicular traffic, likely involving large trucks. But you're right, none of the information in these known unknowns fills in hour by hour or block by block of time as to what exactly would take place.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So this is January 25th. And then on the 27th, as we get closer to the first weekend arrival, you attended a meeting with your Command Team, as well as the Legal Services. If I could take you to document number OPS00014559 and page 1, please? So if we scroll down slightly, do you see the last bullet? So first of all, a bullet that says "Chief questions." It sounds like at this meeting you asked some questions in the four sub-bullet, "Interdict tow truck equipment prior to it being used against us. Heavy equipment within convoy to take down barriers - a level of preplanning we don't normally see. Concern they have this for something that is supposed to be lawful." Is it fair to say that, by this date, you had some concern for, given the presence or anticipated presence of the heavy equipment when it was supposed to be something lawful, you were questioning why are these equipments there?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, that actually almost reflects I want to say word by word, but certainly the sentiment of some of the intelligence that was in the Hendon reports. I can't remember the date of that. I do believe, and, again, I stand to be corrected, Commissioner, evidence in-Chief was led by Interim Chief Bell that talked about the heavy equipment. There were efforts made to interdict, to prevent that from coming in or at least mitigate it. And I believe he said that this is not information I had as the time of Chief, so I'm relying on Interim Chief Bell's testimony, that in fact much of that heavy equipment did not make it into the downtown core and he described differently some of the equipment that did make it down there than what has been reported on previously in media.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So as the Chief, you had the strategic oversight, so to speak, and you were asking appropriate questions to ensure that those deputies who were reporting to you were doing their job when this kind of concerns arise; am I correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely. I mean, it could be as simple as I think a term that other people have given testimony on. Just need to kick the tires on different parts. Just make sure you ask questions at different levels, strategic, operational, and, yes, sometimes tactical, to make sure that they're aware of it and they have put some effort into it and there's a reasonable approach to how they're going to address it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now we also understand from the testimony of Inspector Lucas that there was a potential that the OPS would be overwhelmed during the weekend of January 29th and 30th. I can take you to the transcript, but it was in evidence. So I guess my question to you is this. If there are these warning signs and as we progressed towards the weekend, these warning signals get stronger and stronger. Shouldn’t the OPS have known what was coming?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
To answer your question, no. If you’re asking -- and I don’t want to interpret wrongly your question, so if I go in the wrong direction please pull me back, as the signals became stronger and stronger, what I would expect is, first I would know the signals were getting stronger, and clearly, we did. Secondly, that whether I asked about it or someone offered it, that we would have a constructive discussion around mitigation for those signals. I can tell you, I think it was -- well, I can tell you. I think it was the Wednesday that I received my first formal request through Acting Deputy Ferguson to reach out to fellow Chiefs of Police and request additional resources. If I’m wrong on the date, Commissioner, I’ll stand corrected, but middle of the week, I reached out to London Police Service, York, I believe, Toronto asking for general resource officers, but particularly Public Order officers. It’s my recollection, again, I stand to be corrected, that around this date or on this date, I had another request to reach out for more Public Order. I believe in Commissioner Carrique’s testimony that he was aware of that request. He had two Public Order units that were sent to Ottawa. I don’t believe they were under our ICS control, but they were in the Ottawa area and available. So that is what I would call Inspector Lucas signalling we might be overwhelmed by the numbers, we’ll need to bolster our abilities to not be overwhelmed. Particularly that would be Public order assets, and I had a specific request to get more Public Order assets and I made that request in this case to Commissioner Carrique. And thankfully, as he did -- provided those resources as quickly as he could.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we heard from Superintendent Bernier when he testified at the Commission that after he read the January 27th Hendon Report, he told Superintendent Drummond about this bizarre disconnect between the Hendon intelligence and the OPS preparation. Do you -- do you think that there was a bizarre disconnect?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
First of all, while I have the greatest respect for Inspector Bernier, he was not involved directly in the planning or the intelligence threat risk assessment. Police services and organizations are wonderful places. Everyone has an opinion. The briefings that I was getting from the commanders that had been assigned to the task, the people that they had assigned through their responsibilities to produce the information, some of which is displayed on the screen here, did not indicate that there was a bizarre disconnection.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And do you think your Deputies were doing the best they could?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think they were. Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And knowing what we know now and reflecting back on the way that the OPS handled or applied the intelligence they got, what lessons, if any, should we learn from that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. An important question, Commissioner. If I’m going -- deviating too far, please pull me back. But probably one of my top recommendations for you to consider, sir, while we had excellent intelligence and particularly excellent support from the Ontario Provincial Police, this was, from the very onset, a national issue. It was a national event. It started in British Columbia. It was joined on the east coast and it brought convoys from the southernmost point in Windsor. Probably the greatest number of participants and vehicles and vehicles came from our border with Quebec across the five interprovincial bridges. The vast majority of the formal intelligence threat risk assessment reports that we relied on came from the Ontario Provincial Police. To this day, I have a question. Why wasn’t I getting intelligence threat risk assessments on a regular basis of the quality that I got from the OPP from our federal partners? And I want to be clear, they contributed meaningfully and I’m grateful for their contributions. But I’ve said this in the Parliamentary committees and I’ll say it again to the Commissioner. There’s a structural deficit in our national intelligence threat risk assessment process. I’m grateful for the Ontario Provincial Police for filling that gap and doing so to the very best of their ability, but it was not optimal for us or any other jurisdiction that faced any element of these events. And one of my recommendations, sir, with great respect, is that there needs to be an investment in our national intelligence threat risk assessment structure organizationally, institutionally, through integrated organizations and institutions. Some of that will be a financial investment, but it doesn’t all have to be a financial investment. It needs to be an investment to bring this country truly into the 21st century where we are two decades, two and a half decades in.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in your view, was there anything that the OPS could have done differently to better handle the intelligence they did have?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There is no doubt, sir. And I’m sure you will ask me multiple times over the course of my testimony could we have done better. Absolutely. I never had a chance to do a debrief. I suspect -- I understand that Interim Chief Bell has conducted some or completed one. I’m not sure of the status. And I’m sure within that document there will be many, many, many examples of how we could have done better and need to do better going forward. I believe in his testimony lessons were already learned and applied to subsequent demonstrations, so if you’re - - long way of answering, there’s no doubt that we could have done some things better.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But specifically about how it handled intelligence, anything you can teach us from your experience?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Low-hanging fruit, and I believe it’s already been rectified to some degree. A substantive element of our intelligence and information directorates, I would suggest even in other functional units and directorates, the ability for us to conduct open source social media and other online information gathering with the caveats of Charter rights, privacy rights. Absolutely, that would have to be a very transparent process. I stand to be corrected, but when I became Chief of Police, we actually had a unit that would have, by description and definition, fulfilled much of that function. Not all of it. It was either zero percent staffed or staffed by one person because we did not have the financial resources to put human beings into those budgeted positions. We didn’t have the internal skill sets even if we could find a human being to sit in there. I believe that’s been rectified to some significant degree based on testimony from Interim Chief Bell, but that is something it took me almost a full year, two years to convince the Toronto Police Service to do, and this is going back 2010-2011 after the events of the G20 -- actually, before and after when we finally got our first -- it was called a cyber group, but really, it was for pre-intelligence and post- investigative online capabilities. There are very few police services anywhere in Canada, municipal, provincial. OPP is an exception. I don’t know about Sureté du Québec. RCMP and the OPP are the only -- and Toronto Police Service are the only ones that I would comfortably describe as a reasonable extending to optimal level of capability in that area. The Ottawa Police Service did not have that capability.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, a moment ago, in answering my question, you referenced the need to respect Charter rights. That brings me to my next topic. You’ll recall that one of the topics we discussed during our interviews was your understanding of how the Charter might have limited police options in responding to the arrival of the convoy. Do you remember those discussions?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if I could take you now to the interview summary at page 15. If we go to the second paragraph -- sorry. Scroll down, please. That’s right. The paragraph that starts with “Chief Sloly”: “Chief Sloly was advised that based on the known intelligence reports, OPS did not have the legal authority to deny the Freedom Convoy access to downtown Ottawa simply because some people disagreed with the views of some participants. He understood that OPS did have authority to close roads and restrict traffic if there were public safety concerns, but closures and restrictions had to be commensurate to actual threats or reasonably predictable threats. Highway Traffic Act or bylaw violations alone would not be sufficient to justify restricting access to the city for all protestors.” So that was the view you expressed at the time. Is that the view you still hold now?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir, with this caveat. I’m a police officer, not a lawyer.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. And some of us regret to be lawyers. Now, since our interview, we’ve received a legal opinion provided to the OPS on this issue. So if I may take you to that opinion. Let me find the document number. It is OPS00003692. (SHORT PAUSE)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Scroll down, please. Now, you see there’s the paragraph that starts with, “While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa...” -- by the way, this memo, I believe is dated January the 28th. Deputy Chief Bell requested the opinion on the 27th and got it the next day. So this paragraph says: “While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa, various considerations will need to be assessed, and reassessed, to determine the appropriate response, including: • the balancing of competing Charter rights; • impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility; • impacts to health and safety; • impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles; and • impacts to public safety generally.” Do you remember if you had access to this legal opinion at the time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir, I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So in terms of these bullet points, they mention the “Impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility.” Do I understand that to apply to the right of the residents to move around freely in the downtown core and not be impeded unduly by the trucks and commercial vehicles? Your answer ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry; yes. Yes. Sorry, sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then, “Impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles”; that’s obviously important for reasons we all understand. And the “Impacts to public safety generally.” So in assessing the options available to the OPS to respond, including closing roads and, you know, setting up barriers to the downtown core, these considerations were applied at the time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, first of all, just an observation. Deputy Chief Bell made the request on the 27th. Again, if you recall my earlier testimony, this was a four-day event, starting on the 27th, continuing to the 28th, which is the Friday, with the main events on the 29th and 30th, the Saturday and Sunday. This legal opinion, while helpful to a degree, arrived technically in the middle of what we were already dealing with. There were already vehicles in the city, protest vehicles. There were already protesters and demonstrators in the city as we were receiving, reading, and considering this. This did not arrive a week before, or even a day before; this was already in the middle of the events. With that caveat, this is helpful. It certainly articulates to a greater degree what I think most of the police officers, and even my general counsel, Christiane Huneault, would have known and could have articulated differently. It’s not definitive; it’s advice, not direction. I understand that’s counsel’s job, but there isn’t a definitive line that says, “Because there might be any level of any one of these five points you therefore must go to some substantive interdiction, prevention, blocking of the events that are going to happen.” Again, language is important, and I think you and I have talked about this before. The reference of the lawyer who draft this says, “The convoy” I believe. There wasn’t one convoy, ever. There were multiple convoys and there were multiple other individuals and small groups, and I think Supt. Morris used better language than I will but affiliated groups that joined or left on a daily basis. I’m always mindful when I read, particularly advice documents that use a pejorative term, when what we were dealing with in reality was a massive group of fluid interacting individuals and groups where there is no one leader, no one spokesperson and no one thing to deal with. This was helpful, but not particularly instructive.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, by the 27th of January, am I correct -- and I believe this evidence came from Supt. Abrams -- that the OPS was expecting somewhere in the range of 3,000 trucks to come to Ottawa, downtown.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe I recall seeing that number by Inspector ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So with that in mind, I we go to page 4 of the same opinion; if we scroll down to page 4, please.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry; ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- with your indulgence; Commissioner, with your indulgence? I do want to be clear, though; what was listed in those five points materially happened on Saturday, the 29th. Those -- I think Deputy Bell gave excellent evidence on his own; I won’t repeat his testimony. But what we saw in terms of a violation of our community’s rights, our business community’s rights, the level of unlawfulness, and assaultiveness [sic], in the broadest sense of that terms, including the literal sense of that term, was not what we expected, and was overwhelming, not just for the Ottawa Police Service; most importantly, it was overwhelming for those communities that were most directly impacted by those events that weekend and every other day after that. So this was helpful because it, to some degree, anticipated -- anticipated -- that there would be competing Charter rights; there would be significant mobility challenges; there would be an impact on our emergency services in the ways that they were described theoretically on the page. So there was usefulness in this exercise. It was just a little too little, and already in the middle of the events that were still unfolding around us.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I guess my next question, after I take you to the passage I want you to have a chance to consider, is, what it would be reasonable to anticipate, in light of this guidance from the lawyer. So this paragraph starting with “Therefore”: “Therefore, while the case law indicates that those who wish to protest have a Charter-protected right in doing so, it is not without limits. These limits, as the courts have recognized, prevent threats of violence, acts of violence, and unlawful conduct. Moreover, these limits also prevent demonstrators from obstructing travel on roadways. It is worth noting, however, that there has been at least one decision where it was found that a blockade for a very brief period only constituted a minor inconvenience and was therefore permissible.” So this paragraph referenced the need to be preserve travel on roadways as a way to limit whatever other competing rights the protesters may have for free assembly and free expression and so on. So having this in mind, can you help me understand why when upward of 3,000 commercial vehicles and trucks are expected to arrive in downtown Ottawa, that this wouldn’t put some limits on where those trucks could access in downtown Ottawa?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. And as I’m reviewing this document and we’re having this dialogue; all of these things were actually within the operational plan. I believe Insp. Lucas has given evidence to you, sir, that he considered that number; he considered it, that through the combination of the PLT negotiations engaged by OPP and OPS officers, that there were agreements made with as many of the convoys as possible that would significantly reduce the impact of such events by parking trucks and arranging bus or rideshare into the downtown core that would alleviate much of this; that they recognized that emergency lanes need to be kept open; there were significant amounts of planning, detailed out on the traffic plan and other plans. Again, evidence led by many others in that regard. The Ottawa Police Service were neither ignorant of this; and, more importantly, they had taken steps to reasonably mitigate this, based significantly on the intelligence and information available; and ,as we’ve heard by other OPS members, including Insp. Lucas, Deputy Chief Bell, based on the previous experience they had with similar types of events in a reasonable similar timeframe. So I think, again, this was an informative document; it validated much of what we were thinking; it provided a more clearly articulated legal basis for what we were thinking; and we put in place the mitigation pieces that I felt were reasonably presented to me in advance of this, and we had the support of an excellent group from the OPP and their PLT as well. We’ve heard that unfortunately, the majority of those agreements were broken. Let me be careful of my language, and I believe, sir, it was Insp. Lucas that gave an insight that I was only aware of in his testimony. I believe it was the Windsor convoy that arrived first, and largest, into the city and occupied the majority of the red zone area along the Parliamentary district. Once that happened, the convoy’s -- again, relying on Insp. Lucas’s testimony, if I get any of this wrong, I will walk that back. But once that happened, Insp. Lucas described something, I think he called it, like, a chaotic scramble of convoys breaking off and going anywhere. The traffic plan collapsed. The extra resources held in reserve had to be immediately actioned to try to get the agreements that were in place, get the trucks to the designated parking zones. None of that was accomplished in the morning of, and I guess the early afternoon of Saturday the 29th. The Windsor group had claimed, for the most part, Wellington Street and the Parliamentary District, and everybody else wanted to get as close to that as possible. I shouldn’t say everybody else. A lot of other participants for almost the full duration of that event, tried to get to that most prized and prolific public place. And that was another complicating factor on our operations, our traffic plans, our PLT operations, even our POU operations. So I think we had an informative legal opinion sought at a reasonably early opportunity, received literally in the middle of the event, certainly within less than 24 hours. Stop me if I’m going on too much, sir. But my last point in this, and it’s a what-if, and I don’t want to engage in too much conjecture, but other witnesses have provided this what-if. I believe Deputy Chief Bell talked about this. Assuming that even on the 28th, Commissioner, that we decided to lock down the city, close off all the interprovincial bridges and the offramps from the 416 and 417 highways, we would have needed, in Deputy Chief Bell’s estimation, 2,000 officers. I think it would have actually been more. Even if that was our wish, even if that was the clearest conclusion that came from any of the Hendon Reports or any other combination of intelligence or legal opinions, on the 28th of January, we were not going to get 2,000 extra officers into the city and deployed on a plan that could execute and implement anything that relates to this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you pointed out that this became the reality as of the 28th. It materialized, in your words, on ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
On the 29th, sir. Sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, the 29th. But isn’t it fair to ask that by the 27th, when OPS knew that 3,000 vehicles were coming to Ottawa and much of the online messaging suggests that the protests had an intent to stay for as long as the mandates were not lifted, why isn’t it predictable and why shouldn’t the OPS be acting on this advice to take active steps to mitigate access to the downtown core?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Two things. First of all, we did take active steps. Roads were closed. We’ve heard repeated testimony from OPS and OPP senior officers that there were efforts to manage the convoy’s on-route and on the King’s Highways. A new term. I’m so used to the Queen’s Highways. But the King’s Highways. And so there were mitigation efforts. Second thing, and it does relate to the first, the biggest mitigation effort was the work of the excellent PLT teams, from the OPP, which is best in class PLT program in the country. I hope I haven’t disrespected my RCMP colleagues, but that’s a humble opinion. Take it for what it’s worth. They have an excellent PLT program. But our PLT was engaged. I believe from Commissioner Carrique’s evidence, or it might have been Commissioner Abram’s evidence, engaged as the western convoys crossed Manitoba, and they were engaged with all the other convoys. So PLT had negotiated, in good faith, and had received good faith agreements, small A agreements, because I don’t think it's a contract, that the 3,000 trucks would be mitigated substantially by their willingness to move those trucks into pre-designated areas and carpool, for lack of a better term, into the core. They had agreed not to block the emergency lanes. We had no indication, even on this date, that we were going to have the type of public display of unlawfulness, a terrible term, and my English teacher will turn over in grave, assualtiveness [sic] in the broadest sense, sensory, as well as physical. Hate related incidents that we saw materialize and metastasize on the 29th into the 30th and beyond.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let me ask you now, from your perspective, how did that weekend unfold?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That was ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about the events.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- fast and furious.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In preparing for today, I read through some of my notes and I think I shared with my counsel, I was reading the 9:00 o’clock briefing on the Saturday morning. Whether you find this as validation or not, Commissioner, but the 9:00 o’clock briefing that I received on the Saturday morning, the 29th, was still talking about a weekend event. It described we might have a tent city at the end of this. Tent city in the vernacular, meaning that we would have some five, six, seven, eight, maybe 20 tents somewhere in an NCR park, Confederation Park, and that we would need to remove it, as we had in previous ways. And I’d seen that done during my tenure. There is a bit of a back and forth that I’m quoted in as saying, well, can we make sure that we have our ESU, which is our Emergency Services Unit, down on the ground, and when everybody -- when anybody brings out a tent, can we, in a very smiling and polite way, ask them not to put their tent up so we have less work to do after the weekend? That is literally the substantive assessment. Traffic plan is working, PLT agreements are in place, convoys are arriving, officers are ready to go, INTERSECT is stood up, NCRCC is stood up, and we might have a bit of a tent city to deal with. That is consistent with all of the briefings, intelligence, and operational, on balance, in summary, that I had been receiving up until that point. That wasn’t the case probably by 11:00 o’clock in the morning. It happened that quick.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. What happened by 11:00?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My understanding and my observation was by 11:00 o’clock, we had a significantly embedded, clearly beginning to occupy, and in some cases fortify, elements of Wellington Street, the Parliamentary District, and other parts of our downtown core, that we were not able to maintain the agreed level of cooperation with the various convoys and that the traffic plan and the staffing and reserve staffing was significantly, if not already, fully exhausted. I do not have the detailed descriptions that have been provided in testimony here around what was taking place in the NCRCC, and I can’t validate or invalidate the level of chaos and potentially the occasional F-bomb that might have been thrown around in that room of dedicated professionals who were having been, excuse my term, punched right in the nose and engaged in a standing eight count, trying to get the city back to a level of safety as quickly as they can, and also trying to keep our Ottawa Police Service members and our partner agency members, our city workers, residents, business owners as safe as they possibly could in a set of circumstances that, at this point, sir, clearly was unprecedented. Clearly was unprecedented.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So are you describing the events of the 29th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The morning, early afternoon of the 29th, which essentially stayed on a steady state with varying degrees of crowd dynamic and other injects, like alcohol and drugs, into the evening. But that was pretty well the next 72 hours.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So at some point on the 29th, you realized that you’re confronting something unprecedented?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I believe Insp. Lucas described it as drinking from the firehose?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s a very polite description.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How would you describe it?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
However many convoys there were, that’s how many firehoses were coming. Add 10 more firehoses for all the other odds and sides that showed up, with three more firehoses in for the minus 35-degree temperature, four or five more for the level of fatigue that our officers already had going into those events, 43 more firehoses for the level of public trust in policing based on all the events that I outlined earlier on, and I think that’s a more accurate assessment of the amount of water that we were taking on at that point.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
At the height of the day’s events, how many trucks would you estimate were there?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I received an estimate. I never made the estimate. As high as 5,000 trucks and 15,000 participants is the upper end number that I received -- I recall receiving on the Saturday. I said 5,000 trucks. I want to be careful. 5,000 vehicles, predominately trucks, but that might have included a range of other vehicles that I can’t detail for you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And that’s just in the downtown core?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What about the emergency lanes? Were they kept open?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My understanding through testimony is that they managed to keep the Wellington lane -- I always get this confused, the south lane open for much of that day. I don’t know if they lost it for portions or at some point between the Saturday or the Sunday they lost it or made a decision to close off Wellington and then create an emergency lane access egress through other street combinations. I’m not clear on the details, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
As the members of the Ottawa Police Service began to focus on responding to these events downtown, what is -- what was the impact on the rest of the city?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s a very important question and I think it was touched on at some point in testimony. The downtown core was like, clearly was the epicentre and hyper volatile, hyper complex, like I won't be able to provide adjectives, so I'll just leave it at that. But you could drive south of the 416, is that right, 417, into literally still downtown neighbourhoods, and you would hear honking and you'd see, unfortunately, Canada flags stuck on vehicles and behaviour that was clearly anti-social, but it dropped off significantly once you got south of the 417. Further out into the Kanata's and the other parts, there were probably micro things happening, I'm never really sure of it. So the City would be aware of it, it would be obviously on TV. Social media is exploding at this point and people are dialled in to what's going on, but from a physical standpoint, physical location, you know, 98 percent of it was in a micro concentration, hyper concentration of activity, and trauma, unfolding trauma to our community in the heart of our city, in the heart of the Parliamentary District. And I don't want in any way forget, I know there are federal representatives here, but the trauma impacted on federal employees, elected officials, public officials, the entire infrastructure and ecosystem that represents our Nation's Capital, the Parliamentary District, and the, I believe Mr. Champ quoted, 18 or 15,000 residents in that aera. I don't know how many businesses, I know the Rideau Centre was closed. All of that happened literally within hours, and the relief did not come I believe until February 17th, 18th or 19th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And we've heard evidence, from some of the residences and business owners affected, during the first week of hearing, that from that time on they started feeling abandoned by the police, by other leaders, and they felt hopeless, that was one of the adjectives they used, and they started seeing a kind of general chaos and lawlessness. How would you describe what was happening? Were those adjectives accurate?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
First of all, I'll never challenge the feelings of a member of our community, they're their feelings, they're as righteous and as accurate as they need to be for the human being that expressed them. So I'm no way challenging wherever that sentiment came from. I can tell you that I met with, spoke with, walked around, and talked with many of the residents, the business owners, I was at a Business Improvement Association meeting that was referenced by one of the witnesses, and I heard a range of sentiments. I saw a range of responses from incredibly resilient and understanding and patient people. An elderly couple, both of them infirm and wheelchairs, travelling through that minus 35 degree temperature, stopped me as I was getting out of my SUV, while doing a live call on a board meeting, on February 1st, I believe, and talked to me. I had -- I think Chair Deans was talking, and I was literally talking to this couple, "Chief, we know your guys are doing the best you can. Please, it's hard for us to get around the sidewalks. We're trying to do our shopping. We know this is really tough on your team, please do your best for us." So yes, I heard expressions of hopelessness, I heard accusations of abandonment, but I would say the vast majority that I received directly to me was around resilience and patience. "Get this thing resolved as quickly as you can, as completely as you can", but resilience. And a level of understanding as to what the officers on the ground, and I don't say just officers, the members of our organisation. The partners that were deployed already from OPP, RCMP, London, God bless them. I think people understood how difficult it was, but they didn't see the situation resolving in a day, in two days. And I think it's reasonable for people to feel really aggrieved that there isn't a clear solution or a timeline to a clear solution that they could tangibly see and anticipate, and we were simply not in a position to provide that to them ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And in addition ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- at that time.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
In addition to the perspectives of the residents and business owners, et cetera, since you were the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, can you tell us how was the -- how were the members of the Ottawa Police Service holding up? Because this was only the beginning. It continued for another three weeks or so.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
This is always a little tricky part for me, sorry.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
You want us to take a break and ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, sir. It's okay. They were doing their very best under inhuman circumstances, like the city was, like the community was. It was too cold and it was too much. But they did their very best. And I'm grateful to them. And they should be celebrated. Not celebrated, that's the wrong word. They should be understood.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you feel that they were misunderstood?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Could you elaborate on that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I've given this testimony in Parliamentary Standing Committees. The level of disinformation and misinformation was off the charts. It was crushing to the members' morale, it was crushing to the Incident Command Team's morale, it was crushing to my Executive Team's morale, I suspect it was crushing to the Board. It was crushing to everybody. It was unrelenting. It was 24 hours a day. And I think by the end of the weekend it had become a global story that mainstream media was following, and none of it was portraying in any way accurate the hard work of the men and women of the Ottawa Police Service and the partner agencies that stood with us. None of it. To this day it hasn't. And that is very unfortunate because public trust and confidence in any police service I believe is the number one public safety factor. When any Police Service loses significantly public trust and confidence, that in of itself is a massive public safety threat and risk. It materialises in so many ways. I don't know if the Commissioner wants me to expand on that, but I'm happy to do so. And unfortunately, as quickly as the events unfolded on the morning and the afternoon of the Saturday, public opinion against the Ottawa Police Service and its members turned just as quickly and to the same unprecedented levels that were unrelenting, at least from my entire experience, up until February 15th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you spoke of how the officers were misunderstood. Let's hope that this Inquiry will be the beginning of that understanding. Commissioner, could we -- would this be a good time to take a recess?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
If you would like, sure, we can take the morning break for 15 minutes.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes. La Commission est levée pour 15 minutes.
Upon recessing at 11:02 a.m.
Upon resuming at 11:17 a.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l'ordre.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
No, it's okay. There's no need to stand.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It's just respect for your profession.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Good morning, Commissioner.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Go ahead.
MR. PETER SLOLY, Resumed
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU (Cont'd)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So before the break, Chief Sloly, you were telling us about the events of that first weekend and how it hit everyone really hard. I'd like to take you now to January the 31st, which I believe is the Monday after?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We've heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that that was when the Executive Team realized that a lawful protest has now turned into an illegal occupation. That was her evidence, and I'm interested in your view on that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My view is it was unlawful the moment a law was broken in or relation to the events. And so for me, that was clearly the Saturday morning. I don't want to in any way interpret Deputy Chief -- Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's impression. I think I would position the 31st as we now know this is going to be a longer-term occupation. There are fortifications and there are -- there is alarming level of public safety issues at large and we're going to have to pivot our plan to now address the current context and near future context that we're going to be dealing with. So it's in that context that perhaps -- again, I don't want to misinterpret, but perhaps the full Command is fully on the same page and the Incident Command Team is pivoting the plan now into the next phase of this occupying period.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that pivot. What did the Executive Team decide to do?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know if there's any significant decision. I mean, we needed a much -- we needed a significant update on the intelligence threat risk. Much of that was in place in the buildup and iterations, but we now need it to escalate to another level. And again, that cycle of intelligence threat risk assessment to then feed the pivoting operational plan to what extent are we going to need different resources, greater levels of resources in one area versus another area, and to what extent do we need to build out sub- plans and other things. For me at the Chief of Police level is what resources are we going to need. What do I now need to do to inform and/or engage other levels including the oversight body of the Ottawa Police Services Board, the City of Ottawa and other factors. And I will be -- I was still trying to understand really what had just arrived in our city, what really was it, and even just level set my own understanding, never mind the work that was being done on behalf of me through Deputies Bell and Acting Deputy Ferguson.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Deputy Bell described that first week as a period of orientational reorientation. Do you agree with that description?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I understand -- I think I understand the theme behind it. I would probably use different language, but I think it's definitely a what just happened, how do we now need to reorient, to reassess, and then start to address the situation going forward.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So before the convoy arrived, we've seen an initial plan dated January the 28th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was the understanding now in terms of going forward in terms of the need for a new plan?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, there was no need for a new plan. There was a need for an evolution of the plan that we had, an evolution of the threat risk assessment that was in that plan. Again, I want to make it clear, there was only ever one plan. There were many iterations of it. There was only ever one threat risk assessment. There were many iterations of it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what was the understanding then about this -- the need for this new evolved plan?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
On the Monday the 31st?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Probably the number one thing at that point was staffing, staffing, staffing, staffing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And how did you go about achieving that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, without the -- with the absence of my notes, but as simple as how many more officers can we redeploy from our overall complement of policing a city of a million people in the nation's largest municipal geography to that micro-ore of the red zones and the immediate neighbourhoods around it. I think, by that point -- again, I stand to be corrected if the records say otherwise, but that point, we had already started to look at changing our shift hours to create a greater volume of officers available, officers and civilian members. I don't know if we had, at that point, reached out to the Association, the Ottawa Police Association to start to negotiate a whole different shift schedule. That might have come later on in the week, but that was the focus, and then external resource requests that went to OPP and other police services to send additional resources atop of what they had provided us already.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So around that period, January 31st and the next few days, did the OPS start reaching out to other external agencies for help?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, absolutely.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us what steps you or the other members of the second team did?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Predominantly, it sort of happens at two levels. You know, the agency-to-agency relationships would already be, you know, phone calls and text messages to people that they knew in other agencies. You know, you'll get something formal from the Chief, but we need X, Y and Z. And then the formal request would come up through Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and then I would make a reach out to the respective agencies. So probably my approach for the main may have deviated every now and then, would be a text message to the Chief of Police or Commissioner, saying that you'll be getting a formal request, but I'm looking for X or Y or Z. And then my executive assistant would produce the document and I would forward that formally. But once I got a positive response, the positive response I would then forward to our Legal Services Department, and they would go through the process of enabling a memorandum of understanding, an MOU.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And now I want to get a better understanding of the options that were open while the OPS were reaching out for external help. So I want to take you to a document, OPS00005631. So just looking at the top, it says "Public Order Truck Convoy De-escalation Planning Meeting February 1st, 2022." Do you have -- perhaps we can scroll down a little, so you can familiarize yourself. It says that there's a meeting with the Chief. Can we go down further? There are a number of discussion points. So, for example, the third bullet, there's a notation that, "Every single option to be explored and is open to discussion. He is happy to come back and further discuss anything that we need him to." He, I take it, refers to you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we go down further, "PLT would like one more attempt to speak with every convoy to get them on the same page." We scroll down further, "Every POU we ask for will not be released to come to Ottawa as protests happening now everywhere. We might not get the staffing numbers we ask for." So there are a couple of things I wanted to ask you to comment on. First of all, there's a reference to things happening elsewhere. What can you tell us about that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe by the 31st, I'm certain there was -- I'm really off base, but Coutts, Alberta was already in play at that point. On the Monday, I don't recall any other Ontario sites. I don't even think the announcement of the -- no, on the Monday -- oh, sorry, on the Tuesday, by then, there might have been some sort of indication that there would be an event in Toronto around Queen's Park.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
But I don't think there was any other active sites in Ontario. There were, I believe, some demonstrations at other provincial capitals across the country, but for sure, Coutts was active and clearly being televised and we're seeing I was getting briefings from Commissioner Lucki on the events out there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So by this time, which I believe was February the 2nd or the 1st -- February the 1st, I believe, things are happening elsewhere. And if we go back to the top, one of the discussion points, do you see the third bullet from the bottom, it says, "POU units across the province needed." What does that refer to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So maybe I could just give some context to the meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Please.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So this is the Tuesday. We are into the -- significantly into the pivot at this point. I had received varying levels of input, some of them just random emails, some of them very specific conversations with people with a lot of experience in unprecedented, unusual public safety events. And the validation that I was getting from small i information to large I information based on expertise was this was unprecedented. This was larger than your police service is going to be able to handle. It was national, and in some cases, international in scope. It was fueled by significant funding, significant misinformation, disinformation and polarization, just to name a few. This meeting was my first attempt to sit down with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson as the Major Incident Commander. I had invited -- I'd asked for Inspector Lucas to be at the meeting. He could not attend, and I respect his reason, although I don't know it specifically. I think Inspector Marin was sent as his designate, I think, but he was a senior officer from the ICS team that was there, Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll, who was the ESU Commander, our POU Commander. And he ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What does ESU stand for?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Emergency Safety Unit, I think, or Emergency Services Unit. Sorry, it's been a little bit of time.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
It's synonymous with POU, Public Order Unit?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Essentially, but broader -- I think actually a broader use of trained officers that are actually more effectively deployed, a really good practice here that Ottawa should be recognized for, Ottawa Police Service should be recognized for. And I had brought with me the two PLT supervisors because I had information, feedback internally that our PLT members weren't being optimally used and were feeling out of the loop of substantive discussions like this. And I had requested that the two supervisors be there, and they were there, and you see their contributions later on in the notes. But this is the substantive first time that I'm sitting down with the Incident Command thread, strategic, operational and tactical, asking what are you folks seeing? How are you assessing this? No decision's being made here. I need situational awareness. I need your assessment. We had been blessed with commanders of some expertise and experience from other jurisdictions that were in that room. I think London was there, can't remember if Durham. I believe there was an OPP commander. I can't recall, but there were at least three other agencies in the room. So it wasn't just us talking to us. There was a healthy amount of external expertise. And we went through what I would call -- I won't say it's a whiteboarding session, but a consultation, discussion session that I wanted to get at some point to, okay, well, this is good. Now what's the move forward coming out from this? So that's the context of this meeting. I'll pause there if you want to come back to the question that you wanted me to ask -- answer.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes, because I'm interested in this notation that POU units across the province ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- needed.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So around -- I'd say around the mid point of that meeting, I would have almost turned to Michel Marin and Mike Stoll, who were sitting to my right, and said, "What's the level of POU that you would think we would need to start to dismantle the red zone and end the occupation?" And then there was, like, a real-time discussion between my folks and the other POU commanders in the room, but there were others that were chiming in. It was mainly a POU discussion, and I've been in them in many other times before, so I know how this feels. I just sort of sat back and watched this new generation of experts do their thing, and it was kind of cool to watch. And within a really short period of time, it was almost unanimous. This may not be the exact language, but it was close to it, we're going to need everything in Ontario and a bunch more from across Canada. That was one of the moments where I truly understood the scale of what we were facing. Everything in Ontario and a bunch more from across Canada for me was state visits, an Olympic event, G8, G20. Nothing else requires that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's when I truly understand from people with amazing expertise, from different jurisdictions, add onto that whatever other resources we're going to request, that's somewhere already in the range of 6, 7, 800 officers plus investigators, plus boots on the ground officers, plus dispatchers, analysts, special constables to handle mass arrests. The number is going to be well north of a thousand, and it's way more than we will ever be able to supply within the Ottawa Police Service, within the eastern region of Ontario, within the province.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So that recognition came as early as February 1st?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, if we go down a little, in the first box under discussion point, I read a bit from it earlier, "PLT would like one more attempt to speak with every convoy to get them on the same page. Truckers need to clear all the roads and stop honking in exchange for fuel and a place to park. Have zero room to negotiate. If they don't deal with it in this way, they will be removed." Why is it that there was zero room to negotiate?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know. I'm assuming this is the PLT contribution to the discussion, so I don’t -- these aren’t my notes, and it doesn’t seem to be attributed to one or both of the supervisors. I don’t know if this is their briefing contributing in totality, so I’m not sure what that means.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I was just curious because it appears that the PLT would like more time, more opportunity to speak to the convoy and then perhaps there was another view expressed, no room to negotiate. I was just wondering if you could enlighten us on what this discussion was about.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, there were some 20 people in the room and it was really an open forum discussion with people just contributing ideas in a very fluid way.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. If I could take you now to the next document, the next day, OPS00014484. So if we go to page 22. Now, Chief Sloly, do you have a practise of making notes to yourself, sending yourself emails as reminders or things like that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I do, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And would this be one of those examples?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So here, we read, “Advise that all options on the table needs to consider” ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry. Can you -- I’m just not sure the context or date or time of this, sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
“Call with Mayor”, and the time stamp, at least from the entry, is 1:30. Okay. Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And we see a name on the top left, Maria?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Fortunato.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Who’s that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s my Executive Assistant, or was my Executive Assistant.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So the content of the email, which is, I guess, note to yourself, says: “Advised that all options on the table needs to consider the ‘political option’ - what role(s) can Premier and PM play in diffusing the demonstration. It is not my legal responsibility to end a demonstration - it is my legal responsibility to provide adequate and effective policing to serve and protect the city/citizens.” What was the purpose of this note to yourself?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
At this point, I actually didn’t have an assigned scribe, so I was trying in real time to capture information around conversations that I thought were important or a point that I was trying to remember, so it’s not a consistent practice with every single meeting that I would go back and do this. That’s the context of the note. I don’t know if that answers your question, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And since the subject at the top says “Call with Mayor” ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- “re Demonstration”, does that capture some of the contents of the call?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Some of it. Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
On the 2nd of February.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, on that same day, you made a public announcement that turned out to be somewhat controversial. Do you know what I’m talking about?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I can guess what’s coming, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Give me your guess.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There may be not be a policing solution to this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why did you say that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
For all the reasons that we’ve talked about. The size and scale of the events were not going to be able to be handled by any one police of jurisdiction, certainly not mine. That this was a national scope event started from corners of all parts of Canada and arrived in our city. It was already, by the 2nd, in several other locations, Kutz, specifically, I think by the 2nd. There would have been some indication that Queens Park in Toronto would have been a location. This was borne out by a wide variety of polarizing issues, not the least of which was the vaccine mandates, but there were many other anti-government sentiments expressed at all three levels of government. And some of this was just people looking to come into our city and participate in an event, to have an unruly and, in many cases, unlawful party. This was the underpinnings that created this event and brought it substantially into our city. We’re well beyond the Police Services Act mandate of me as a Police Chief and the Ottawa Police Service and the police of jurisdiction, and we were going to have to engage other elements of civil society and likely all three levels of government to make in some way a meaningful contribution to a sustainable solution to the end of it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was the context in which you made this statement?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe there was a -- I can’t remember if it was a Board meeting or if it was a Council meeting that the Board was in attendance at. There was a range of questions for hours, and at some point one of the questions elicited that response.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And how was your comment received?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If there are 35 million people in Canada, probably 35 million different ways.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you feel that you were understood?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No. Largely misunderstood but, by a lot of people, very understood.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And have you had a chance to reflect on the statement you made since the time you made it?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
A lot.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what conclusions have you come to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It needed to be more clear.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. What did you need to be more clear on?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That the Ottawa Police Service is doing and will continue to do everything we possibly can do. Just to be clear, that was literally the substantive answer I was giving during that meeting. All options are on the table. We’re doing everything we can. We’re calling all the staffing we can. We are rearranging our plan. We’re calling out to our partners. So before that statement was made -- it wasn’t made in a vacuum. We were hours into a long meeting with multiple questions from multiple stakeholders. I believe my Board were present. I stand to be corrected. City Councillors, the Mayor, “What are you doing? How are you going to end this? When is it going to end?” Please understand, we’re doing everything we can and we’ll continue to do everything we can on a repeat loop, but at some point this isn’t going to end just by the Ottawa Police Service. Even if we could find a way to get all the resources we need, it’s going to come back again next week, the month after, Canada Day. This is a larger movement or series of movements. This is a trend that’s happening across the country and around the world, and so there needs to be more than just a policing solution to it. That’s the context. Now, I did reflect on it and in the days and weeks and now months after that I’ve, in opportunities like this, expanded on that short phrase. I think there’s ample documentation in my notes, note scribes, to talk about me explaining this further to the Chair, at Board meetings, in other conversations and meetings. So I didn’t just leave it till now to provide a more fulsome explanation. Within hours and days of it, I was trying to provide that more fulsome explanation to my Board oversight and to other public bodies and civil actors.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, there are those who may say that your statement fostered a perception among the public and the protestors that the OPS was vulnerable and unable to police the convoy. What do you say to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, like my earlier comment, sir, everyone is entitled to their opinion and is certainly entitled to their feelings. And I can understand that if that was the only thing they heard from me and they were not available to hear all the other efforts I made to clarify that, that that could leave them with a sense that we’d just given up. So I’m not challenging that. But let me clear. I don’t know if that is different from any other statement I’ve made around the role of policing in society. If you recall my earlier comments when I introduced my approach to policing and how I did it, the police are not going to solve guns and gangs and drugs on their own without education, health care, social services, the volunteer sector, communities themselves. The police are not going to be able to solve sexual assaults on their own without advocacy groups and legislative change. So there isn’t any major aspect of policing, crime management, order management, traffic management -- even traffic management, we can’t patrol the amount of highways unless we have bylaw changes, signage changes, engineering changes that are well beyond the remit of the police service to demand and deliver. So for me, this is a consistent them that I have spoken on and acted in accordance throughout my entire policing career. It wasn’t, for me, an unusual statement, but it was heard in unusual and unprecedented circumstances and misinterpreted broadly, badly.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you think that the lack of clarity of the statement might have risked contributing to a loss of public trust in the ability of the police to respond?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I can’t rule that out, sir, but I think I made enough efforts after that to clarify that and, demonstrably, the Ottawa Police Service kept -- with its partners, kept putting out everything we possibly could for as long as we could, I would very strongly suggest well past where we should have been. Our actions should have spoken louder than words, but unfortunately, by Saturday afternoon, there had been a cemented narrative and I don’t think it ever changed. My statement probably didn’t help it, but I don’t think it was really changeable from that first weekend.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we’ve also heard from other police leaders who disagreed with the statement from their perspective, in the way that they interpreted the statement, and they felt that there was, in fact, a policing solution. And the way that the occupation was ultimately dismantled proved that there was a policing solution. What do you say to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, if their comment was based on what was said without the benefit of hearing all the other explanations, I certainly attempted, through the larger calls, to establish the things I just talked about. We are still looking -- we are still doing everything we can. We’re seeking all the help we can. And if we can get 1,800 resources, or whatever number the final amount is to come in, then we could take care of the unlawful aspects of this. But there were broader implications and underpinnings that could bring it back to my city or any other city or jurisdiction. And so sustainably, to resolve the situation, we were still going to need larger civil society, all three levels of government. I don’t know if this is the time to interject around any of the levels of declarations of emergency, municipal, provincial, or federal, but clearly we had indications, and I believe that there were assistances from those various levels, the injunction, the private injunction. And so there are clearly examples where some additional efforts were needed beyond the efforts of the police to resolve it. Local community mobilized themselves in mostly constructive ways. In some ways, less constructive. But there were efforts across the board, from private citizens to public institutions, that contributed ultimately to that success. While I respect the comments of my peers, I want to be careful with my language here, I don’t know any major operation, including that one, that did not benefit material from the supports outside of police organizations themselves. And I think that’s unfair to the contributions made by broader civil society, including all three levels of government.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know if that’s what they intended in their comments. I want to be clear about that. but no police organization of any size, operation of any size, that I’ve ever been involved with, that had the clear level of success, no deaths, no serious injuries, no significant damage to infrastructure, no rioting, no burning police cars. I don’t know if any size operation that didn’t materially benefit from the consent and cooperation of citizenry, the injections of material resources or advice, expertise, from other experts outside of policing, legislative change, et cetera, et cetera.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. Okay. So this was on the 2nd; right? That you made the statement?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let’s move forward by a few days.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I did recall it was the 1st, but I’m not going to quibble.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So let’s move forward by a few days. And we’ve heard from other witnesses that the weekends are always the worst. Is that right? In terms of the surge of numbers.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. In terms of the surge of numbers, and then the extra dynamics of convoys coming in or not coming in. definitely larger in scale, and more complex.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So I want to show you an email dated February the 5th at 6:33 a.m. The document number is OPS0007355. I expect it will show an email from you to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. And by this point, on around the 5th, what was the state of any evolving plan that the OPS had?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think on that date, I received a briefing on the three options I’d asked for from the meeting on February 1st, the POU options. So that’s a substantive subplan development. By then, we’d had major changes around our internal staffing capabilities, decisions around how to redeploy resources around both the events for the convoy, as well as policing the rest of the City, which still had to happen on a 24-hour basis, obviously. We had made announcements around our efforts to try to address the disorderly, unlawful, and assaultive behaviour, the hate type behaviour that was happening directly in the communities most affected around the red zone, variously described as surge and enforce and contain. So those are some of the examples of overarching -- we were now planning for a week’s cycle, as opposed to a weekend cycle. Requests had gone out to partner agencies not just for police officers, but for planners, people with expertise in PLT, POU, recognizing we didn’t have the expertise or the number of people necessary to do the type of planning and sub-planning that we needed to do. I know I’m going fast, Commissioner, so if you need to me slow down, I will. So there’s a range of activities that are engaged in involving the prearrival plan into an in-event plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well that context is helpful as we take a look at this document. Can we scroll down a bit? So in this email, you said you have directed Insp. D’Aoust to convene a full incident command briefing at 8:00 a.m. If we go down further, there’s a recap situational awareness, and then below that, we see some -- two sets of priorities. First of all, the general priorities has a couple of points: “Surge, contain and enforce”. That’s the first point. Second: “Demonstration - fully implement plan - BUT - close everything (roads, bridges highway off ramps, etc.) as early and as long as possible” Third: “Shut down/secure enablers for unlawful and unsafe protest; funds […], fuel […], fun…” I won’t read the contents in brackets. Is there a fourth point? Can we go down? Okay. So that’s it. the first priority -- general priorities. Explain to us what this is all about?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So this is the second Saturday. You’ll recall what happened on the first Saturday. Point number two around close everything, at the meeting that was held, that was qualified, I want to be clear about that, clearly access and egress -- access into the city and access into the downtown core was one of the major reasons why that situation on the first Saturday so quickly escalated and metastasized into the events that we’re feeling right now. It was reasonably predictable at this point that we were going to have another large influx of convoys, ones and twos vehicles, and walk across bridges demonstrators that would again likely overwhelm the number of resources, even at that time that we had in the city. And so that was a major public safety risk that, on the second Saturday, was now even more likely to happen. And so that’s the point there. The “Surge, contain and enforce” was announced on the Friday morning at a media conference. And this was specifically to address the level of ongoing disorderly, assaultive, hate related behaviour that our downtown communities and businesses were experiencing, particularly in Councillor Fleury’s ward and Councillor McKenney, although I’m not sure she’s in office now, but former Councillor McKenney, her ward. And the overwhelming amount of community complaints, business complaints were coming from the unlawful, assaultive type behaviour in that area, and we needed to -- that “Surge, contain and enforce” is not for the red zone. That is for the areas outside of the red zone. And the reference around the stacking the day shift and the night shift is to hold back the night shift officers, and then deploy the day shift officers so we have a larger amount, at that time, to be visibly present in the mid- morning to mid-afternoon when the bulk of those arriving demonstrators and activities, unlawful, assaultive type of activities, would be taking place. The third point is around probably less of a public safety piece, but still unlawful, unsafe. Funds that were enabling, to some significant degree, the ongoing activities here, and other locations, but certainly here in Ottawa. Fuel. The trucks needed fuel and we were already trying to deal with the jerry cans and that, the open flames, propane in residential areas that I think has already been spoken about. And the fun. Probably not the best word to use, but these were, I think, significant emotional and psychological impacts on those that felt captured, abandoned, that elements of the demonstration and the convoy events were fun, where they were suffering. And I think there was a reasonable need for us to take whatever lawful and ethical actions we could to stop it or discourage it and negotiate it in some way, and those were largely the actions that PLT, I believe, we’re involved with.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. Now, let me focus for the moment on the third -- well, the second and third point. The directive to close roads and so on, as well as shutting things down, like fuel seizure and so on. In earlier testimony from Deputy Chief Ferguson, and I believe Deputy Bell as well, they expressed the view that this is an example of a strategic level executive going down, crossing the boundary into the Operational or even possibly technical level of Command, and there was some question about the propriety of a Strategic Level Commander doing that. What's your view on this?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
This is me crossing that boundary, and for a very specific reason. It's the first full week. The entire Service is fully deployed and fully exhausted. We are getting massive complaints from our community, and they are suffering. By this time, they are suffering. The resilience I talked about was still there in a lot of people, but it's waning. We are now reasonably able to predict the cycles of increases on Friday, Saturday, into Sunday, and down. We know what's coming, and we knew what hit us the week before. And this is the Chief of Police calling a special Incident Command meeting to say, "Are we ready? Do we have the capacity? Are we able to significantly alter what took place last Saturday to what is going to take place this Saturday? And I need to look around the room and eyeball everybody and get a nod or a headshake and then figure out what we need, you need for resources." So I framed out something that people come prepared to discuss and invited them to that meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Just so I understand, you're acknowledging that you were in fact stepping into the Operational/Tactical levels, but you are saying this is justified under the circumstances?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was stepping into the Operational levels to make sure that strategic intent was really clear to the Operational Commanders.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, at this time, on the 5th, who was the Event Commander in charge?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, I thought it was Superintendent Chris Rheaume. I found out at the meeting that transpired later that in fact it was Superintendent Jamie Dunlop.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So when you made these directives you weren't aware yet that it was Dunlop, Superintendent Dunlop?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's correct, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, some may say that the proper way to do this is not for the Strategic Commander to step into the Operational level, but to have a discussion with the Operational Commander and provide strategic direction, or if the Strategic Commander did not have enough confidence in the Operational Commander, to replace that person, rather than to start directing Operations him or herself. What do you say to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If you scroll up to the top of this, please? So this is... What's the timestamp on this email? Sorry, I just can't see it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I believe it's 11:33 on Saturday, February the 5th.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, that doesn't make sense.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, I'm told that this may be Greenwich Mean Time, and so -- is this six hours difference?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So I think this around ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Five hours.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It's around five or six o'clock. So to give you context, Confederation Park had become a significant site that we were conducting PLT negotiations. The issue of fuel coming into the downtown from Coventry Road was escalating. The level of complaints, legitimate, desperate complaints coming in from businesses and residents are escalating. We had spent most of the Thursday and Friday trying to build towards the announcement on the Friday of the surge and force, contain. The statements "all options are on the table, we are putting all of our resources on the ground. You will see a visible, different amount -- visible -- a greater visibility of police officers engaged in a wider array of activities, including enforcement, to address the substantive complaints and concerns affecting our community." And I know I went way too fast there, so I'm going to take a breath and let people catch up. Coming into the Saturday night, I woke up because I wasn't getting a whole lot of sleep those days. I woke up somewhere around three o'clock in the morning, could not get back to sleep. Checked the situation report that came from Duty Inspector Frank D'Aoust, and he laid out information that is contained in this email. The Confederation Park, I'm not reading exactly, but the Confederation Park negotiations ended badly. The Indigenous Elders that had come in were treated badly. There was an attack on one of our sergeants at one of the sites. Other City workers were being attacked. This, for me, was an alarming situational report in the middle of the night that no one else was likely reading, and I wouldn't have been reading until I had woken up with my alarm at five o'clock in the morning. But I read it. So I got in the shower and I got into my car and I got down to the station, and I changed into my gear, and I looked around. We were thinly staffed. I understand why. There was not much to staff with, and we were thinly staffed. And when I went down onto the, we call the Zero Level of our Headquarters, and asked the watch commanders there and the sergeants, "What's our staffing levels look like for 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock, 11 o'clock when the bulk of the resource -- when the bulk of convoys are coming in?" The numbers I got were really concerning. The level of threat from the situational report from Inspector D'Aoust at three o'clock in the morning was alarming. So overnight we had an escalated level of threat at multiple different sites, and in the morning, I wasn't getting a sense that we had the staffing commensurate to what we had announced and what we actually needed. And so I needed to make sure that I could pull together an Incident Command Team and ask these Operational level questions to be assured that we were in a better state of affairs than what I was getting at that point in the morning. And I think that is a reasonable level of situational awareness for a Chief of Police in an unprecedented crisis to ask of their Operational Commanders.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Would you agree, then, that these priorities set out in this email were conceived by you and directed by you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They were conceived by me, they weren't directed by me. They were -- these were the areas that we were going to explore at the Commanders meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But then we also heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson, or what we confirm through her testimony the notes that she wrote, that you expressed the sentiment that this plan was not to be changed. "Not changing the Operational Plan, needed to implement the hell out of that plan for the next 72 hours. The plan we have is excellent." So I believe we asked Deputy Chief Ferguson whether that was what you said, and she confirmed it. Do you remember?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
At what point was that? Is that the subsequent meeting that we had when I called for the Incident Command meeting?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Perhaps it would help if we go back to OPS00014479. Those are Deputy Chief Ferguson's notes. If necessary, we can also go to her transcript from last Thursday's testimony. So if we go to page 43. Can we go down? We need to go back up a little. Sorry, go up. Further up: "Need to turn the corner on this today. I am not changing the Op Plan. Need to implement the hell out of the plan for the next 72 hours." So does that refresh your memory?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you said that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you consider this an excellent plan, and it was not to be changed?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just -- I'm a little confused, sorry, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The three-pointer that I put in my email writing is not the Ops Plan I'm referring to here.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Ah. Could you clarify that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. I sent a meeting request. I'm concerned about these three areas. We're going to discuss them. We have this meeting, and I'm saying, "Our Ops Plan is the right plan. What I want us to do is implement the hell out of it." So surge and force, contain was part of our Ops Plan. Implement the hell out of it. That means you're going to have to have enough resources to do that. To surge into the neighbourhood, you -- I think the number we said was, I might get the numbers wrong, but I think it was 30 per shift over 3 shifts in two neighbourhoods, where you would see 15 extra uniform officers in those neighbourhoods. But if we can't staff to that level, we can't implement the heck of out it, or even implement it. So the staffing request is around make sure that what we've announced as part of our excellent Ops Plan, which is not changing, has the staffing to implement it. That's the reference. The reference around the Traffic Plan, we're supposed to be reducing the amount of convoys coming into the city. Make sure the Traffic Plan is staffed adequately and implemented effectively, so we don't have the same level of surge of trucks and vehicles coming into the downtown, but we're not changing the plan. There was a clarification, and there was a misunderstanding from Inspector Frank D'Aoust and I first contacted him at probably four o'clock in the morning, where he interpreted close everything as literally get the OPP to close every highway off ramp of the King's highways across the entire municipality of Ottawa. He would need probably a thousand police officers to do that, and I would never intend that to happen. I would never need that to happen. I never needed it to happen. That misinterpretation has stayed alive to this day. I clarified in this meeting, down to off ramps that give direct access to the downtown core where our red zones area, that's what I need. I wanted all the interprovincial bridges closed because all of them give direct access to the downtown core, and I wanted to know that we had more roads closed internally than we had the weekend before, but I never publicly in the media, and I never in these meetings said get the OPP to close everything, everywhere, and keep it closed.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. That's helpful introduction to my next question because there was a public announcement the day before on the 4th; right? What's your best recollection as to what was said at that press event in terms of what was contemplated?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My best recollection was around the concept of all options are on the table. We are looking at greater levels of road closures including highway off ramps and interprovincial bridges.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But would you agree that the purpose of the meeting on the 5th was to establish the resources required in order to carry out these priorities?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not at all, sir. I wanted to ensure that the resources that had been said that would be in place were actually going to be in place.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So we could have misunderstood, but let's see if we could clarify this. If I could take you to your interview summary, WTS00000040 at page 27. If we go down further?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Actually, if you scroll up a little bit, sorry. Right there. "On February 4th, Chief Sloly announced at a press conference that [the] OPS would be making greater use of road closures, including closures of off-ramps for Highway 417..." There's no statements there saying that we're going to close everything.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, no, no, that -- I agree with you on that, but that's the announcement, but I'm asking you about the purpose of the meeting on the 5th, the morning meeting. So if we go to this paragraph that says, "Chief Sloly saw the situation report early on the morning of February 5[th]. In response, he held several early morning meetings to ensure that OPS's surge and enforcement strategy and efforts to harden the downtown core were proceeding properly. He wanted to ensure that OPS had the staffing to implement what it had announced on February 4[th]. Specifically, he spent Inspector D'Aoust an email with a list of meeting topics and asked him to organize a meeting with the members of the IC..." I believe that's Incident Command? "...and the command team." So and so it goes. So am I correct that on the 5th this meeting was arranged in part to ensure that the OPS had the staffing to implement what he had already announced the day before?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, but the plan was already to have those staff in place. I wanted to make sure they were actually available. A lot can happen in 24 hours. Potentially, without me knowing, the Incident Commander could have developed a plan that was going to take resources away from those commitments. If they had said we can't staff your surge and enforcement because we've got all those neighbourhood officers doing something else, or we had a shooting in the west end last night and it's an extensive scene and we can't redeploy our traffic to that, then I would have understood. We couldn't staff what we planned. But we weren't trying to figure out just then if we had the staffing for what we had announced. That is not correct.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
As a best practice, would it not be preferrable to first ensure that OPS had the resources before announcing these plans publicly?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was told we had the resources, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. But do you agree with me that it would be -- it might be problematic to make announcements when it turns out that the resources are not there, or for other reasons the actions cannot be carried out, because it might contribute to a loss of public confidence?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If that was the case, and clearly, there was no understanding that the resources were available and reasonably predictably going to be available, that would be problematic. That was not the case in this situation.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So we've covered the events on the 4th and on the 5th. Now the general priorities, and if we go back to the email on the 5th? We've looked at the general priorities. Mr. Clerk, do you need the document number? OPS0007355. So I've already asked you, Chief Sloly, about the general priorities. I want to ask you now about the location priorities, which is further down. There we go. So there are four locations listed: Confederation Park, Rideau -- I take it that this refers to the intersection Rideau and Sussex?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe so, sir, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Third is Wellington and then fourth is SJAM. Who set these priorities, the general and the location priorities?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So those were the locations where our red zone -- Rideau, Wellington and SJAM are the three basic footprints of the red zone. Those were established, I believe, through the Incident Commander up through Trish Ferguson. She was the first that I recall hearing about the red zone and the footprints were described to me in subsequent meetings from probably the Sunday through until now. Confederation Park, as I had advised, I think that started up somewhere around the Thursday. I might be mistaken, but Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, but certainly had escalated to a significant event for us to be managing on the Thursday night, Friday into the weekend. So those weren't my priorities. Those were already priorities established by virtue of the briefings I was getting, the situation reports that were coming in to me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Are you speaking now of just the location priorities or does that apply as well to the general priorities?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm sorry, what general priorities? I maybe ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The previous list, if we just scroll up? It's three points.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, we were dealing with a demonstration, so that's literally the entire theory of operations, number two, surge contain and enforce was to address the trauma impacting our communities. And shutting down the ability for this thing to sustain itself, again, those are just priorities that we'd been working on literally since the previous weekend. Those aren't new priorities. That's essentially what we have been working on.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, I -- perhaps I'm not clear, but I -- my question is, who set these priorities -- or is your position that shutting down fuel funds and fund, these are priorities known to everyone?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, in terms of shutting down enabling factors, at a broad level, that was already well underway. We already had established I think through Deputy Bell and Christiane Huneault contacts with the City to try to shut down the GoFundMe. I may not be using the right terminology, but not allow those funds to continue to enable the ongoing occupation of the city. Diesel and propane and wood had already been established through briefing cycles coming up to me as priorities that the Incident Commander and the team were working on, and there's lots of communication around that, and questions and public forums, so that was already well established. I would probably agree the fund piece was something that I had inserted in there, but clearly had become a significant problem and a public trust problem. And so that's probably the only newer element but already a well-established part of our briefing cycles that we had been discussing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What about “Close everything”?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’ve explained -- again, I’ve explained that, ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
With the -- with the ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- the context. That that was misinterpreted and then clarified in the meeting that happened subsequent.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But who set that priority; the direction to close roads, interprovincial bridges and so on?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The pre-planning document.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Then I don’t -- what I don’t understand is, I thought a moment earlier you said you did step -- you did cross from strategic level to operational level but for a good reason.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, well -- then let me further explain. I’m not enforced -- I’m not introducing new priorities. I am asking; “These are the priorities that we’ve set. Are we able to implement them? We have a plan. Are we able to implement them? Do we have the resources? Are we ready to go this morning?” Because we weren’t ready to go the last morning. We did not have the ability to have the resources to address the level of surge coming into the city, and now we have additional priorities that we’ve identified over the week. I wanted to make sure -- I’m not setting new priorities, I’m ensuring that we have the resources to actually fully implement, the vernacular, the heck out of the plan that we have in place; it’s an excellent plan. Do we have the resources? Can we fully and effectively implement it? That’s my mindset going into the meeting; that’s why I’ve called that meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So, just if I understand, your position is that whoever developed the plan, the plan that kept evolving, they decided the priorities. You didn’t set anything new except for the third point, the fun part, and ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Even that, sir, I would suggest, clearly, we were already aware of the issue of the bouncy castles and the DJs and the dancing and the fireworks. That was -- that’s a very short list of all the things that were afflicting the neighbourhoods in and around the red zones. Open barbeques; people blocking lanes, tearing masks off people’s face. I could -- I could go down the list and detail the incredible range of assaultive-type behaviour. But the broad thing is shut down these enablers and let’s not allow our city to look like it’s a theme park in the middle of a public safety crisis. I hadn’t introduced anything more than articulate the obvious. And these were briefings that I was being given for days in advance of me calling this meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
All right. And another point to clarify, because you told us earlier that this is not the plan, that this is not -- this email, these priorities are not the plan that you thought was excellent; there was another plan, the one that has evolved.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There’s only one ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I want to take you ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There’s only on plan, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The one plan that kept evolving. I want to take you to a document and see if you can confirm that was the plan as of this time. Could we go to OPS00006941? So it says, “Freedom Convoy - Canada Unity - Phase 2 Operational Plan.” There’s a date that’s partially cut off; February 4th, it looks like? If we scroll down to the Table of Contents, perhaps? Does this look familiar?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s the basic template of our operational planning.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We go down further, maybe we can just scroll through so the former Chief can familiarize himself with this document. Let us know if you’re ready to scroll down.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, please do. Okay, thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So would those priorities be reflected -- well, assuming that this is the plan -- because this is this -- the cover says February the 4th, and we have the email saying February the 5th; it should be approximate in time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So when you said, “We had an excellent plan”; could -- were you referring to this plan?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know if I was referring to this plan. I don’t know if I ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Or another iteration very close ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know if I’ve ever received it, but at whatever point I was last briefed on our plan, that’s the point of reference that I’m making on the Saturday the 5th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. And should those priorities, general or location-wise, be reflected in this plan?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, unless there’s sub-plans that have those priorities identified in there, I can’t recall ever receiving or reading through this version of the plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But you had read a version of the plan that you called excellent?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I had been briefed on versions of plan. You’ll recall I only got the pre -- I only got the pre-operational plan on the 28th; two days, technically, into what the event was. So I wasn’t required to sign off on these plans. There’s no signature block from me. I’m not approving plans. They’re happening on a real-time basis, so I don’t have a timestamp in my head that I saw a document at point zero and said, “That’s the excellent plan.” The briefing cycles that I had been getting, I have an understanding of what the priorities are, how they’re being resourced, how they’re being -- going to be actioned, what requests for resourcing is coming to me. But that’s based on a briefing cycle, not me sitting and flipping through pages of a plan saying, “Wow, this is excellent; this is the one we have to implement.”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So just to be clear, the initial plan, the one dated January 28th, that one you did read?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, it was delivered to me the morning of the 28th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And any subsequent evolvement of that plan, you learn about those developments through briefings but not through your reading them?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
With the exception of the February 9th version.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So as of the 5th, when you describe an excellent plan, is an excellent plan that you haven’t read?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s an excellent plan based on the briefings. I can’t recall whether or not this was sent to me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So if we move on to the next topic, which is something that you’ve alluded to; the Event Commander’s -- there was some switching of Commanders, and at the beginning of the events you weren’t always apprised of those changes in a timely manner. So I’d like to ask you about that. Let me find the page reference; OPS00004771. (SHORT PAUSE)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you see that this is dated January the 30th. It’s an email from you to Deputy Chief Ferguson, Deputy Chief Bell; who’s John Steinbach?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
He’s the executive -- was at that point the Executive Director of Communications and Strategy.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then it was also sent to Russ Lucas and Chris Rheaume. So I assume that that was because Supt. Rheaume was the Event Commander at the time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s my understanding, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now according to Supt. Rheaume’s notes, he was removed as the Event Commander on or around February the 1st because Trish Ferguson, the Deputy Chief Ferguson received direction from you to remove him; is that correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, it’s absolutely false.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So that’s what I wanted to clarify because we actually heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that he was removed for other reasons. But we do have these notations in Supt. Rheaume’s notes, that’s what I want to bring those to your attention. If we could go to document ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was told by Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that the switch for Dunlop was because -- my recollection was because Insp. Lucas needed some time off; he was tired. I may have misinterpreted that, maybe it was Chris Rheaume. But that’s my understanding, that there was a temporary switch to give somebody days off to go and sleep, basically.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But I gave no direction whatsoever at any time for Supt. Rheaume to be removed from his role as Event Commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But we do have notes from Supt. Rheaume. So first I want to take you to two sets of notes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Can I see those notes, sir?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. That’s where I’m taking you to. So OPS00014537. I believe it’s page 5. So 19:30 ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Which day would that be? Is it the 1st or the 2nd?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
It would be the 1st, I believe, because the next -- the date after the line is February the 2nd. We can go back and check. The date might have been on the first page, actually. So can we go back to the first page to establish the date, or the second page, I guess. Oh, no. Okay, so keep going down. Okay, so this is page 2 of 7, it's February 1st. Now we scroll down. That's right. It's the next page: "I was informed by [Deputy Chief] Trish Ferguson to report to duty tomorrow at Greenbank and to take care of my teams. No reason why I was removed from NCRCC and that I am no longer the Event Commander." So the notation on this date suggests that he was removed and he didn't understand why. Now, if we go to page 6. Go down a bit. Okay, so now we have his notes on February the 10th, and the notation says: "Advised by [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson that Chief Sloly had me removed by her on Feb 1." So it appears from these notes that he was removed on the 1st, not told why, and then there is a notation on the 10th that -- giving him the reason, that he was in fact removed by her -- well, through her by you. So I just wanted to get your position on what happened.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely false. Never ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Never gave that direction.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So in fact, you were not aware that he was removed?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was -- again, I understood from my recollection, and I don't know if there's notes to support, my recollection is hearing that Inspector Lucas was very tired. He had been -- gone through the entire planning cycle and had survived through that first weekend, and he had requested time off, and it was for him that Superintendent Dunlop was replacing. I don't recall a reference to Superintendent Rheaume. I have not recollection whatsoever of any conversation in which it was suggested to me or I directed that Superintendent Rheaume be removed as the Event Commander.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Zero.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, if we could go back to ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And it's very concerning that it's articulated in that way.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, that's why I want to bring these to your attention so you have a chance to respond. OPS00014484. And if we can go to page 10, please. So these are notes to yourself again? Yes?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
It's dated February the 5th. Title is Meet With Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and DC Bell: "I advised that I had only just officially heard that Supt Dunlop had replaced Insp Lucas as the Incident Commander at the previous briefing." So you just learned on the 5th that Dunlop is now the Commander, and ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well -- sorry. Again, here is the confusion for me, because either in that meeting or before, Ferguson, sorry, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson said "Lucas needed time off. We brought Dunlop in." So that's why I'm referring to Lucas, not Rheaume here. In my mind, my notes, contemporaneous notes are "Lucas got replaced. Why? Why didn't you tell me?" I had no idea about the Rheaume piece. I had no idea about why he was removed, I had no idea he was removed. My only context was Lucas was removed, and that was surprising for me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. I'm not challenging your version, I'm just trying to understand from your perspective just what happened because it was pretty confusing when we're trying to go through the record, as you can imagine. The next paragraph: "DC Bell advised that he was the new Incident Commander installed this week..." Referring to Dunlop: "...and was leading the implementation of the preferred POU option. I asked why I was not advised of the change in the Incident Commander from Insp Lucas to Supt Dunlop. [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson took ownership of that failure to communicate and DC Bell admitted it was based on his recommendation. I counselled [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson that she was accountable for all Incident Command decisions so I hold responsible for this change and for not advising me of the change. I counselled that DC Bell that he is to stop interfering in [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson's role as Major Incident Commander. I counselled both that such major changes in the leadership of the [Incident Command] was to come to me for final approval outside of Operational exigencies. I advised both that I did not have confidence in Supt Dunlop as the Incident Commander based on his performance in the Panda Game..." And so on. So I just want to clarify a number of things. First, when Superintendent Rheaume, as the Event Commander, was replaced by Jamie Dunlop on or around the 1st of February, you had no knowledge of that until on or around the 5th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Even on the 5th I don't think I realised what had happened to Rheaume.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But you did not understand that the Event Commander is now Dunlop, you did not know that until the 5th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And that was concerning for you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Extremely.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You addressed the situation with both Ferguson and Bell, and that is because as the Chief Executive you needed to know?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I needed to know who was running our Operations.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So what effect, if any, did that incident have on your trust of your team, your Command Team?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It was a massive trust hit.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think it's pretty clear, honestly. We're in the middle of what is now I consider a national security crisis, my opinion, it doesn't have to be held by others; certainly a local public safety crisis; and one, if not the most important functions is the Incident Commander. The Major Incident Commander, Event Commander, Incident Commander, that is my entire understanding of leadership capability and capacity to orchestrate all of what needs to be done across the Incident Command System just so that we can continue to provide adequate effective policing. That is a major level change, and one that was made without any consultation, any communication to me, and one that appeared to have been kept secret from me until literally it came up in the briefing meeting that I had called. I don't even know if to this day that I didn't call that briefing meeting that I wouldn't have known about it until the Sunday, the Monday or the Tuesday. What's also materially important here... If you scroll back up, please. Right there. "I asked why I was not advised" -- sorry: "...he was the new Incident Commander installed this week and was leading the implementation..." This is Dunlop: "...was leading the implementation of the preferred POU [plan]." Superintendent Dunlop was not at the February 1st meeting in Kanata, that two hour plus meeting, where we had that discussion around "where are we now, and how can we get out of this?" He was not a part of the discussion of the Public Order Unit Commanders who were expert in that area. How could he have been replaced to lead this if he wasn't part of that essential meeting? I left explicit instructions, and it was in the notes that you showed earlier, "If you need anything more from me, if you need to clarify, I'm available to you." This is clearly one of the most important things that I've asked Trish Ferguson and her Incident Command Team, who were there represented as fully as they could be, Lucas couldn't attend, you recall, for whatever reason, "This is critical. I need a set of options in three days before the weekend events come." And somehow in that timeframe, without me understanding or even knowing, a switch of that magnitude was made and then put in charge of the planning for that that I was expecting a briefing on. I finally got a briefing later in the afternoon on the 5th of those three options. Could it have meant I could've had a briefing on the Wednesday or the Thursday, possibly, and could that have meant that we could have started two days, three days, four days earlier to actualise that scale of Operations, including making the request for the Public Order Commanders on scale that I was told on the February 1st meeting? We lost time, and clearly there was a lot of confusion. Even this note demonstrates I'm still not quite sure who's running what. And for Chief of Police, with the citizens and trauma and victimisation that they were under, our own members as struggling as they were, at best I can call this a significant lack of judgement on behalf of my two Operational deputies. At worst, probably this would've been a review that I would have done after the events had concluded and looked at it even more closely.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did your level of trust in your two Deputies change from that point on?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did they regain your trust afterwards?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Significantly. But at that point, it was low.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And to support some of the other things that you’ve said, can we go to OPS00014479?
Paul Champ, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
While that document’s being pulled up, Commissioner, I would just note -- it’s Paul Champ, for the record. Just taking a look at the testimony of Deputy Chief Ferguson, it wasn’t put to her by any witness (sic) about whether she had been directed by former Chief Sloly to remove Superintendent Rheaume from that position, so I’m just -- just noting for the record that that -- we don’t have any other evidence on that in the background. Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I believe my friend is correct. I think she simply said the reason she believed that he was removed but she wasn’t given this document.
Paul Champ, Counsel (Ottawa Coalition of Residents and Businesses)
Yeah, I’ll just look at the transcripts and confirm that. Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we can go to page 67. You see the notation, “The Chief began by saying we floundered last week and because we switched riders partway” -- I can’t read the next word.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
“Through”, I believe.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Through -- perhaps you’re better at reading this. Can you help me out?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know if I’m better, sir. But what I can read here: “The Chief began by saying we floundered last week and because we switched -- we had switched riders partway through [something] the switch between Rheaume and Dunlop...”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Indicating.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
“...indicating the switch between Rheaume to Dunlop to Patterson. The Chief and the team will not change any of the players until the operation is over unless Bill gets hit with a truck.” I don’t know what that means.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, that comment was supposed to be attributed to you.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I never used that term in my life, so I don’t know what that means, “Bill gets hit”. Who’s Bill?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But apart from that phrase on the last line, do you agree that this was the message communicated on this day, which I believe is February the 9th?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
These are her interpretations of what was communicated, so I don’t agree with ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, no, no. But I’m asking for your recollection if anything was said of that nature on February the 9th.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So of that nature, we will not be changing out any of the major incident command positions unless there’s exigent circumstances. If it’s 3 o’clock in the morning and someone got hit by a truck and you got to switch, switch. Tell me in the morning at the first early opportunity or call me because I had a standing position that any major issue, I could be woken up out of bed for a phone call. Operational, officer safety issue or a major issue like this, you can call me, and they all knew that. So -- but other than that, the team we have, the plan we have, implement the heck out of it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. You expressed the view that things were delayed because of this unfortunate miscommunication or, for whatever reason, the lack of communication of the change to you or to seek your approval first.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No. No. To be clear, things were delayed, things were confused. There was a churn of three Incident Commanders within a way too short period of time. Yes, some of that might have resulted in delays. I can’t tell you specifically. It felt to me that the POU plan was delayed because of Dunlop’s insertion and his need to get up to speed and his then reinterpretation of things. That’s about the only thing I can point to that was materially delayed. I don’t know if there’s any other material delays. But the confusion was clear. This is also around the same time, I believe, that we’re starting to get some concerns that are articulated from the OPP that there’s confusion with the Incident Command Team. I recall a phone call from Commissioner Carrique in this period where he was saying, “My folks are saying there seems to be some confusion with your Incident Command Team”. I took that to mean what was happening in this circumstance, and that’s why, on February 9th, when the Integrated Command Team -- sorry, Integrated Planning Team was coming in for their briefing that we weren’t going to do this to ourselves again.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So do you remember saying something about floundering the week before because of a switch in Commanders?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I might have used a term like that, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. That’s helpful. And you talk also about the discussions around -- -
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not across the board. That’s not a pejorative. We were floundering around the incident command switch-outs.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Precisely. And you mentioned PLT was discussed around this time, too. Let me take you to where I want to go. I want to talk to you about the use of PLT. In fact, I think we may be going back in time because this is -- these notes were made on the 8th or 9th, and this is a discussion about the week before, whether things were delayed the week before. So I’m going back to the week before. We’ve all heard about the Coventry incident. I believe you know what I’m referring to.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe I do, but I’ll let you carry on.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So specifically, the PLT was involved with some successes and challenges during the first week. Do you agree? So for example, we’ve heard about Coventry. We’ve also heard Confederation Park. And would you consider the PLT’s involvement at the Confederation Park -- the clearing of the Confederation Park to be a success?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
One they significantly contributed to, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I want to get your perspective on the role of the PLT within the operational system because we’ve heard from different witnesses about these diverging approaches, emphasis being put on enforcement as opposed to engagement, so to speak. And we’ve heard evidence that you and perhaps Mark Patterson, Superintendent Patterson, at the time during that week of what one witness has described as ad hoc enforcement periods, that the two of you were favouring more enforcement in contrast to Deputies Ferguson and Bell, who were more in favour of PLT. I’m sorry. That’s a long preamble, but do you get what I was trying to ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I understand that there’s been a theme around that. I completely ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Perhaps you can explain that better.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- disagree with it. From my earliest days as a -- in training as a Public Order Unit Commander and in all of my times as a Public Order Incident Commander, Incident Commander, Major Incident Commander, Duty Operations Commander, the use of engagement -- community engagement pre, during, all the way through, even in the restoration phase has been something I was trained to and did in both police services that I had the honour to be part of, Toronto Police Service and the Ottawa Police Service. While the PLT program expanded from an RCMP-OPP kind of technique to broader -- to other police services, I -- for that most part, I was out of policing at that time. I had left the Toronto Police Service and was a partner at Deloitte. I came back into the Ottawa Police Service and the term Police Liaison Team was a new term to me, but their function was not new at all to me. I had deployed such tactics, seen them work effectively and less effectively, and fail, but always had that approach. Come back out of Incident Command -- and I know I’m going too fast. Come back out of Incident Command, the concept of community engagement is something that I had been championing for and had done at multiple levels for multiple decades. There isn’t anyone on God’s green earth that would have to convince me of the necessity and the value of community engagement, trust building, negotiation, mediation, de-escalation in any aspect of policing, not the least of which in Incident Command, Critical Incident Command. I have never in my entire life as a police officer, certainly as I became a senior officer and an executive and Chief of Police, have advocated for more enforcement over anything else. My record in the public is exhaustive on that. The operational plans I led in the Toronto Police Service when I had 4,000 officers under my control, responsible for anti-gang activities, always had a significant element of mediation, negotiation and engagement. I built the Toronto Police neighbourhood policing strategy, and brought that here to Ottawa. So this concept of Peter Sloly as being some sort of ultra-enforcement-driven focused leader is a narrative that someone has constructed to attack my character, but bears no resemblance whatsoever to my actual record in policing, including my time as Chief of Police here in Ottawa, including the three weeks that I was in charge at the Ottawa Police Service during these events.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Is it fair to say then that the view attributed to you as less inclined to allow the PLT team to do its work and to prefer quick win, as one witness has described it, by enforcement methods, that is inaccurate?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I did talk about quick wins, as I do literally in every major operation or administrative project. You need quick wins. I think such is basically standard around to do something different, you need to prove you can do it different, and it builds morale and confidence. In that concept, quick wins was my contribution to that, and I didn’t get any sense that there was a wrong or a misunderstood contribution. What unfortunately has happened is that has been tied by someone or some people for some reason unknown to me to mean that PLT could not or should not be used, or could not and should not be used properly, or worse, that somehow I had to approve every single PLT action, otherwise it could not occur. And that is a complete fabrication and a lie.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And just to clarify your attitude on the role of the PLT, so let’s go to the next document and see if you can enlighten us. OPS0004568. Now, just to give you the context, I believe these are the notes of S/Sgt. Ferguson. Not Deputy Chief Ferguson. S/Sgt. Ferguson, who was the lead of the PLT team at the OPS.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, just for correction, John was brought in partway through the events to provide additional supports and leadership to the PLT, but that wasn’t a function he had before.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s a decision that I was aware of and fully supported.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
The Clerk (POEC)
For counsel, is that OPS00014568?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. And if we can go to page 15, please? Can we enlarge? So I believe the date is February 5th, but we can confirm if we need to. So do you see, Chief Sloly, here the notation that says: “CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE PLT DOING A GREAT JOB NEED MORE OF THEM TRAINED” So maybe we should scroll up just to give the witness some context.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
This is February 5th?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We can scroll further up.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So it’s February 5th. So it says: “CONFERENCE CALL CRITICAL INCIDENT COMMAND” Go further down. Go down. I thought there was a reference to chief briefing.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
A reference to what?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That it was the Chief ---
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Well it’s further up. There’s a reference to ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, okay. So I just missed it.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
--- Chief, I saw.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So, Chief Sloly, do you remember congratulating or encouraging the team?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t have ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
If they were doing a good job?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry to interrupt. I don’t have a specific recollection, but on literally a daily basis that would have been a comment that came from me. So I’m glad it was captured by John Ferguson. I’m glad I said that, because they probably deserved it based on the success of Confederation Park. I don’t have an explicit ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- recollection.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But there are other occasions when we see notations in other people’s notes, not with regard to this incident, but PLT or negotiation more generally when the comments are a little more ambiguous. So I want to get your help in illuminating that. I want to take you to another document, OPS00014454. If we go to page 55? So we’re now on February 5th. If we go down? H’m. Can we go back up, please? It appears I may have the wrong reference. A moment’s indulgence. Okay. I don’t want to waste anyone’s time. Let’s move on to another document. Can we go to page 32 of the same document? So here, there’s a notation, “What is our trajectory?” And then there are two branches: “enforced…” “enforced end” or “negotiated occupation end”. “Need to [take] a decision today.” February the 3rd, ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, whose notes would these be?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I believe these are notes taken by the legal services.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
February 3rd. And sorry, what time or what’s ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I’m not sure we have the time. We just have the date, which is February 3rd. If you want to scroll up, we can see if we can find out more, but that’s redacted, so that’s not helpful. So we’re left with these notes. It may be that you cannot help us with more information, but I thought I’d try. Do you recall anything discussed along these lines on the 3rd?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know how many meetings I would have had on the 3rd. Do you have a sense of what -- is this a morning meeting? Is this an afternoon meeting?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Unfortunately, the context, we don’t have much to guide us on these pages. So I’ll just leave this and move on to the Coventry incident. Oh, so I have a new note. Let’s try page 59. Same document, page 59. If we go to the bottom, please? Right. Here. So here there’s a notation. This is again on February the 5th. The notation that says: “Negotiation gives us legitimacy to use force if negotiation fails.” (As read) I take N-E-G to refer to negotiation. You can -- -
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s not my handwriting, so.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, these are the ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I would assume so, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- notes from the legal services. But “PS”, I take it, refers to your initials?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you recall any discussions around the use of negotiation as a way to give the police legitimacy to use force should it fail?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well somebody’s interpretation. In every aspect of policing, a measured approach is the preferred approach. From our use of force continuum through to incident command, communication, negotiation, de-escalation, risk mitigation is the preferred route. And if you can’t demonstrate you did it, even for a second, even if you had a second of opportunity, if you can’t demonstrate that you attempted to do that, then you have less legitimacy around your decision to use force. That would be the context in which I’m talking about it. What I am not saying here, to be clear, is let’s just pretend to negotiate while we put on the armour and go in there and hurt people. I would never say that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And if anyone suggests otherwise, they would have misunderstood your view on the matter?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It would be really hard to understand how they could misunderstand that, but that would be the most charitable thing I could say.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we spoke earlier about the success at the confederation Park, the involvement of the PLT. Now we -- I want to take you to the event involving Coventry. That is -- that didn't go so well; did it, for the PLT?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, thank you for that clarification. From my limited understanding of it, there was a lot of moving parts there.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In the net -- I'm still not sure whether as a whole it advanced our operations. It certainly caused, again, confusion and contention among key elements of it and demonstrated that we were not at the level of maturity and optimal alignment around these things, but some good things did occur as well.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What good thing occurred in your view?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
This was part of the change to the transition from the preplan into a new phase of involving more attempts to stop fuel coming into the location. We had just, I think that week, had the success of at least temporarily ending the GoFundMe piece. We were starting to see some effect from the efforts of addressing unlawful and unruly behaviour in our neighbourhoods. We were starting to get a sense of what the priorities are. We had the Confederation Park win. I would call that a full win, largely through PLT, which I've talked about. So we were starting to show that we could aim at a priority, at a problem, at an objective and get a material result out of it, not just be paralyzed into complete, reactive, immobilized periods of time, which we had suffered in the first 72 hours. So for me, this was a sign that we were starting to get somewhere towards the front foot, rather than being completely on the back foot. So while I would completely agree it was a challenge for the PLT, and a substantive one, and I won't in any way change the commentary that others have brought to it, but to suggest that it was a complete failure, I can't agree to that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
As I understand it, the issue was not so much whether it was legitimate to seize fuel or to prevent people from taking fuel downtown, as Superintendent Beaudin explained, that wasn't the issue. The issue was for the PLT team to tell the protesters that something's okay, that -- but then to turn around and arrest people when they take the fuel away. That's the problem that's leading to mistrust between the PLT and the protesters; do you agree?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And I don't want to be obtuse on this. That level of detail I was never aware of. After the fact, why didn't that happen? The morning I am briefed on it didn't happen. I have no idea if it happened or didn't happen. I think one of my complaints is I actually didn't get a call the night before to say it wasn't going to happen. So I don't know what was said by what PLT member, to who, what promise was made, I have no level of understanding even to this day what the PLT log notes say that they told them versus what happened. I've heard repeated descriptions of what took place, and even to this day, I'm still quite -- not quite sure what the sequence of events was. Clearly though, I am aware that there was a significant departure from the optimal way that PLT should be utilized, and it had a major impact on the PLT's abilities to move forward. That I am aware of and I'm confident enough in that evaluation. And that's why you will see, even more after this point, I am requesting additional PLT expertise from Commissioner Carrique. I'm reinforcing PLT and the need for it to be properly utilized, literally at every meeting that happens after this.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Just so we are on the same page, it may be helpful if I take you to the interview summary of Staff Sergeant Ferguson. If we can go to WTS00000027, please, at page 8. So he provided a description of what happened that day. I'd like to read that to you and then get your thoughts on it. So, "At 4:40 p.m. on February the 6[th], Superintendent Patterson advised Staff Sergeant Ferguson that POU was going to Coventry Road and would be seizing fuel for evidentiary purposes. At that time, PLT had been at Coventry Road for at least two hours, engaging with protesters. Staff Sergeant Ferguson informed Superintendent Patterson that PLT was negotiating with the protesters and that they were compliant, but Superintendent Patterson indicated that he intended to proceed with the public order operation. Staff Sergeant Ferguson attempted unsuccessfully to convince others in OPS not to proceed with the public order operation at Coventry Road. At 5:00 p.m., Inspector Marin reiterated Superintendent Patterson's direction to Staff Sergeant Ferguson that they did not want the fuel from Coventry Road to be displaced and that they were proceeding without warrant. At 5:10 p.m., Staff Sergeant Ferguson contacted Deputy Chief Bell and advised him that the enforcement operation would undermine PLT's negotiations, which had been proceeding for at least two hours. Staff Sergeant Ferguson informed Deputy Chief Bell that protestors were compliant. Shortly after the call ended, at 5:18 p.m., Deputy Chief Bell contacted Staff Sergeant Ferguson and informed him that he agreed with Superintendent Patterson's decision. Later that evening, Staff Sergeant Ferguson learned that Deputy Chief Bell supported Superintendent Patter's decision because three convoy vehicles had left [the] Coventry Road site and were transporting fuel to supply protestors downtown." In a nutshell, that's what happened. Do you have any view on what transpired there and any thoughts on how these kind of problems or troubles could have been avoided?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, if that is accurate -- again, it's one person's account, but for the purpose of -- there's so many problems in this paragraph beyond the PLT.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Staff Sergeant Ferguson contacting Deputy Chief Bell ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sorry?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Staff Sergeant Ferguson contacting Deputy Chief Bell makes no sense to me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why is that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Deputy Chief Bell is not in charge of operations in any way on February 6th. That is an internal incident command contact out of the Incident Command System to another deputy chief that doesn't have a functional role in the Incident Command System. So that alone is very confusing and concerning for me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So problem number one. Keep going.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Problem number two, I'm going to assume that at any given time across the theory that we were dealing with here, even in the micro-red zone and Coventry Road being a 10, 15-minute drive from that, there's a lot of moving parts. If Staff Sergeant Ferguson, who probably at that point was a couple of days into his assignment, he's not trained on PLT, and has not, up until that point, been materially involved in the intelligence threat risk assessment, all of the various iterations of the operational plans, and the subplans is all of a sudden in the middle of PLT world, he's likely not aware of the larger intelligence and the larger frame of operations that Superintendent Patterson is. Even Superintendent Patterson is probably 24 hours into his job. So there's a lot of people who've been all of a sudden moved into different positions, after a period of Rheaume, Dunlop, Patterson. There's a lot of confusion happening at this point. This is clearly an evidence of a suboptimal system trying to right itself. People trying to do the right things, but not really coordinating and in some places conflicting. And people trying to get help, but going up the wrong chains of command and the wrong chains of command getting involved in areas that they shouldn't be getting involved in. If this is accurate, Deputy Bell should have contacted Deputy Ferguson. There's a concern from PLT. I'm making you aware of it. Can you manage that back down? That would have been more appropriate. So there's a lot of things happening here. It's on the basis of one individual's concept, and that's an individual who's probably relatively new into their position and has never been trained on PLT. So ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Which one ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- problematic.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- are you're talking about, yeah?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That big, long paragraph ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, no, which one -- who wasn't trained on PLT?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My understanding is that John Ferguson was a trained and excellent crisis negotiator ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- but was never trained on PLT as a Police Liaison Officer. That's my understanding. I stand to be corrected.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So to summarize, we have confusion regarding the command structure, who should be reporting to whom about what. You were giving us the example of Staff Sergeant John Ferguson seeking direction from Bell.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I suspect John's substantive position is under Deputy Bell's command, and so in his brain, if I have a problem, I escalate it to my deputy. I'm assuming that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's the only reason -- logical reason why he would go to Deputy Chief Bell and not go through Patterson, Deputy Chief -- Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson to get a resolution to the problem that he's facing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And there were a lot of movement from one unit to another for a lot of people during those periods; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the fact that the event commanders has changed a few times, Patterson being the third commander, also didn't help. What about the fact that the PLT and the enforcement arm, which we learn were the two sides of a -- the Command Triangle, what about the fact that they didn't seem to be coordinating their actions in carrying out their respective responsibilities? Is that a big concern?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It's a big concern, sir. And again, I reiterate, I -- this is an Ottawa Police Service that its PLT program was a part-time program. PLT officers, I had approved them to get training I think in the late summer, early fall of 2021. So they're a part-time group of people, who within six months get some training. We're still in COVID. I don't know how many times they've been able to utilise that training in any substantive way before the arrival of this massive unprecedented event. And then they're literally asked to do the impossible from the beginning to the end, and do the best job they possibly. But no, there isn't a optimal optimisation within this incredible unprecedented even between that Command frame, there isn't. And even with the extra help that we got from the OPP and the arrival of experts, like Inspector Beaudin, we weren't going to be able to flick a switch and all of sudden go from OPS immaturity, to OPP excellence within the dynamics of what's taking place in real-time in the City of Ottawa.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So without any unrealistic expectation of flicking a switch, what are your thoughts on what we can do better in terms of avoiding these kind of troubles? What can we learn from all of this?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. Well, first of all, again, Commissioner, with your -- the Incident Command System, I had the honour and pleasure in I think 2008, 2009, along with Mike McDonell, then of the RCMP, and Sue Sullivan, who was then a Deputy Chief in the Ottawa Police Service. All of us had been trained up on the Incident Command System. We believed that that was the appropriate Incident Command System for the types of demonstrations we were seeing in the new century. I hate to make myself old, but that's what we were back then. And we had made presentations to the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police that to avoid integration challenges we should have a standard Incident Command approach across the province. We were able to get the OACP Executive to adopt that, and that became, through that process, I don't want to say the standard because I can't say for sure, it's written into the current Police Service Act standards, but that became the default standard for Incident Command across the province. We attempted to that at the CACP level. I got promoted, and I don't know where that ended up. I now know there's a national framework. Long way of saying we are going to increasingly have to bring large organisations together across potentially multiple sites. We need to be working off the same understanding, nomenclature process, we need to narrow that gap of a grey zone between Strategic, Operational, and Tactical. I would suggest we also need to narrow the grey zone around a working Incident Command structure as it sits into the regular business of policing in any jurisdiction or multiple jurisdictions. Training needs to be standardised, nomenclature needs to be standardised, equipment needs to be standardised, joint training needs to happen, and all of that has to happen a long time before a major unprecedented paradigm-shifting event, like what we just saw arise, in any jurisdiction. This is one of those structural deficits, sir, that have existed for decades in policing. It doesn't all require money, but it's going to require a little bit of investment on that end. But it requires an investment of time and resources and focus. And what this event did to Ottawa, to Ontario, and Canada was exposed that type of structural deficit. It's the same concept of structural deficit around intelligence gathering. We can't afford to duct tape our way through these incidents anymore. Unfortunately, this reads like a duct tape effort to get through a really complicated dynamic situation. I need to be clear, every name here did their best in the circumstances they found themselves in. I don't read into anything here a deliberate attempt to undermine or frustrate or cause risk to the public. It just didn't go off very well.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. Commissioner, I note the time. We're past one o'clock. Would this be an appropriate time to break?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. So we'll take the lunchbreak for an hour, and come back to continue the evidence. Thank you.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess for one hour. La Commission est levée pour une heure.
Upon recessing at 1:08 p.m.
Upon resuming at 2:09 p.m.
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l'ordre. The Commission is reconvened. La commission reprend.
Eric Brousseau, Counsel (POEC)
Good afternoon, Commissioner. For the record, Eric Brousseau, Commission Counsel. Very, very briefly, I just rise to give notice formally. The documents that the Police Team is bulk entering this week, it -- my colleague Mr. Mather sort of explained the process on the record I believe last week. We circulated a list last week. We received objections. Those documents have been removed from the list and Commission Counsel will deal with those objections with the parties. The final list was circulated to the parties this morning and those documents will be marked as exhibits. They are a number of emails and other documents from the OPS, the OPP, the WPS, Windsor Police Service, as well as a few RCMP documents and the City of Ottawa documents, and including witness summaries for witnesses who, importantly, are not going to be called to testify, but whose evidence we wish to put in by way of summary.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Thank you. So with that parenthesis, go ahead. Okay. Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Commissioner, before I continue with the examination, just to clarify for the record, when I put the notes of Superintendent Rheaume to the former Chief Sloly, Mr. Champ correctly pointed out that those notes were not put to Deputy Chief Ferguson in our examination, but she did, in fairness to her, say both in her interview summary as well as in her evidence that Superintendent Rheaume was removed for personal reasons. He needed a rest or some rest days, so she did not say anything about his removal being connected to the former Chief. I just wanted that to be clarified on the record.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay.
MR. PETER SLOLY, Resumed
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF BY MR. FRANK AU (Cont'd)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, Chief Sloly, just before the lunch break, we spoke about a number of issues that I also wanted to clarify so that there's no misunderstanding. First of all, I asked you about the date when you found out that Superintendent Rheaume was replaced by Superintendent Dunlop, and I believe you said that was on the 5th of February. Now if I could take you to a document, I want to see if that would refresh your memory. OPS00014484. So if we go to page 2. So it appears that on the 3rd of February, these are, again, notes to yourself. On the 3rd of February at around -- well, in the morning, you attended a meeting with both deputies on Teams with Superintendent Dunlop. What was your understanding as of the 3rd about Superintendent Dunlop's role if he was not the event commander?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. On the whole, sir, I wasn't sure what his role was. I had understood that Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll would be the primary presenter of the analysis that came out of that meeting on the 1st; a range of three options, I have described them, but not necessarily accurately as to what they would come back with; and a preferred option, including the implications of resources, et cetera, et cetera. On the 3rd, if that's the Thursday, that would be the Thursday, there were two, yes, there were two meetings, one at 10:30, and then another one I think maybe around 12 o'clock, where I was waiting for Mike Stoll to give that presentation. I think the notes indicate that he wasn't available, the presentation wasn't on what I had asked for, and I was saying, "Look, I just want that presentation that I had asked for." So there were two I would call aborted attempts to provide that on the Thursday morning, the first one around 10:30, the next one around 12 o'clock or so if my mind is accurate. Finally, the third attempt, which occurs I think on the afternoon I think of the 5th, the Saturday, I get the three options, I get their preferred option at that point. So I'm still not sure even at this time why Dunlop is, Jamie Dunlop, sorry, Superintendent Dunlop is involved in the presentation and what his role in it is. My recollection, I stand to be corrected, is he wasn't introduced as the Interim Event Commander or the Event Commander, that's my recollection, and my confusion is based on that point.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. The other thing that we spoke about was with respect to the Coventry incident, and we were attempting to draw some lessons from that event. One of the issues you identified was the fact that Staff Sergeant John Ferguson went outside the Incident Command System when he sought guidance from Deputy Chief Bell. Now, if Staff Sergeant Ferguson were -- if he had concerns about the direction that he was getting from Event Commander Mark Patterson, Superintendent Patterson at that time, who should he have gone to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So while it was confusing, again, I don't want to characterise it as he did the wrong thing, I just want to be clear about that, John Ferguson, there would have been options. John could have gone to the Incident Commander, which at this time should've been Russ Lucas. He could've gone to the Event Commander and explained -- attempted to further explain, and if that wasn't happening, he could've gone to the Major Event Commander, in that case -- Major Incident Commander, in that case it would have been Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. So there were options for him to engage. I understand it seems to have been he was doing his best to get people engaged around something he thought was important.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But just so we understand, Superintendent Patterson was Inspector Lucas's superior. If he was challenging a decision by Superintendent Patterson, wouldn't it be problematic for him to go to somebody who reported to Superintendent Patterson?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Challenging, but still appropriate. There is an Incident Command chain of command and then there's an organisational chain of command. So at any point when there is a disagreement in the chain of command, if done professionally, if done timely, and if done seeking a constructive outcome, not for rumourmongering, not for undermining, not for any other personal agenda, you can engage that chain of command in trying to reach some sort of a better outcome. I think that would be appropriate.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, I understand from Inspector Lucas's interview summary that he thought by that time, around 5th or 6th of February, he had -- his role had diminished to more akin to an Operations Chief at the tactical level. So if Staff Sergeant John Ferguson had issues about the Operations, is it not arguable that he shouldn't have gone to Inspector Lucas?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And I -- again, I want to be careful. I received that through information that's been presented at the testimony. Myself, I wasn't aware of that, so it's new information for me. That Inspector Lucas's perspective on his changed role is new information for me. If that was materially the case, if that was known to everybody, and if it was known to John Ferguson, yes, he would then have another challenge of who could he turn to, I would accept that, but this is all new information to me too. So it's just conjecture, sorry, conjecture at this point to try to answer your question, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And I appreciate that you are doing the best you can. We're also trying to understand what lessons to draw from it. We just don't want to draw the wrong lessons. So the other option that you identified was for Staff Sergeant John Ferguson to perhaps approach Deputy Chief Ferguson because she was by then the Major Incident Commander. But wasn't that also problematic because they are married?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
At some risk to go into the realm of conflict of interest in relationships and organisation, I mean, that's -- there is that challenge, but in the frame of the Ottawa Police Service at that time, there wasn't any breach of policy. And so it would've been appropriate if he felt it had, again, you know, constructive, objective, not unprofessional, not undermining, not self-seeking, to have sought the intervention of or at least to have provided his information to the Major Incident Commander. I do also recognise, if I understand the context as to what happened, this is sort of a real-time unfolding event. It seems to me, again, I may be wrong, it seems to me that there wasn't an opportunity for Staff Sergeant Ferguson to wait for a briefing cycle to raise the concern when all the people would've been around the table, and then that would've allowed Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, or even Superintendent Patterson, to reconsider. It seemed like he was trying to get a real-time decision in the midst of an operation. So the third option would've been to wait for a briefing cycle, raise it as part of the briefing cycle to try to deconflict it and make it better going forward. I don't think it was appropriate in that circumstance.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So because there are some uncertainties about the circumstances, we shouldn't be too quick perhaps to ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I certainly can't be quick to judge or to in any way attribute blame. But I think, Commissioner, it goes back again, these are the still need to be developed areas of consistent-across-the-board understanding of Incident Command Systems within the operation of a Policing Service that clearly, here in the Ottawa Police Service, and other jurisdictions, we need to get to a higher level. There are examples of excellence across the country, I think we need to try to raise that -- raise all boats in the harbour as high as we can, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. So let's move to a new topic. You've told us earlier that the Ottawa Police Service was badly in need of external help. It needed more resources to resolve the situation on the ground. I want to take you to a document. This is OPS00014454. So you see that the document is dated January 31st, so this is the first Monday after the arrival of the convoy, and it looks like it's a meeting with the RCMP and the OPP. You were there. If we go down the page. You see the notation: "Can't safely remove them unless we have hundreds of officers to maintain risk." And then if we go down further, "No way we can come-by", not sure. What's that word? "4 more days w/out" something "help", "lots of help".
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Lots of help.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was that the -- and then the next line says, "Now transitioned into an occupation." Does this reflect the thinking at the time on or about the 31st, that the OPS will need hundreds of officers in order to safely remove the protesters?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then if we go to the next page. "We need..." Sorry, go down a bit. Oh, sorry, go down. Oh, go up, sorry: "We need resources and…" What is that next word?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It looks like “communications”.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
"…(saying together) Joint together at 3:00 p.m.?" Do you recall these discussions at that meeting?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. I mean, specific lines, not as clear, but I recall the meeting with Commissioner Lucki and, I believe, Commissioner Carrique. I don’t know who else would have been on the call.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And if we go down the page a little, there’s a comment from Trish. Maybe go to the next page, here: "Looking for boots on the ground." What did you understand her to mean?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Those would be your sort or general duty officers, traffic directions, taking a traffic point along the red zone, patrol, just general duty officers that could be utilized in a variety of different ways.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So do you understand the request at that time was for general duty officers from the RCMP and the OPP?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, she outlines ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the other ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, that’s the running list that she was asked to sort of, you know, come up with on the spot. I think it’s actually a pretty reasonable list based on what we knew at that time and where we were.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And how did the Commissioners Carrique and Lucki answer?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I can -- we can scroll down.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
From Commissioner Carrique: "We will facilitate all of your requests and get embedded in the command structure."
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you had a commitment from Commissioner Carrique as of the 31st that they would do all they could to assist and they were willing to embed in the OPS command structure. And then Commissioner Lucki from the RCMP: "Why did negotiations fall through last night at 8:00 p.m.?" What was that about; what negotiations?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m not sure. I’m not sure what she’s referencing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then, if we go further down, there’s a comment attributed to you: "Reach out to…" Do you see?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
“Gatineau and Sûreté de Québec”.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So you extended the ask to Gatineau and Sûreté as well?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you know what kind of help at this time the OPP and the RCMP were offering? We know what you asked for but do you remember they were committed to providing?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I understand the question. They had already had resources in the theatre. Again, I stand to be corrected by other information that might come up. RCMP, I believe, had three, what they call, “troops”, Public Order Units in the National Capital Region. They were not under our incident command system control but they were available in an emergency and they had, certainly, a range of important duties to manage. I believe, at that point, we still had OPP Public Order Units, again not -- if I understand correctly, not under our incident command, supporting Parliamentary Protective Services but, again, in the theatre -- general area of the theatre. Within -- what I would say within the incident command system deployment, there were general duty officers from the OPP somewhere in the range of 30, 40, 50 -- and I stand to be corrected on numbers -- as well as a range of other municipal police services agencies’ contributions, London Police, Durham Regional Police. I think Toronto might have been up at that point. Most of those were Public Order Unit officers, though, as opposed to general duty officer. That’s my recollection around the January 31st.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. If I could take you to the next document, which is an email that you sent to Commissioner Carrique dated February 2nd. The document number is OPP00001576. So this was sent February the 2nd? On the first line, you see that you wrote: "I’m seeking your assistance in providing resources to assist the Ottawa Police with our operational plan." The subsequent bullets mention 50 to 60 uniform officers, PLT and POU supports, as well as incident command supports. And then the next line talks about a tactical dispatcher. So were these the nature of the request?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, so those would have been -- I’m assuming that that would have been a refined list of requests that I received from Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson who - - she had -- she would have received through her incident command chain of command.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in testimony yesterday from Commissioner Carrique, he was asked about a formal request and the implications of a formal request under the Police Services Act, Section 9(6). Just to be clear, your request here, was that the kind of formal request under the Police Services Act?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I may not be understanding the question, sir. Sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So it may help if we take you to the Act, COM00000819. You’re familiar with the provision I’m referring to, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m not that familiar with it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay, so let’s go to the Act and look at it together. So this is the Police Services Act, if we could go to page 12. So under “Request of chief of police in emergency” -- this is Section 9(6): " A municipal chief of police who is…"
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, I’m just not seeing it on my screen. Am I missing?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Oh, at the top. Do you see ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Oh, okay, sorry. Thank you. Sorry, I missed it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you see the heading ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- “Request of chief of police in emergency” in bold?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
So I ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Maybe it’s the screen.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m aware -- I’m aware of the language in the Act but I wasn’t, in my mind, referencing this. If it happens to fit it, that’s fine.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, that’s my question. When you wrote the letter, you were not having in mind this section - --
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- under the Police Services Act?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- I was simply sending a communication to another chief or commissioner asking for resources.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What do you understand to be the difference of requests formally under Subsection 9(6) or the kind of informal request that you appear to have sent?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I will say, I have never in my policing career relied on this section so I don’t have a -- other than what’s written on the page, this would seem to be, if we needed more officers, we could ask the -- or resources, we could ask the OPP. But I -- I mean, if this -- if this is intended to -- and again, I’m not aware of what’s underneath this. If this means, “We can’t manage -- we can’t adequately and effectively continue to be the police of jurisdiction. Can you come and do this for us?” I wouldn’t interpret that that way and that was certainly not the intent of me sending that letter to OPP Commissioner Carrique to ask for those resources.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, that is -- that is where I’m going because perhaps it is open to interpretation but certainly one interpretation is that the OPP had the ability to step in and take the lead.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe there’s certain conditions that would have to be met. They couldn’t just arbitrarily make that decision.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And that’s why I’m asking you, if a request is made under this section, would you have been comfortable to let the OPP take more of a lead role under this section?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If I felt the conditions in Ottawa required that level of intervention from the OPP or any other police service, I would obviously be making that request and therefore be very comfortable with it, subject to all the usual discussions as to how that would transpire. But I was not making that request.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You were not making that request. And I guess my question is, given the situation that you found the OPS to be in shortly after the -- what you call “the paradigm shift”, after the first weekend ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
M’hm.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- isn’t that something that should have been done, logically?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not at all, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why not?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We were three days, 72 hours into a situation. I don’t think anybody in Canada at that time really understood what was going on and I think it would have been irresponsible and unnecessary to burden another police service with that level of request without having any real understanding. So I just don’t think there’s -- listen, you could talk to other police chiefs and they may have their opinions but as of the 31st or the 2nd, when I sent that letter, that was a not situation that I was considering at all. That’s not a situation that anybody had raised to me either within the Ottawa Police Service or from the Police Services Board, just not in the realm of considerations.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did the situation in Ottawa escalate at some point to a stage where you would have considered that appropriate?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not during my tenure, sir, no.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So in your view, up until mid- February -- February the 15th was your last day as the chief -- the situation was not desperate enough in Ottawa to -- for the chief to be requesting that kind of assistance from the OPP?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s correct, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What would be the downside to the OPP stepping in when they had the resources and if they were willing to help?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The OPP never had the resources necessary, sir. They could coordinate the resources, and they did a good job of that, but the OPP on its own could not have come in and with its totality of its compliment, provided the full level of some 2,200 officers that were required.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, they alone might not have been enough, as we know. During the final days, both the OPP and the RCMP stepped in. But certainly, the OPP had more resources than the OPS had at the time.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The quantity of resources, while being a factor, would not be, even in my humble opinion, a significantly weighted factor for such a decision as for a chief of police in any jurisdiction to request through section 9 of the Act for another police service to come in and run its police service.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But in addition to quantity, they also seem to have the right expertise such as the -- as we'll come to talk about it, the group led by Chief Pardy, the Integrated Planning Group. They had the expertise, they had the capacity, they were willing to help, they were offering help; why not?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There's a lot of things they had, and they offered those things, and we utilized them as quickly and as effectively as we could. And ultimately, through to my -- end of my tenure and beyond that, there was a very successful outcome. But you've asked me before, did the circumstances in Ottawa rise to the occasion of what I now understand to be a function of section 9? No, they didn’t, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So this is the letter -- sorry, if we can take this off, the Police Services Act. You'll remember we were -- we looked at an email, this one, that was your request. I want to take you to another email that you sent on the 4th. So this request was sent on the 2nd. On the 4th of February, we have another email, OPP00001582. That’s right. This is the part I want to take you to. You address this email to Commissioner ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, what's the date of this, please? Sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The 4th of February.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you address this email to Commissioner Carrique. You said: "Once again, let me express my appreciation for the significant and ongoing support that you and your OPP team have provided to the OPS over the course of the demonstrations." It would appear from this reply that you received the additional resources that you requested?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The short answer is yes. I don't know if we got everything that we asked for and when we got it, but again, at this point, I have no concerns whatsoever. I think this is more just I'm actually seeing some of the most well turned out OPP officers and vehicles operating in and around my -- in fairness, they really just looked good. They were like the cavalry coming over the hill and they were just really well turned out, really professional group of officers. So I'm just complimenting Chief to Commissioner the quality of his people.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm. On the 2nd of February when you send the request to the OPP, I believe you also sent a request to the RCMP. Let's take a look at PB.NSC.CAN.00001743. So this is a -- actually, this is your reply. February 2nd, "Thank you, Commissioner Lucki." If we go further down -- that’s right -- we see an email from her to you, and at the bottom paragraph -- sorry, go up a bit, the paragraph that starts with, "At present". "At present, all of our Public Order Units are actively deployed and I'm not in a position to be able to redirect any teams to Ottawa." Do you have a memory of what you were asking for and what this response was meant to address?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, just -- again, the date, is this February ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The 2nd.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- 2nd. So this is again, this would be around the time that we are pivoting the plan. We know we're going to need -- this is the day after the February 1st Kanata meeting. We know we're going to need a substantive amount of POU, short term and long term, and so this was a request that I sent out to the RCMP for POU at least. I don't know if there were other things that we asked, and it seems that the substantive response here is, you know, "Our POU units are deployed. You can't get them." Reasonable. I'm not challenging that. They're having their own resource challenges and they're exploring the possibility of the other 50 resources. I'm assuming they're police officers, but there might have been a variety of different knowledge, skills, and abilities that we were asking for.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So these are examples of the kind of early requests following the paradigm shift and the kind of responses you got?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
On the 6th of February, I understand that you told the mayor and Chair Deans that you needed 1,800 additional resources; am I correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It's 1,790 odd, but yes. I think the number 1,800 has become the most functionally used number.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm. Let's go to an OPS document, 00014454, page 98. So there's a reference here, 1,800 additional members that came from other services.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, the date of this again, sir, sorry?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can we scroll up? February 6th -- -
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- 5:10 p.m. So am I correct that the number 1,800 was communicated as early as the 6th of February?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. So again, just context- wise, there was an emergency board meeting held on February 5th. During that meeting, the public session, I received a direction from the chair of the board to produce a list of all the resources that we thought we would need to -- my words -- safely, successfully, lawfully end the events in Ottawa. I needed explicit understanding from the chair, did she need that on the spot or could we -- could I and my team take that away and then provide a more thoughtful and full response, and she said yes, the team had -- I had asked can they try to turn that around in 24 hours, and I think by this time, which is almost 24 hours later, we had a substantive list that was drawn up. And it wasn’t just police resources, this also included discussions around what other things could the City help us with, increase bylaw fines, other potential supports from the City and civil society. I think we were looking at the insurance industry, whether they could help us to address some of the issues around the trucks and vehicles. So that’s the background to, I think, this meeting.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How did you derive the 1,800 number from?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, without the benefit of notes, but at some point after the board meeting, there would have been a request at two levels within the Incident Command System for their planners to identify the number, types of resources, and associate that to the overall operational plan and the relative sections -- sorry, sub-plan sections -- then across the organization. I asked each of the functional commanders -- so that would again include Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson in her functional role, Deputy Chief Bell in his functional role, and Chief Administration Officer Dunker in her functional role to identify supports. The reason for the two, sort of, coordinated requests, we needed a certain level of capability, resource capability, and predictability within the incident command structure to work under that structure to achieve the goals of ending the events in Canada, but we were still struggling with staffing for our policing jurisdiction responsibilities. And I don’t know if at this time we’d finished the negotiation with the Ottawa Police Association for the shift schedule change, but we were struggling on both ends, staffing to a level beyond just maintaining the red zone through the incident command piece, and staffing to maintain our contractual obligations and member health and wellness requirements in the general police services to the rest of the million residents in the city. The sum total of those 1,790 odd resources reflects all of the different aspects that we were looking for and they were broken down short-term, mid-term, longer-term. The bulk of the resources, I would suggest, were more short term, A significant amount was mid-term, and then another amount would have been long-term. That would have been assisting in prosecutions after the fact, the case management, crime analyst, all that together. But the bulk of that request really was in the days and weeks, as opposed to the months and years portions of some of it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, I understand that later that day, on the 6th of February, there was a command team meeting where you asked your team about the resource needs.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Later on the 6th?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
On the 6th. Does that accord with your recollection?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, just so many different - --
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- meetings. If you could show it to me, I might have a recollection.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the Commission has heard evidence from Supt. Abrams that he was present and overheard some of the things that you said to your team -- or not overheard, he was there. He was invited to attend. And the next day, he wrote to his superiors, including Chris Harkins, among others, about what he observed on the 6th. So can we go to that email? If only I had the document number. OPP00001546.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just for clarity, sir, just while the document is being searched, my understanding, and I stand to be corrected, I had a meeting with my command team on the afternoon of the 5th, after the board meeting was over, where I was interrupted for part of the meeting, had to leave to go out for a phone call and come back, and it was in that meeting I said, “Look, we’ve just gotten direction from the Chair. We need to produce this over the next day. Start thinking about what you need. This is a big lift that we’re going to have to do.” Then on the 6th, after my team had worked through the night, through the day, the number of 1,790 odd was broken out into various functions. So if it -- Supt. Abrams’ recollection of that comment, it should have been, in my memory, on the 5th, not on the 6th. But I stand to be corrected.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I could be off on the dates. I -- but the date of the email is not in question. The date of the email is the 7th, as you can see on the screen. And it was on the 7th that Supt. Abrams wrote to his superiors, including Deputy Commissioner Harkins, and this is what he wrote: “Deputy, I did not want to mention this on the call with the group but [I] feel it important for you to have this information. On my call with OPS Command last night Chief Sloly asked his people to send him their resource needs. They told him that they need 250 members a day to run things. Chief Sloly told them that if they need 100 he will ask for 200, if they need 200 he will ask for 400. He seemed very comfortable asking for twice what he really needed. He looks at it that it [sic] the other partner police agencies can’t meet the ask number then Ottawa may still get more than they really need.. Was a very strange call to be a part of. Hearing the Commissioner say that he may ask for a thousand members I felt you should be aware of the above.” So that’s what he wrote about his observation the night before when he attended the meeting with the OPS command. What do you have to say to this?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s a very strange interpretation by Supt. Abrams. What I can tell you was that at one of the meetings that I recall on the 5th, maybe it was the 6th, but what I recall on the 5th, I said to my folks, “Up until now, I’ve been getting requests that I would call incremental. What we need to get through this day or this weekend. What we need to do, and what the Board Chair has asked us to do, is what do we need to get to a safe, complete, successful, sustainable end to the events happening here in Ottawa? This could take weeks, so I need you not to think incremental. I don’t want you just to think in a short-term cycle of planning. I need you to think exponential, short, medium, and long-term.” It’s in that context, I don’t know if I gave the exact if they say 100, 200, but “Don’t let your thinking be incremental. You have to be able to consider the full range of resources. We’re not going to get to be able to make this request again, so think about everything you might need. A special constable, crime analyst, computer dispatcher, someone who can do open-source social media. Whatever you don’t have right now to meaningfully contribute to the end of this -- these set of events, or to not be able to continue delivering our basic police services, this is the time to put that resource request into this.” So I was not, in any way, trying to put any other police service in a situation where they would need to give us tings that we did not need. If it was interpreted that way by Supt. Abrams as a guest on that meeting, that’s unfortunate. If it was reported that way to the Commissioner, that’s very unfortunate.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, we’ve heard from other witnesses, we’ve asked other witnesses the question what should go first, the plan or the request. Is it the number that drives the resources, or sorry, the plan, or the other way around? What’s your view on that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
You’ll very rarely hear me agree to an or. I’m always an and person. So it isn’t one or the other. Particularly in fluid events that literally up until the day of the 29th, no one really knew what was coming, the plan will always need to make adjustments, in real time, sometimes. But at any point, where you have to make a commitment to some portion of the plan, you need to have some relative insurance of the predictability of the resources available. So these are not consecutive exercises. They are almost inevitably concurrent exercises. A lot of my concern about how this whole issue has been portrayed is it’s been portrayed as one or the other, and the preferred one seems to be planned before resources, consecutive. In this instance in real time events, whether they be natural disasters, or unplanned protests, or protests that are so fluid in the making that you don’t have the benefit of months or even weeks of advanced planning, you’re literally making resource requests in real time as the threat assessment or the context of the circumstances change. We saw that play out in the pre-arrival plan. You asked the question earlier on. As the warnings increased, did your resource requests increase? Yes, they did. Not because we stopped everything and wrote a perfect plan for the next resource request. We continued with the planning process, while we continued with the intelligence process, while we continued with the recourse request process. And quite frankly, that has been the way that I have seen Toronto Police Service work in all my time there, that has been the way that the Toronto Police Service supported many other jurisdictions, that is the way that my experience with the Ottawa Police Service was during my time as Chief. I had never, never once before in my entire career been asked to provide a fully detailed plan with subplans laid out, timing, and exact details and logistics as to where people were going to sleep, what uniforms they should bring, before we sent out a request in good faith to good police partners and said, “We’ve got something big. It’s happening right now, or it’s happening two days from now. This is our best guess of what we need. We might need to fine tune that. Can you help us? Yes or no?”
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M’hm. Now, a moment earlier, I think you clarify that it was on the evening of the 5th that your team started working on the numbers?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s my recollection, but again, if my dates are off, I stand to be corrected.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I don’t know which dates may or may not be off. I just want to bring to your attention what is in your summary and give you a chance to correct anything if necessary. Can we go to the former Chief’s summary at page 31, please? So ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Can we just -- I’m seeing -- sorry. I’ll let you finish. Sorry.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, go ahead.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It looks like it was my mistake. But just refresh my memory. Can we go to the 5th? Is there any reference of the Board meeting on the 5th of February?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, here’s the thing. The reference is in the previous page, on this page to the 6th and the 7th. I don’t think there’s a reference to the 5th. But you saw an earlier email dated the 6th where you had he 1,800 number; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I’m just trying to get some clarification in terms of when your team worked on the number in order for it to be available on the 6h.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, my recollection -- sorry to interrupt you, sir. I shouldn’t talk over you. Sorry. My recollection was that we started those discussions immediately after the conclusion of the Board meeting on the 5th. Now, that might have been the command team and I, my immediate chief staff, might have started that discussion and then on the 6th, the Incident Command Team and other command areas were briefed and then involved, so there might be some -- a bit of a bleed-over from my recollection, me actioning these things on the 5th, to whatever the meeting was on the 6th Superintendent Abrams was participating in.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So depending your best recollection, it could be that the date in the summary is in error, in which case I wanted to give you an opportunity to correct it if necessary.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m not suggesting it’s in error. I just recall having discussions with people in my organization about the staffing numbers immediately after the Board meeting where I’d been given that instruction from the Board Chair. I wouldn’t have waited until the next day to start having people engage in the exercise of -- the planning exercise around getting that number.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
A moment’s indulgence. (SHORT PAUSE)
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, this number, the 1,800 number, was publicly announced at some point, was it not?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe, yes, it was, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you remember the date or should we go by the summary?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, it looks like there was - - it was announced at an emergency Council meeting, I believe.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So if we go to page 32 of the summary. “Chief Sloly publicly announced the request for 1,800 police resources during a special City Council meeting on February 7.” Is that what you remember?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
This was not his normal course of action, but the Freedom Convoy was unprecedented. Specifically, Ms. Deans asked Chief Sloly in a public OPSB -- that’s Ottawa Police Services Board -- “meeting to provide a detailed report on the level of resources required.” Could you explain the circumstances in which you made the public announcement?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes. So it definitely was not the normal process. There were a series of communications from the end of the Board meeting on the 5th through the 6th into the 7th as to what role the Board and the City could play in supporting the Police Service to get the needed resources. The substantive outflow of all of that was a desire by the Chair and the Mayor - - they arrived at that through some level of discourse to have a joint letter to the other two levels of government to seek their direct support in securing those resources.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in the ordinary course, would it be the practice for the request to go from Chief to Chief? From one police service to another and not through these political channels?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In the ordinary course, yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And was that not sufficient in these circumstances?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
These were extraordinary circumstances, and so -- and there was an increasing and significant desire, would be the -- I think not quite the right word -- for the Board to be seen as actively supporting the service in one of its few ways that they can, which is securing resources for adequate and effective policing. Again for context, the start of the February 5th Board meeting, the Chief -- sorry, the Chair in her opening comments talked extensively about whether or not circumstances in Ottawa would allow the Ottawa Police Service to be able to provide adequate and effective policing. The transition from her opening statements to me was a question directly to me, “Chief” -- I’m not quoting exactly, but as close as I can -- “Chief, do you have the resources necessary, the ability to provide adequate and effective policing in the city?”. And then there was a substantive period of that Board meeting spent on that topic. The sum total of that was the request, the direct request from the Chair, for the list of resources that we would need. This is not ordinary, but I do believe it falls somewhere within the realm of the Police Services Act for the Board to make sure that we had the resources necessary to provide adequate and effective policing. And I believe this is one of the ways in which, again, Chair Deans may -- former Chair Deans may choose to frame it differently, but I interpret it as a genuine effort to exercise some level of their mandate to support getting those resources. There was then the additional layer of whether the Chair would sign this alone or the Mayor would join in signing. I wasn’t very much involved in that, so I can’t really speak to it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, there are those who are concerned about the public announcement of this large a number of request. For example, there are -- there may be legitimate concerns that this announcement exposed the OPS’s vulnerability to the convoy participants.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I presume someone could come to that conclusion on their own. I’m not sure why it would be so enlightening because I think almost every public statement that I made after January 29th, I talked about how desperately we needed resources and how we were seeking resources and asking for resources. I think in the middle of the February 5th Board meeting, the topic of resources came up and, in fact, in the middle of that Board meeting, I received a communication from the RCMP saying that 250 officers were arriving and I literally made that announcement on the Board meeting. So nobody should have been surprised, I think reasonably surprised, on the 7th that we were significantly in need of resources and that we were going to be asking for a lot of resources.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And to those who hold the view that this announcement was made outside the proper channels and invited inappropriate political influence into the intra-police resourcing discussions, what do you have to say in addition to what you’ve already said about the context of these?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. Again, listen, I think there would be as many opinions in this room or all the rooms across Canada on any one of the aspects that took place here, so I’m not in any way going to try to suggest that no one should ever hold that opinion, including another police leader. But I suspect they would have the same problem about previous political announcements around staffing numbers that took place the week before.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, another criticism that could be leveled against this public announcement is, especially in light of what we’ve heard from other police administrators about the lack of an adequate plan at the time this announcement was made, was it really appropriate to make this kind of public announcement when OPS didn’t seem to have the kind of plan sufficient to deploy this large number of resources even if it were given them?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, I can appreciate concerns raised certainly throughout this process and in discourses well beyond these walls. This is -- this, again, is not an -- not a practice that I’ve experienced in my policing career where there would be a requirement for detailed completed plans submitted and then analyzed prior to any substantive release of resources. It wasn’t -- it wasn’t in my experience around planned events like the G8-G20, and it certainly wasn’t my experience in unplanned or highly fluid and contentious events like the one that we experienced here. If this had become a new standard and a new expectation in policing, I was not aware of it, and I had, at that point, been a Chief of Police for over two years. Secondly, we did have a plan. It was an ongoing, evolving plan. I would by no stretch of imagination suggest to anyone, the Commissioner or anyone else, that it was an excellent plan. It was a robust plan, given that we were still pivoting from what we'd experienced just a week before. Canada was still trying to figure out what was going on across the country, just as we were trying to figure out exactly what was going on in the city. And we had been literally using every resource possible, just to get through hour by hour, day-by-day operations and the planning for those operations. There was no additional capacity to be able to produce such a level of standard plan while we so desperately needed those resources. I think, unfortunately, it became a misinformed issue around an unrealistic expectation, and, unfortunately, that caused a lot of concern across the board, inside our organization, and clearly outside of our organization.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now this Commission has heard evidence from both Superintendent Bernier of the OPS and Superintendent Abrams from the OPP that officers from the OPP already in Ottawa were not receiving adequate instructions for them to be properly integrated or deployed in Ottawa. If there were officers in Ottawa who were not being effectively used, then one may ask, what's the point of sending more?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, from what I've heard and what I've seen and what I knew at the time, yes, there were occasions where officers were not optimally deployed. And I tell you, I have never been involved in any police operation where we have brought in resources from across our own city or brought in resources from outside of our city in two police services, including my time in Kosovo, where there was suboptimal deployment and utilization of resources. What tends to happen is the Incident Commander almost exclusively will be from the police of jurisdiction, who will utilize the resources that they know best and use the most frequently, and then go and tap into the other resources. Inevitably, that means that the external resources will be underutilized. It is in no way surprising for me to have heard that at points during the entire three weeks that I was involved in this, that there might have been officers from some police department that didn't get their briefing at the right time and may have even spent the better part of the day not doing the things that they thought they were going to be doing. I'd experienced that many, many times myself.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now the last criticism that could have been made, that I can think of, and that we've heard from some witnesses, is that between the 3rd and the 10th of February, the OPS was using RCMP and OPP officers simply to relieve OPS officers who were exhausted and not as part of a plan to end the occupation. What do you have to say to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That's probably very true, sir. Our officers were exhausted, frozen right through. They needed relief and there was no other place to get relief from. And that's part of the reason why the very first request on the 31st of January that Trish Ferguson announces to the RCMP Commissioner and the OPP Commissioner is to send us some general duty officers. Our people are asleep on their feet, or they're frozen to their post. I'm not surprised. That is not an optimal situation, but that's the reality of what was going on.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now I'd like to take you to a new topic. We've been talking about your request for resources. But before we leave that topic, actually, now that it's clear to you as of the 6th or the 7th that Ottawa would need at least 1800 officers in order to effectively resolve the convoy events, why is it still not a good time to resort to Sections 9(6) of the Police Services Act?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. Thank you and I appreciate the opportunity to have a second go round on this. The concept of a measured approach I think that's been talked about usually in terms of PLT and secondarily in terms of use of force, a measured approach is we need more resources. Let's ask for it. We need help with the planning for those resources. Let's get that. We might need to integrate our operations to a greater degree than we have every considered before. Let's work on that. Okay. So we've got -- we're getting more resources. We are stepping up integration. Our planning now is getting to a much greater level of efficacy. Now we're going to consider a unified command. That is a measured approach of stepping up. I think it would be irresponsible, as I said before, and I'm sticking to that, I think it would be unprofessional and unwarranted to go from, wow, we just had a really bad weekend, let's get the OPP to come and police our jurisdiction to we just had a really bad weekend. Let's figure out how we need to get better and start to use everything we possibly can, and let's be as clear as we can but as quick as we can in requesting the things that we can reasonably anticipate we'll need in the short, medium and long term. Let's be very open to, as we have always been in Ottawa, even during my time, to integration. Nothing was off the table. I think I probably said that statement 453 times. Everything's on the table, including greater integration, and including unification. And ultimately, through greater integration, ultimate unification, and some 2200 officers, the Ottawa Police Service as police of jurisdiction, and the amazing supports we received from across the country were able to safely and successfully end the events here in Ottawa.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Perhaps this raises a more general question of how should we deal with multi-jurisdictional event that requires external support? You've mentioned that Ottawa is the police of jurisdiction, but the reality is that you're asking these external agencies, the OPP or RCMP, to supply tremendous resources that, at the time, Ottawa did not seem capable of effectively deploying. You've acknowledged that there were issues with officers already present, but for different reasons.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just on that point, I just want to be clear, and I think it was -- I understand somebody clarified this before. There were instances where clearly that was happening. I believe Superintendent Abrams was the direct conduit to Deputy Chief Bell, organization to organization. He raised it. I believe it was received well and it was actioned. I don't recall that being a continuous problem or a problem of scale. I will not deny that it happened sporadically, and particularly in the early parts, but it's my understanding it wasn't daily occurrence on scale where hundreds of officers were sitting around being unutilized or underutilized. I just want to make that clear for the public record.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And again, that level of underutilization is something that I've experienced in my entire three decades in policing. That was not a unique situation to the events here in Ottawa.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I do not wish to exaggerate the problem in Ottawa, but surely, you won't deny that OPS was struggling. That's what we've heard from the ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I've ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- all of the other witnesses.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- I think I've said that repeatedly myself, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And OPS was struggling on many different levels. It needed to develop a plan, but it was struggling to the point where it was finding it difficult to have the expert planners to make that plan. Is that fair to say?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the OPS officers were tired, exhausted. They needed external agency's help just to maintain a regular level of policing. That's the reality at the time ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We needed external police agency's help primarily for the Incident Command System to address the crisis happening in the downtown core. We needed less help for the policing of the rest of the city.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We still needed help there, but we were nowhere near by comparison.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So, again, I think my question is, wouldn't it be very simple to let a bigger organization like the OPP or RCMP to be -- to have a greater capacity to help? They wanted to help.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm not sure they wanted what you're suggesting Section 9. I never received any suggestion from Commissioners Carrique or Lucki that they wanted to come in here and bring the necessary lift of 2,000 plus officers, and have them on the ground here for days, if not weeks on end. I stand to be corrected if there's information out there that's different from that. Here's the challenge. Then you're going to have to get three levels of government to invest differently in three levels of policing. I don't know how the formula would work, but if we're to go down the what if scenario that you're asking me to entertain, and please, if the Commissioner doesn't have time for this or you want to move on, just let me know. But here's scenario number one: Take a percentage of every municipal police service, just say 10 percent, fold that up into the OPP because every single year some event is going to come to some municipal police service where they don't have enough resources, so automatically the OPP will get 10 percent cut of every police service because when, not if, they will be required under the new components of section 9 to come and take over policing for a day, a week, a month, they have the lift to be able to do that. I don't think any mayor or any regional authority is going to go for that, and I don't even think the Province would want that responsibility. Now, just layer in that on top of the RCMP. With how stretched they are with contract policing, national policing Indigenous policing, force protection internationally, there's probably eight functions that not one of them are staff adequately. Now are you going to take a 10-percent cut from the Provincial Police Services to allow the RCMP to do that? And now you come to the National Capital Region, where there are six police services operating in here at any given day. How do you divide the pie there? I understand the intellectual desire to explore that. The practical and financial side I'm sure merits the effort. I think what we need to do is get standards across the board, really clarify how and when we work together in integrated and/or unified, clarify the gaps between the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical, and how that fits into police of jurisdiction adequate and effective. That's going to be a lot cheaper and probably a lot faster, and it can be iterated over the course of time for lessons learned from experience to experience. You're talking about a major structural change, legislative change that would take years to hammer out and then years to get to a point of efficacy.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm. Well, let's go back to what happened on or around the time that Chief Pardy led his group, the Integrated Planning Group, to Ottawa. He arrived on the 8th, and he had a meeting with your Command Team on both the 8th and the 9th. I want to get your best recollection of the meeting you had with them in the afternoon on the 9th.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Okay. Well, I think it was around 12 o'clock. Again, for context, if I get the dates wrong, I believe somewhere around the 6th or the 7th there was a communication between myself and Commissioner Carrique, where we had talked about a significant increase in integration. I forget who raised it, whether he did or I did, but we were very quickly in agreement that that would be very helpful and that we would need then to bring in folks from -- senior folks that had experience and expertise and that type of thing. He referenced Carson Pardy almost immediately. That name, I believe, came up in our first conversation, and I welcomed him and anybody else that he could send to support that. And to his word, I think within 24 hours we were contacted, 24 hours after that there was an initial meeting out at the RCMP Headquarters. That was a meeting, unfortunately -- I realise I'm going really fast, so I'm slowing myself down now. That was the meeting, unfortunately, that because of the distance to travel to and the Teams meetings problems that we had, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was only able to get a portion of her Incident Command staff on there. While there was somewhat of a productive discussion, it didn't get to the level where there was any substantive move forward. There was an agreement to have another meeting on the 9th of February, is that right, the 9th of February, and there was additional efforts during that period to continue to improve and evolve that plan. A substantive lift that day. I referenced earlier on that I got involved in that lift to try to elevate the plan to as great a degree as we possibly could for these partner agencies coming in. I believe around 12:00, 12:30, Chief Superintendent Pardy, Superintendent Abrams, RCMP Superintendent Lue, and I forget, there were other members, but those were the three primary members of the team, arrived at our headquarters. Take a pause there. But that was the context to the start of that meeting. I had my Command Team and my Incident Command Team there as well.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I'm glad you paused there because before we get to the actual meeting with the Integrated Planning Group, do I understand correctly that that morning, the morning of the 9th, you had another meeting with your -- the OPS Command Team.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
M'hm.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can you tell us more about that meeting first?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. And we debriefed from what happened the previous night, looked to see where we could again continue to evolve the plan in advance of this next meeting, and put every effort into that so that again we could have the best product available. It was clear to me that this -- the arrival of this team was not only to support what we're -- the ongoing efforts here, but they needed to assess where we were with our ongoing efforts here, specifically, assess the plan.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, let me take you to some notes. These are notes written by Deputy Chief Ferguson, I believe. OPS00014479. And I want to take you to page 66. So you see from the top there that is Wednesday, February the 9th. If we go to... What time did you say the meeting was? I don't remember.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I see a note here 7:10. I don't know if that's accurate, but that would seem about right. It was relatively early in the morning.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So this is the day after the group arrived, and your attendance was delayed the day before, and then the next morning we have this meeting. Do you remember Mission Hydra?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us about the name?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Ancient Greek civilisation, an old myth about a multi-headed monster. When you cut off one head it would grow back.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And was there a reason why it's -- this is called Mission Hydra?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Bit of creative license on my part, but the idea was we were struggling to take a section of the red zone or Confederation Park and then hold it while we continued on. And so that was a constant challenge as our officers made efforts to secure portions of the theatre, particularly in and around the red zone, that the challenge was as much to take the portion and then to hold the portion. The concept of the Hydra, if you can cut off the head and cauterise it, it can't grow back. If you can take a piece of ground and hold it, people can't come back. We can then focus on a smaller theatre with more resources, smaller theatre more resources, smaller theatre more resources. That's the concept behind the ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, I understand from the testimony of Deputy Chief Ferguson that the day before, on the 8th, when your Command Team met with the Integrated Planning Group, she presented a Strategic Concept of Operations Plan with eight points with a mission statement that included elements of engagement by the PLT and so on. And part of the discussion at this morning meeting, on the 9th, is a new version with a different mission statement, and there's a reference here that this was a "very aggressive posture": "...language throughout the whole briefing & mission statement..." I'm not sure of that next word: "Asked if anyone needed clarification. Chief laid out his plan, omitted negotiation and when I brought it up he reacted angrily saying 'we are not negotiating', then said 'it's implicit'. I advised..." Is it "all CIC mission statements are": "...our mission statements always has explicitly stated in the mission statement." And then the next comment I believe is attributed to you: "If it doesn't reduce the size of the footprint that is not a good negotiation." Do you remember this exchange?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
These are Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's recollection of that. I would not in any way characterise what took place in that meeting to reflect what I'm interpreting and language here. So again, without the chance to hear these concerns and understand... We had a very healthy discussion, yes, around whether the term "negotiation" should be explicit in I believe the mission statement, but other than that, I'm not really sure as to why she has interpreted things the way that she has chosen to do so.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So let's hear it from your perspective. You've told us about this as well, I believe, during our interviews. If I could take you to your interview summary at page 36. So if we go to the section under Discussions: "Chief Sloly recalled that on February [the 9th] he held a special meeting with Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, OPS general counsel Christiane Huneault, CAO Dunker, and Insp. Kevin Maloney. This meeting took place after an internal OPS planning meeting but before the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting with Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue. His intent was to emphasize that the entire command team was signed off on the February 9 plan. At the meeting, he stated that he would ‘crush’ anyone who undermined the plan - Chief Sloly recognizes that it was an unfortunate choice of words but public safety, member health, wellness and safety, and the successful conclusion of the local Convoy event were all at a critical juncture and this required absolute command commitment to supporting the implementation of the updated plan. He restated the need for unity within the command to support the updated plan including the level of integration and the acquisition of the needed resources to safely and successfully end the events in Ottawa. There were to be no major changes to the plan, the concept of operations, the elevated integration and the senior ICS assignments without discussion about the need for such a change.” Does this reflect your recollection of what happened?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir; it’s my statement.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So there appears to be an emphasis of committing to this plan, unless there was -- there were significant changes that would have justified a different course. Why this emphasis?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We had had the challenge of the previous week where senior people were swapped out without any communication; where we had delays around the development of a significant portion of the plan, that being the Public Order Plan. This was a reminder to folks about the problems that we incurred -- we encountered last week. We are now bringing in a significant amount of resources, a significant level of integration, and we simply cannot have a individual make a change that could affect the strategic intent of what we were trying to accomplish at this point. We needed to have -- on the positive side, we needed to have a full commitment across the command team that we had reached a position now that could move forward with. There was still going to be evolutions of the plan and subplans and as resources became available, but that the base of the week and change of pivoting from where we were into this new position, particularly with the request of resources and integration, this required a very firm and full commitment from the command team going forward.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you acknowledged that the word choice “Crush” was unfortunate?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Absolutely, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But you meant to convey an emphasis that no-one should deviate from the plan lightly.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Lightly, at the strategic level, no major changes in the plan; no major changes in the concept of operations, the elevated integration with RCMP and OPP, and the senior ICS assignments -- Major Incident Commander, Event Commander, Incident Commander -- without discussion first. Probably the only thing I forgot to add in there, unless there were exigent circumstances. Again, obviously -- I shouldn’t say obviously. Exigent circumstances is always implicit in any one of these circumstances.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Is this consistent with the Incident Command system where the Operational Level Commander required a certain degree to adapt and to respond to quickly changing circumstances?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s the concept of exigent circumstances, sir. That would not fit within what I was relaying to these folks here.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So would your colleagues have some away from this meeting understanding that if there were to be changes, that it would require some kind of an approval from the Chief?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not at all, sir. At the operation level, no. Again, I’m very clear: No major changes to the plan. No major changes to the concept of operations, not objectives, not subplans, not operational decisions made during the course of the day. The elevated integration, I wasn’t going to have a Superintendent, an Inspector, a Staff Sergeant or a Deputy Chief tell the OPP and the RCMP, “You know what? We don’t need that integration, never mind what Sloly says.” So this was me being very clear. At the strategic level of where we were, no major changes outside of exigent circumstances, for these areas.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So we’ll come back to this very shortly, but just to clarify this point I may take you to the notes taken at this meeting by the Legal Services, by Ms. Huneault. If we go to OPS00014454, please, page 130. So this is -- this appears to be the same meeting? Do you want to scroll up and look at the date?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, thank you. (SHORT PAUSE)
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
February 9th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So we go back to page 130. The point I want to draw your attention to is the second arrow from the top: “No changes to plan unless Chief approves.”
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So that was the question I put to you. Would someone walk away from this meeting thinking that there were to be no changes to the plan unless the Chief approves?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, to be explicit: No changes to the architect -- sorry; the architecture of the plan. But that is not me saying, “You can’t have a tactical change; you can’t have an operational change unless I approve it.” It would be -- even if I wanted that, it would be impossible for me to validate, approve or not approve, every single aspect of any potential change to the plan. It would just be impossible. I would never have said that. And I can see any experienced person in that room taking such a literal interpretation and walking out, particularly after being in this theatre for almost a week and a half. And if they had that interpretation, with the maturity and the rank in that room, I would have expected them to raise clarification.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, it was at this meeting as well that we’ve heard from other witnesses that you discussed politics. If I could take you to page -- maybe later on in this page, actually, or maybe the next page; I’m not sure. Go down a little more. Do you see the comment from Trish: “I want us to limit politics!”
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And the comment just before that I suppose was attributed to you, “Tom C.”; Tom Carrique, probably?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
M’hm.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
“...is assessing if we are worthy of getting the additional ask resources”
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What is your recollection of the discussion?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just that. It was made clear to them that the folks that have arrived here have come with clear instructions from their Command to assess the level of our planning, the adequacy of the resource requests that we made, and then to -- assuming that we could come to that arrangement of integration, to then move forward on building that out. But they were coming to assess where we were.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now -- so there was a reference to Deputy Chief Ferguson asking to limit the discussion of politics. Her own notes -- now, these are notes taken by the Legal Services. Her own notes are more explicit. If we could go to OPS00014479, at page 67? Go down. Okay. “Talked about the plan...” So keep going. See the dash? “Talked about the plan...” I’m not sure. “Talked about the plan for...”
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
“Briefing”?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
“...briefing the embedded cell of planners & commanders and he spoke of a type of conspiracy that is happening at Provincial & Federal levels and this team is being handled by their political masters and promoted the idea that they are not really here to help.” Can you help us understand who are these political masters and what was the conspiracy theory?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah, first of all, these are Trish’s -- Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson’s words. I won’t challenge her emotions or interpretation around it but they’re not the conversation that I was leading at this point. I had a very clear discussion about two elements. We are going to be assessed on our quality of our planning and the relevance to the resource requests and if we cannot provide enough substantive justification for what we’re looking for, we’re likely not going to get the level of help that we need. Secondarily, I did talk about the politics that are happening in and around this entire event. By this time, it is a national event with global coverage. By this time, I had had several interactions with all three levels of government and the board. It was clear to me that there was increasing intense and, in some cases, I believe, undeserved and unhelpful political pressures happening to the Ottawa Police Service, pressures that could affect our ability to secure the resources. So I was letting them be aware, giving them situational awareness and allowing a conversation to happen in a very tight room with my command team so they could have as much understanding before they went in front of the group of external agencies to have that conversation. I didn’t want there to be any surprises and I wanted them to be as fully informed as possible. An example would be the day before this there was a public motion put forward by a significant number of city councillors asking for the Ottawa Police Service to remove the police’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the incident command. So these were very live, real-time issues. There were others that they were less aware of. So I tried to give them indications as to what was going on without going delving down into unfortunate details of it. It’s in that context that I think Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson may have thought it was a conspiracy theory. These were very real experiences that I was aware of and I was trying to bring my command team to a level of awareness so they could appreciate the challenges that we would have to show a unified approach around this going forward. And if we didn’t have a unified approach, the type of politics could very quickly divide and conquer us.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Were you concerned that these officers coming from the OPP or RCMP may not come with a pure motive to help but rather were acting on behalf of whoever was sending them or other politically-related reasons?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If you’re asking whether Chief Pardy -- Chief Supt. Pardy and Supt. Lue were there for political reasons, no. I think they were genuinely assigned and they came with genuine hearts to offer the help that they could to understand what was going on and offer the help they could. But I’m very much aware of the politics that comes to play on the heads of chiefs of police and commissioners. And I’m very much aware of a number of issues that my colleagues at that rank were facing.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you were the one who was asking for help. And when they came, were you -- did you have any -- was there any reluctance on your part to share the information within the OPS in order to help them help you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
None so ever, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did you have any issues of trust in relation to working with them cooperatively to resolve the situation in Ottawa?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Trust, no, but I was very explicit on two points. Integration means that the Ottawa Police Service remains police of jurisdiction, and that the Ottawa Police Service remains in control of the incident command system, and that the resources I’m asking for are to be under the control of the incident command system. Those were the only three caveats. If they couldn’t agree to those three caveats, we’d probably have to go back to the drawing board in some other way to get the resources and achieve another type of integration. Those were the three caveats. It’s not a matter of trust. It’s simply a matter of the baseline aspects, the redline aspects of our ability to move forward under and integrated model.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Your command team has told us that they perceived an issue on your part of not willing to let go of control to -- a concern to hold onto -- by way of this “police of jurisdiction” concept, to hold onto some kind of control; do you agree with that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not at all.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Do you know what they’re talking about?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, I don’t, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
What was it that was so important -- why is it so important to you that Ottawa remain the police of jurisdiction; what’s the significance of that? What does that mean?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s in the Police Services Act, sir. We are the police of jurisdiction.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But don’t different police services often work cooperatively to figure out how to solve a problem? Isn’t that what ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And we did that every single day of my day in -- of my time in office -- joint forces operations. I invited in the RCMP to do internal criminal conduct investigations. We did that every single day. That is a very, very different thing from we are no longer the police of jurisdiction in the Nation’s Capital for a million people. The Ottawa Police Service will no longer be the police service even though we’ve been so for a century and change. That is a very different concept of operations.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But if it makes sense for, like, a major case investigation for -- let’s say a crime is committed in Toronto but the expertise required to successfully solve the case necessitates a combination of expertise from Toronto Police, Peel Police, and York Regional Police, isn’t there some protocol that the lead would not necessarily be the police of jurisdiction? It would depend on the circumstances what makes the most sense?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I can think of examples where yes, a investigator would come out. The lead investigator in the criminal conduct investigation was from the RCMP but professional standards were still under my control as the police chief in the police of jurisdiction. The decision to lay charges or not lay charges from the Police Act were still under Part IV from me as a chief of police. But if I’d abdicated that role and responsibility, then it would be up to the RCMP lead investigator to decide on the totality of the circumstances around that case. So yes, hundreds of times, probably thousands of time I’ve integrated police services for a wide variety of things -- administrative, HR, human rights, operations, Guns and Gangs. I have no trouble whatsoever with that concept. In my time in policing -- got to be careful here. I can’t think of a single time in my 30 years in policing where a police service said, “We’re done. Somebody else come do this for us.” I stand to be corrected but I can’t recall a single of that happening.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But why would it be a matter of someone else doing it for us? Wouldn’t it be a true matter of collaboration? It would still count on the local expertise but -- maybe this is a question for the policy round discussions. I don’t know.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Potentially, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But in any event, at this meeting on February the 9th, if I take you to the notes, OPS00014454 -- so we’re returning to the Legal Services notes, if we go to page 136 and we go down -- so this is still the 9th, I believe: "Yesterday provided them the org chart of command. What more do you need to implement/build into our plan? Need to know what resources we will get here in Ottawa." That was attributed to you. And the OPP responded: "Strategic decision because of rest of provinces." Do you remember what this was about?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Explain to us, please.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think a very healthy discussion, “Look, we have a local need here but we now have a national set of events.” I think by the 9th, Windsor might have been starting -- kicking up around that time. Toronto had just got through their Queen’s Park piece. I think much of the Prairie provinces had one or more things going on. Coutts was still very alive. So yeah, this is a healthy discussion around, “Look, we know we need a lot of resources but we also know you’ve got a lot of other resource demands happening.” Around this time, I believe there was a steady, almost daily call of all chiefs that were facilitated by the OPP and they had already, I think, established two levels of resource integration, one on Public Order Units explicitly and another one on general resource requests. So we were already in a provincial/national Theatre where we are trading off resource requests against risks on a scale that I’d never experienced. And I’m not aware of any police chief from my generation that says they experienced something similar. So that’s the context of the discussion taking place here.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Could we go -- scroll further down? OPP said ”We stated 1,200 OPP staff over” -- it's hard to read -- sorry, it's actually there at the below quote that I'm interested in, "Can't build a plan without a plan." And the chief said, "Fine, build a plan and get us the people."
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I know what was taking place here. I don't think these notes are particularly accurate at this point, and I suspect there's a lot of back and forth and people are talking fast, as I am now, and there's a little bit of catch up time here. So I will build off these notes, not ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes, but tell us what you remember.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They're not accurate. So first, there was a discussion. I forget who raised it -- it might have been Supt. Abrams, but I'm not 100 percent sure -- around how many staff had been sent over, and again, I said, "Well, there was that miscommunication from the Solicitor General that that left the impression that 1,500 officers from the OPP or from across the province were here in Ottawa on a daily basis." And I again explained the challenges, the public trust and confidence challenges that that caused us, that then pivoted out of that discussion into -- again, I don't know who from the OPP would have led this, but I don't think this is an accurate statement, but it probably captures the theme -- "Can't build a plan without a plan." This is the chicken and egg discussion, should we have a plan in force before you get the resources? And I'm saying, "We are planning and we know we need a level of resources we can find to the plan. I need a commitment of resources." So that’s the gist of the discussions that are taking place, probably in rapid fire, and the scribe is, in this case, Christiane Huneault, is doing her best to keep up.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, you do recognize these notes are from the OPS council, Ms. ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, I just referenced Christiane Huneault.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Because didn’t you ask her -- if we go to page 43 -- so I'm going back in time -- page 43 is her notes on February the 3rd, as you can see here. Do you see the bullet where she notated that she asked, "He asked if I've been taking notes. I told him I'm acting like a scribe and capturing everything." So it appears that you've asked her to take notes, and she's been doing her best to take notes, almost like a scribe in trying to capture everything. But you don’t believe that these notes are -- or at least the part that we've referenced?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, sorry if I've left that impression. She -- Christiane Huneault is many things wonderful and an excellent general counsel. She, for a period of days, offered to and took on this role of being a scribe. We were just so thin on resources, she offered to do that until she could free up Vicky, Vicky Nelson, I believe is her name. I'm not suggesting that the effort on the 9th was an insufficient effort. That was a very dynamic meeting and there was a lot of points being made, and she was doing her best to capture them. I'm only saying they're not actual quotes that I can attribute, and she hasn’t attributed the people. So she's done her best, just not able to say who said what exactly when.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The notes that she provided were incredibly helpful for me.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, in the interest of time, I think I'm going to skip ahead, but the last point I need -- I do want to put to you because in fairness to you, Chief Pardy, in his will-say, has said that the tone, the overall tone of this meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful. "Chief Sloly was very clearly under tremendous pressure to act and was very suspicious of levels of commitment from police agencies. He went as far as to advise us that he had sources in the Ministry office that his requests were not being supported, and essentially, they wanted him to fail. There was disagreement on this point from our team." I just want to give you the opportunity to respond to those comments.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
All of them, sir?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
You can -- if -- would it help if I ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t -- put it up, I just -- -
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- can't -- there was lot of things you just said there, so.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Of course.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Let's go to OPP00000792, and if we can go to page 4, please? So do you see the bullet that starts with, "The overall tone"?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. It was a tense meeting at times. We certainly got into very contentious discussions like the discussion -- sorry, I'll slow myself down. We got into contentious discussions like the discussion around the Solicitor General release of the 1,700 number. I could see if, at during those points, Chief Supt. Pardy, who I believe was selected appropriately and sent quickly and came with the view of supporting -- I suspect that would be the same for Supt. Lue representing the RCMP -- they were not aware of and had not been involved in these events. I suspect they weren’t even following all the events, and certainly not the political aspects of it. They were operational people coming in to provide an operational support. In that context, I could understand why Chief Supt. Pardy might describe some aspects of it as disrespectful - - get the right words here ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- "somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful". I needed to be very clear on behalf of my service and my city and the state of public safety that we're in that we needed the resources, that we needed them as quickly as possible, they needed to be predictable, sustainable resources, and not, as we had experienced so far, through nobody's fault, but we can send you this, but if an event comes to us, we got to pull them back. Without any predictability of resources, I don’t want to get back into the plan first versus the resource request -- but absent the predictability of resources, planning for something that you can't resource becomes a waste of time, and we had no time to waste, and we had no resources to waste. So again, I come back, it's an "and" not an "or". The rest of this, I don't know if you want to go -- me to go through bullet point by bullet point ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, that’s fine.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- and comment?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes, I -- there are so many things I would like to get your thoughts on, but we do not have all the time that we want.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Suffice it to say we discussed political -- the political pressure aspects, and that is always an uncomfortable conversation to have between police services.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. Now, if I could take you to a different topic, and this relates to the invocation of the Emergencies Act, I want to ask you, before the 14th of February, did you ever form the view that additional powers that could be granted under the Emergencies Act could help OPS resolve the convoy events?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm not sure I understand the question, sorry. I may have just missed it. I apologize.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So the Emergencies Act was invoked on the 14th of February?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s right.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Before that date, did you ever think about whether the powers under the Emergencies Act might be helpful for the OPS to resolve the convoy events?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Before that, they'd have never thought about the Emergencies Act. I think I might have been made aware of it over that weekend. My challenge, literally, up until my last day in office wasn’t additional legislation or injunctions, it was resources. In fact, there was a period of time where we were hoping there wouldn't be any injunctions or emergency declarations because they would give us more powers and we didn’t have any resources to implement those powers, and then we would be accused again of not doing our jobs or not using powers available to us. So for a significant portion of my time in office, discussions around injunctions, discussions around emergency declarations were maybe that’s something that we actually don’t want at this point. I was never consulted explicitly on the Emergency Measures Act that was put into place on February 14th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm. If I could take you to the OPS document 00014566? It appears that these are notes of a meeting that occurred on February the 14th at around 10:00 a.m. So if we go to page 2. If we go to the section under the redaction, do you see a note that, "Lucki did not get prime minister briefed [...] on the plan. Prime minister will be enacting [...] Emergencies Measures Act." And then if we go to the very bottom of the page, there's a notation that, "CHIEF grateful for every tool we get in the toolbelt but need the resources." Do you remember this discussion about ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I remember the discussion. I can't remember word for word, and certainly, that last line would be basically summarising what I just tried to tell you.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
M'hm.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Tools are great. If we don't have the resources to use them, there could be problems with that.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So was Commissioner Lucki the first to inform you that the federal government would be declaring an emergency?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't have an independent recollection. This appears to be the first time I'm hearing about it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And it certainly wouldn't have been anything more than a day before, if there was any other discussion on it.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now later that day, I understand that you spoke with Chair Deans about the Emergencies Act. Do you remember that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't have an independent recollection. If you could take me to a leading note or ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah, I'll take you to OPS00014566, at page 6. Sorry, if we go back up a little? Trying to see. Go -- okay. So the last bullet. "You have a municipal state of emergency, then a provincial and now a federal. I have already said that we need more than just the OPS." Was that something you said during that meeting?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That would be in line with the sort of type of discussions. I can go back to the there may not be a policing solution to this. This would be in line with that line of discussion. We have three levels of states of emergency. This is obviously more than just the OPS.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now you said also in your interview summary that you participated in several phone calls with Federal Deputy Minister of Public Safety Rob Stewart and Commissioner Lucki before the Federal Government declared an emergency, and that you made it clear on these calls that number one thing that the OPS needed were more police officers.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir. Sorry, I know I need to answer.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did the federal declaration of emergency help OPS obtain more resources?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I can't tell you that because I resigned office within 24 hours.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I'd like to show you an email exchange between Commissioner Lucki and Mr. Mike Jones, who was Chief of Staff to Minister Mendocino. The document number is PB.NSC.CAN.00003256. So the context in this email, Commissioner Lucki enumerates a few emergency measures that she believes would be useful, but then added that she's of the view that -- well, I'll let you read it. If we go down -- she gave a few examples of additional tools. But then if we go further down, she said, "[That] said, I am of the view that we have not yet exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation." Do you agree with that assessment?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know what she's referring to, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
The available tools, if you want to -- well, she explains in this paragraph, "There are instances where charges could be laid under existing authorities for various Criminal Code offences occurring right now in the context of the protest. The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act just enacted will also help in providing additional deterrent tools to our existing toolbox."
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, she may be relating to elements of Coutts, Alberta, or other parts that they're involved in. I don't know if she's explicitly talking about the theatre that I was involved in. It's hard to tell what she thinks could be done. These are certainly elements that we were doing in Ottawa. Where we couldn't arrest, we were getting information to lay charges after the fact. The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act had just been announced on the Friday. We were still looking -- I don't know if by this time on the -- by on the Monday that we'd even had a substantial briefing from our legal team as to what those powers were and whether or not our Incident Command Team had considered how to roll them into the ongoing evolution of the plans. I can't disagree with the position of the Commissioner, but I can't say that it applies entirely to the circumstances that I was dealing with.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
At that time, did you have a view on whether we have exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We meaning the Ottawa Police Service?
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That's right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, I come back to it, sir, we didn't have the resources to fully effectively utilize the private injunction and the elements of the Ontario -- you got the Provincial Emergencies Act at this point. So I can't tell you that I would even have an opinion on that, other than we were just trying to get resources.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now let's go back and talk a bit about we began today's discussion ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry ---
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- I do recall, just as an example, I forget which day it was. It could have been the Saturday or the Sunday. It feels like it was the Sunday. One of those trilevel calls that you referenced with Rob Stewart and Commissioner Lucki, it was the only time that Ministers Mendocino and Blair were on the call, and I joined it late for some reason. I think I had multiple competing demands. And there was a question asked. Maybe it goes to what Commissioner Lucki was talking here about existing legislation, but a question was asked of me by Minister Blair, "Have you considered doing by-law enforcement?" Which I thought was a strange question. And I said, "Yes, we've been doing by-law enforcement from the very beginning." And then he asked a second question, "Well, have you considered towing trucks?" And I said, "Yes, we've been towing trucks from the very beginning, but we don't have sufficient officers to do full enforcement and we don't have sufficient trucks to do extensive towing." Maybe that has something to do with this we haven't exhausted all the tools comment, but that's the only context that I can think of.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now we began our discussions today with questions about the Ottawa Police Service at the time the convoy arrived. And now we're into -- well into February. I want to come back to the question of your confidence in the OPS team. On the day before your resignation on the 14th of February, we have this communication -- your communication with Chair Deans. If I could find the reference, could we go to OPS00014566, page 6? So this is a call on February the 14th. So if we scroll down a little, "When asked by Chair if any of my orders were disobeyed during the demonstration, Chief advised there have been major issues with senior leadership team members but he has not had time to do an investigation on what has been going on here. The best and the worst of us have been strained - [that] is why there has been tense meetings and why some have not demonstrated their best [efforts]. Like everyone, I have been at my best and I have not been at my best" Can you explain what you meant there?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There was a discussion in there with the Chair around the quality of support that I was receiving inside the organization and my own sense of where we were at at the leadership level. A reasonable question from the Chair of the Police Services Board at the direct employee level that the Board has with myself, and in this case only Deputy Chief Bell because Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson was not an employee of the Board. And I gave my best answer to her, there were some challenges. I mean, I actually think these notes capture it well. I -- there would be elements of some of those leadership challenges that would need to be reviewed in an after-action report, again, I didn't have a chance to ever conduct that. And I had made decisions on the fly in the midst of this very fluid situation to address conduct issues and park them or address them and move on from them completely. But I also gave the caveat that there had been incredible levels of stress and fatigue, and that clearly no one, including myself, could claim that they were always operating in their best, at their best.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How did that lack of trust affect the leadership of the OPS during the convoy events in the sense did it make you more likely to step in and provide directions because you could not trust others to lead at the Strategic or Operational levels?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No. It's an important question you're asking, and it's a -- not an easy question to answer. So please if you can give me some leeway here. There was a significant trust issue. That's the only significant trust issue that I was aware of and I thought had a material impact on the events that transpired over those weeks, was the switching out of Superintendent Rheaume for Superintendent Dunlop. And we've been through that, so I won't go back to it. When I realised what had happened, as close as I can, good discipline should be in the smallest -- small "d" discipline, should be applied as quickly to the event. I immediately called a meeting with the two Command Officers. I asked them a straight question, and to their credit they gave me straight answers. I wasn't happy with the answers, meaning I was disappointed that they had chosen to go that route, and I expressed that immediately and clearly. And then I counselled them immediately, and I told them what good behaviour would look like going forward, and then I moved on from it. And as I said earlier on, they both in their own ways worked back towards demonstrating trust and capability. What I was asked here was overall what's happening, and I related that circumstance, but there were other elements of a lack of cohesion within the team. People making assumptions. We've already elements of people taking a rumour and assuming it's truth and how that impacted a range of issues from PLT to whether or not there was a plan to whether or not the plan had been approved. So those were issues that I was dealing with on an ongoing basis. They were difficult issues to deal with. They took time and energy away from everybody involved, including me. And in some cases, they caused confusion. So those are the types of things I was trying to relate to the Chair, but I was also trying to relate the context in which we had found ourselves, unprecedented, uncharted, unrelenting pressures, inside the organisation and outside the organisation, to not leave with her with the impression that we were having some sort of a mass internal revolt. That was my understanding at that time, and that's what I tried to relay as honestly and as fully to the Chair at that time.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, there are two other events I want to cover. So you had this conversation with Chair Deans on the 14th. I want to ask you about the 13th, as well as on the 15th. So let's start with the 13th. I'm skipping ahead. I jump a few things because in the interest of time. We've heard from the other witnesses, including Chief Pardy and Superintendent Bernier that Superintendent Bernier was working closely with the Integrated Planning Group as of the 12th, and by the 13th they have signed off on a plan, and we've seen the plan. There was an email that was exchanged on or around the 13th that I'd like to take you to so as to clarify what your understanding was as to the evolving plan that you described. Can I take you to OPP00001547. So if we go to the very bottom of the chain, this email chain originated from you to Deputy Chief Ferguson, you ask her to please send you the latest version of the Operations Plan that you approved on Wednesday, February 9th. That was the day when you met with the Integrated Planning Group that we talked about, and then you also ask: "...to please advise if the plan has received official approvals/signatures/etc as there seems to be some concerns about this from the RCMP." If we go up one level. So Deputy Chief Ferguson replied to you, saying: "In checking with Rob Bernier, he finally had a chance to review the plan from the Integrated Planning team and has sent it back with his comments. He would prefer that it be completed and signed off and will then share the plan, as he is the final approver of it. As for version 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo '22 [9th of February]..." I think she attached ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- that as a -- as per your request. So we've heard from both Deputy Ferguson and from Superintendent Bernier. Superintendent Bernier was very clear that to him the 3.0 and the February 13th plan were very different plans. So I just want to get your comment on that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They were very different plans in that they were significantly more evolved. The 13th was significantly more evolved than the 9th plan, but they were the same continuity of iterations from the pre plan that we had on January 28th.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we go one level up the email chain, you reply to Deputy Ferguson: "Thank you for the clarification. I was not aware of this delay as I had approved the plan last Wednesday." By "last Wednesday", that would've been the 9th. And I put this question to both Chief Pardy and Superintendent Bernier, I believe, and they disagree that you had approved any plan the previous Wednesday, in part because there was no plan to approve the previous Wednesday.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And again, I understand the perspective of Chief Superintendent Pardy that he did not consider what we had presented to him as a plan. I disagree with that assessment. It may not have been to his standard or the OPP's standard, but it was the plan evolved since January 28th through several iterations, some of which we've seen here today, that was signed off by Inspector Lucas and Superintendent Rheaume, and continued through until the next signature blocks appeared on the February 13th version of the same plan. I can appreciate Chief Superintendent Pardy might not have known of the iterations that preceded it, he might not have understood our business processes and policies, and he might have assumed that this was a brand new plan. I'm also aware of an email from Superintendent Lue of the RCMP that shares my impression, that the February 9th plan was being used by the Integrated Planning Team to build on. And that is entirely my understanding. That is why when I sent the email to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, "send me the latest version", I wasn't talking about the February 9th plan. "What was the latest iteration that had developed since then? I just need to see. Is there a new org chart? Have you got an updated mission statement? Have you got a better sense of objectives you want? Are there subplans that I should be looking at?" I just needed an update. And I was having phone calls on a daily basis with Commissioners Carrique and Lucki in which there was these constant questions of "Have you signed off on it?", and I would respond, "I don't sign off on the plans." "Well, we heard it's with you." "It's not with me. I haven't even been briefed on it yet." "Well, we've heard it's you that have to approve it." "I don't approve the plans." I have to tell you we went around and around on that. And this is me trying to finally just say, "Trish, whatever is the latest version send it to me. If it's been signed off, please send to me quickly so I can forward it to Carrique and to Lucki -- Commissioners Carrique and Lucki." And that's exactly what I did at the end, I think somewhere around nine o'clock, I said, "Here it is. You can see the signatures on it. It's Bernier, it's Lue", sorry, I should use their ranks, "Superintendent Lue, Chief Superintendent Pardy, and Acting Superintendent Bernier. It's signed off. It's done." I never had to approve it, there's no signature line, it’s being implemented. I think there were still questions after that. I cannot, to this day, understand why there are still questions about whether or not the plan was approved and signed off. It had been approved. It had been signed off.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Finally, I’d like to take you to the events of the 15th of February. That was the day you resigned. At the time of your resignation, did you think that the OPS was well positioned to end the occupation?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think we were well positioned. I wouldn’t say we had reached a position of certainty but we were well positioned. We had, at that point, a significant level of integration. We had received significant levels of resources including expertise, including experienced leaders of the quality of Chief Supt. Pardy, Supt. Lue, and others. I think at that time, we actually had the strongest of the different iterations of incident command teams with Acting Supt. Bernier as the event commander. I think at that point he had a deputy commander in OPP Insp. Springer. Both of them seemed to have a very good rapport. And Insp. Springer, I believe, was one of the most experienced and trained incident commanders, if not in the province, across the country and there really seemed to be a sense of structure to what they were doing, and they were building in position that, in my experience as an incident commander and the roles I played in Toronto Police, were very useful for us, and I can see how they were being applied here. So my sense was we had a strong and increasingly stronger plan, a strong and increasingly stronger level of integration, and finally, demonstrably, a greater level of resources coming. But it was that last area that I still that there was -- there were challenges in getting those resources. And it’s in that particular aspect that played probably the biggest role in my decision to resign my office.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
We’ve heard from other witnesses that after your resignation, things appeared to move quicker. Do you have any idea why that might be the case?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We had a very strong integrated team. We had very strong leaders in that team. There was clarity around the plan. I suspect, yes, when there’s a leadership change, there’s always a sense of there’s a change, and that change alone, as you’ve seen in decisions to replace a hockey mid-season or whatever, the team plays well for three or four games and the old challenges that hadn’t been addressed yet come back pretty quickly after. So I don’t in any way challenge the notion that the change created a change but I do note that the level resources flowing was incredible at that point and that within three or four days there was sufficient resources on the ground to execute successfully the operations that have already been described in this court.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
When you attended your interview with us, you told us that the primary reason for your resignation was consideration of public safety.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, sir.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Tell us what you meant.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, I think I started off my testimony here today, Commissioner, with my thoughts on public safety being one of, if not the number one reason -- public trust being, if not one of the number one reasons for public safety. I gave lengthy descriptions throughout the course of the day here around the impact of public trust in the first day, that Saturday. The public’s opinion, the opinion of three levels of government, opinions of civil society leaders, that I think unfairly and unnecessarily laid the blame of this thing on the Ottawa Police Service. We did our very best for as long as we could. We sought the resources and the help that we could. We integrated and implemented those resources, ultimately, successfully. But on the morning of February 15th, it was clear to me that the trust factor in Ottawa Police Service was still headed in the wrong direction and the only person that could take that pressure off the Ottawa Police Service was me and I made that decision to resign from office to get the resources on the ground to support the safety of our communities and, quite frankly, to support the safety to health and wellness of our own members and out partner agencies that were, at that point, in the theatre.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, when we began our examination this morning, I took you to your CV. Can we bring up the CV again? It’s Document No. COM00000759. So at the top of your CV, there’s a motto: " Others before self. Compassion for all." What is that on your CV?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s just how I was raised. It’s who I am. Everything after that is just what I did.
Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. Commissioner, those are my questions. My colleague, Mr. Rodriguez, will have more after the break, if you see this as an appropriate time.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. So we’ll take a 15- minute break and then come back to complete the examination by Commission counsel.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is in recess for 15 minutes. La Commission est leveée pour 15 minutes.
Upon recessing at 4:19 p.m.
Upon resuming at 4:34 p.m.
MR. PETER SLOLY, Resumed
The Registrar (POEC)
Order. À l’ordre. The Commission is reconvened. La Commission reprend.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Well maybe I’ll take another couple of minutes in the circumstances.
The Registrar (POEC)
La Commission levée pour quelques minutes. The Commission is in recess for a few minutes.
Upon recessing at 4:34 p.m.
Upon resuming at 4:37 p.m.
MR. PETER SLOLY, Resumed
The Registrar (POEC)
À l’ordre The Commission is reconvened. La Commission reprend.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Are you okay to continue? Okay. Go ahead.
EXAMINATION IN-CHIEF BY MS. NATALIA RODRIGUEZ
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Good afternoon, Mr. Sloly. Nice to see you again.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Good to see you too.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
For the record, it’s Natalia Rodriguez for the Commission.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, ma’am.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I’m going to pick up where my colleague, Mr. Au, left off with your resignation. Can I ask, was it your decision to resign?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It was ultimately my decision. There was a lot of factors that went into it. Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Did the Board ask you to resign?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There were significant pressures. It was clearly, to me -- it was clear to me that the Board, specifically Chair Deans, had lost confidence in my position, and that was a factor in my decision.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, I believe Chair Deans told us when she was here last week that she did not lose confidence in you. But you’re saying you felt that she had lost confidence in you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
From statements made and -- yes. The totality of the circumstances, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And did the Board, anyone at the Board, or the Chair, express that they had lost confidence in you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
On the evening of February 14th, I received a phone call from the Board Chair essentially asking would I consider resignation?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I assume you're familiar -- and maybe I shouldn't assume -- are you familiar with the evidence that she gave on that exchange last week?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm aware of some of it, but I'd be happy to receive more context or information around it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, maybe you can tell us how it transpired from your perspective?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Twenty-one (21) days into an event of the size and nature that we were dealing with, and 9:30 at night, at the end of I don't know how many hours and days of in that day I worked, you get a phone call from your Chair discussing rumours and then pivoting into, "Have you thought about resigning?" conversation, for me is a pretty clear indication that I no longer had the confidence of the Chair, and by the Chair, the Board of the Ottawa Police Services.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And as she tells it, at that time, you told her that you would not resign, but then the next morning, you called her to say that you had reconsidered; is that accurate, from your perspective?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I told her that I put my heart and soul into this organization, the mandate that she had given me, and that I'd be seeing this thing through, and that at 9:30 at night, it was a very inappropriate conversation to be having with me. I wasn’t going to be giving it any more consideration.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so what made you change your mind?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The almost 11 hours' worth of continuing to manage the situation in this city on behalf of the Ottawa Police Services.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And did anyone within the City of Ottawa or the Government of Ontario or the Government of Canada express to you that you should resign?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I'm a little bit -- I realize I'm not supposed to referencing other people's testimony or evidence presented already, but I am aware of a very alarming text, apparently from Brenda Lucki, Commissioner Lucki to Commissioner Callique. I wasn’t aware of it before my decision, but I am now aware of it now. So I don't know how to relate that into this situation, so ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, it's more about did anybody tell you, did anybody put pressure on you or suggest to you that you should resign, that at the time, obviously, you would have been aware of that if somebody had said that to you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. That’s more helpful for me. I had direct experiences with officials at three levels of government. I had direct experiences with three levels of government over the course of the time of these events that left me with a clear sense that I had no -- little to no support from elements at those three levels.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
In all three levels?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Are you aware of any political pressure on the Board to seek your resignation?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Municipal, yes, definitely. There was a motion passed -- motion presented. I don't think it was passed, so clearly, yes. I don't remember if any of the Board members, the three councillors that were on the Board voted in support of that motion to remove the Ottawa Police's jurisdiction, but there was certainly, I'm aware, at the municipal level, significant pressure on the Board for that to take place.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
My understanding is that motion didn’t make it to the floor. There was not a vote on that motion.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Still, a clear indication.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay, thank you. Now, I want to go back to the beginning, if I may, and just go through some of the events with you kind of from the municipal/Board lens, if you will. So I want to talk a little bit about pre-arrival intelligence, and you talked about that with my colleague, Mr. Au. And I want to just talk about what was -- what information was relayed to the Board with respect to what could be expected before the convoy arrived. Now, Mr. -- Supt. Abrams of the OPP confirmed in his evidence that on the 27th, there was an Intersect call and on that call, OPS confirmed that their planning was on the basis of assuming 3,000 trucks coming into the downtown. You're aware of that, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And I believe Interim Chief Bell indicated in his witness summary that as the convoy drew closer, they were expecting 3,000 to 4,000 vehicles to arrive in Ottawa?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't remember the 3,000 to 4,000 number. My memory is around 3,000, but I don't think at this point it matters.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sure. And then I believe Inspector Lucas, in his evidence, confirmed that by January 26th, the OPS was expecting about 10,000 people on the 29th, on that side.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I did hear that from Inspector Lucas.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. And so now I want to just, having that context, turn to what the Board understood would be the situation on the 26th when there was that Board meeting. And my understanding is that the January 26th Board meeting was the only pre-arrival, pre-convoy meeting that dealt with the convoy; is that ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It was -- sorry for interrupting. It was a specifically called meeting for the purpose of the convoy. I have a recollection -- I stand to be corrected -- our regular January meeting was, I think, the week before, and there was some discussion at that level. But by no means was it a briefing and I wouldn't expect the Board to have sufficient information to even form substantive questions. But I just recall there might have been some mention of it at that previous regularly-scheduled meeting.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. My understanding is it wasn’t discussed in any level of detail, but you can agree with me then that this would have been the briefing meeting in which substantively, the details would have been discussed?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we can turn to the minutes of that meeting, OPB00001257, and these are the minutes of that meeting. And I want to take you to page 5. So now, this is the portion where -- and we can scroll up, actually, because just to note that there are no kind of numbers that we can see there being given -- if we can keep going up. So these are -- yeah. In any event, there's no actual numbers that are provided, but there's a question from one of the councillors at page 5 regarding the numbers. So I'll just take you to page 5 then, Councillor Brockington. And then the question was raised regarding whether the Service had an idea of how many people and vehicles were expected. "The Service noted that although the information is in flux, the truck movement began on the West Coast and had swelled and shrunk as it has travelled. The Service is also monitoring other groups expected to participate in demonstrations over the weekend. The Service was anticipating in the 1,000 to 2,000-person range; however, they indicated that it could change even with an hour." So by this time, there was a plan in place assuming 3,000 trucks entering the downtown core. Why wasn’t that information given to the Board?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
These minutes are not verbatim minutes. I would prefer to look at a more detailed record. These are all taped. They're available on YouTube channels. These minutes of meetings were never intended to be verbatim minutes, so I'm not suggesting the number wasn’t given, but I can't tell you whether or not it was. So that’s my challenge with trying to refer to these as "scribe notes" or "detailed minutes" of what was discussed at the meeting. They're substantive summary points as opposed to what we've been using as scribe notes. I just ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But I mean, the question is kind of very directly put, how many people and vehicles are expected? And the answer appears to be 1,000 to 2,000 people.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know who gave that answer, ma'am. I don't know whether it was in relation to a direct question here. There was some context missing. I just don’t know.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But you were present at this meeting?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so by this time, you would have known that that was the expectation or that was what the plan was based on, 3,000 vehicles, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, just to be clear, I don't think anybody had a fixed number. The 3,000 vehicles was, I believe -- and again, I stand to be corrected -- an estimate that Inspector Lucas, through his traffic team and his planners felt that could be accommodated, but that doesn’t mean we were going to get exactly 3,000 vehicles. We could have got 5, we could have got 1. He was looking at an upper range that he could accommodate, but that wasn’t a prediction of the number of vehicles that were expected to arrive 72 hours later.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But in terms of numbers, this was the only pre-arrival briefings, so there were no other updates that were provided to the Board about the number of people or vehicles expected?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No. I -- this was a formal Board meeting, but I had been in regular daily contact with the Board. There were calls that took place this week with the Board Chair, was on with the mayor and team. So there was a number of other discussions, communications, formal meetings that took place in this timeframe were questions around what we had, what was coming, were we ready, “What messaging should we be providing? are you getting enough support from the city?” There’s a range of other meetings and communications. This was just the only formal board meeting ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- where there was -- specifically for these events.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we can go to page 2, if we look at the first paragraph, “They indicated…” -- I’m just looking in the second line there: "They indicated that there was a coordination of intelligence between agencies, and the Service noted expecting that the ‘Freedom Convoy’ would arrive in Ottawa as early as Thursday and likely remain through Sunday. Their destination remained Parliament Hill. Questions regarding counter-protests and protest groups was expressed." (As read). So this was the information that was provided in terms of the expected stay of the convoy; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But at this point, there was at least some indication from intelligence that there was the possibility that they could stay longer, right, through the Hendon Reports and other ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There was the possibility that smaller group could stay longer as opposed to everybody arriving was going to be staying longer.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And my understanding was that there was in-camera portion to this meeting.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I honestly, at this point, can’t remember.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’ll take your word for it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I guess my question is -- the OPS had much more detailed information about what was expected by this point in time. So my question is, why not share that with the board as, you know, they are tasked with oversight and assisting in helping to prepare for these types of events?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We answer the questions given to us by the board in the public meeting and the board has the opportunity to move the meeting into in-camera if they choose. I can’t control their decision on an in-camera meeting, nor do I control the questions they ask in the public session.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So we did ask Councillor Deans about this and she testified that she didn’t know to ask for an in-camera portion because she wasn’t aware that there was additional information that could have been provided in-camera.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I will accept that that was her explanation but, as the board chair, and a very experienced board chair on multiple boards, she would have known that that was an option.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so I understand you’re saying there were other updates with the chair but in terms of the board as a body, this was the one briefing that they received and there were no updated briefings before the arrival of the convoy as more information became available; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Nor would there have been time, quite frankly. I would have gone to a board meeting if directed to do so but that would have probably not been the most optimal use of our time given the circumstances that were unfolding.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, I want to speak about the injunction to the City -- or you had a call with the Solicitor David White on January 30th about the possibility of seeking an injunction. Ultimately, we know that the City did seek an injunction and was successful but by that time, it was quite further along in the events and the injunction was not actually ever used as an enforcement tool. And we’re trying to understand why that’s the case. So you recall you had a call with Mr. White on January 30th about the possibility of the City seeking an injunction; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. And again, just by way of context, my recollection -- again, I stand to be corrected -- was that we had -- within the Ottawa Police Service, we had discussed a range of options as mitigating factors, risk- reducing factors, and an injunction was one of them. This was before the arrival of the trucks, in the pre-planning phase. Once the event unfolded, as I’ve described earlier, on the Saturday, there was an attempt to step that up, and I believe that is the call that you’re referencing.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. And so what exactly were you seeking from him?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We were seeking to now ask the City to get involved. It would be a City injunction, not an Ottawa Police Service injunction. We had now just seen what had landed in our city and so we had a much better understanding of what we were facing, different from the sort of blue skying of, “Well, let’s consider an injunction,” before. And so now we’re having a real discussion about the real problem that is unfolding in our city and asking the City to start to put their minds clearly to the possibility of an injunction. But we were not, at this point, strongly recommending or anything; we were just keeping all of our options on the table and trying to engage the fullest range of City supports that we could.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And what was your understanding of what the injunction would be for -- an injunction for what?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It would be a range of different things. And again, it would be the City’s injunction. It would be their decision to decide what to put into its injunction. We were giving them some base-level ideas from a policing perspective but we would not be the only perspective necessary for them to make a decision and to include causes within that injunction.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you felt that that would fit within OPS’ overall plan to have an injunction from the City?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
At that point, we were doing the pivot on the plan and we were just looking at all the options that we could.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, my understanding is that, at that time, there were enforcement opportunities that were not being taken because of lack of resources and potentially the concern that it might incite the crowd, if I will.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Maybe just rephrase. Officers always have the discretion as to whether or how to use enforcement actions. And certainly, the crowd dynamics made it very difficult for them to do that. I know you phrased it, “There were enforcement actions not being taken.” Officers were applying their discretion around enforcement, inciting other public safety issues, and officer safety issues would have been a part of that discretion.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But I think we can agree that enforcement was not being consistently done on every occasion for various reasons, including lack of resources, potential safety concerns, et cetera; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, yes. Thank you.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So at that time, there were multiple bylaw, Highway Traffic Act violations so I’m trying to understand what more -- you know, considering that there were violations happening that were not being enforced, what would the injunction then add to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, it could have added a range of different things. Again, it’s not an area of expertise that I have. There could have been heightened fines. There could have been new bylaws passed. There could have been, though an injunction -- maybe there would be some way to engage other elements like insurance bureaus, hotels. Again, it’s not an area of expertise. I’m not a lawyer. I don’t believe I’ve actually been involved in the drafting and carrying through of an injection all the way. I would have relied almost entirely on my Legal Services team to have those conversations and they would have been entirely informed by the needs of the incident command group.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Fair enough. So I’ll take you OTT00029695, and this is an email from David White, City solicitor, to Steve Kanellakos, who’s the City Manager, and this was after his discussion with you, Mr. White’s call with you. He emailed the City Manager copying others at the City about the discussion that he had just had with you. So that’s the context for this email in case you haven’t had the chance to see it before. So he says: "I just got off the call with Chief Sloly and his team that is coordinating the OPS response to the protest on the issue of an injunction." So then he says, “This is what they’re looking for.” And then if we go to the second paragraph -- oh, third paragraph, excuse me: "I also took the opportunity to explain to the chief that any request for an injunction would need to be founded in public safety concerns. While the OPS’ main concern seems to be around noise, traffic impacts, public frustration based on the idea that the police should be doing something about the protest, mounting costs, air pollution, et cetera, there does not yet seem to be significant violence associated with the event, nor much in the way of public safety concern…" So I just want to pause there for a second. Is that what you told the City solicitor on January 30th, that there was not much of a public safety concern at that point?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, thank you. I can’t imagine why I would ever say that. I think this is the 30th so this would be the Sunday. I mean we’d seen -- we had seen massive public safety concerns across the downtown in the red zone. They were well-publicized on mainstream media and social media events of assaults, threatening behaviour, hate incidents. I don’t know how he would have taken the impression from us that these were just minor bylaw issues, public frustration, and who’s going to pay the bill. I suspect all those areas were part of our discussions but he would only have to look out of his window at City Hall to understand what was happening in our city at this time, a significant public safety event happening in our city.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you did not express to him that there were no significant public safety concerns at that time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I have no recollection of that and I couldn’t believe that I would ever express that to him.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And he says “according to the police”. So do you have any sense where he would have gotten that information from?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Perhaps he talked to other people before or after.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So there seems to be a bit of a theme of conflicting narratives here about the degree of public safety, especially in the first week -- in the first weekend. So on the one hand, we have the City being told that, you know, enforcing bylaws and any laws, really, was too dangerous for public safety issues, that there was the risk of violence, there was the risk of injury and death. And I can take you to some notes where that’s indicated. But on the other hand, the City was also told -- at least in this email, seems to have been told that there wasn’t much in terms of a public safety risk and we’ve seen, actually, from some EOCCG, which is the group that manages the emergency response on a municipal level -- that group was putting out updates every day and they used language such as “party-like atmosphere”, “it’s festive”. So there seems to be these two competing narratives, was this a tinderbox waiting to explode or was this a family-friendly carnival with bouncy cases. And so I wanted to get your perspective on those two narratives.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It was a tinderbox waiting to explode. It was not a family festival.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Thank you. Now, my understanding is that in terms of the discussions of the injunction, the City got to the point where they were looking at potentially seeking an injunction for various things, but they required OPS to provide them information that they can then use to support an application for an injunction. And that was never provided, according to the City witnesses that we heard from. Do you have any sense of why that is?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
None whatsoever. This had been assigned, I think -- again, I may be corrected by documentation, but my recollection is that Christiane Huneault as general counsel would have been lead for this. She would have relied on the supports of the Incident Command Team as well as other planning capabilities outside of the Incident Command Team within our general organization to be able to address any questions or information requests. I will say on the spectrum of million things we needed to get done in real time, this was probably in the middle to bottom half of it, so it is possible that the City was waiting for updates but everyone in the organization -- my organization was busy on higher priority items at that point. So that’s the best explanation I could give you. But there was certainly no indication that I had that we were disinterested in supporting it. We’d simply passed it over to them and washed our hands of it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. Now, I understand that you were looking to have the City exercise kind of political influence at different levels of government in order to assist in getting resources and there were various -- various things you had asked them to look into and to do on that February 6th email where you told them, you know, “We need 1,800 officers”. I believe in one of the -- and actually, maybe we should go to it, OTT00018172.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just while that’s coming up, Commissioner, if I may have your indulgence for a second. Sorry. I don’t know what the procedure around this is. I was asked a question earlier on and I was giving an answer and I changed midway through my answer. And it may have sounded like a complete phrase. It was a change of phrase. Can I just correct the record with that indulgence?
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Absolutely. We’re just trying to get to the bottom of things, so no, there’s no -- if there’s a problem -- and in fact, by the -- later in the day something comes to you, please interrupt and put it forward.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you, Commissioner. If I get the question wrong or the context, please correct me. I believe you asked me a question to what extend did I believe that others -- that the three levels of government had lost confidence or trust in me. And I believe part of my response was I felt that all three levels had expressed very low. What I was about to say was very, and then I changed to low. It came across, I believe, as very low. I just want that corrected for the record if that’s ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So the answer was “very”?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, it was “low”.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Low.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
But I had experienced incidents where there was clearly some level of -- low level of lack of confidence in the organization from all three levels of government.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So this is the email of February 6. If we go to the first email of the thread -- right. And go up a little bit so we can see who it’s from. Yeah, right there. So it’s John Steinbachs from the OPS, and it’s to Chair Deans and the Mayor and others in Ottawa, and you as well. And if we go down, Chair Deans and Mayor Watson: “Please find below the list of Ottawa Police Service asks to the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government that was requested yesterday by the Board.” So as my colleague pointed out, on the 5th of February you were asked to provide a number of resources that you required as well as other requirements that you needed in order to bring this to an end. And if we go down, we see that you have some asks there from the City. And I wanted to just briefly ask you about a few of these, if we go down. Okay. So here -- and actually, this is an interesting question because I think we touched on it earlier but maybe didn’t get a clear answer. So it says there, “The Service requires 1,800 additional staffing and enforcement resources.” So this is, I think, the first reference that we see to the 1,800 ask. And this is on February 6th. I believe it’s at 4:07 p.m. There’s later a meeting that you have with Chair Deans and the Mayor in which you provide them that number as well, and then the following day you send them an email with a chart. You might recall that chart, and that was on February 7th. So the question was, you had been asked by the Board to come up with the number of resources that you required to end the protest on February 5th. And on February 6th at 4:30, you send this email. So at what point did you determine the number of additional resources you needed and how? Because my understanding is the meeting that happened later with your command team was after this email was sent in the evening at 7:45 p.m.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. And again, my recollection is that as soon as that Board meeting ended on the 5th, we turned our attention to start getting the information we need. So I don’t -- I’m not aware of notes, scribe notes, that say my Executive Officer and my EA started to assign things to CAO Dunkirk, but there was no way that I would have left that Board meeting with that request in front of us and the extremely short timelines and simply waited 24 hours later to start to have people thinking about it. So that’s just my recollection, and I stand to be corrected if that proves to be wrong.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So your understanding is that February 5th in the evening you would have had a meeting ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
As soon as that Board meeting was over, we would debrief right away, as we would with any Board meeting at the end of it, what are the substantive issues that came out, what do we need to do, what are the timelines, and certainly in this meeting that was the direction that needed our full focus and it would not have simply waited till the end of the next day to get to.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Yeah, I just don’t think we have in our documents a meeting on February 5th in the evening where resource numbers were discussed, so I think that’s the question that we’re kind of left wondering with. And so if we look at the third bullet point, “Professional mediation and negotiation capacity”, what were you asking for there?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Again, we were trying to think of anything that could assist us. The concept of mediation and negotiation was clearly a live discussion at many levels in the organization and many levels of government, and so any particular advice, supports, expertise that we or the City could bring in could be helpful.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so with that in mind, you’re asking the City to exercise its political influence and to look into professional mediation, even. You’re aware on February 6th it’s also the day that the City of Ottawa declared a state of emergency. Do you recall that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t recall that, but I’m not challenging the date of it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so according to some of the documents that we’ve seen and the evidence, the expressed intent of that declaration or at least one of the reasons for that declaration was to put pressure on the Premier to exercise powers to resolve the situation in Ottawa. Did you ask the Mayor to declare a state of emergency?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was involved in discussions around it. I’ve been involved in those -- had been involved in those discussions in my time in Toronto for a variety of reasons. And literally every time it ever came up in Toronto is it may get you some money, transfer payments. It might get you access to certain resources, but it’s not going to give you -- the declaration of state of emergency in our context here in the province isn’t the same as it is in other jurisdictions in other countries. So it has, put my police officer hat on, limited efficacy to support policing operations and I have limited understanding of how it supports other city functions, but even there, my understanding is it is by no means even close to being a silver bullet.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sure. But it can exercise some political leverage, can it not?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I can’t speak to political leverage. I can only tell you what, practically, it would provide for a jurisdiction and, in my case, a policing jurisdiction.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Fair enough. I wanted to just ask about the legal opinion that you had received in which you said you believed, based on that opinion, that you were not able to block access to trucks entering downtown. Did I get that right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I wouldn’t put it that way.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. How would you put it?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We had a legal opinion -- sorry, can you just frame your question again, please?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sure. My understanding is that pre-convoy, or when the convoy arrived, we saw an opinion, in any event, that was dated January 28, and I assume you saw it sometime after that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, we requested on the 27th, it arrived on the 28th. I don’t know the date that I saw it, but it was still in and around that time. And again, the events started on the 27th, went through the 28th, heightened on the 29th, and continued through the 30th. So it arrived in the middle of the event, not prior to the event.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And that goes to the heart of my question. Councillor Fleury was here some time ago, a few weeks ago now, and he testified that at the pre-convoy briefing with you and the City Manager, the Mayor, Councillors, this was on January 26th, he had specifically asked about maintaining truck routes in the city, and you said to him, in answer to that question on the 26th, that you had a legal opinion that said that the Charter prevented you from doing that. That’s what he told us. So I want to understand what would have been the basis for your understanding that the Charter prevented that on the 26th of January when you didn’t receive the legal opinion until the 28th. Was there another legal opinion?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Probably my general counsel. I mean, I don’t have an independent recollection, but before we go outside for a legal opinion, I would usually run it by my own general counsel.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you testified that by the 29th, on the Saturday, I thought I heard you say this morning, that the demonstration was an unlawful demonstration? Is that right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
By virtue of the first law broken in and around it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so what did you mean by that? What were the laws broken?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Too many to list.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can you give me a sense? Like are we talking Criminal Code violations?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Trite law, ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Are we talking about ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- Provincial Offences Act, Criminal Code, federal statutes. Too many to list.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So by-law, Highway Traffic Act offences. Okay. So my question is, with respect to the first weekend, I think it could be assumed that 3,000 vehicles in the downtown core would lead, necessarily to Highway Traffic Act and by-law violations; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m sorry, just I may have missed your question. That just having 3,000 vehicles would mean that there would be offences?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Within a limited space, would necessarily mean some violations, such as blocking traffic, parking illegally?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In the context of a protest, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We probably have more than 3,000 vehicles in the downtown core in Ottawa on any given day.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But I’m talking about, you know, 3,000 tractor trailers and big heavy vehicles coming into the downtown in a space that had been designated for them to be there; right? But ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- they weren’t designated to be there to be legally parked. Clearly they were all going to be taking up lanes and preventing traffic and et cetera.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I understand your question, and so I’m trying to be deliberate in my answer. I can’t imagine that the PLT would have negotiated, “Hey, when you come in, you can break our laws.” I suspect, and I haven’t seen the PLT log notes, but, “When you come in, in order to not break our laws, in order to maintain the free flow of emergency vehicles, in order to not create as many problems as could happen, we’re going to try to get you to do these several things. Park your vehicles here. Carpool/rideshare downtown. We will designate areas where you can park your trucks.” And in designating those areas, it would be the police facilitating that, as opposed to an independent decision by a truck driver or pick-up truck driver to violate the law on their own -- through their own decision making. That’s different from us trying to facilitate a peaceful, lawful protest.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So then I’m just trying to understand what changed from the moment they arrived to the 29th. What additional violations would have occurred? It seems to me that by the time they arrived, those violations would have already been crystalized.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m not sure I understand the question, but I’ll try to answer it. If I get it wrong, please redirect me. And we’ve heard some, I think very helpful -- I want to be careful. I’m aware that Insp. Lucas describes a situation where there’s sort of a race to Wellington Street. And it seems that that is one of -- one of, not the only, but one of the main factors that seems to kind of end the agreed levels of cooperation that had been achieved through a lot of hard work by these PLTs. It then becomes a series of snake-like efforts to move heavy vehicles, and lots of vehicles, through the downtown core. And the traffic plan that had been set up had to be in real time rearranged. All of that chaos, yes, in all of that, we started to see significant levels of by-law, Provincial Offences Act violations. Not to mention those who were either walking, riding, or in any other conveyance, starting to do a wide array of social disorder, threatening and intimidating behaviour, physically and psychologically assaultive behaviour, and yes, hate related behaviour, and ultimately Criminal Code violations, all of which happened in near real time over the morning and early afternoon and throughout the remainder of the time of the events in the city.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if by the 29th it had become an unlawful demonstration, why was access not prevented into the downtown core by the second weekend, the 5th of February, when additional convoys came and joined? By then, surely, you would have the authority ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
You’ve touched on one of my frustrations.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Was not my intention.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That is why there’s clear documentation of me saying, “Are we ready to go? Have we thought about all the things we need to do? Have we considered whether we’re going to be closing more roads, more highway offramps, more bridges, based on what we learned from last weekend and what we’ve seen in other jurisdictions.” And I was really kicking the tires hard on that. And that is why on the third weekend, I issued my only direct order at the operational level: close the interprovincial bridges and close the highways that give direct access to the downtown core. I rescinded that only when the then incident commander, sorry, event commander, Rob Bernier, articulated a substantially robust traffic management plan to address the circumstances that were happening at that time. And it turned out to be a very successful plan. But that remained a significant concern for me and for the organization. There were more roads closed on the second weekend. There were more effective coordination around the interprovincial bridges. There was more assistance from the OPP on monitoring traffic around the King’s Highways. But I really still had a lot of concerns.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. The downtown core was never hardened, so to speak?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In the fullest sense, meaning that we blocked off all of the access off ramps which I saw as a private citizen? No. To that level, that level of hardening did not exist in the three weekends that I was the Chief of Police.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I want to turn to OPS00005665. And this -- these are notes from a command briefing on February 1st. And I’ll take you to page 3. And I think you had testified today that by the 30th, you had recognized some elements of an occupation, as opposed to a demonstration. Is that right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, ma’am.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so it says, that first point: “If more demonstrators are expected back this weekend, early request for resources is required; decision on whether this is an occupation needs to be made by tomorrow; use experienced resources ie Rob Bernier and others - pull from sections” Why did there need to be a decision about how to kind of classify this kind of a demonstration, whether it was an occupation or not? What turned on that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I -- this is the first time I’m seeing the email. I don’t know the context of the meeting. Seems to be Kenny Bryden -- sorry, Insp. Bryden would be within the Intelligence Directorate. So I don’t know the nature of this.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Fair enough. And if we can go to the bottom of page 2? And trying to find my reference. Yeah, just at the bottom. The third line from the bottom. “PLTs have done an excellent job in preventing rioting and de-escalation by overall position in change needs to happen; looking more like an occupation than a negotiated end…” If we could just keep going? “…too many photos of police with protestors/trucks - Chief would like this addressed” Now this -- you also conveyed this sentiment to the Mayor and to the Councillors on the 31st, explaining that you didn’t think that this was okay, photos being taken between police officers and protestors. So I just wanted to ask, Inspector Lucas testified this week that this was part of de- escalation, that this was trust building. It seems like you might have had a different view, so I just wanted to ask about that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah. No, I'm not sure where you got the information that I said it was not a good thing, Counsel.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So I'll take you to OPS00005187, and this is notes of a meeting that you had with the mayor. So update from chief. And if we go to the bottom ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Whose notes are these?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Michael Anderson sent these to John Steinbachs. It's points of the meeting that happened on the 31st, update from mayor to chief, and then there's -- you give an update first and then it looks like the mayor has some things to say after.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So if we go to 7, if we go to page 7, and I believe there were councillors here at this meeting as well. So at 7(f), Councillor Menard says: "Curious on why certain behaviours are being allowed to continue. Not peaceful, need to move on from that language. Want services to be maintained and acts of hatred to be addressed. Residents should not feel intimidated. By law services should continue." And so (f) seems to be your answer. I had asked one of the witnesses who was answering these questions and I believe it was Mr. Kanellakos said that for the most part, you would answer these questions. And so the last line there, "Officers posing in images is unacceptable and are following up." Again ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- I can give you more context if you like. There's another notation, your last full day in office of February 14 when you also kind of addressed the same issue. And if it's helpful, I can take you to that, OPS00014566. And these are, I believe, your notes. And if we go to 1932 -- or sorry, 9:32 -- okay. So Chief's Morning Brief. If you look at the first point, Media Report 2XJTF2. Do you know what that reference is, what that is?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Sorry, Task Force Officers.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. "Were supporting the demo here in Ottawa, supporting the command and control of it, now being investigated internally. Pat Morris last night --- " I assume this means indicated; he was not indicted, correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not that I'm aware of.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. "Pat Morris last night indicated we might have a significant issue with police members being involved in demos." So I just wanted to ask about concept in general.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
How did -- the public was seeing this; the public was pushing back a little bit. And so what is your view on that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you. The language used around the officers posing in photos are problematic to me. If I was not clear in my language, I'll accept that. I accept and adopt the views as relayed by Inspector Lucas. Officers will often have to do a fist bump or lean in for a selfie just to try to keep the temperature down in circumstances they're in. That is just the reality of almost any circumstance, any day, not even requiring something of this level, just in order to try to build rapport in a minute so to keep things at the right level or de-escalate things that could be escalating. And I'll always defer to an officer on that. In the broader sense, I could understand -- and maybe that’s where my comments were attributed -- in the broader sense, these photos that are being -- going viral on social media without proper context, would be extremely problematic and were extremely problematic. They were used extensively in the social media disinformation and misinformation campaigns, and unfortunately, crept into some of the mainstream media reporting as well. I think it's more in that context that I would be talking about it as opposed to every single officer I saw in a photograph doing a fist bump or a thumbs up was unacceptable. That’s never been my experience, and I would have done the same things and had done the same things throughout my policing career, and wouldn't expect to be sanctioned by a superior officer if they took the time to find out as to why I was doing it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And do you think this might have contributed to the erosion of the residents' trust in the OPS?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There's no doubt that the photographs of officers -- sometimes they weren’t even officers in the Ottawa theatre that were being passed around on social media saying, "Look what's happening in Ottawa." So there was just a lot of that going on, and I can understand why the public, without the context that we're sharing here now, would just look at that and say, "Oh, that’s sympathy from the officers to the movement or various movements represented."
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I want to talk now about the role of the Board. How would you describe the Board's oversight function? What is the scope of their oversight?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Primarily to set the strategic direction of the police of jurisdiction, ensure that the police of jurisdiction has adequate resources to develop, to deliver adequate and effective services, and to hire and manage the chief of police and the two deputy chief positions, or in our case, two deputy chiefs.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And what's your understanding of the Board's role in a major event?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In the same respect, they have an oversight body. Does it align to strategic purposes? Are there any policies that come into play? Are there adequate resources? What is the performance of chief and command, and through them, the performance of the organization?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And do they have a role ongoing throughout the duration of a major event?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They have the same role ongoing every single day, regardless of whether there's a major event or not.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Can I take you to OPS00014484? And I'll take you to page 36. And I believe these are some of your notes. We've seen these before, notes about meetings that you've -- that you often make to yourself, and this one's dated February 5th. The subject line is "Call From Chair Deans". I understand here she's called you for a Board meeting and you say: "I advised that I was fully focused on the major demonstration and all other operational priorities. I can refuse a Board direction." I assume that means can't?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, very much so.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. "I can't refuse a Board direction for a meeting, but I stated that I would put my ability to lead the Service in this critical operation in jeopardy, and should be delayed until Monday." So was it fair to say that these meetings were distracting you from your operational responsibilities?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not distracting. I understand the need that the Board was trying to fulfill, but every minute, every hour, where one or all of the command and supporting personnel were not focused on managing the events was less resources that we could put to those events, less leadership that we could provide to support those who were leading those events. So it's -- there's only a finite amount of time in any day, and on some days, I spent three, four hours on Board meetings and had my two deputy chiefs there as well. I think in every occasion, we had the full command team there. So I understand. It's not a distraction, but it is a demand on time, and it's in that context of demand on time.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And from her testimony last week, we understand that the Board started asking for more information, more details of an operational plan to bring an end to the demonstration as of about February 5th. There was some more pressure to provide that information. Would you -- is that a fair assessment?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And I can take you to the meeting minutes of that Board meeting on February 5th, OPB00001264. And at page 5, paragraph 2: "Although the Board expressed frustration at the lack of clearly outlined plan that would result in the end of the demonstration, the Service noted having articulated a framework aimed at their surge and contain strategy." So what did you understand the Board to be requesting in terms of information at this time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just what they're asking for, a clearly-outlined plan that would result in the end of the demonstration.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And you were not able to provide that to the board?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not on February 5th, no.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And why was that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Because there was no way to end the demonstration with the resources we had at that time and we were in the process of pivoting the plan to put that in place.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So there wasn’t a fully formed plan ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s right.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- that you could take - --
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We’re still evolving that plan from the pre-planning piece. We’re still trying to gather the resources necessary to move from -- simply, at this point in February 5th, still just holding onto the red zone and not allowing anything else in there but not really able to do much more than that.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So this meeting did go in-camera, and I’m going to take you to the in-camera meeting minutes, OPB0001647. And so at page 2, the 4th paragraph -- sorry, if we can -- oh, sorry, yeah, at the bottom, the last -- the paragraph at the bottom: "The Chief reassured the Board that there was a comprehensive plan, however, he could not provide all the details of what the Service was doing operationally." So I just want to marry that with the concept that by February 5th, there was not actually a well kind of conceived fully formed plan but the board is being told there is a comprehensive plan. So I just want to give you a chance to reconcile that.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There’s not much reconciliation. I mean there’s a comprehensive plan. We’ve looked at the full range of issues from PLT to POU, enforcement, intelligence gathering, traffic. We are engaging in all sort of efforts to get resources into the organization. It’s comprehensive. It’s just not into the detailed levels of sub- plans and dates and times when operations will take place, assuming that there are resources available. So “comprehensive”, it covers the full range of what we need to have in a plan. Back in the details in order to be able to say, “A week from now, with these 1800 resources, we should have the ability to execute a POU plan in the morning of, and by the end of the evening, we should have cleared 75 percent of the red zone,” I couldn’t give them that.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right, but they’re asking for a plan that would result in the end of the demonstration and you’re saying, “Well, there’s a comprehensive plan. Don’t worry.”
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There’s a comprehensive framework. I don’t know if “plan” is the sense -- but that’s the reconciliation I can give you.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, Councillor Deans testified that she understood there was an evolving plan but she was asking for details about a plan to end the demonstration, which was not provided to her.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Because there was no -- at that point, there was no plan that we could say, “This will end the demonstration.”
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. So had there been that plan, or once that plan was developed, my understanding is the board never, never saw a plan, or even a high level, or even a summary of the plan. So even by the time it was developed, that was not provided to the board. So I just wanted to ask why that would be.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, I can’t speak to the final plan that was used in the week of -- after the 15th of February, so I don’t what was provided or not provided by then Interim Chief Bell.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Well, I’m asking about your time, not about ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, I ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- Interim Chief Bell.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
We never provided an operational plan in its totality in a bound document to the board. Let me be clear about one thing. The Ottawa Police Services Board provided a lot of support to the Service and to myself, our executive team on a range of issues, but there was a challenge around confidentiality on that board. There were clearly documented events where Service information, board information including in-camera discussions had been leaked by board members to the public. And so there was a concern prior to the arrival and the events of the convoy around the confidentiality -- the ability of the board to keep confidential information confidential.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And was -- how was that being addressed?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I had formal documentation and correspondence with then Chair Deans around those concerns and specifically pointing to those events. It was up to her to investigate and remediate whatever issues. I never got a final update from Chair Deans as to the outcome of those concerns.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But your obligation to provide the board the information they need in terms of to be able to exercise their oversight function, that’s irrespective of whatever internal issues the board may be dealing with on its own; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It is a factor that came into my consideration as to the level of detail that I could provide on intelligence, threat risk assessments, operational plan, or other operational details.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So is your evidence that the reason that more information on the operational plan was not provided to the board because you had confidentiality concerns about that board specifically?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My evidence is that is one of the factors I had to consider, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so what were the other factors?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That I was not going to be handing over an entire detailed operational plan to the board. It’s not a practice I’d ever seen done before. It’s not one that I’d be comfortable with. And from my knowledge of the Morden Report, not one that’s required.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. But a summary wasn’t provided either; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, we did provide summaries on a regular basis.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
In terms of, like, a document which provides a high-level summary?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
A document? No. In hours-long board meetings, we -- all dedicated to this, we were asked, repeatedly, questions and provided as much information as we possibly could. I can’t recall whether or not somebody provided a summary document. That, I can’t recall.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Well, Chair Deans testified that at times she did not have the information she needed in order to exercise her oversight function. Does that concern you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Not at -- well, it concerns me that she would characterize it that way. I had daily calls, sometimes twice and three times daily calls with Chair Deans. We offered the board, and they accepted, to do ride-alongs. I think four of the seven board members actually participated in ride-alongs that were by my Service Sergeant Major would actually put them in a police vehicle and drove them throughout the theatre in safe ways. They had hours with the Service Sergeant Major to ask any questions that they wanted. I had given explicit instructions to the Service Sergeant Major to answer those questions as fully and honestly as possible. So we went through a variety of means beyond public meetings to ensure that the board could literally see and be in the theatre, talk to frontline officers, have direct access to the chief of police on a regular basis, on a daily basis, including the formal board meetings. I can’t understand why Chair Deans would say that she did not have the ability to ask questions and receive information in a very timely manner.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. I’ll take you to OPS00011037, and these are again your notes. These are from February 11. And I’ll take you to page 6 of your notes. And if we got to 13:01, there, where it says: "Call back from Diane Deans, 13:01." And then it says: "Expectations for board meeting. Going to do like we did on Monday, minimum level. Cannot and won’t be drawn into what I cannot lawfully provide, i.e., staffing numbers, what the plans are. Need you to be clear and understanding about that." And if we keep going: "The response will be as much as we gave you on Monday. Cannot go into the confidential. Accusatory language in request for information that is unlawful for me to provide, you will not be provided. She is accusing us of not responding to crimes; we don’t respond to Twitter. She needs to report any threats. Was reported to Stephine Lemieux. Encourage the board to not ask questions which cannot be answered - operationally." So I want to ask you a few questions about that. It sounds like that was part of your exchange with Chair Deans on February 11. What did you mean by, “Going to do like we did on Monday, minimum level”? Is this -- are you referring to the amount of information that you’re going to give her?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m going to be consistent with what we’ve been doing all along. We’re not going to be changing and deviating from that.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So “minimum level”?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, I don’t know what that -- what that means. And I know these are my scribe note. We’re going to be consistent with what we did on Monday is the substantive theme that I’m trying to relay here.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And when you -- just to go up a little bit to the first part of that exchange. So when you say, “Cannot and won’t be drawn into what I cannot lawfully provide, i.e., staffing numbers, what the plans are,” you’re indicating there that the board is not entitled to those, right, staffing numbers and what the plans are?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Detailed plans, detailed staffing numbers, how many we’re going to have on this shift, that shift, in public meeting and documents, those are problematic questions.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why is that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
For all the reasons that have been explained before. We’re just -- it’s -- this was a unique event, that’s for sure, but the types of questions we were getting repeatedly, over and over and over again; “What is the plan to end this? Like, I’m looking out my window now. I can’t see a police officer out there.” Unfortunately, these were the types of questions that just couldn’t be answered and were taking up hours of our time, literally, at these meetings.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then you say, “Cannot go into the confidential.” In camera would have allowed you to go into the confidential.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t think I’m referring to in-camera there. I cannot go into the confidential elements of what we’re doing, I think is what I was trying to say. I would have said in camera.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But my question is; can’t you get into confidential matters in camera?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes, and I think at the previous meeting -- what’s the date of this?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
February 11th.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Right. At the previous meeting, I think I’d urged them at least three or four separate times in the February 5th meeting, “Let’s go in camera.”
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you are saying you can give confidential information as long as it’s in camera.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I can give more information in camera. I wasn’t, at that point, committing to give everything that I was being asked, but I certainly could give more information in camera.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And what did you mean -- what did you understand to be unlawful for you to provide in terms of information, and what made it unlawful?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Probably more loose language. I don’t know if it would have meant unlawful, but I certainly wouldn’t be giving -- there are unlawful information around human resources’ things, conduct information that wouldn’t necessarily be lawful for me to provide but I’m not sure what the actual reference there is.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
In your view, as you sit here today, is there any information that you lawfully cannot provide an oversight board?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I’m sure that there would be something that would allow for that to happen. I’m not sure I could give a member’s blood type or something like that, but -- there might be some limits on that, but I think in general, I can share the information with the organization.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Generally, the Board is entitled to any information ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- they need in order to ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
There may be some restrictions that I’m not an expert on privacy rights to be able to say that there’s health information that we would have in the records of the Ottawa Police Service, that relates to a member’s psychological assessment that I could hand in complete free form to the Board.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But I mean, the Board, as you know, takes an oath of confidentiality, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I know that.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And they have broken that at least on one occasion during my tenure. So that oath of confidentiality doesn’t mean that there aren’t problems with the Board’s ability to maintain its oath of confidentiality.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. And I guess what I’m saying is that whatever Board -- issues the Board may have does not alleviate your responsibility to provide information that the ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
--- Board needs, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
You’re right, but it does cause me to have to be very careful under the conditions that I do it, and this was a national security event.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So you would agree with me, then, that under the Police Services Act, there’s no restriction on the information that can be provided, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Subject to other Acts and legislation, I would agree with you.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Sure. And so right now, there’s nothing specifically that you can point me to to say it would be -- it’s unlawful for me to provide this type of information, right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Now, my understanding is that during these events the Board did not issue any formal directions to you, as it can sometimes do under the Police Services Act.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It did issue a direction to me to provide the staffing numbers on the February 5th meeting.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And that was a formal direction from the Board?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So aside from that, did the Board ever specifically direct you to provide more information, as a direction?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t recall now.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, had they specifically directed you to provide them with a copy of the plan once it was then formulated, that 3.0 that we hear about, would that have been provided to the Board?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
If it was a formal direction, I probably would have to get consultation with my general counsel, and then assuming that there was no prohibition, we probably would have provided what we could, and that would largely be a heavily redacted document.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Now, we’ve heard from some councillors that they were concerned about the ability of OPS to police other areas of the city was compromised during the convoy because all of the resources were concentrated in the downtown area. You’re aware of those concerns?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I want to take you to the Morden Report, COM00000616. And we’ve talked before about the Morden Report, and I know you’re very familiar with it. So we’ll go to page 37.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Just for clarity, I read it probably 12 years ago, but I am familiar.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And it’s the independent review into the events of the G20, for those who may not be familiar, and it’s often referred to as the Morden Report; it was authored in 2012. And if we go to Recommendation 22: “The Board should review the Toronto Police Service’s continuity of service [plan] for major policing events. Where there is a large event that may impact upon the...Service’s ability to deliver regular policing officers in [in this case] Toronto, the Board should consult wit the Chief of Police concerning how continuity of service can be achieved. The Board should be provided with any plans developed by the Toronto Police Service to aid in the consultation.” And so I wanted to ask whether the Board was ever -- our Board, the Ottawa Police Services Board, was ever provided with plans with respect to the continuity of service in areas outside of the downtown core?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They didn’t request any continuity plans, but we briefed them on our ability to maintain business across the rest of the -- police services across the rest of the municipality while we’re dealing with the incident Command as well.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So they didn’t receive any plans, but informal briefing explaining what the plan was, essentially?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. All right. I want to turn now to negotiations with the City and I think you’re aware, maybe you can explain whether you were aware, that on February 7th some protesters asked to meet with the City Manager in exchange for facilitating a move from the Rideau and Sussex intersection to Wellington. Were you aware of that at that time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I was not aware of it. I became aware of some level of PLT-related negotiations happening around that location. That came up through Supt. Patterson and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson at a briefing.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So my understanding is that meeting between a City Manager and the protester in question was Mr. Marazzo, took place on February 8th, but then the move from Rideau and Sussex to Wellington never happened. And according to Supt. Drummond, who was here on Wednesday, he said that the move had not been approved, and I said, “By whom?” and he indicated that it had not been approved by Supt. Patterson or by yourself as well. So I just want to understand why that move would not have been approved.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That’s a Supt. Patterson decision. I gave no decision on that.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And earlier than the 8th, my understanding is there was also a potential move from the Rideau and Sussex, again to Wellington, that had been negotiated by PLT after the January -- the first weekend, so it would have been around the Monday after that first weekend, the 31st. There was a PLT-negotiated potential move from Rideau and Sussex to Wellington at that earlier time. And according to Insp. Lucas, he said that that had been negotiated, but that the direction came from you to prevent that move from happening. So I wanted to ask about your ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I gave no directions in regards to PLT actions.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And were you generally aware that the Parliamentary Protective Service had concerns about moving more trucks onto Wellington after that first weekend?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
My recollection of the first time hearing that directly was when -- I might get his rank wrong but Larry Brookson, who was the head of the Parliamentary Protection Services, raised that, I think on the weekend of the 13th, 14t, with me directly.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And when you first learned of negotiations between the City of Ottawa and protesters, I believe was around the 12th of February.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yeah.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And is it fair to say that you were generally receptive to the Mayor’s office negotiating with protesters to come up with some sort of negotiated solution?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
On one -- well, one, maybe two singular -- two caveats; it cannot direct policing operations, and it cannot run counter to the operational plan that was under the control of the Incident Command.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So on February 12th, my understanding is you received a call from Steve Kanellakos advising you that over the last 24 hours there had been some discussions, and then you had a meeting after that with Deputy Chief Bell and Ms. Haneault to inform them of that call. And my understanding is that Mr. Kanellakos had indicated to you that these discussions were confidential because they were ongoing, they hadn’t been finalized yet. And my understanding is that in a subsequent meeting with Deputy Chief Bell and Ms. Huneault, you asked Deputy Chief Bell to also keep that information confidential; right? Did you see any -- did you have any concerns about having to tell him to keep it confidential? Were there any -- do you see any issues with that? The fact that you asked him to not share that with anybody else?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
In hindsight, yes. At the time, I thought it was reasonable.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And you thought it was reasonably why?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
They were just negotiations that were ongoing. There hadn’t been a final outcome, and at this point, it didn’t have any major impact on our operations -- any impact on our operations.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And since then, your view, you’re saying, has changed. So what’s your view of that now?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Probably be one of those areas I would have wanted to share down one more level into the -- at least to the event commander.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Who would have been Supt. Bernier at the time; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
The date, sorry, again? February?
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Twelfth (12th).
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And so with that caveat that you gave us before about wanting to make sure that these negotiations fit within the overall plan, informing Supt. Bernier on the 12th, or the earliest that you learned about it, would have facilitated ensuring that those negotiations meshed or fit in to the overall plan; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No. It would have given him situational awareness, but I would have told him, you keep working on your plan, because this thing may fall apart. We didn’t have the time or the effort to be putting a lot of resources into planning for something that hadn’t been negotiated and might never happen anyway. So I would have given him for situational awareness, but not to give him more work to be done around it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But for example, he could have contacted the Mayor’s office and put some parameters around the negotiations or ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, because -- sorry. I shouldn’t interrupt you. I apologize.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
No, go ahead.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Please finish your question, because I want to make sure I answer properly.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
That was the question.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I would not have wanted anybody in my organization to then get involved directly in the negotiation with -- between the City, and I believe it’s Mr. French, and the convoy organizers. I didn’t want the Ottawa Police Service to be directly involved in that negotiation.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Why is that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It was a political negotiation.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
But again, if it’s being done separately from the OPS’ plans, there’s the potential of conflict; isn’t there?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
And if there was, I would have defaulted to the OPS plans.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Right. But if something is negotiated with OPS input, can OPS then prevent it from moving forward?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
That was the condition I gave to Steve Kanellakos when he had called me.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you wanted to ensure then that the City’s negotiations was completely independent from the OPS’ plan?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Despite the fact that this was a police-led operation and the police was the lead agency in the response?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then the February 13th, that morning, you got a call from Steve Kanellakos confirming that there had been an agreement reached, letters would be exchanged, et cetera; right? I believe then at noon, there was a meeting with city officials called by Steve Kanellakos, and the people who were on that call were Steve Kanellakos, yourself, Deputy Chief Bell, and Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, and a subsequent meeting then took place to inform a broader group of your team; right? Now, I understand that day, shortly after 1:00 p.m., you called OPP Commissioner Carrique to update him on the negotiations with the City; right?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So he knew, as of February 13th, at around 1:00 p.m.?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I believe that’s the timing, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
On that call, did he express any concerns to you?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I actually don’t have an independent recollection.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
But I don’t recall anything being substantively discussed.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And Drummond testified, Supt. Drummond, rather, testified that at that subsequent meeting with the broader team was the first time that he learned about those negotiations and he said everybody on the call was cautiously optimistic. Is that -- does that accord with your ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
With my general recollection, yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then after that meeting, you called RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki, and she said she was aware of the negotiations. Did she express any concerns to you at that time?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t recall any. Again, sorry, I don’t have my notes and I don’t have a clear independent recollection.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And my understanding is significant resources were required to carry out OPS’ assistance to implementing that deal?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t know. I just wouldn’t know the level of lift, but I suspect it would be. We didn’t have a lot of resources to spare, so any amount of resources could be considered significant.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And so if I take you now to just the next day, which is February 14, I’m going to take you to OPS00014566. And these are your notes, again. And I’ll take you to page 8. And at 1631 -- so just to give you some context, the trucks started moving at 1:00 p.m. on this day. It was decided that that evening, on the 13th, the night before, Supt. Drummond went and coordinated kind of the details, and the following morning, it was to start -- it didn’t start until 1:00 p.m. And this is now at 4:30 p.m. that same day. So trucks have been moving for the last three hours, give or take. So you have a Teams call with Brookson. So maybe you can explain who Brookson is?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It’s Larry Brookson, who was leading the Parliamentary Protection Services. And I apologize, I don’t know his -- I can’t remember his rank or his title.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yes. And I’m not sure either, so we can go with Mr. Brookson.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Okay.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
He said: “…trying to get understand the meeting to completely fill up Welling St.” And then you say: “Chief briefed his team. Understood that the intersect team would then brief everyone including PPS” So is it fair to say that you had reached out to the OPP Commissioner and to the RCMP Commissioner, but you didn’t reach out to PPS and he’s essentially calling you out on it and saying, “Why didn’t you let me know?” Is that essentially what’s happening here?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, that’s not how I took it.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So maybe just explain that discussion?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
He’s concerned about not being aware of it, which I can appreciate fully. But I’m explaining that the Major Incident Commander and Event Commander would be able to brief all of our partners in the NCRR and everybody who is contributing at that point, an integrated operation about what was taking place that day, and that my understanding was PPS was part of that Intersect team and would have received that briefing. I didn’t get the impression that Larry Brookson was calling me out, or the Ottawa Police Service out.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we just go down, there’s more to the discussion. So again, these are point form notes. It’s hard to really get a good sense for what’s being kind of conveyed here, but maybe you can review those point form notes and give us a better sense of what transpired in that discussion? And specifically, I want to understand the references to: “…does city usually direct police on how this goes”
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don’t what that reference is. I looked at that myself. I don’t know -- it obviously would be from Brookson, sorry, Larry Brookson, ---
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
--- Mr. Brookson.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Yeah.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
But again, it’s hard to -- like you said, it’s back and forth sort of almost real time attempt to get the full conversation.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And then the note: “For an administrator to reach-out on their own and then permit the vechils [sic] to sardine in on Wellington st. [sic] This was purely political” What was the discussion around that point?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I mean, I remember Mr. Brookson expressing his concern around the politics, and as I’ve said, there was a lot of politics going on all around this at so many levels. But I don’t know who he’s referring to as “an administrator”.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I just want to confirm that by this time, certainly he’s telling you that trucks have moved on to Wellington. So you knew by this time; correct?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I understood by this time. I still, to this day, have some confusion as to that portion of things, but clearly by this time, I would have known that trucks were on Wellington Street.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And your witness statement says you didn’t know, but I think we can agree that you did know. This is probably ---
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Yes.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And then my understanding is at 1701, so you have this discussion with him, you’re not able to give me too much more than what’s there, it sounds like, based on your recollection. If we could go to page -- is this still page 9? Yeah, 1701. So it looks like there’s a demo briefing call at 5:01. On the second bullet we see "Trish", that's Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson: "...[l]ots of Convo with Carson at NOK, PPS not happy with trucks on Wellington." And at the bottom it says, "Had to pivot due to new". Do you have any sense -- it seems to be some words missing at the end of that. Do you have any sense for what that's referring to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, I don't. Sorry.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. And if we go to page 10, the bullet before the redaction, "We need" -- or -- right, the last -- the first redacted portion, the bullet before: "We need some significant legal advice regarding the Mayor's position that they can be on Wellington." Can you just explain what that refers to?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know. I apologise.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. Are you able to give us any insight into what was the issue that was concerning?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
It seems to be all a discussion around the relative sequence -- the sequence of events that took place throughout the day, the relative efficacy of it, challenges experienced, logistical staffing, there is PLTs referenced there. So it's a general discussion that seems to be going on. I'm not sure who's leading and who is making what points.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So this is the day before you resigned at 5:00 p.m. So I don't know if that helps to situate you in the timeline of events and if you have a recollection of this meeting. It would've been one of your final meetings.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
No, it's just another busy briefing on a very difficult period of time.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
And we know that after this meeting, certainly by nightfall on that day, no more trucks were relocated onto Wellington, and that kind of ended the facilitation of trucks onto Wellington. Do you have any sense for why -- what was the reason behind OPS no longer supporting the movement of trucks onto Wellington?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't. I mean, I've -- subsequent through disclosure I've seen things, so I don't know if that makes my opinion valid at this point, but I understand - - my understanding is, without getting into any more detail than that, is that the Event Commander made a decision to discontinue the Operations. And the only thing I can say to that is that would be entirely within his purview. That was the caveat I gave to City Manager Kanellakos. I said "If at any point that the Operations around the negotiation cross purposes with the Operational Plan" that we would default to our Operational Plan.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So you can't tell us why.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I don't know.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Okay. So just quickly, last time we spoke in our interview, I asked you about kind of lessons learned. We talked a little bit about that today. You spoke with Mr. Au about that. And I asked you if in your kind of reflection since these events you had thought about anything you could have done differently as Chief of Police. And at that time, you mentioned, you know, clarifying your comment about there may not be a policing solution, which I understand you've done that now, but nothing really else came to mind. And so I wanted to ask now, having had the benefit of hearing your former colleagues, going through documents in preparation for your evidence today, whether there is anything else that you would add to that?
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Around recommendations going forward or lessons learned in...
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Reflections on what you may have done differently or what you would do differently next time if you were in the same position, what could you have done differently as Chief of Police.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I did provide some list of recommendations for the Commission to consider in my statement. I'll trust that that will be followed up as the Commissioner determines. I was about to say we have a Board liaison person because we talked about the Board quite a bit, but John Steinbach was the designated Board liaison person at that position before I even arrived as Chief. I'm just thinking through sort of top-down from Board relationship. Intersect was there. There was a recommendation around funding and investing in Intersect to create more -- deconflict some of the problems we've learned. I -- honestly, the list of recommendations that I've provided are the substantive reviews of what needed to be in a better level to address some of the structural deficits that I've talked about. And I've tried to provide both national, well, national, provincial in terms of Police Act legislation, and local in terms of the unique aspects of the NCR region within my recommendations. I can't think of anything else at this point.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
So I understand kind of at a systemic level, but I'm asking more on a personal level, something you could have done differently as Chief of Police. And if nothing comes to mind that's fine, that's the answer, but I wanted to give you that opportunity.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think the broadest statement around understanding how to be able to be even more resilient during that level of time. I think there's a whole new level of science around sleep and wellness that probably executive leaders who face these types of sustained levels of crisis and pressure just need to understand how to develop a level of physical and emotional and psychological resilience to get through these things. How do you -- I mean, we talk about wellness for frontline officers and building resilience there. It's -- and I think that would be probably just a personal lesson learned, there just never is enough sleep. I suspect people on this Commission are sleep deprived as well, and not optimal in terms of what they're doing. So I mean, it's just a human condition.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
I don't know what you're talking about.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Well, I know for my legal team, and I'm looking at sleepy eyes all around me. So -- I mean, I said it. I think it came up in a comment earlier on when I was talking to Chair Deans, like, we're just human beings, and none of us are supermen or superwomen, and this was a super difficult situation. And mistakes were made, moments were lost, relationships were strained, meetings didn't go the way they were intended to, language was not precise enough, assumptions were made, rumours were passed around. Just -- it's just a human condition. Systems are built by human beings, policies are designed by human beings, institutions are just human institutions. And I said it before on the Standing Committee, someone asked "Did the Ottawa Police Service fail?" Canada was exposed in these events, our institutions were exposed, our systems were exposed, and our leaders were exposed, and our frontline members were exposed. Probably worst overall our communities were exposed. We just got to get it better the next time. I'm fully committed to doing that, that's why I'm here.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you. And you mentioned your recommendations to the Commission. I understand you have spoken to some of those. But I wanted to give the opportunity to highlight some of the other ones that perhaps we haven't had a chance to get to, if that's something you would like to do.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
I think I'll leave it with the Commission to see those areas, and I'll make myself available, Commissioner, to you, and your team at any point to expand on that. I think each one of my recommendations could probably fill another 20 pages or so, but I just think for the time here I'll leave it there and make myself available to you.
Natalia Rodriguez, Senior Counsel (POEC)
Thank you very much. Those are my questions for you.
Peter Sloly, former Chief (Ott-OPS)
Thank you.
Paul Rouleau, Commissioner (POEC)
Okay. Well, we're finishing a little early. I'm not sure if we want to start cross-examination, but I promised we wouldn't, so I'm going to adjourn. I just want to raise, if there are any concerns, of course as was mentioned, this has been a very tight schedule, a very -- a lot of documents, a lot of movement, everybody in my view has cooperated very well. But if there's anything that is of concern to the Commission, please don't hesitate to raise it, either with Commission Counsel or directly with me. Because ultimately, I think we know it's been stressful, but I think we're doing a not bad job. Certainly the -- I'm very impressed with everyone's work so far. So thank you, and have a great weekend.
The Registrar (POEC)
The Commission is adjourned. La Commission est ajournée.
Upon adjourning at 6:07 p.m. Ottawa, Ontario