Frank Au

Frank Au spoke 2101 times across 8 days of testimony.

  1. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We do.

    06-007-08

  2. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Commissioner.

    06-007-10

  3. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission. Our next witness is Deputy Chief Ferguson.

    06-007-12

  4. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Deputy Chief.

    06-008-04

  5. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Acting Deputy Chief. We met in the summer when you attended an interview with the Commission.

    06-008-07

  6. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And after that interview, we prepared a summary for you to review?

    06-008-11

  7. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I understand that you've adopted the contents of that summary?

    06-008-14

  8. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is there any corrections that you'd like to make to that summary?

    06-008-18

  9. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Commissioner, will that be the evidence, then?

    06-008-21

  10. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I'll just call you Deputy Chief for short.

    06-008-24

  11. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh the -- yes. It's WTS00000 -- sorry, WTS00000023. Now, Deputy Chief, during the Freedom Convoy protests back in January and February, you were the executive responsible for Community Policing.

    06-008-28

  12. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in that role, you supervised the Specialized Policing Directorate.

    06-009-07

  13. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that directorate includes the Special Events Unit, which was responsible for planning before the arrival of the convoy.

    06-009-11

  14. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just to get a sense of the top executive level at the Ottawa Police Service, at the time at the top there was the former Chief Sloly?

    06-009-16

  15. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then he was assisted by two Deputy Chiefs.

    06-009-20

  16. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you were one of those?

    06-009-24

  17. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the other -- who was the other Deputy Chief?

    06-009-26

  18. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he's now the Interim Chief of the Ottawa Police Service.

    06-010-02

  19. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What portfolio was he responsible for back in January last -- well, last winter?

    06-010-06

  20. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So whereas you had strategic oversight over planning as part of the Community Policing, Deputy Chief had strategic oversight over Intelligence?

    06-010-11

  21. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you've told us during our interview that you first learned about the Freedom Convoy, the fact that they were travelling to Ottawa, at -- during the week of January 17th; is that right?

    06-010-16

  22. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And yesterday, the Commission heard evidence that the OPP started sharing Intelligence reports related to the Freedom Convoy with the OPS as early as January 13th.

    06-010-22

  23. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to explore with you the extent to which that intelligence was shared within the OPS.

    06-010-28

  24. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when did you first learn about those Hendon reports?

    06-011-11

  25. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    06-011-16

  26. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can I call up document Number OPS00014479? If we go to page 26. Now, Deputy Chief, so this is your notes. There's some reference, I believe, to February the 1st. So during the interview we had in the summer, I believe you said that the first time you learned about Project Hendon was after the arrival of the convoy. Do you recall that?

    06-011-20

  27. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And if you received the report as of the 27th, what did you do with it since you first learned about it?

    06-012-06

  28. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you had your team started planning for Project -- started planning for the arrival of the convoy sometime before the 27th. Do you know the extent to which they were privy to those Intelligence information?

    06-012-13

  29. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the usual process for the OPS in planning for a major event, like these convoy protests. What's the expectations in terms of information- sharing as between the Intelligence Unit and the Planning Unit?

    06-012-25

  30. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, yesterday we heard from Superintendent Morris that the intelligence that was available strongly suggested a long-term event, meaning weeks, not days or a weekend. Did your planning team take that into account?

    06-013-23

  31. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, were there not signs that this protest was going to be different in the days or weeks leading up to the arrival?

    06-014-10

  32. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let’s take a look at some of the documents that we know were available to your team. First of all, the initial plan that was developed by the OPS, that was written by Staff Sergeant Kevin Kennedy; right?

    06-014-27

  33. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And it was then approved by Inspector Lucas?

    06-015-05

  34. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And they both reported to you; right?

    06-015-09

  35. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. They reported to you through Superintendent ---

    06-015-13

  36. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we could call up, please, OPS00002878. So Deputy Chief, I’m showing you an email from Sergeant Sean Kay to Staff Sergeant Kennedy dated January the 21st. It was forwarded to you at the top, as you can see. We go down to the -- to the -- to page 4. At the top of page 4. You see that -- it’s written there that, “The goal of the convoy is to remain in Ottawa until the restrictions are repealed.” Right?

    06-015-16

  37. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And there’s no expectation at the time that those restrictions would be repealed any time soon.

    06-015-26

  38. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So didn’t that suggest to your team that it was going to be a long-term event, not a weekend event?

    06-016-01

  39. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Let’s call up another document, OPS00002932. I expect this will be an email dated January the 24th from Sergeant Louis Carvalho, and it was forwarded to you. If we go to page 1 near the bottom. Sorry. Page 1. Maybe we go up. I’m looking for the reference where it says different groups now getting on board. (SHORT PAUSE)

    06-016-09

  40. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you see the cursor here, “Different groups now getting on board such as the farmers and right wing extremists calling for major disruptions.”

    06-016-18

  41. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what does that suggest to you?

    06-016-23

  42. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, the Commission heard evidence last Friday from a businesswoman, a Ms. Carrier. She’s a layperson and she said it was clear to her that the trucks wouldn’t be travelling all this way to Ottawa from the west to stay a day for a short protest. It was obvious to her. She didn’t have access to any police intelligence. Why wouldn’t it be obvious to someone who’s trained to analyze this kind of events?

    06-017-08

  43. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, in addition to the Hendon reports, there were also other sources of information being provided to the City and to the OPS corroborating those intelligence reports such as the email from the Hotel Association suggesting that people were booking somewhere upwards of 30 days to stay in the hotels, lots of people doing that. Why wouldn’t that strongly suggest an event beyond the weekend?

    06-018-04

  44. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, the trucks started to arrive on Friday, the 28th; right? And you gave a media briefing on that day at 11:00 a.m., so let’s go to OPS00003851. So you see, Deputy Chief, that these are your speaking notes.

    06-018-25

  45. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go down a little bit, you said: “Over the last few days our team has been finalizing operational plans in anticipation of the demonstrations. Planning has involved coordination with our policing and intelligence partners at all levels of government and the Ottawa Police would like to thank them [and so on]. Information gathered continues to indicate this will be a large and significant event that is expected to last through the weekend.” There’s no mention that there was any expectation it would go beyond the weekend.

    06-019-04

  46. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why was that?

    06-019-22

  47. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Wouldn’t it have been helpful to notify the public, the business owners and the residents that, at the very least, there was a strong possibility of the event going beyond the weekend?

    06-019-27

  48. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you agree that the planning was premised entirely on the assumption that this was going to be a two-day event; right?

    06-020-05

  49. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now when you spoke to us in August, you mentioned that the OPS had standard plans that it used for parades and other major events like Canada Day; right?

    06-021-23

  50. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now the initial plan for the Freedom Convoy, and by the way, the document number is OPP00004262. We don't need to call it up right now but just for the record, that's the plan I'm referring to, the January 28th, 29th plan. Do you agree that that initial plan was largely a boiler plate plan that followed the standard template?

    06-021-27

  51. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And according to this initial plan, the convoy, convoy vehicles would enter downtown Ottawa and the plan was to stack those vehicles along Wellington between Kent and Elgin; am I right?

    06-022-08

  52. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    06-022-14

  53. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now as this plan then, this graphic component, was it premised on this being a two-day event?

    06-022-17

  54. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so here's something perhaps you can help me understand, because we heard from Councillor McHale on Friday that even for an event like Canada Day, there would be road closures in the downtown core and barriers set up to control the mass of vehicles that might otherwise cause a problem. So why wasn't this done here?

    06-022-22

  55. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was any consideration given to, for example, taking the trucks somewhere beyond downtown and have transportation arranged so that people could protest downtown, so the people could be there?

    06-023-14

  56. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But my -- I guess the intent of my question was to move all of the trucks away from the downtown, not just some of them.

    06-023-24

  57. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now in hindsight, what would you have done differently in this planning phase?

    06-024-11

  58. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. All right. Now so far we've been talking about the OPS planning before the convoy's arrival and we're going to turn now to the OPS response after they've arrived.

    06-024-17

  59. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But before I do that, I want to ask you some basic questions about what's known as the Incident Command System.

    06-024-22

  60. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now I understand that in responding to incidents including protests and demonstrations that police sometimes use a model called Incident Command System.

    06-024-26

  61. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And within the system, the role you played back in January and February was the role of a strategic commander; correct?

    06-025-04

  62. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now there are three different levels to the command.

    06-025-09

  63. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Strategic, operational and tactic.

    06-025-12

  64. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What does the strategic command do?

    06-025-14

  65. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, before we get to the next level ---

    06-025-25

  66. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- we're going to talk about the operational; right? So before we leave the strategic, so just to clarify, you'd be setting the strategic objective, and would you be also responsible for appointing the operational commander?

    06-025-28

  67. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So once the objective is set and you've appointed an operational commander, is there some expectation that you'll give autonomy to the operational commander?

    06-026-06

  68. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And why is that important?

    06-026-12

  69. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And would it also be the role of the strategic commander to ensure that the operational commander had the requisite resources to see to the end of the situation?

    06-026-21

  70. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now let's talk about the operational commander, the next level down. What does that involve?

    06-026-26

  71. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So is it the responsibility of the operational commander to develop a suitable plan to address the incident?

    06-027-10

  72. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And depending on the severity of the incident, perhaps the operational commander is sometimes called an incident commander, sometimes a critical incident commander, and I guess with the OPS they’re also the event commander; right?

    06-027-16

  73. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And your role as the strategic commander is also known as the major incident commander?

    06-027-22

  74. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, you mentioned that the operational commander may get other people to help them?

    06-027-26

  75. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would these be, like, subject matter experts in specialized policing areas?

    06-028-02

  76. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And some of these specialized areas that I suspect we’ll hear about include the Public Order Unit?

    06-028-10

  77. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the Police Liaison Team?

    06-028-15

  78. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let’s talk about the next - - actually, before we leave this, we’re going to be hearing from Insp. Lucas and Supt. Bernier next week. Would they be operational commanders?

    06-028-17

  79. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And they would both be at the Operational Command level; right?

    06-028-24

  80. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    06-029-03

  81. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So they would both be reporting to you back in January/February?

    06-029-05

  82. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So finally, the tactical level, what does that involve?

    06-029-09

  83. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would it be fair to say that the tactical level of command is responsible for executing the plan that is developed by the Operational Commander?

    06-029-24

  84. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let’s talk about the two specialized units that I put to you before. The PLT or Police Liaison Unit. What are they?

    06-030-01

  85. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if disruptive behaviours occur during an event, would it be the role of the PLT to engage in order to try to de-escalate the situation?

    06-031-03

  86. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the Public Order Unit, or POU?

    06-031-08

  87. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So in responding to the freedom convoy after they’ve arrived, was this the model that the OPS used to address the incident?

    06-031-25

  88. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So with that background, let’s start talking about how the OPS responded to the freedom convoy. And now we know that they arrived the weekend of the 28th and they -- and the incident was not resolved until those three and a half weeks later.

    06-032-09

  89. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let’s break down the time period and let’s talk first about the first week after they arrived. So let’s say from January 28th, to -- which is a Friday, to February the 4th; okay?

    06-032-15

  90. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now during that period? Well, first, tell us what happened on the first weekend?

    06-032-20

  91. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, during that first weekend, when did you first realize that this may last longer than a weekend?

    06-033-24

  92. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me take you to a document dated the 31st, which would be the Monday; OPS00004976. This will be an email from Robin Millbank. Who’s Robin?

    06-034-12

  93. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. I expect this email will -- is a kind of minutes for an executive briefing at 8:00 a.m.; is that correct?

    06-034-18

  94. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So if you take a look at the second bullet, you see a reference to: “Staffing is #1 risk; priority is working on plan;” Can you explain what that refers to?

    06-034-24

  95. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry; why was staffing the number one risk?

    06-035-02

  96. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. Did staffing become the number one risk overnight because there was no contingency plan within the initial plan?

    06-036-12

  97. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So to the extent there was any contingency planning, it only covered up to, perhaps, Monday at noon.

    06-036-23

  98. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, that bullet also talks about, “priority is working on plan,” so I assume this refers to some kind of a new plan?

    06-036-28

  99. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what’s the vision, now, for the new plan? What was that going to look like?

    06-037-08

  100. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. If we go -- scroll down a little bit. Go down. Okay. Do you see the bullet, the third bullet from the bottom it says: “No longer a protest but an occupation now; need to move away from operational plan and reset - new plan needed to go forward;...” Now, whose view was it that this is no longer a protest, but an occupation?

    06-037-15

  101. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what makes it an occupation as opposed to a protest?

    06-037-27

  102. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, at around this time, Supt. Abrams of the OPP was also in Ottawa. He’ll actually be testifying this afternoon after you, and we expect that he may say that the OPS was struggling to develop a new plan; that Chief Sloly would give inconsistent direction and there was much confusion. What’s your perspective on this?

    06-038-10

  103. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So who was the Event Commander, the Operational Level Commander at this time?

    06-038-27

  104. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in terms of developing a plan to resolve the incident, would it be on Supt. Rheaume; would that be his job to develop a plan?

    06-039-04

  105. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What would have been your role at that time?

    06-039-09

  106. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why, then, would the former Chief be giving directions?

    06-039-15

  107. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. So let’s take a look at what happened a few days later, on the 4th of February. Can we call up OPS00014454, please? And I want to go to page 52. So Deputy Chief, this is -- these are scribed notes or minutes taken at meetings that involve former Chief Sloly. So I want to scroll down to the part where it says, “Last Friday”; it’s page 52. So Deputy Chief, you see: “Last Friday’s operational plan is not valid. If so, then we need to update it.” Now, help me understand here because as of the 31st, there was a recognition that you needed a new plan, but here we are on February the 4th, three days later, and we’re still talking about last Friday’s plan not being valid. Was there no new plan yet by the 4th?

    06-039-22

  108. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    These are scribe ---

    06-040-19

  109. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    06-040-22

  110. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we go back in time to the day before, February the 3rd. And I want to show you the document, OPS00014484. So this looks like an email that the former Chief sent to himself with respect to a meeting that he had with you and Deputy Chief Bell. So if we go down to page 3. Go down. Keep going. Keep going. Okay. Do you see the part where he says: "I advised that I cannot approve a recommended course of action without being briefed on all other reasonable courses of action..." So the context was a discussion of POU plans. What's your recollection as to the Chief, the former Chief's role in terms of approving actions?

    06-040-26

  111. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, are these not operational or tactical decisions involving the POU?

    06-041-18

  112. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But at that time, it was -- it's your understanding that he was directing decisions at this level of command?

    06-041-21

  113. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you feel any need to intervene and perhaps speak up and say, "Hey, we have the Incident Command model here to run. Each one has their role within the model." Did you do anything like that?

    06-041-26

  114. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So as of February the 4th, there was no plan. Let's move to the next week, roughly from February the 5th, which was a Friday, to February the 10th, which was a Thursday. Can we have the document OPS00007355, please? So this is an email from the former Chief to you, Deputy Chief, and I'll give you a moment to look at it. Can we slowly scroll down? So this seems to be about a meeting that he was having with the Command Team at 8:00 a.m., and he set out some priorities. So for example, here, you see three general priorities listed, "surge, contain and enforce"; the second being, well, "close everything", in brackets: "...(roads, bridges, highway off ramps...) as early and as long as possible." The third priority being to shut down -- well, shut down a number of things: Shut down the funds, the fundraising; shut down the fuel; shut down the fun, the bouncy castles and so on. So these are the general priorities, and then some specific priorities with respect to locations are set out, and we see four here. There's a Confederation Park being one; the Rideau, we've heard some evidence about the Rideau/Sussex intersection, I assume that's what this is referring to.

    06-042-15

  115. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Wellington. Is that the Wellington?

    06-043-13

  116. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And then SJAM, is Sir John A. MacDonald ---

    06-043-16

  117. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- right?

    06-043-20

  118. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall the substance of this meeting?

    06-043-22

  119. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, was this an outline for a new Operation Plan?

    06-043-26

  120. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So who set these priorities?

    06-044-02

  121. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it is not the Operational Commander setting these priorities or developing a plan?

    06-044-05

  122. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was this outline developed into a fully operational plan?

    06-044-09

  123. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, we'll get to that.

    06-044-24

  124. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, sometimes these meetings, we have multiple accounts. So here, we see the former Chief's notes to himself, basically ---

    06-044-26

  125. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- but you also recorded this in this in your notes; right?

    06-045-02

  126. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to show you the document OPS144 ---

    06-045-06

  127. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Very good. I think it would still be helpful for everyone else so that we can look at the same document as the same time. I only, unfortunately, recorded the electronic record page number, but... So this is your notes, the document number being OPS14479. And I want to take you to page 43, which is the electronic record number.

    06-045-14

  128. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we see that you recorded the meeting starting at around 8:00 or 8:06. If we could scroll down a little bit. I'm looking for the part where it says "need to turn the corner." There we have. "Need to turn the corner..." Perhaps you can read it to us.

    06-045-22

  129. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay, let's stop there. So this is the Chief saying that the plan is excellent; right?

    06-046-08

  130. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you agree that it was an excellent plan?

    06-046-11

  131. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we expect to hear from Superintendent Bernier next week. As you've described, he was the Event Commander later on. I think he was appointed on or about February the 10th. And I expect that he may tell us that the OPS lacked an overall plan with all of the supporting components to end the protest when he took over the Operational command as of the 10th. Would you agree with that?

    06-046-15

  132. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We saw in the previous document, the February 5th email from the former Chief, that one of the priorities was to shut down fuel; right?

    06-046-24

  133. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to take you to what's been referred to in some of the evidence, the so-called "Coventry incident". Now, that happened on February the 6th; right?

    06-046-28

  134. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I guess things are happening according to the outline of the plan on the 5th to shut down fuel, and then on the 6th, we saw actions shutting down fuel. Tell us what happened on the 6th?

    06-047-05

  135. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So there was a switch.

    06-047-13

  136. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, maybe we should go back, because you mentioned that the first event commander was Superintendent Rheaume.

    06-047-16

  137. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how long did he serve in that role?

    06-047-21

  138. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why so short?

    06-047-25

  139. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when did Superintendent Dunlop take over?

    06-048-08

  140. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how long did he serve in that role?

    06-048-13

  141. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why so short?

    06-048-17

  142. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now you told us earlier that, according to the Incident Command model, it was -- it's supposed to be the strategic commander, who was you at the time, to appoint the operational commander. How did you feel about the Chief stepping in and essentially removing the operational commander that you chose?

    06-049-02

  143. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when did he step in?

    06-049-14

  144. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who chose him?

    06-049-17

  145. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So back to the Coventry incident.

    06-049-23

  146. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    February 6th, this is when Mark Patterson had assumed the role of the event commander. Tell us what happened on that day.

    06-049-26

  147. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now when you spoke of engagement by the PLT team earlier, are you referring only to the PLT team from the OPS?

    06-050-19

  148. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Specifically with respect to the Coventry location, what was the PLT team's objective at that time?

    06-050-28

  149. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    They were looking for small wins for everybody?

    06-051-10

  150. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And now you spoke earlier about this command triangle with the operational commander at the top of the triangle and then the two sides being the PLT or negotiation and the other one being the kind of enforcement action on. What is the -- like, how are those two sides in the bottom supposed to work together?

    06-051-13

  151. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So because you -- when you described the role of the PLT earlier, you talk about how they were the first point of contact. They were supposed to engage and deescalate and to show the protesters what the lawful limits are; right?

    06-052-04

  152. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So is the idea then that they will make contact and then see if, you know, it can be successfully deescalated before part actions is enforced?

    06-052-11

  153. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    06-052-24

  154. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how important was it then that the -- these two arms, the PLT and the POU kind of, that enforcement part, that they coordinate a coherent strategy in terms of the timing? Because you said you need to time it so that there's sufficient time for the protesters to cooperate; right?

    06-052-28

  155. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what happened in this case?

    06-053-08

  156. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just so we understand, when the enforcement action started, was the PLT team even notified that this was going to happen?

    06-053-23

  157. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So were they caught in surprise?

    06-053-28

  158. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As much as the protesters?

    06-054-03

  159. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when you spoke of a sense of betrayal, what do you mean? Is it ---

    06-054-05

  160. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, before this unfortunate incident happened, the PLT team actually had some success earlier that week, right, with the Confederation Park?

    06-054-25

  161. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the Confederation Park?

    06-055-02

  162. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the Confederation Park was one example where the surge, contain, and enforce proved unnecessary, because the PLT team did its work?

    06-055-27

  163. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I want to take you to -- back to your notes, which relates to the Coventry incident. So we’re back to OPS00014479. Page 55. So Deputy Chief, if you want to look at your hard copy, I’m taking you to the time around 17:18, so 5:18 p.m.

    06-056-04

  164. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, okay.

    06-056-12

  165. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well then we’re all on the same page.

    06-056-15

  166. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The same electronic page.

    06-056-18

  167. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So page 55. Now do you see: “Conversation w DC Bell re[garding] the operation @ Coventry road.” And then if we go down: “weighing all options…”

    06-056-21

  168. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “…including state of emergency. Advised we may lose OPP PLT if we do actions.”

    06-056-27

  169. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that’s what you were just describing to us?

    06-057-04

  170. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we go further down, page -- the next page, 56, please? I want to take you to the part that says: “PLT is pissed - OPP has left - set [up] back…” Could you read it to us? Is it “set up --”

    06-057-08

  171. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. “set us back days or a week on PLT”. What do you mean by that?

    06-057-18

  172. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The person who was very upset, who was that?

    06-057-24

  173. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what did you mean when you said Patterson was not there?

    06-058-01

  174. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    At the time when ---

    06-058-05

  175. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- when the enforcement action happened?

    06-058-08

  176. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Now, we’ve spoken to Insp. Lucas back in the summer and he said that the Coventry operation was an example of the OPS prioritizing a quick win on enforcement without an overall plan that integrated the role of the PLT in operational decisions. What’s your view on that?

    06-058-12

  177. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I want to ask you about the Former Chief Sloly’s attitude towards negotiating with protestors. I want to take you to the document -- I believe these are minutes of meetings involving him. So OPS00014479. Oh, it’s the same. At page 63. I want to take you to the part where he seems to have asked the question -- so he -- the question: “…why […] negotiate w unlawful protestors…” Do you see that?

    06-058-19

  178. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Okay. So sorry: “Chief has said he does not know why we would negotiate w unlawful protestors…”

    06-059-02

  179. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember this kind of sentiment being expressed by the former chief?

    06-059-06

  180. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What -- can you tell us more?

    06-059-09

  181. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But surely we can understand the pressure that the Chief was under.

    06-061-10

  182. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We heard from the residents last week that they were feeling abandoned, basically, by the police. They felt helpless and very frustrated. Is it fair to say, then, that within the OPS there was disagreement as to the most appropriate way to approach the situation and to resolve it?

    06-061-14

  183. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, thank you for that suggestion. I believe this is February 6th. But let's scroll up so we don't have to guess. Keep going up. Oh, February 8th. Okay. So now, on February 8th, the same day that -- as this meeting, a new development happened, and that's that arrival of the Integrated Planning Group, led by the OPP Chief Superintendent Pardy and the RCMP Superintendent Lew (ph); right?

    06-061-23

  184. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what that was all about.

    06-062-06

  185. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand that there was a meeting, the first meeting between the OPS and the Integrated Planning Group happened on the 8th ---

    06-063-03

  186. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at around 5:35 p.m.; right?

    06-063-07

  187. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You've referred -- you've told us about this Strategic Concept of Operations. Was that something that you came up with?

    06-063-09

  188. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    06-063-14

  189. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. I want to show you a one-page document and see if that's the document that you were referring to.

    06-063-18

  190. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    OPP00000774. Not OPS, OPP. Okay, can we go down? Oh, I see. Page 77, please. Is there a way for us to rotate the view? No? All right, then -- now, I wanted -- it may be a little challenging, but let's see if we can read the Mission Statement. So it's near the top: "The Ottawa Police Service, in a collaborative approach with other police agencies, federal, provincial and city partners..." Sorry, I'm missing the last word on...

    06-063-22

  191. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we try the rotation button on the top? I'm not sure it's doing it. Okay. So: "...federal, provincial and city partners, community organizations..."

    06-064-07

  192. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Of course.

    06-064-19

  193. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why don't we do that.

    06-064-22

  194. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you, Commissioner. So during the break, we managed to resolve the technical issue. The document that I read out the document number of previously was an OPP document, but there is a duplicate provided by the OPS, and the document number is OPS00008518. And so we're now showing the OPS version of the same document, and this one is easier to read.

    06-065-06

  195. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I could take you, Deputy Chief, to the Mission Statement. This is the Strategic Concept of Operation that you've developed, and the Mission Statement says: "The Ottawa Police Service, in a collaborative approach with other police agencies, federal, provincial and city partners, community organizations and the event organizers will provide a safe and secure environment in the City of Ottawa during the Freedom Convoy 2022 event. The primary goal is to end the protest peacefully. This may be achieved through proactive engagements by all officers including Police Liaison Teams, facilitating communication, de-escalation and negotiation as means to achieve a peaceful resolution." So there was an inclusion of the engagement process, and specifically, the Police Liaison Team here. With that in mind, I want to take you to... Now -- so we were -- before the break, we were talking about this meeting, initial meeting, with the Integrated Planning Group at 5:35 p.m., right, on February 8th.

    06-065-14

  196. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was it at that meeting that you presented this strategic concept of operations?

    06-066-12

  197. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, about two hours after this meeting at 7:30 p.m. the same day, there was a command team meeting. And I want to take you to the minutes of that meeting. This is OPS00014454 at page 124. So you see a reference of something the former Chief said. He said, “People came to assess my readiness and if we’re ready to receive their resources.” We go down further. The Chief said, “Enforcement is where we need to be. We need to show teeth and that the officers”. It seems to be an incomplete sentence in the notes, but do you recall this command team briefing?

    06-066-17

  198. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    7:30 p.m.

    06-067-02

  199. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you tell us the nature of what was discussed at this meeting?

    06-067-05

  200. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you tell him?

    06-067-22

  201. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how would you -- how you describe the former Chief’s perspective on this?

    06-068-02

  202. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we go to the next day, February 9th, early that morning at around 7:10 a.m. there was another briefing involving the Chief, you and, I believe, perhaps Deputy Chief Bell as well. And I want to show you the document OPS00014479. So this is perhaps your notes.

    06-068-12

  203. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I know it’s page 66 of the electronic record. So do you see at around 7:10 a.m. there was a reference to the Chief briefing the team?

    06-068-19

  204. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the top, “Mission Hydra”. Does that ring a bell?

    06-068-24

  205. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what that means.

    06-068-28

  206. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Just to help us understand, what did you understand the many heads to be an analogy of?

    06-069-10

  207. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Carry on.

    06-069-16

  208. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you made a note about, in the middle of the page, “very aggressive posture, language throughout the whole briefing and mission statement”. What’s the next sentence?

    06-069-28

  209. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what do you mean by “very aggressive posture”?

    06-070-06

  210. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, the plan that this Mission Hydra -- the plan that the former Chief wanted to carry out, we have a document that I believe is the one he referred to, and I want to show it to you to confirm it. Can we call up OPP0001889, please? It’s a plan that’s also been referred to by various witnesses as 3.0. Does that ring a bell?

    06-070-16

  211. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What does that refer to, 3.0?

    06-070-25

  212. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So are you able to confirm, then, that this is the plan that the former Chief wanted, the one that he spoke to you about on that morning at 7:10?

    06-071-05

  213. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, if we can go to page 6. I believe that’s where the mission statement is. This is a shorter mission statement compared to the Strategic Concepts of Operations document that you had provided the day before. And this one simply says, “To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa truck demonstration and restore safe and open neighbourhoods and businesses.” There’s no reference to the engagement process of to PLT. Tell us about any discussions you may have had with the Chief on that point.

    06-071-12

  214. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So I want to go back now to the -- to your notes, OPS00014479, at page 66, because there's some subsequent notes that I want to ask you to clarify. So do you see: "At 7:20, chief said -- chief laid out his plan, omitted negotiations, and when I brought it up, he reacted angrily, saying, 'We're not negotiating.'" It's better that you read it.

    06-072-09

  215. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that was the exchange?

    06-072-26

  216. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that was at 7:10 a.m. And then later that morning, at 9:15 a.m., there was another meeting with -- the chief had with you and Deputy Chief Bell. This is at the next page, page 67. That’s okay. Sorry, go up. Oh, sorry, yeah, sorry, go down a little bit. Do you see the part where the chief said -- he said, "Anyone" -- I'll let you read it.

    06-072-28

  217. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you understand the chief to convey by those comments?

    06-073-17

  218. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we go down further -- okay. Here, we just talked about the plan.

    06-073-23

  219. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So before you carry on, the cell or the team, is that the integrated planning group that just came to Ottawa?

    06-074-03

  220. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The one that you met with the day before?

    06-074-08

  221. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So do you remember this conversation?

    06-074-13

  222. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you understand him to mean by political masters and so on?

    06-074-17

  223. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, so these are your notes, right?

    06-074-28

  224. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But this meeting is also being recorded as a form of minutes by other people?

    06-075-03

  225. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to take you to another record. This will be OPS00014454, and I want to take you to page 113, please. If we go down a bit? Keep going. Okay. So there's a reference at Comm. C, OPP. Is that Commissioner Carrique of the OPP?

    06-075-06

  226. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is assessing if we are worthy of getting the additional ask resources, and there's a note that -- Trish is you, right?

    06-075-13

  227. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That you said, "I want us to limit politics." And the chief said, "Last week, we didn’t have an incident command. Everyone was running with confusion. Now we know our roles as of noon." "Does that -- none of us did our jobs last week in what our teams needed? We need to stay focused and stick to the plan." And then we have the minutes recording you saying, "They're here to help. Not sure why we're --- "

    06-075-18

  228. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    "--- forcing them to arrive here." And the chief said, "The last night was amateur hour." Do you recall this?

    06-076-02

  229. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you give us the context and what was -- what you remember was exchanged?

    06-076-07

  230. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you mentioned that you were going to meet with the group again that day, and I believe that meeting took place at 12:10 p.m.; am I right?

    06-077-09

  231. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I could take you back to your notes now, OPS00014454 at page 136? Oh, I'm sorry. That’s not your notes. It's the same document. I apologize. So if we just go down a few pages to page 138, if we go down further. Okay. I want to ask you about this. So we're now at the meeting with the integrated planning group, and the chief asks this question. "We can add the information that was provided by the RCMP, but we haven't agreed not to proceed with our plan for tonight."

    06-077-14

  232. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember this?

    06-077-27

  233. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was that about?

    06-078-01

  234. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Tell us about Rideau Sussex. The Commission has heard some evidence about why that intersection might be problematic.

    06-078-05

  235. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It is at February the 9th at around 12:10 p.m. So ---

    06-078-10

  236. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the plan that was discussed at that meeting?

    06-079-04

  237. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’re going to hear from Supt. Abrams later today, as I said, and we expect him to -- he may say that he was quite critical of this OPS plan; he thought it unsafe. And he thought, also, in that discussion that Supt. Patterson might have represented the PLT involvement. What is your perspective on that?

    06-079-15

  238. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So that meeting between the OPS Command Team and the Integrated Planning Group took place at around noon and then, at 1:40 p.m., the OPS Command Team had a debriefing; do you remember that?

    06-079-27

  239. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go down to the next page, 139. So do you see “OPS debrief from meeting with the OPP/RCMP meeting”? And it recorded the Chief as saying: "As far as I consider, keep going. Nothing has changed until I hear something different coming from the RCMP and OPP." So I just want to be clear here because at that meeting, right, at the meeting with the Integrated Planning Group, there were at least two things being discussed, one was the degree of integration. There was the OPS Plan 3.0 and I understand that the RCMP and Chief Pardy, they were also starting to prepare a kind of plan to support what the OPS had?

    06-080-04

  240. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right, so there were those two plans and then there was these Rideau/Sussex discussion ---

    06-080-19

  241. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at the same time. So just to be clear, when the Chief said here, “As far as I consider, keep going,” do you recall the context? Was he referring to the integration issue or was he referring to the Rideau/Sussex issue?

    06-080-22

  242. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    06-081-03

  243. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. All right. Now, moving on to the next day, February 10th, at 11:00 a.m. -- now, I can take you back to your notes, and that is OPS00014479. If we could go to page 75, please. So do you see that first bullet: "Patterson said the OPP want to make sure this stays in Ottawa and have no interest in resolving this. They only want to negotiate and not do any actions on." And then the next line says: "I disagree."

    06-081-08

  244. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that exchange.

    06-081-20

  245. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, when we spoke about this, about this day, during our interview back in the summer, you said February 10th was probably the worst day in your professional career.

    06-082-02

  246. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why was that?

    06-082-08

  247. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what decision did the former Chief make after that?

    06-084-19

  248. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Not event commander. Strategic commander.

    06-085-09

  249. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you did take some rest ---

    06-085-26

  250. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- on the 11th and the 12th?

    06-086-01

  251. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then you came back on the 13th?

    06-086-04

  252. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now when the Chief made the decision to remove Superintendent Patterson, who stepped in?

    06-086-06

  253. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you involved in that decision?

    06-086-11

  254. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why was he selected?

    06-086-17

  255. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Now before I -- before we get to your return on the 13th, I just want to show you another document. It is one that I've shown you before during our interview. If I could call up the document number OPP00004283? If we can just look at the first page? Can we do that? So this appears to be a draft document prepared by the Integrated Planning Group. And these are the services involved, right, the RCMP, OPP, TPS is Toronto Police, YRP ---

    06-086-23

  256. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- York Regional Police, and what's PRP?

    06-087-05

  257. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. So this document is a draft dated February the 10th. Can we go back to the title, please? SMEC proposal, what is that?

    06-087-09

  258. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Now if we go to section 3.1 of this draft proposal? It appears that the group was trying to get a sense of where things were at as of that time on February the 10th. It seems to be an assessment of the current situation that the OPS had to confront with. And these are -- well, we see the list. Can we go down the list? I don't mean the -- I don't mean scrolling down, but I mean, Deputy Chief, can you tell us -- look at each bullet and tell us your perspective on whether this list accurately reflected the state that the OPS found itself in as of the 10th of February.

    06-087-16

  259. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Does that include the preplanning phase, or are you referring strictly to the February 10th ---

    06-088-02

  260. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Yeah.

    06-088-07

  261. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would that include the Rideau Sussex POU action?

    06-088-21

  262. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What does that refer to?

    06-089-24

  263. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let’s take that a bit further, “Information sharing - incomplete and unknown command structure”; do you agree with that?

    06-091-06

  264. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in terms of information sharing, did you see that as an issue between OPS and external agencies, or was that an issue within the OPS itself?

    06-091-18

  265. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    06-091-25

  266. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall when we interviewed you back in the summer, you described some challenges to us, in terms of this sharing of intelligence within the OPS?

    06-091-28

  267. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us more about that.

    06-092-04

  268. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you think those barriers that existed back in around January, February impeded the degree of integration of the planning and the intelligence in preparing OPS for the arrival of the convoy?

    06-092-25

  269. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now -- and the point about “Lack of leadership”; looking back, what do you think you could have done differently to provide more leadership?

    06-093-06

  270. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I’ve asked you about your leadership but what about when you look around, do you see other leadership issues around those around you?

    06-093-22

  271. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, we spoke a bit about Superintendent Bernier, who assumed the role of Event Commander as of the 10th, and so he would have been reporting to you when you returned on the 13th, right?

    06-094-14

  272. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did you find him as a leader, as the Operation Commander?

    06-094-20

  273. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Speaking of unfettered, does that go back to what you said earlier about the importance of having autonomy for an Operational Commander:

    06-095-07

  274. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And who became that liaison person?

    06-095-12

  275. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And you said Supt. Bernie insisted on the autonomy as well as the liaison. Why was the liaison so important?

    06-095-16

  276. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, Supt. Bernier will testify next week, and I expect he will tell us that one of the early decisions he made was to appoint OPP Superintendent Springer as his deputy.

    06-095-28

  277. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you know about that?

    06-096-05

  278. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Tell us about the degree of integration in the days after your return. So you took two days off and you came back on the 13th. What did you find when you’d come back?

    06-096-22

  279. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So I understand from interviewing Superintendent Bernier that a plan that he worked on with the Integrated Planning Group was signed off as between him and the other members of the group. But it appears there might be some confusion around that time just as to what extent additional review or approval may or may not have been required from strategic level commanders, including yourself or the former Chief. So I want to take you to an email chain and see if you can help us clarify some of this confusion. Could we call up document OPP00001547, please? So if we go down to the very bottom to the beginning of the email chain, so Deputy Chief, you see that this email began with the former Chief sending you an email as a request. He said: “Please send me the latest version of operations plan that I approved on Wednesday, February the 9th.” Now, which operations plan did you understand him to be referring to?

    06-097-13

  280. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 3.0. And then he also asked: “Also, please advise if the plan has received all official approvals, signatures, etc., as there seems to be some concerns about this from the RCMP.” Tell us about this.

    06-098-07

  281. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in this one email, he seems to be referring to two different plans.

    06-099-02

  282. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we go further up, we see your reply at 5:58. Now, by the way, in between the request and your reply, did you speak to anyone that you remember?

    06-099-05

  283. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let’s take a look at the reply: “Good evening, Chief. In checking with Rob Bernier, he finally had a chance to review the plan from the Integrated Planning Team and has sent it back with his comments. He would prefer that it be completed and signed off and will then share the plan, as he is the final approval of it.” As for 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo ’22, February 9/22, it looks like you attached that 3.0 plan. So were you responding to both requests and trying to -- like I’ll let you tell us what you were trying to do.

    06-099-11

  284. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Up to?

    06-100-12

  285. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And in -- you said “in checking with Rob Bernier”. Does that refresh your memory?

    06-100-15

  286. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we go further up, this is the former Chief replying to your response. He said: “Thank you for the clarification. I was not aware of this delay, as I had approved the plan last Wednesday.” Now, this is February 13th. And when he said, “I had approved the last Wednesday”, would that have been the 9th?

    06-100-20

  287. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I appreciate and support the need -- sorry. Yeah. “I appreciate and support the need for A/Supt Bernier to make adjustments to the plan that he inherited.” What did you understand the Chief to be saying here, adjustments in the plan “that he inherited”?

    06-100-28

  288. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So were you left with the impression that -- like I -- like what did you understand? Because we started with you explaining that there were two plans. What did you understand the Chief to mean when he said this?

    06-101-10

  289. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 3.0.

    06-101-19

  290. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So he appeared to suggest that there were adjustments made to the 3.0.

    06-101-21

  291. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So while Superintendent Bernier was asking for action on the Integrated Planning Group plan, he wanted to have it move ahead, the former Chief was asking about the 3.0.

    06-101-28

  292. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then he said: “That said, please ensure that the plan is fully signed off at the earliest possible opportunity as this is a priority need expressed by our integrated partners.” The plan in this third paragraph or fourth paragraph, to ensure that it’s fully signed off, what did you understand which plan he was referring to now, the 3.0 or the Integrated Group Plan?

    06-102-06

  293. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So help me understand here. Was there simultaneous work being done on two plans as of the 13th?

    06-102-21

  294. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, when you were responding to the chief's request on this day, have you seen the integrated group plan yet?

    06-103-04

  295. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So his last paragraph to you: "As such, please communicate by email to the OPP and RCMP the reason for the delay in the approval ID, the current plan, along with the timeline that they will receive the approved plan. Copy Christiane an I on these emails." (As read) Christiane is the lawyer, right, the ---

    06-103-09

  296. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you understand his request to be? Was he asking that the integrated group plan be actioned on?

    06-103-21

  297. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And you speak about the lawyer reviewing documents as a practice, but we're talking about an operational plans here.

    06-104-12

  298. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the practice includes having legal review of operational plans?

    06-104-16

  299. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in your experience, at the executive level, was that the practice of other chiefs?

    06-104-21

  300. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you understand to be the significance or the reason that he wanted to have these kind of legal review?

    06-104-24

  301. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was it understood that the action, the plan could not be actioned on before the legal review was completed?

    06-105-04

  302. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. All right. Can we go further up? Okay. So this is your -- this belongs -- "The plan that was sent to you just now is one that both party and Lou worked on to include the additional and necessary parts to ensure it met everyone's needs." (As read) So you are now sending the former chief the new integrated groups plan, right?

    06-105-09

  303. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    "Both Carson and Phil were aware of the reason for the delay, as they have been in regular contact with Rob yesterday and into today. The plan now has the proper signatories on it and will be the one referenced, moving forward. I thank everyone for the patience ---" (As read) And so on. So was that the end of it for that day for you?

    06-105-19

  304. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go up to the top, we see that the former chief forwarded it to the RCMP and OPP Commissioner. "Please be advised our operational plan was updated per the integrated model with the input of your respective representatives and has now been fully approved." (As read) And we go further up. We have the Commissioner Carrique thanking the OPS chief. What was your understanding as to the status of this plan, the integrated groups plan?

    06-106-04

  305. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, were you aware of any subsequent delay after the -- this is all on the 13th?

    06-106-20

  306. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. How am I doing with the time? Okay. If I could now take you to the plan that was signed off on the 13th, I believe this is OPP00001851. Could we go to page 22, please? Oh, maybe further down. I'm looking for the organization chart. Now, this is a document that you didn’t see until later -- well, I guess on the 13th you had it, and you had an opportunity to review it. Tell us about this organization. Was this level integrated -- integration kept ever before, in your experience?

    06-106-26

  307. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And we see in one of those blue boxes an executive liaison, Acting Superintendent Drummond. That’s what you talked about, right?

    06-107-27

  308. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And comparing -- we haven't seen - - we're not going to have time to look at the contents of this plan, but you've had the benefit of understanding this plan -- comparing this to what was the 3.0, can you describe -- summarize for us the main differences between those plans and which one was superior?

    06-108-04

  309. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I expect that we will hear more evidence from members of the integrated group who did not consider the 3.0 an adequate plan, the kind of plan that would enable the proper allocation and deployment of resources. What's your perspective on that?

    06-108-15

  310. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was stopping the OPS from developing this kind of plan earlier? It's had more than two weeks.

    06-108-27

  311. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    06-109-03

  312. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So, looking back, having regard to all that the citizens of Ottawa had to go through during those three and a half weeks, what could the OPS, in your view, have done differently or better to have shortened that period to resolve to incident or protest earlier?

    06-109-18

  313. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And finally, there may be a debate as to whether the plan should drive the number or the number should drive the plan. Do you know what I’m asking?

    06-110-06

  314. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why do you say that?

    06-110-11

  315. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Thank you. Those are my questions.

    06-110-22

  316. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No re-examination, thank you.

    06-202-24

  317. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Commissioner. It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission. Our next witness is Chief Superintendent Pardy.

    07-115-17

  318. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon. Please have a seat. Chief Superintendent Pardy, do you remember attending an interview, well actually, two interviews with me and my Commission colleagues in the summer?

    07-116-15

  319. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And after the interviews, we provided you with an interview summary?

    07-116-21

  320. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    May I call up the document Number WTS00000033. So Chief Pardy, this is the summary that we've sent you for review?

    07-116-24

  321. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. This is the version that you approved.

    07-117-02

  322. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And do you adopt this content ---

    07-117-05

  323. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- in its entirety?

    07-117-07

  324. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Are there any changes or corrections you'd like to make?

    07-117-09

  325. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right. Okay. Now, Chief Superintendent Pardy, I understand that you recently retired after serving more than 30 years with the OPP?

    07-117-14

  326. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Only three weeks.

    07-117-21

  327. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Congratulations. Now, you were a former Critical Incident Commander?

    07-117-23

  328. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you have, throughout your career, worked for many years in the National Capital Region on major events?

    07-117-26

  329. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in the course of your career, have you collaborated frequently with members of the Ottawa Police Service?

    07-118-09

  330. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what do you know of their reputation in terms of managing or responding to large-scale events like protests and demonstrations?

    07-118-13

  331. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    First class.

    07-118-17

  332. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, are you aware of any changes within the OPS in recent years that might affect their ability to respond to these kinds of events?

    07-118-19

  333. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'm going to take you back now to the events back in January and February. I understand that in January of this year, you were the Commander of the OPP Northeast Region; right?

    07-119-09

  334. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then, in early February, you were asked to lead the Integrated Planning Group to assist the Ottawa Police Service?

    07-119-14

  335. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's talk about the specific assignment, your lead role with the planning group, the Integrated Planning Group. When were you asked to take that on?

    07-119-18

  336. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the following morning, what time was the briefing?

    07-120-03

  337. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who attended?

    07-120-07

  338. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And we've just this morning heard from Superintendent Abrams. Now, could we call up the witness's Will Say, Number OPP00000792, please? Now, Chief Pardy, we have -- the Commission has received a Will Say that's going to be shown on the screen. I just wanted to ask you, do you recall when this Will Say was first prepared?

    07-120-13

  339. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When in Ottawa?

    07-120-23

  340. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when did you complete it?

    07-121-05

  341. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, tell us about the nature of your assignment. What was the mandate?

    07-121-07

  342. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So a moment ago you were starting to tell us about this nine a.m. briefing ---

    07-121-20

  343. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- involving, among others, Commissioner Carrique of the OPP. Tell us about that briefing. What was discussed?

    07-121-23

  344. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now you mentioned earlier that the purpose was to support.

    07-122-08

  345. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    07-122-14

  346. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What kind of help?

    07-122-16

  347. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you were in Orillia at 9 a.m., and by 5:35 that afternoon, you were in a meeting with the members of the OPS; right?

    07-123-08

  348. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who did you meet with at that 5:35 p.m. meeting?

    07-123-12

  349. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was delayed; right?

    07-123-23

  350. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. And we heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson from the OPS yesterday. I believe she said that the Chief -- the former Chief was delayed, but he did join by teleconference or some other means of remote communication.

    07-123-28

  351. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now if we scroll down, this willsay to the next page, right, so this -- the first dark bullet, "Planning team held its first meeting at 1735 hrs from RCMP [Headquarter] with the OPS (all OPS were on video or conference call). Also note that Counsel for the OPS, Christiane Huneault was present..." Do you recall her being present on -- by video conference?

    07-124-11

  352. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And okay. Now let's talk about what was discussed at that meeting. Tell us what happened.

    07-124-23

  353. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was there any discussion at that meeting about the nature of integration between the OPS and the group that you were bringing to Ottawa?

    07-126-01

  354. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    07-126-06

  355. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-126-12

  356. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let's talk about the members of this team that you were assembling and bringing to Ottawa. It's called Integrated Planning Cell or Integrated Planning Group?

    07-126-24

  357. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    07-127-03

  358. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So ---

    07-127-27

  359. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So yesterday when we spoke to -- when Deputy Chief Ferguson testified and she explained the process of developing a plan, an operational plan, she referred to subject matter experts. So this group of people that you’re bringing to Ottawa, are these subject matter experts, then, in the various areas?

    07-128-03

  360. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right.

    07-128-13

  361. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, we’ve heard from some witnesses about the importance of operational plans, and I just want your view on what are the components, the key components, of a good operational plan.

    07-128-17

  362. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, we’ve heard references to an overall or overarching plan and sub-plans for specialized areas. So were those what you were trying to describe to us?

    07-129-18

  363. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And in terms of an overall plan or overarching plan, does that refer to something that takes you from start to finish?

    07-129-25

  364. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about contingencies?

    07-130-01

  365. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And command and control structure, should that be reflected?

    07-130-08

  366. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why is that important?

    07-130-11

  367. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    At the time you arrived on February 8th, did you know if the OPS had experienced planners like the ones you brought to Ottawa to help them develop this kind of a plan?

    07-130-23

  368. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you told us that on that first meeting -- at that first meeting, you were shown this strategic concept of operations document but you didn’t have a copy; right? You didn’t -- you weren’t given a copy at that meeting.

    07-131-08

  369. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you said you asked for more.

    07-131-17

  370. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we go to the next day, February the 9th, at 7:00 a.m. There’s a note in your will say that you weren’t getting the plans yet. And we go to page 3 of the will say, the second bullet -- sorry. Maybe scroll down a bit. So sorry, scroll up, please. The second bullet, discussion around injunctions and then stressed we needed to develop a plan -- I’m sorry. I think I’m looking at the wrong page. Okay. I found it now. So go down again. I apologize. After February -- the heading February the 9th, do you see the second bullet?

    07-131-22

  371. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the last two sentences: “I learned that everything had to go to the Chief before it could be actioned or released to our team.” Now, I just wanted to ask you about that. What did you mean by this?

    07-132-08

  372. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who told you this?

    07-132-18

  373. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    07-132-22

  374. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in fairness to the former Chief, you did tell us that there was some departure of senior officers; yes? So isn’t it quite understandable that he wanted more things to go through him to ensure that, you know, the important decisions are made with the benefit of his input?

    07-133-03

  375. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you also mentioned earlier that the OPS counsel, Christiane Huneault, was present.

    07-133-15

  376. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why’s that?

    07-133-19

  377. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But wouldn’t it be helpful to have a lawyer around in case any legal questions arise?

    07-133-27

  378. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-134-07

  379. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Okay. So that was your -- that’s the morning of the 9th when you were still looking for a plan and not getting it yet.

    07-134-11

  380. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then that -- around noon that day, you got to meet with the OPS team again; right?

    07-134-15

  381. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Where did you go?

    07-134-18

  382. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-134-22

  383. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Well tell us what happened at that meeting?

    07-135-09

  384. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That was the same one that you saw yesterday?

    07-135-14

  385. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-135-18

  386. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-137-04

  387. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-137-12

  388. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is that Burnett?

    07-137-18

  389. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. So you’ve covered a lot of ground there. Let’s try to unpack that a little bit. First, with respect to the numbers, as it relates to the Rideau/Sussex operation. I just want to be clear, because we heard some evidence about doubling the number, but here it’s quite the opposite; isn’t it? Like, they were preparing for an action, planning for using 400, and you’re telling us that according to the subject matter experts in your group, you’re going to need 800?

    07-138-15

  390. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh.

    07-138-27

  391. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see.

    07-139-03

  392. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right.

    07-139-06

  393. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-139-09

  394. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Does that go back to something we talked about earlier? Planning from beginning to end and anticipate the different ---

    07-139-15

  395. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, you also said something about the former chief being very passionate. Now, I want to take you to your will-say at page 3. Sorry, yeah, page 3 at the very bottom. So here: “Chief Sloly was very passionate about the impacts the demonstration was having on the city and he was looking to break the occupations however they had limited ability to affect this due to base line levels of staffing I offered that we were there to ensure that he had what was needed to sustain operations but needed a plan. He advised they were working on last minute plans.” Does that reflect what happened at that meeting?

    07-140-01

  396. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let me ask you this. As I understand it then, you were offering to help and then you said you needed a plan. But putting this in context, because this happened on February the 9th; right? So we’re already more than a week into the protests, and the Commission has heard evidence how that has caused significant social impact on the residents and so on. And if the suggestion is that you need a plan before we can send resources, isn’t that problematic? Because they may not, at that stage, have even the resources to do the planning? So how do they get more resources?

    07-140-17

  397. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    07-141-26

  398. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So let’s take a look at this plan that they did show you on the 9th at this meeting. Could we call up, please, OPP00000774? So if we go to page 91, please?

    07-142-07

  399. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Page 91.

    07-142-13

  400. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. So looking at the cover, does this resemble the document that you saw at that meeting on February the 9th?

    07-142-15

  401. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we go to the mission statement at page 96? So the mission statement simply reads: “To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore safe and open neighborhoods and businesses.” What do you think of this mission statement?

    07-142-19

  402. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, we heard from Deputy Ferguson yesterday that by February the 13th, your group has collaborated with Supt. Bernier of the OPS to come up with another plan. So can we call up that other plan? And the number is OPP00001851.

    07-143-10

  403. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    OPP00001851. Can we see the entire front page, please? Or maybe the next page has the date. There we have it. Do you recall this as being the plan that was developed by the 13th?

    07-143-17

  404. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Can we go to the mission statement at page 8, please? So this mission statement reads: “Using an integrated response, the Ottawa Police and policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, and maintain public safety for the duration of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration, with the utmost respect to the individuals Charter of Rights and Freedoms with priority on community and emergency services personnel safety & wellbeing.” How does this one compare with the one we saw before?

    07-143-24

  405. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No you said a moment earlier that the other one, the shorter one, wasn’t so much to your liking, but is it a matter of subjective preference or is it something more objective?

    07-144-17

  406. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So your group came and four days later, after the February 9th meeting, you have this plan developed collaboratively with OPS. So I guess my question is, if this can be done within a number of days after your group arrived, why didn’t you come earlier?

    07-145-01

  407. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-145-09

  408. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, I’m sorry. It is not a fair question to you. You were chosen to lead ---

    07-145-15

  409. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- the project. You weren’t the one who came up with the idea. But looking back, knowing what we know now about the OPS capacity to develop something like this, would you agree that it would have been very helpful for a group of experts like yours to offer assistance to the OPS, let’s say the Monday after the first weekend, instead of on February 9th?

    07-145-18

  410. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Let’s talk about -- now, you said the February 9th plan that was presented to your group missed a lot of the key elements of a good plan. In your view, the February 13th plan, was that good enough?

    07-145-27

  411. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, one of the things that you also told us that arose during this February 9th meeting is the former Chief’s request for -- he was seeking some assurances. He was asking for some kind of a guarantee that the resources would arrive; right? And I take it that you disagree that that kind of guarantee is to be given?

    07-146-12

  412. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But what about the argument that to plan properly one needs to know a little more about what kind of resources you can count on? So for example, if the OPS were to develop a plan based on having 1,800 officers available, that plan wouldn’t have been very helpful if those people are not actually coming; right?

    07-147-03

  413. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, can we go back to the will say, please? Document number is OPP00000792. Page 4. I’m looking for the -- okay. Do you see the sentence, “The overall tone”?

    07-147-18

  414. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “The overall tone of this meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful. Chief Sloly was very clearly under tremendous pressure to act and was very suspicious of levels of commitments from police agencies.” Tell us more, why you said that.

    07-147-24

  415. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It wasn’t what you expected.

    07-148-14

  416. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, if we scroll down on the same page a little further -- oh, we may go into the next page now. I’m looking for the sentence that starts with “After the Chief and his team left”. Right. Thank you. “After the Chief and his team left the room, Insp. Debbie Palmer remained with our team and we again pressed for copies of their plans, e-versions, and she stressed the Chief’s comments that some aspects of their plan had not yet been approved.”

    07-148-20

  417. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what ---

    07-149-06

  418. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So at the end of this meeting on February 9, was there any agreement between the OPS and the Integrated Planning Group on any operational plans going forward?

    07-149-17

  419. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was there any agreement about the degree of integration?

    07-149-25

  420. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we expect that we may hear evidence from Mr. Sloly that, to the extent the -- his approval is required, he gave all the approval necessary on February 9th. What would you say to that?

    07-149-28

  421. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Commissioner, I saw you looking at me. Is that a sign?

    07-150-12

  422. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    This is a good time.

    07-150-16

  423. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you.

    07-150-19

  424. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Commissioner.

    07-151-03

  425. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I am.

    07-151-06

  426. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Chief Pardy, just before the lunch break, I was asking you questions about the meeting on February the 9th.

    07-151-10

  427. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I just want to finish that off by taking you to one more document of that meeting. This is not your notes, but someone at the OPS was also taking notes. So if I could call up document number OPS00014454, please. Page 138, please. So if we go to the bottom of the page, please. Do you see a reference from the Chief that starts with -- there we go. So the Chief -- the former Chief of the OPS, Mr. Sloly, apparently asked the question: “We can add the info that was provided by the RCMP, but we haven’t agreed not to proceed with our plan for tonight.” And then he asks: “Are we still separate entities or are u folding into our incident command system?” There’s a notation that the OPP said, “Yes, we should” -- I think it’s probably. “Yes, we should prob[ably] fold into the OPS command structure.” Do you recall having that kind of exchange?

    07-151-14

  428. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    07-152-10

  429. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-152-16

  430. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And this is also consistent with what you’ve been telling us all along, that you were there to offer help but not to take over.

    07-152-25

  431. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And this may be a question that’s unrelated to the February 9th meeting, but since we’ve heard so much about the Hendon reports, I’m just curious. Were you one of the recipients of the Hendon report at around January- February of this year?

    07-153-05

  432. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you reading them?

    07-153-12

  433. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So with that, if I could now take you to the events in the subsequent days following the February 9th meeting. Did work continue on February the 10th in terms of working on this plan, a new plan from the Integrated Planning Group or making improvement to the OPS plan that you were shown on the 9th?

    07-153-18

  434. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-154-02

  435. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that makes sense because you came to offer support ---

    07-154-06

  436. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- and you asked what they had so that you could build on it.

    07-154-09

  437. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I could take you to the next document, OPP00004283. So if we could shrink the page so we could see the entire page, please. So this is a document that we received from the OPP. It looks like a draft document of some sort. At the bottom it says it’s prepared by the Integrated Planning Cell, RCMP, OPP, you know, those police services that you talked about earlier. And I want to take you to Section 3.1 of this document. So now if we can enlarge it. So this part of the document appears to be an assessment of the current situation as you found it on February the 10th, which is the date of this draft document. You see that under “Current”, the first bullet says, “Not intelligence led”. Do you agree with the assessment that the OPS operation at that time was not Intelligence led?

    07-154-12

  438. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when your group was trying to build on whatever plan that you saw on the 9th, what was your objective like in terms of incorporating any available intelligence that was available to the group?

    07-155-13

  439. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And I think I saw some references in your notes that on the 10th you got some input from Marcel Beaudin.

    07-156-09

  440. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was he the person from the OPP in charge of the PLT group?

    07-156-13

  441. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So on the same document that’s on the screen, if we go down further, we see a section with the PLT. So there we go. And, Chief Pardy, you see there's some -- there's not complete, I assume, because it's a draft a document, but there's some information incorporated under this section. And if we scroll down slowly, so that the witness can have a quick look? Now does this capture in broad terms the kind of information you were looking for in order to inform the new approach?

    07-156-18

  442. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Now if I could take you back to your willsay, Madam Clerk, at OPP00000792. I believe it was on this day, February 10th, Chief Pardy, that the -- one of the subject matter experts from the RCMP, Darwin Tetreault, prepared the concept of operations that was based on the information that you were gathering. So if we go to page 5 of this document, I want to go down to the bullet that starts with on February -- on the 10th of February. There we go. Do you see this bullet, that tells us that Sergeant Tetreault was preparing this, "...concept of operations based on the totality of the information that [you were getting] from the OPS but more importantly intelligence that would support a systematic and safe action plan to [dismantle] the entire protest zone." So does this also refer to something you told us earlier about not doing things block by block ---

    07-157-12

  443. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- but to have start to finish of the entire protest?

    07-158-04

  444. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If I could take you to the next document, I believe this is your notes, OPP00001792. So this is still February the 10th. And if we go to page 28, the time I'm looking for is 1925. There we go. You have a telephone call with looks like Deputy Harkins, and there's a -- can we make the -- look at more of the page? Oh, there we go. I think go down a little bit, please. "Obstacles with OPD still" -- can you read this? These were your ---

    07-158-07

  445. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- notes; right?

    07-158-16

  446. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So first of all, why are you saying that there are still obstacles at the Chief level?

    07-158-21

  447. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the second part where it says we're working effectively with the rank and file?

    07-158-28

  448. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who are these rank and file?

    07-159-03

  449. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. If we go to the next day now, so on same -- these are your notes, but we go to page 32, please? And the time I'm looking for is 12:30. So there are two points being made here. You may be -- perhaps you can read those better.

    07-159-09

  450. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-159-27

  451. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now on that day, February the 11th, you also attended a meeting with the -- with a group, the Integrated Planning Group. That might have happened actually earlier that day, and I want to take you to the document -- the minutes of that meeting. It's a document provided by the OPP, so OPP00001837. And I want to take you to page 5, near the top. Oh, no, it says not enough memory. Maybe while - - oh, there we go. So if we can go to page 5, please? Right. So there's a reference to something you said at that meeting. "...we're here to build a plan to support our partners, but we have no information. Can't deploy when we don't know what we're deploying to. We have an OPS Plan but it does not give us enough information to deploy 500 officers without a more comprehensive plan. Intelligence picture will inform this..." And so on. There's a reference to 500 officers. Tell us more about that.

    07-160-10

  452. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Now let me take you to your willsay. At page 6, please? You notice that I'm taking you to lots of documents. Sometimes these contemporaneous record help ---

    07-161-17

  453. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- to tell the story. So if we go to page 6, at 1645, so scroll down a little bit, please. So 1645, that's 4:45 p.m. "... our team presented our proposed plan to senior command in the RCMP and the OPP with significant support. This plan was a detailed concept of operations for which our team would build the entire POU plan however it still relied heavily on injects from the OPS planning team." Now I suppose that goes back to something you told us earlier that you were building on what was given you ---

    07-161-22

  454. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- that you thought was inadequate for the purposes of resolving the protest situation. And by this time, at 4:45, you had something ---

    07-162-08

  455. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- to present to the senior command. What was that proposed plan?

    07-162-12

  456. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If we go further down. So you see the bullet that starts with: “Superintendent Lue and I presented the plan at a high level to her…” Her referring to the person in the bullet before, which is Deputy Chief Ferguson. You presented it to her: “…and she immediately voiced her full support. She preferred however that she be permitted time to present it to the Chief and we agreed to prepare and forward a slide deck for her use, which was completed, and that we would be available regardless of time to answer questions.” So you’re making yourselves available ---

    07-162-26

  457. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- to answer questions, but you’re waiting for her to get an answer from the Chief? Is that your understanding?

    07-163-13

  458. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you may or may not know this, but we heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson yesterday that she was actually off that day.

    07-163-25

  459. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You didn’t know that?

    07-164-01

  460. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. But she still spoke to you ---

    07-164-04

  461. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at around 9:00 or 10:00?

    07-164-07

  462. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. So that was February the 11th, late at night. And then the next day, so we’re going into February the 12th now, at 11:45 a.m. on the 12th, you placed a phone call to Chief Sloly. So the two of you had a conversation. Tell us about that conversation, please?

    07-164-09

  463. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, yes.

    07-164-16

  464. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-164-26

  465. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-165-09

  466. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. But staying on this call, for the moment, so if we look at what is said in the will-say, on the fourth line: “I advised we were looking to work in a more integrated fashion that insured resources were strategically placed where needed, that I had provided [Deputy Chief] Ferguson with that plan. He advised he wasn’t sure what was agreed to yet as to how that integration was to happen…” So he suggested a call. I wanted to ask you, if you had specific recollection about what he said to you that day?

    07-165-15

  467. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So this accurately captures ---

    07-166-08

  468. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- the nature of the conversation? So if we go further down -- oh by the way, so around the time that you were having this conversation with the former chief, I suppose your other members of your team were having a conversation with Supt. Bernier?

    07-166-11

  469. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what did you find out from other members of your team about what they spoke to Bernier about?

    07-166-18

  470. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So they got the message that they were good to go, while you were speaking to the Chief, who asked for a further meeting or briefing?

    07-166-23

  471. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So if we go further down, that meeting that finally happened took place in the afternoon. So first of all, at 1400, so 2:00 p.m., you placed a call to Deputy Chief Bell upon learning that the former chief would like a briefing on the plan?

    07-167-06

  472. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so you suggested, C. Pardy, you suggested at 3:30; right?

    07-167-12

  473. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then at 3:04, you got a call from Deputy Bell who apologized, but said that the meeting was - - has already started and the Chief was insisting that it happen now. Is that still your recollection?

    07-167-15

  474. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then a few minutes later, at 3:10, you and -- I guess you joined -- when you say “We”, I assume that’s you and the members of your team?

    07-167-20

  475. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    07-167-26

  476. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I’d like to ask you what you wrote here at 1510, about the third line down. The end of the second line: “The tone of the Chief’s comments during this meeting was very troubling to the point that I asked if the Chief wanted my team to leave the call to allow him to speak privately with his team first. He was blunt in saying no, he would get to us momentarily.” What was this about?

    07-168-03

  477. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then eventually it got to you. And your will-say tells us that there was a presentation of the slides; right?

    07-168-23

  478. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we scroll down a little bit? The last sentence of this bullet, do you see “Key in the plan”?

    07-168-27

  479. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “Key in the plan was reducing the protestor footprint through compliance and that ensuring safety, above everything, was factored in at all stages.” So it looks like when you said “key”, some emphasis was put on that point? Can you elaborate?

    07-169-04

  480. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now -- so this is a meeting between your team and the OPS command team. Chief Sloly was obviously there. Who else, do you remember, was present from the OPS side?

    07-170-04

  481. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was Bernier there?

    07-170-13

  482. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So he was supportive. What about the former Chief?

    07-170-16

  483. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no. But, sorry, in terms of how receptive he was.

    07-170-20

  484. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So at the end of that afternoon meeting, was anything agreed on?

    07-171-18

  485. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You did not.

    07-171-22

  486. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    This was the 12th.

    07-171-26

  487. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, if we go down on your will say to page 8, there was a bullet that starts with -- that’s right -- “We had discussion about integrating the command, location of CP”. What’s CP?

    07-172-01

  488. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So this is in reference to discussion about where to set up the command post if there is to be an integrated command; right?

    07-172-07

  489. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you said there’s some apparent momentum being gained with a new IC. What’s the IC?

    07-172-11

  490. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So nothing was agreed as of yet on the 12th, but you were sensing apparent momentum from the new commander, who was Rob Bernier.

    07-172-15

  491. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if we go down further, I reviewed -- yeah. “I reviewed and signed off of our detailed ops plan by the end of this date, as did the RCMP. All that was required was approval by OPS.” What do you mean by that?

    07-172-19

  492. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let’s go to the 13th. The first bullet: “We still did not have approval from Chief Sloly yet. In consult with OPP senior command forged ahead with developing roles of senior and strategic command and the absolute importance of these roles in support of the Incident Commanders.” Could you explain that to us?

    07-173-02

  493. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you were forging ahead at this time even though there wasn’t a final approval yet.

    07-174-01

  494. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So by 3:50 that day, it appears as though your optimism was justified because you received a call from Incident Commander Bernier, who was accompanied by the major -- Critical Incident Commander Springer. And then if we go down two bullets, sub-bullets, you see that yes, the plan is approved; right?

    07-174-16

  495. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So he approved it, as the Incident Commander was entitled to do, and then at 6:05 p.m. that day, if we go down further, you discussed the above with Deputy Chief Ferguson. She advised that she fully agreed with Bernier’s authority to sign off, “that we were good to go”. Was that accurate?

    07-174-23

  496. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So with both Bernier and Ferguson confirming the authority to sign off, was that sufficient for you on the 13th?

    07-175-07

  497. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So there was optimism as of the 13th, but as we read on in your will say, it appears that on the 14th, the next day, there was still a few more issues to iron out. So I want to take you first to -- so page 9, February 14th, the bullet that starts with “Key issues”. Do you see? So scroll up. That’s right. “Key issues dealt with through the day related to OPS need to have their lawyer approve the plan, which was understood based on everything they had been going through, however, was unusual in the context of a lawyer approving an operational plan.” Now, we spoke about this a little bit. And during our interview you clarify that perhaps approval was not the best term, and you said maybe review was a better word. Could you explain that, please?

    07-175-15

  498. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    07-176-12

  499. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So that's the first issue on the 14th.

    07-176-16

  500. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Another issue that you spoke about, if we go down the page, please? The bullet that starts with furthermore. "Furthermore, it was determined throughout this date that Incident Commander Bernier was being pulled away continuously to brief his Chief and this was creating frustration within our planning group, especially as it related to the POU component. I tactfully addressed this concern with the OPS." How did you tactfully address it?

    07-176-19

  501. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So those are the first two issues. There was a third issue. If we go up the page, I want to take you to the bullet that starts with "while it was established." There we have it. "While it was established that all key commanders would be kept in the loop, it was learned that the mayor of Ottawa had engaged with protesters and negotiated them to all move to Wellington Street and that OPS made some decision on action." So and then the next bullet says that Incident Commander Bernier briefed you at around six -- just after six o'clock, that due to the mayor's decision, it was a good time to take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington. Now in your interview with us, you describe this action plan as uncharacteristic of Bernier. Why did you say that?

    07-177-22

  502. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did not happen?

    07-178-23

  503. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The action?

    07-178-25

  504. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-178-27

  505. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So it would appear that all of these issues on the 14th, the first day of the supposed integration caused you sufficient concern that the -- early the next morning, you spoke to the OPP Commissioner Carrique; am I right?

    07-179-13

  506. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'm sorry?

    07-179-19

  507. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The next day, yeah, February the 15th.

    07-179-21

  508. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me show you a document that may help refresh your memory. OPP00001785 at page 28, please. So this appears to be a phone call that you made to Commissioner Carrique where you raised some of these concerns and about the unified command, and you asked for his intervention. So if we go down the page, looking for where it says -- is this page 28? I'm looking for the reference where it says the elephant in the room.

    07-179-24

  509. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you remember reading that?

    07-180-07

  510. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-180-16

  511. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you might have just anticipated my question, because I was going to ask you for the context where this conversation took place and explain this statement that you apparently made to Commissioner Carrique. The elephant in the room is -- can you read that to us?

    07-180-25

  512. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, okay. So ---

    07-181-04

  513. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- we're on equal grounds here. The elephant in the room ---

    07-181-07

  514. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We have done.

    07-181-11

  515. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So these are notes that attribute things that -- to you things that you apparently said. Have you -- did you say this?

    07-181-14

  516. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    07-182-01

  517. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in that context, you asked for his intervention.

    07-182-04

  518. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So that was the morning of the 15th. As we know, later that day, the former Chief resigned. And in your interview with us, you said that the implementation of the February 13th plan moved more quickly after Chief Sloly’s resignation. What did you mean by that? Moving more slowly -- moving more quickly?

    07-182-22

  519. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    07-183-04

  520. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    07-183-09

  521. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in my remaining time, I hope I have another -- I believe I have another 15 minutes. Yeah, so in my remaining time, I want to ask -- focus your ---

    07-183-15

  522. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, that’s very good news indeed. So now the -- we’ve been speaking about the February 13th plan, and that was the one that you and Lue, and Bernier approved. And then as I understand it, the integrated planning group continued to work with the OPS to develop that plan until it was finalized on or around the 17th. Is that right?

    07-183-20

  523. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And between those dates, the 13th and the 17th, something happened on the 14th, which was the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

    07-183-28

  524. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to ask you now about, like, can you confirm whether the final plan of February 17th contemplated the use of any powers or any measures made available under the Emergencies Act?

    07-184-04

  525. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    07-184-09

  526. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And tell me about that?

    07-184-12

  527. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, during your interview with us in the summer, and I guess in September as well, you said the group had a lot of debate about the authorities that the Act provided and so on. But did the police in Ottawa end up needing the Emergencies Act to tow vehicles?

    07-184-21

  528. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Explain to us why not.

    07-184-27

  529. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. And you also said that the police would have managed to put an end to the protest without the Emergencies Act. They would have done so within the timeline that the cell was contemplating before the Federal Government declared an emergency. Could you elaborate on that, please?

    07-185-14

  530. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in your view, was the Emergencies Act necessary to end the protest in Ottawa?

    07-186-01

  531. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in your view, was there a police solution to the demonstrations?

    07-186-09

  532. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Policing ---

    07-186-12

  533. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Policing solution?

    07-186-14

  534. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    In -- within around the same timeline that ---

    07-186-21

  535. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Is there anything else that you want to tell the Commissioner that I haven’t yet asked you?

    07-186-24

  536. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you very much.

    07-186-27

  537. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Interim Chief Bell.

    08-007-09

  538. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Commissioner. Good morning, Chief -- Interim Chief Bell. Now, Interim Chief, you remember that ---

    08-007-24

  539. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. It's Frank Au for the Commission. Interim Chief, you remember that we met in the summer remotely, and you attended an interview that we arranged. You -- after the interview, we prepared a summary of the interview and you reviewed it; am I correct?

    08-008-01

  540. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'd like to call up the document, WTS00000029. And this is a copy of the summary that you approved?

    08-008-08

  541. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could we scroll through? Yes?

    08-008-13

  542. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, is there any correction that you'd like to make to this document?

    08-008-17

  543. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you adopt its content, then?

    08-008-20

  544. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. Now, Interim Chief, you've served with the Ottawa Police Service for some 26 years?

    08-008-22

  545. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And over those years, you've been in charge of many different portfolios?

    08-008-25

  546. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could you give us a quick highlight of some of your responsibilities over the years?

    08-009-02

  547. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in January of this year, you were Deputy Chief in charge of what Deputy Ferguson has describe as the Three I's.

    08-009-11

  548. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Those are Intelligence, Information, and Investigation.

    08-009-15

  549. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, for the purpose of this hearing, we are going to be focussing on Intelligence. And what were your responsibilities as the Deputy Chief in charge of the Intelligence Unit?

    08-009-18

  550. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I am going to show you a document of the organisational chart, and perhaps you can explain some of the people involved in that unit. OPS00014925. Okay. If we go further to the right. Sorry, go up. Yeah, further to the right. I'm looking for Deputy Chief Bell. So am I correct that -- well, we saw former Chief Sloly at the top, and then underneath him, at the executive levels, there are -- there were Deputy Ferguson, who was in charge of Community Policing, and then you in charge of the Three I's?

    08-009-27

  551. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then going down that line under you, we see Intelligence. So we need to go further to the right. So now we see all three I's, and then under Intelligence Directorate, who was the superintendent in charge when -- around January and early February?

    08-010-11

  552. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So let's talk about that turnover. When did Superintendent Patterson assume this role of the Superintendent -- of the lead of the Intelligence Unit?

    08-010-24

  553. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And were you not relatively new as well to this portfolio of the Three I's?

    08-011-01

  554. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you took over in December 2021?

    08-011-09

  555. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then in early January 2022, Superintendent Patterson took the lead of the Intelligence Unit?

    08-011-11

  556. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he reported to you?

    08-011-14

  557. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And under him, you said, there are two inspectors; right?

    08-011-16

  558. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    They would be on this chart. They're Inspector Cartwright and Inspector Bryden. When did they join the Intelligence Unit?

    08-011-19

  559. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-011-24

  560. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how did those two branches interact with each other, the Intelligence and the Information branches?

    08-011-28

  561. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in the context of Incident Command, we've heard last week that the command system is structured by way of three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. When it comes to the work of the Intelligence Unit, is that also the rough organisation?

    08-012-19

  562. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in that structure, you would be, I assume, at the top strategic level?

    08-012-25

  563. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And Inspector, sorry, Superintendent Patterson would be what?

    08-012-28

  564. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And so inferring from this chart, did -- Inspector Bryden would report up to Superintendent Patterson, then?

    08-013-05

  565. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And they both report to you?

    08-013-09

  566. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And -- okay. So let's first talk about that reporting process. How often would you receive an update or briefing from Superintendent Patterson.

    08-013-11

  567. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let’s turn our mind back to around January-February of this year. Now, we’ve heard from other people that Freedom Convoy-related events came into their radar at around mid- January, say January 13. So starting at around that time, I’m just trying to understand the frequency of briefings and meetings and so on.

    08-013-16

  568. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I heard January the 20th. Did I hear it correctly?

    08-014-11

  569. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve spoken to the former Chief Sloly and I expect that he may give evidence that he became aware -- well, he was in receipt of the first Hendon Report as of January the 13th and he forwarded a copy of that report to you. What’s your recollection?

    08-014-18

  570. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve also spoken to Inspector Bryden, and during his interview he informed us that he received a copy of the January 13th Hendon Report from Superintendent Patterson. Have you -- do you have any recollection at all that you received any Hendon Report before the 27th?

    08-015-01

  571. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, as one of the deputies assisting the former Chief and you were tasked with the intelligence responsibility, do you recall any discussions you had with the former Chief about your specific assignment with respect to the Freedom Convoy events?

    08-015-11

  572. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I understand that Mr. Sloly, the former Chief, made it clear that he wanted all operations to be intelligence led. Is that your understanding, too?

    08-015-28

  573. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he assigned you the specific responsibility to ensure that appropriate intelligence were collected and disseminated to the planning team.

    08-016-09

  574. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so that would have been your duty as -- around when? When do you recall that first discussion with Mr. Sloly took place?

    08-016-13

  575. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, was a threat assessment eventually completed by the Intelligence Unit?

    08-016-19

  576. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I want to take you to a threat assessment that the Commission has received. And the document number is 00 -- sorry, OPS00004039. Now, looking at the first -- cover page, this is a document completed by Sergeant Chris Kiez. Am I correct?

    08-016-22

  577. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It is dated January 28th, but the title is “Freedom Convoy Ottawa January 29th, 2022”. Is that right?

    08-016-28

  578. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And is the date -- the title date January 29th because it was initially expected that the event would start on the 29th?

    08-017-04

  579. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But this version is -- was completed on the 28th; right?

    08-017-08

  580. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And I understand from earlier witnesses’ testimony that that week in particular was a very fluid and dynamic week, lots of things happened.

    08-017-13

  581. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    In any event, we have reached now the 28th and this is the threat assessment. I’d like to take you to page 3. Can we take a look at the second paragraph? Can we enlarge the screen a little bit? Thank you. So you see that in the second -- the second paragraph starts with: “The most likely police matter at this time, will be the vast number of vehicles on the area roads. The Convoy will be able to stop and effectively shut down movement if they desire.” That’s the understanding as of the 28th; right?

    08-017-17

  582. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we go down the page to the very bottom, the last sentence in bold says, “These conditions create grounds for passionate emotions.” And those conditions refer to the sentiment of the truckers.

    08-018-04

  583. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. Take your time.

    08-018-11

  584. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we go to the next page, page 4, we go to the heading “Summation”. So the writing concluded that: “There is a quickly growing financial fund that can pay for food, lodging, fuel and legal cost. This event is, as described above, less of a ‘professional protest’ with the usual sad players, but rather, is a truly organic grass roots event that is gathering momentum largely from the widespread population.” And then in bold, “Read: Expect Very Large Crowds.” Am I correct?

    08-018-13

  585. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then the next bullet went on to quote from a journalist to the effect that, if we go to the last sentences: “When it finally meets a successful protest to air their grievances, there may be larger crowds and longer disruptions than was ever planned for.” Right?

    08-019-01

  586. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. You’re talking about the reality that dawned on everyone once the convoy arrived, as compared to what was known the day before?

    08-019-28

  587. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-020-08

  588. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. But you agree with me that this is an assessment and this is a summation part where the writer was trying to draw some conclusions; right?

    08-020-12

  589. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It’s not -- the writer is not here just reporting various pieces of information? This is the conclusion, at least from this writer, having gathered all of these disparate sources of information; correct?

    08-020-16

  590. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-020-23

  591. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, if we go to the next page and we look at the third bullet. So the author is here saying that: “In 6 years of working large demonstration events from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action, which means three things for planners…” Now the third thing is redacted, but we can look at the first two. “the event is likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events but more disruptive.” Second: “There is significant popular support for this event on a scale not seen in recent years. This means the protest groups have access to larger protestor pools than they have ever had access to, which means there will be likely widespread disorganization and confusion.” Now, so the author seems to be warning here of something quite unprecedented, at least compared to recent experience. Do you agree?

    08-020-28

  592. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it may not contain as much detail about, you know, some of the events that the residents subsequently experienced, but it’s providing a warning here as to something quite significant, not seen before?

    08-021-27

  593. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And there’s nothing here to suggest anything other than a lawful protest. But the author is pointing to the significant number and the likelihood of this organization, or at least the, if not likely -- well, there would be likely widespread disorganization and confusion. Now, if we go on to the paragraph underneath the third redacted point: “The demographic of the Convoy is very unusual; the protests globally are made up almost entirely of middle-class members of society. Since the so-called; silent majority’ is numerically much larger than the professional activists. As a result, law enforcement is being met with numbers of people beyond the norm.” So it just reinforces the theme that we’ve been on; right?

    08-022-17

  594. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, what Chief Sloly wanted was for you and Deputy Chief Ferguson to coordinate an approach with you -- I mean, your unit, the Intelligence Unit, providing the best intelligence to the Planning Team, so that an effective response could have been developed before the convoy arrived; right?

    08-023-22

  595. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he took some oversight role in the days leading up to the arrival of the convoy; right?

    08-024-01

  596. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You mentioned that ---

    08-024-04

  597. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let’s talk about those briefings. You’re reporting up to the former chief. How often do those briefings occur?

    08-024-08

  598. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if Supt. Patterson knew of the Hendon Report as early as January 13th, why was it that you weren’t aware until the week of the 20th?

    08-024-21

  599. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, I want to ask you about the plan, the initial plan that was developed to respond to the freedom convoy events. That plan was also dated January 28th; right?

    08-025-12

  600. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    08-025-18

  601. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So can we call up the document, OPP -- sorry, OPS00004221? So can we zoom in to look at the entire first page, the cover page, please? So this document is titled “Freedom Convoy - Canada Unity January 29th, 2022”. So the title date is also 29th, but if we go down, we may need to enlarge it now to see the print, here it’s noted that it’s authored -- oh, actually the name of the author is redacted. Let me put -- we have the identical document in an unredacted fashion, and I’ve spoken to counsel about this before. Let's call up the identical document in the unredacted version, which is OPP00004262. Can we go down, please. So here, we know that the author of this is Sergeant Sean Kay, and it's dated January 28th, 2022; am I correct?

    08-025-21

  602. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that's the same day of the threat assessment that we saw earlier?

    08-026-11

  603. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we turn the next page, the authorizing authorities, there are two here noted. The first one is Staff Sergeant Kevin Kennedy, and if we go down, and Inspector Russ Lucas. And we heard from Deputy Ferguson last week that these are members of the Planning Team; am I correct?

    08-026-14

  604. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go to page 7, I believe, that's where there is a Risk Assessment section -- Threat Assessment. Are you familiar with this part of the plan?

    08-026-20

  605. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we scroll down a little?

    08-026-24

  606. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, of course. Can we go back up to the beginning of the section?

    08-026-27

  607. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we scroll down now?

    08-027-04

  608. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Next page.

    08-027-07

  609. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, did you read it at around that time?

    08-027-11

  610. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what did you think of it at the time?

    08-027-17

  611. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you, Commissioner.

    08-029-03

  612. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Interim Chief, if I could take you back to the initial plan of the 28th of January, at page 7, where the Threat Assessment is found. I think you were in the process of going through the assessment.

    08-029-05

  613. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, that's a very good question. I actually don't remember what I'd asked. But let's start with -- so have you reviewed, are you -- have you completed your review of this section?

    08-029-13

  614. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So I'd like to know, first of all, whether you agree with this assessment?

    08-029-18

  615. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If I understand you correctly, your team, the Intelligence Unit, was those gathering information based on the Hendon reports, but also trying to gather information from other sources to corroborate those intelligence reports, is that right?

    08-030-06

  616. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And looking at this threat assessment and in the context of the 28th of January, what you knew, what your team knew at the time, do you consider this an accurate reflection of the reality, to the best that anyone in your team can know?

    08-030-25

  617. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that’s the one thing, in your view -- excuse me; that’s the one thing in your view that was perhaps missing from the assessment is the risk of a prolonged occupation, if we can call it that?

    08-031-14

  618. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let me take you to some of the other information that you said might have been available as well at that time. So now you talked about Hendon report. Maybe before we go to the other sources, let’s talk a little bit more about Hendon. You became aware of it during the week of the 20th, but you also told us that you didn’t read -- you didn’t go back and read all the Hendon reports. I want to get a sense of what you did read and what’s your best recollection as to which Hendon reports you did read at the time.

    08-031-19

  619. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Which was the first Hendon report that you read?

    08-032-12

  620. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so I think you said that from then on you read every Hendon reports afterwards on an ongoing basis.

    08-032-16

  621. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you ask for the earlier Hendon reports?

    08-032-20

  622. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So since you did read the 27th report, let’s go to the 27th report and see what it says. I can find ---

    08-032-27

  623. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    08-033-04

  624. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay, yeah. But since we’re interested in finding out what was known to you at the time, let’s start with the 27th. (SHORT PAUSE)

    08-033-07

  625. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe it is OPP00001331. (SHORT PAUSE)

    08-033-11

  626. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go to page 4 of this report, go down. Okay, so do you see the paragraph that says: “It is highly unlikely that heavy machinery would be transported in the convoy if there was no intent to use it, or if some individuals in the convoy did not anticipate that it would be needed. Such equipment could be used to facilitate or secure access to strategic operational positions in Ottawa. The presence of this equipment in the convoy may indicate that some convoy participants intend to reinforce positions for long-term occupation in Ottawa; to block access to strategic locations; to damage property; to render roadways impassable; or to intimidate the public, government, and law enforcement.” So this is the -- part of the January 27th Hendon report that you read, right?

    08-033-13

  627. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So do you agree that the presence of the heavy machinery supported what the report called, “Positions for long-term occupation”?

    08-034-08

  628. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, do you agree also that there was a serious intelligence gap in terms of any exit plan for these protesters?

    08-035-19

  629. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah, let’s go to page 6.

    08-035-24

  630. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    08-036-12

  631. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, there are obviously many Hendon Reports. This is just one of them, and the information continued to evolve, as you pointed out earlier. But Supt. Morris from the OPP did testify here last week as to the likelihood of a weekend event, and he said that he did not recall, I quote, he did not: “…recall any information which [could] lead to the induction that this will only be a three-day event.” Based on his review of the Hendon Report. Do you share his view?

    08-036-22

  632. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, let me ask you, along this line, about the fact that many of these truckers were coming a long way from the west; right?

    08-037-14

  633. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you knew that. So for example, you understood that a group of participants from the western convoy was -- well, let me give you the reference. If I could take you to your summary at page 6? So this is WTS00000029. So if we go to the top of the page, the second line: “As an example, PLT reported that the western Freedom Convoy lost many vehicles once it crossed the Manitoba-Ontario border. Interim Chief Bell stated that, as the Freedom Convoy drew closer, OPS knew that it was projected to be large. He noted that by January 29, OPS was expecting 3000-4000 vehicles to arrive in Ottawa.” Is that correct?

    08-037-18

  634. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, given that these convoy participants had driven across the country for more than a week, wouldn’t it make sense that they might want to stay for a little longer than a weekend in Ottawa?

    08-038-07

  635. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So perhaps if I could clarify, let us assume that the intent was to engage in an entirely lawful protest. Making that assumption, wouldn’t the sheer size, the number of trucks, and the intention to stay for as long as it took until the mandates are lifted create a risk that it will be a prolonged issue for the residents, in terms of traffic and other issues that came with such a loud crowd -- large crowd in the downtown area for a long time?

    08-039-12

  636. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, you’d agree with me that around that time, both for the former Chief Sloly, who you report to, as well as Insp. Bryden, who reported to you through Supt. Patterson, raised concerns about the threat assessment? Do you recall any communication with them about the nature of the threat assessment that was produced?

    08-040-06

  637. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, it would appear that that former chief was concerned that the threat assessment reflect the actual reality, and in the days leading up to the arrival of the convoy. If I could take you to some of those documents? OPS00000 -- sorry, 00003073. So if we go down the chain and see the -- how it originated? Go to the very bottom, please. So somebody sent -- sorry, go up. So it appears that the former -- keep going. It appears that the former chief received information sent to him about some potential threat. Go up. And he passed that information on to you. So stop here. So somebody sent information to the former chief directly. Somebody wrote: "I lay awake tonight as I read Twitter posts from the Extreme right vowing attacks on Rideau Hall this weekend. Some are calling for action akin to the happenings in Washington on Capitol Hill. I understand the right to peaceful protest but I'm writing as a very concerned citizen as we are not hearing any reassurances from the city or policing regarding the safety of residents surrounding these vulnerable and targeted spots." So we go up now. The former Chief forwarded that to you.

    08-040-27

  638. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    08-042-01

  639. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sure. Sorry.

    08-042-04

  640. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is that good?

    08-042-08

  641. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    08-042-10

  642. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, I didn't mean to ---=

    08-042-13

  643. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- cut off your reading. If we go up now. It appears that the former Chief forwarded that email to you and to Deputy Chief Ferguson, and he said: "The [email below] from an Ottawa resident who is seeing online postings from what he calls extreme right wing elements calling for violence [in] the event." If we go further down.

    08-042-15

  644. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, okay.

    08-042-27

  645. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right.

    08-043-02

  646. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, no, take your time.

    08-043-05

  647. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So he was outlining the concerns from the citizen?

    08-043-07

  648. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then he went on to say: "Yet our briefing note as of last night says there is no intelligence to indicate that this demo straying will be violent. Please review all available info/intel/incidents and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment and the most appropriate operations plan for the event." And he sent that before your briefing scheduled at nine. So you agree with me that the former Chief was taking an active interest as you got closer to the event and he wanted to ensure that the threat assessment reflects the most accurate information the intelligence could provide; right?

    08-043-10

  649. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. I believe this is the 26th.

    08-043-26

  650. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the former Chief was also concerned about the language and content in the Threat Assessment. If I could take you to the next document. OPS00003748. So you see that this is an email dated the 28th of January. It was directed to Deputy Chief Ferguson, but you were copied on it. The former Chief said: "Thank you for sending this DRAFT Operational Plan -..." I assume this is the 28th plan that we've just seen: "...it is well developed considering how fast moving and fluid the situation has been. I provided you with feedback on this DRAFT report at our 945am meeting in your office; review and improve the language and content in the Threat Assessment, explicit expansion of operational scope to include parallel demonstrations/risk beyond [the] Freedom Convoy, explicit adherence to uniform/conduct policy for all participating members." Do you know if that was done?

    08-044-19

  651. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Let me take you to the note of Acting Superintendent Bryden on the 28th. This is OPS00014555. Can we do down? Sorry, I - - oh, sorry, I didn't give you the page number. Page 9, please. So TA issues. Is that the Threat Assessment issue?

    08-045-22

  652. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the notes of Inspector Bryden said: "Narrative around convoy, but need more info on activists." If we go further down.

    08-046-01

  653. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, I'm sorry.

    08-046-08

  654. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'll let you read it.

    08-046-11

  655. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The bullet I'm interested in is the one the starts with: "[P]lan is de-mobilize the convoy on Sunday but current [Threat Assessment] does not support that operational move; current [Threat Assessment] says low or no threat." Do you know what that means?

    08-046-13

  656. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe it's the 28th. Can we go up to check the date? 28th.

    08-046-24

  657. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now ---

    08-047-09

  658. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. No, but -- it's fair enough. But he seems to referring to the Threat Assessment. And his notation here that it says no and low threat when we interviewed Inspector Bryden, he confirmed that that was the view at the time, that the threat was low to no risk. Do you agree with that assessment?

    08-047-12

  659. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That it was low risk.

    08-047-20

  660. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    On the ---

    08-047-23

  661. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you believe that as of the 28th of January?

    08-047-25

  662. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right, so you interpret the low to no threat as specifically referring to the risk of violence?

    08-048-03

  663. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Not to the risk of a prolonged occupation?

    08-048-09

  664. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. And I suppose one of the challenges you faced at the time was the presence of conflicting information. I -- we put to Deputy Ferguson last week the information that we heard from Hotel Association that people were booking stays of upward of 30 days, and I believe she mentioned there were some information to the contrary. So let me take you to one email, one chain of email. OPS00014930. First of all, do you know of which I'm speaking, the Hotel Association was in touch with the City of Ottawa, and I believe that information was transferred to the OPS. And so on the 25th of January, there was information that there are all these people who may be staying for over than -- for more than 30 days. And then on the 26th, we have this email from -- now, Steve Ball, do you know who Steve Ball is?

    08-049-19

  665. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So if we go down a little bit? So it appears that this is -- do you know who Mathieu Gravel is?

    08-050-08

  666. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So this is an exchange of email between them about the information they had received earlier, and now if we scroll back up?

    08-050-13

  667. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, I'm sorry, I keep doing that. Please take your time. Where do you -- how far do you want us to go down?

    08-050-18

  668. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Certainly.

    08-050-23

  669. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, no. Can we go down to the very bottom, please?

    08-050-26

  670. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I just want to draw your attention to this part at 9:08 p.m. "I'll get a sense of how long they are planning to be here by how long they [I guess it should be book] rooms. So far it's only for a few days." So is that one example of information not being entirely clear?

    08-051-05

  671. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now so everyone's trying to figure out to the best they can what's going to happen, and this Commission has heard from Ms. Carrier, for instance, a week or so ago. I've referenced this when I examined Deputy Chief Ferguson last week, so I'll put that to you again, because Ms. Carrier, who was a businesswoman, a layperson with no access to any police intelligence, just based on her observation, you know, she said -- if I could find the transcript. She said, "To me personally, it was clear that the 70-kilometre train of trucks that crossed the country was not coming in for a small protest in a day. And to me, that Sunday night was the proof that, you know, somebody somewhere had underestimated or not listened to the anger, frustration that a large, at [this] point, you know, large number of people felt. They were coming to the City of Ottawa as the representatives of what they thought and they were going to stay there. They were going to stay there until they were heard." So entirely apart from Intelligence reports and so on, there was this common-sense inference that some people draw, that people are not going to drive all the way from the west with all of these, you know, emotions that the Intelligence reports also refers to, to only stay for a full weekend. So in terms of contingency planning, what role did Intelligence have to inform that contingency planning?

    08-051-25

  672. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now this may be open to debate, but one may argue that the combination of the large number of people in trucks with the expression of an intent to stay for some time until the mandates are lifted logically lead to, you know, this risk of social trauma, if large number are going to stay here for a long time; do you agree?

    08-054-01

  673. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now we expect that Superintendent Bernier, who is testifying tomorrow, may say that there was a bizarre disconnect between the intelligence and the planning. What's your perspective on that?

    08-054-23

  674. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let's go to his interview summary, so that we have more context. WTS000006 -- sorry, 00000030, page 4. So we go down. Oh, sorry, it was earlier. Could we go up again? The second paragraph. So page 4, second paragraph. " Superintendent Bernier also shared his concerns about [the] Freedom Convoy with his supervisor, Superintendent Drummond, on [the 27th of] January [...]. He told Superintendent Drummond that there seemed to be [...] bizarre disconnect between the intelligence contained in the Project Hendon reports and OPS's preparations." Do you agree with that?

    08-055-09

  675. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But the question I guess I put to you is not whether they were raised, but whether you saw a similar disconnect between the information contained in those reports and the way the OPS was preparing for the arrival of the convoy.

    08-056-02

  676. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now as you know, this Commission is ultimately about learning from the past to find out what happened in order to improve what we can do in the future. So as the Deputy Chief responsible ultimately for the Intelligence Unit, what are your thoughts on what could have done -- what could have been done differently or better in order for the OPS or other police services to respond better to an event like this in the future?

    08-056-19

  677. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now let's leave intelligence for a minute, but still, I want to ask you about planning. If I could take you to your interview summary, which is WTS000029. Could we go to page 4? Page 4. I'm looking for the part where you said that the OPS's approach to the protest at the time of the Freedom Convoy did not consider community impact.

    08-058-03

  678. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Sorry.

    08-058-12

  679. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right. " Interim Chief Bell saw it as OP's role to respect lawful protests. He noted that OPS was experienced dealing with lawful protests on national and international issues and ensuring public safety at these protests. He commented that OPS's approach to protests at the time of the Freedom Convoy did not however consider the community impact of demonstrations." We go down a bit. Since the Convoy, [you] not only consider[...] public safety and [...] Charter of Rights and Freedoms [and so on], but also the impact on the community." That -- those two, part of what you just told us. Now at the time though, you sought a legal opinion on what lawful authority was open to the OPS to respond to the arrival of the convoy; right?

    08-058-15

  680. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember when you sought that opinion?

    08-059-13

  681. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay, let's see if your notes help refresh your memory. OPS00014525. So it says here, January 27th, and you have a note: "Convoy Plan. Will develop legal opinion on how we will be able to end the convoy." Does that help refresh your memory?

    08-059-17

  682. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So on the 27th, you sought the legal opinion. Do you remember if you got an opinion back?

    08-059-27

  683. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The next day.

    08-060-03

  684. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's go to that now.

    08-060-05

  685. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if could go to the next document, OPS00003692. Is this the opinion you received?

    08-060-09

  686. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you read it at the time?

    08-060-13

  687. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    08-060-15

  688. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And did you circulate this opinion to anyone else?

    08-060-18

  689. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, because it was requested at one of our morning calls I would've shared it with the entire Command Team, I believe. But I don't have independent recollection that I did forward it on.

    08-060-20

  690. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. But you believe you did?

    08-060-24

  691. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just to be clear, the -- by executive team, you meant?

    08-060-28

  692. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let's take a look at this opinion. Staying on page 1, if we scroll down. The paragraph that starts with, "While the convoy", if we could go up. Yeah, that's good: "While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa, various considerations will need to be assessed and reassessed to determine the appropriate response, including: the balancing of competing Charter rights; impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility; impacts to health and safety; impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles; and impacts to public safety generally." So I want to ask you, in preparing for response, how did you and your executive team consider these bullets, including the impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility, and the last point, impacts to public safety generally?

    08-061-08

  693. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, the opinion talked about the balancing of competing Charter rights, and perhaps many of the residents felt that there was an imbalance. And one of the central question that arose from the planning perspective is about the ability of preventing the trucks from entering the downtown core it the first place. So I want to ask you what was your understanding of the lawful authority for the OPS to prevent the trucks from going downtown and park there that first weekend?

    08-063-11

  694. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, we asked the same question or a very similar question of Mr. Sloly, the former Chief, and I want to show you his answer and ask you if you agree with him. Can we go to the document WTS00000040, and if you could go to page 15, please. The second paragraph: "Chief Sloly was advised that based on the known intelligence reports, OPS did not have the legal authority to deny the Freedom Convoy access to downtown Ottawa simply because some people disagreed with the views of some participants. He understood that OPS did have authority to close roads and restrict traffic if there were public safety concerns, but closures and restrictions had to be commensurate to actual threats or reasonably predictable threats. Highway Traffic Act or by-law violations alone would not be sufficient to justify restricting access to the City for all protestors." Do you share his view?

    08-064-21

  695. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Take your time ---

    08-065-20

  696. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- to reflect upon it.

    08-065-22

  697. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me ask you this. In the subsequent events, Rolling Thunder and so on, did you have different intelligence assessment to suggest a more violent event or higher risk in other aspects?

    08-065-28

  698. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in other words, it’s not the nature of the anticipated protest that changed the planning, it’s the experience of having been through what Ottawa went through in January and February that caused a different planning approach?

    08-066-10

  699. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would you agree then that the only thing that’s changed is the appreciation of the potential risk?

    08-066-27

  700. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I understand you correctly, you said what’s different is the new understanding of what could occur; right? Those are your words?

    08-067-18

  701. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How is that different from appreciation of the potential risk?

    08-067-23

  702. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. We’ll go with your words. Now, I do want to ask you this. Taking you back to the legal opinion, which is OPS00003692. If we go to page 4? Go down. That’s right. The paragraph that starts with “therefore”. “Therefore, while the case law indicates that those who wish to protest have a - Charter-protected right in doing so, it is not without limits. These limits, as the courts have recognized, prevent threats of violence, acts of violence, and unlawful conduct. Moreover, these limits also prevent demonstrators from obstructing travel on roadways. It is worth nothing, however, that there has been at least one decision where it was found that a blockade for a very brief period only constituted a minor inconvenience and was therefore permissible.” So what this memo is saying here is that there are limits to the Charter and part of the consideration apart from potential threats of violence is the prospect of the demonstrators obstructing travel on roadways. That was your understanding too; right?

    08-067-27

  703. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when you have a large crowd of protestors and their trucks being brought to the downtown core with no exit strategy, why is that not a suitable consideration for road closures in order to achieve some of the bullet points we saw earlier in this memo?

    08-068-24

  704. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Commissioner, I am about to embark on a new area. I don’t know if this would be an appropriate time for a break?

    08-069-20

  705. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you very much.

    08-069-25

  706. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning again.

    08-070-09

  707. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we -- before the break, we were talking about intelligence and other aspects of the arrival planning. I’d like to take you now to the events after the convoy has arrived. And during our interview, you explained to us that the events after the convoy arrived could be broken down into different phases. So I’d like to take you to those different phases. And perhaps you can first explain to us what those are. And if may be helpful if we go to your interview summary first.

    08-070-11

  708. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So can we call up WTS00000029, please? And this would be found at page 9. So Interim Chief, you told us that broadly speaking, the events after the convoy arrived could be broken down into three phases. The first, roughly from January 28th, which was a Friday, to February 4th, another Friday. Now, you separated the weekends from the weekdays because you said the weekends are very different. First of all, why are the weekends so different from the weekdays?

    08-070-22

  709. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. So phase one, from January 28th to roughly February the 4th, I believe you call that a period of orientation or adaptation after the convoy’s arrival. Tell us what you meant?

    08-071-16

  710. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now I have more questions for you about this first phase, but before we get into that, I’d like you to tell the Commissioner, first of all, what the other phases are? So the second phase, I believe it is from February the 7th, which is a Monday, to February the 11th. Is that a Friday? I believe it is.

    08-073-13

  711. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. But in any event, from the 7th to the 11th; right?

    08-073-22

  712. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the 7th was the Monday and the - --

    08-073-26

  713. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The Friday.

    08-074-02

  714. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that’s the period when -- you called it the period of ad hoc responses; right?

    08-074-14

  715. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then we move to the third phase, which starts on February the 14th, which is a Monday, and carries on to the end of that week, the 18th. And I think you described that as the week when there was a focus on the development of a long-term plan to end the protest or occupation; right?

    08-074-17

  716. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. These dates aren’t exact, but it gives a general sense of how events progressed. So going back now to the first phase, now, you’ve told us in our interview in the summer that that was a time, you described it as, I believe, let me look for the reference. You said the “OPS was exceptionally unprepared” for and you -- and that you realized that after that first weekend. Do you still agree with that description that you gave before?

    08-074-27

  717. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    In the sense that you weren’t prepared for what would eventually turn into an occupation?

    08-075-10

  718. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, so I want to take you to some documents and see if we can explore further what happened during that period. Superintendent Abrams, from the OPP, testified last week that he had a conversation with you on, I believe the 31st of January, that would be the Monday after the first weekend, and you told him that the OPS is now looking for a full week sustainability plan. Do you recall that conversation?

    08-075-13

  719. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us more about that conversation.

    08-075-21

  720. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you and Superintendent Abrams had ongoing discussions as the events progressed about the different challenges facing the OPP and the OPS; correct?

    08-076-22

  721. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, if I could take you to Superintendent Abrams's summary of the events around that time, perhaps you can tell us if you agree with his description. Could we go to WTS00000013, please? Page 5. So: "On February [the 4th], Superintendent Abrams had what he characterized as a formal conversation with Deputy Chief Bell about OPS's lack of a plan and unified command structure. He explained that by unified command structure, he meant that OPS needed to be unified within itself because it was not at the time. He told Deputy Chief Bell what his OPP officers had relayed to him: that OPS was disorganized and poorly coordinated. He also told Deputy Chief Bell that OPS's maintenance of multiple command centres at the 245 Greenbank Road OPS office where OPS's MIC..." That would be Major Incident Commander?

    08-077-04

  722. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    "...Superintendent Patterson, was based, the OPS headquarters on 474 Elgin Road, and at the NCRCC in Orleans where OPS's Incident Commander was based, were contributing to these problems. Deputy Chief Bell agreed that OPS needed to formalize operations and told Superintendent Abrams that OPS was trying to develop a plan and a unified command. In characterizing the conversation, Superintendent Abrams explained that it was an uncomfortable situation but he felt compelled to raise his concerns and offer advice." Now, there is a lot here, so let's unpack it. First of all, he mentioned that there are multiple command centres. And I believe there are at least three locations there. Is that what happened at the time, that there were multiple command centres within the OPS?

    08-077-27

  723. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The headquarters on ---

    08-078-28

  724. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- Elgin Road.

    08-079-02

  725. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If the NCRCC was where all the actions were, where the Command Post was, do you know why Superintendent Patterson was operating, initially at least, from a different location?

    08-079-13

  726. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Superintendent Abrams also pointed out that there was a lack of a plan and unified command structure. Do you agree with those concerns?

    08-079-19

  727. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Did Superintendent Abrams not also raise some issues with you about the difficulty for the OPP officers to integrate in the sense that the OPS, in his view, had failed to provide deployment instructions to his officers?

    08-080-12

  728. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is it your understanding that there were in fact OPP officers physically situated in Ottawa who were just sitting around and not being effectively deployed, notwithstanding the lack of resourcs on the part of the OPS?

    08-081-01

  729. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was there not also concerns that in terms of the planning there were OPP planners provided to assist the OPS but they couldn’t really do their job because they were conflicting directions from the OPS.

    08-081-09

  730. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Could we go to page 4 of this document? (SHORT PAUSE)

    08-081-15

  731. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The second paragraph: “Superintendent Abrams also reported that OPS planners and the OPP planners assisting them were receiving contradictory directions. At OPS’s request, OPP assigned two members, Inspector Younan and Staff Sergeant Gauvin, to help OPS develop plans. Chief Sloly had requested plans for three scenarios:” Went through the three scenarios. “On February 3, Superintendent Abrams was advised that OPS [Instructor] Michel Marin had informed the OPS planners and the OPP planners assisting them to scrap the 3-scenario planning because Chief Sloly wanted a new, different plan, and that Inspector Marin’s intervention had left the planners confused as to what they should be doing. Superintendent Abrams contacted Deputy Chief Bell, who informed him that Inspector [I don’t know if that’s ‘Marin’ or] Marin lacked authority to issue planning directions and that the planners should be reporting to OPS Superintendent Jamie Dunlop, who was leading planning even though Superintendent Patterson was serving as the OPS MIC.” Does that help refresh your memory?

    08-081-18

  732. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what was the nature of the problem, or perceived problem?

    08-082-23

  733. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, let’s move on, then, to the second phase; as you’ve described it, the phase of ad hoc responses. This would have begun on around the 5th, although you separated the weekends from the weekdays, so probably the 7th, right? So I want to ask you about a number of events that occurred during this period and get your perspective on whether they might be problematic, from your point of view. First of all, on the 4th of February, I think this came from our interview with you, but on the 4th of February, the OPS made an announcement about a search and contain plan. Do you recall that?

    08-083-15

  734. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And my understanding is that that plan contemplated surging officers into neighbourhoods affected by Freedom Convoy activity?

    08-084-01

  735. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As well as hardening the downtown core protest site, including by closing interprovincial bridges and highway off-ramps and so on. Now, you spoke to us about this at page 4 of your summary. So I think what’s on the screen is Abrams’s summary. Can we go to Interim Chief Bell’s summary, please? (SHORT PAUSE)

    08-084-05

  736. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go to page 14: “On February 4 during an 11:40 a.m. press conference, Chief Sloly announced that police would close highway off- ramps and interprovincial bridges to prevent convoy participants from entering Ottawa.” Now, first of all, I don’t know how precise the wording is, so I want to ask for your best recollection of what was announced during that press conference.

    08-084-12

  737. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we carry on: “Superintendent Abrams called Interim Chief Bell and informed him that OPS had not consulted OPP. On February 5 during a 10:00 a.m. briefing meeting...” No, no, no, stay where we are: “On February 5 during a 10:00 a.m. briefing meeting that Interim Chief Bell attended, Chief Sloly directed OPS officers attending the meeting to close off-ramps and bridges.” Now, first of all, is that accurate?

    08-085-01

  738. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “Chief Sloly directed OPS officers attending the meeting to close off- ramps and bridges. Interim Chief Bell stated that his understanding was that OPP, not OPS was responsible for closing off-ramps, and that OPS lacked authority to close interprovincial bridges.” Could you explain the authority to do any of those things to us, please?

    08-085-15

  739. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I understand the sequence, the press conference happened on the 4th, right?

    08-086-19

  740. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then the directions to do these things, to close off-ramps and bridges and so on came on the 5th, the day after?

    08-086-22

  741. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, ---

    08-086-26

  742. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's part of why you distinguished the weekends from the weekdays.

    08-087-07

  743. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, with respect to this incident, the 4th and the 5th, the proposed actions and so on, did you have any concern about the way things unfolded?

    08-087-11

  744. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And why would it be a problem for a strategic-level leader be directing operations? What is the concern underlying this rule that the operational commander should be doing these things instead of the strategic commander?

    08-087-23

  745. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now to what extent is it clear or ambiguous what action constitutes a strategic direction or operation -- operational direction?

    08-088-19

  746. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'm just trying to understand, as a layperson having never worked within an Incident Command, like, what kind of directions would be considered a strategic direction and what direction might be considered an operational or tactical direction?

    08-088-23

  747. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Now in this paragraph that we just read, it would appear from what Superintendent Abrams said that the OPP was not consulted before the announcement was made on the 4th, because he heard it from the news. And since you explained that the OPP would have been responsible for the highway off-ramps and so on, would it have been important to consult the OPP before the announcement was made?

    08-089-24

  748. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. So this is the weekend of the 5th and the 6th, and if we go to the following weekend, you know, I could take you to your summary at page 20. I suppose the OPS was anticipating another search for another weekend, and ---

    08-090-11

  749. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, go ahead.

    08-090-17

  750. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in the middle of the first paragraph, "During the briefing, Chief Sloly directed that OPS close interprovincial bridges and highway off-ramps into Ottawa until Monday, February the 14[th]. Chief Sloly indicated that OPS needed to act because of the municipal and provincial state[...] of emergency." So there appears to be a perceived need to close these off-ramps and bridges again, and he's directing, it appears from this paragraph. Is that what happened?

    08-090-28

  751. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go to the next paragraph? "Interim Chief Bell engaged in back- and-forth discussions with Chief Sloly about whether OPS had authority to close interprovincial bridges and highway off-ramps, including at a 12:17 p.m. meeting that OPS general counsel Christiane Huneault attended." First of all, wasn't this discussion -- didn't you already have this discussion with the former Chief the weekend before about the authority to do all this?

    08-091-14

  752. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Okay. So, anyway, you have these discussions with him on the 12th, I believe, and then in the middle of the second paragraph, "Interim Chief Bell explained that while planning and operations would ordinarily have been Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson's responsibility, he was relieving Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson that day so that she could rest. Ultimately, Chief Sloly agreed that OPS lacked authority to close the bridges and off-ramps and rescinded his direction." So, first of all, this is the weekend that Deputy Chief Ferguson took two days off. We heard about that. Is that right?

    08-091-27

  753. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So during her absence, you stepped in to look after her responsibility, and that's why you were engaging in these discussions; right?

    08-092-16

  754. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Because normally, this is part of the planning.

    08-092-20

  755. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. The next paragraph, "During these discussions, Interim Chief Bell informed Chief Sloly that Superintendent Bernier had developed a traffic mitigation plan to divert arriving convoys away from the downtown core instead of closing off-ramps and bridges." So first of all, we heard about directions to close off-ramps and bridges. Did you have the same concern expressed earlier the weekend before about a strategic-level leader providing operational-level directions?

    08-092-24

  756. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But in this case, we have a different incident commander or event commander who already developed a traffic mitigation plan; right?

    08-093-09

  757. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we start reading from the middle of the third paragraph: “Chief Sloly told Interim Chief Bell that he needed more details on Superintendent Bernier’s plan so he could decide whether to approve it.” Now, do you have any concern about the former chief expressing the need to approve the event commander’s plan?

    08-093-13

  758. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “After some back and forth, OPS implemented the traffic mitigation…” Can we go up? No, sorry, go down. “…traffic mitigation plan, which kept convoys from entering the downtown core. Interim Chief Bell’s notes record that, during the 12:17 p.m. meeting, Chief Sloly told him that Chief Sloly ‘would assess the plan & if not satisfied would take appropriate action[s].’ Interim Chief Bell explained that Chief Sloly was asserting his authority to approve or reject the traffic mitigation plan that Superintendent Bernier was developing, as well as to hold Interim Chief Bell accountable if that plan did not meet the thresholds that Chief Sloly believed it needed to meet.” What did you mean by that? Holding you accountable?

    08-093-24

  759. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Did that cause you concern?

    08-094-21

  760. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you were accountable because you are now stepping into the shoes of Deputy Chief Ferguson, who was the strategic commander; right?

    08-094-27

  761. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so when Supt. Bernier was implementing that traffic mitigation plan as the commander, you were the one then providing strategic oversight?

    08-095-03

  762. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that’s why you would have been accountable if anything went wrong?

    08-095-07

  763. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-095-11

  764. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So was that an example of you trying to protect the autonomy of the operational commander?

    08-095-19

  765. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The -- and I believe the -- at the end of the day, the strategic intent was clear here. Keep convoys out of the area. Supt. Bernier and his team took that away and developed a very strong plan to manage that. Members of our organization and other organizations executed that plan very well that ultimately did result in those convoys not attending. That is how strategic, operational, and tactical level decision makings are intended to work.

    08-095-24

  766. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Now I want to turn your attention to another aspect that happened during the convoy events. If we could go to your summary at page 13? If we go down a little? That’s right. So the last paragraph: “During the interview, Interim Chief Bell stated that there were different perspectives within OPS on the role of PLT during the Freedom Convoy.” And we’ve heard a little about this, different perspectives within the OPS on the role that the PLT should play. Can you tell us more about your perspective and the other perspective on PLT?

    08-096-04

  767. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us both.

    08-096-20

  768. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, the reason I asked you for your perspective and the other perspective is because when you spoke to us in August, I believe, and as captured in this paragraph, you explain that there were different perspectives within the OPS. So you’ve just explained to us the perspective that you adopt, as well as Chief Ferguson -- Deputy Chief Ferguson. But as this paragraph explains in the middle, it says: “In contrast, Chief Sloly and Superintendent Patterson wanted to obtain quick wins. Unless PLT could convince protestors to leave, they saw no room to negotiate and preferred utilizing enforcement. Interim Chief Bell explained that, because of these different perspectives, there was often no agreement on how much negotiation should occur before OPS launched an enforcement operation.” Now, does that paragraph -- does this paragraph accurately describe the tension within the OPS?

    08-097-22

  769. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s right. That’s right.

    08-098-17

  770. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, do you recall that on February the 6th, or around the 6th of February, that you had a conversation with Supt. Abrams from the OPP and he said that the OPS needed to give more PLT autonomy to the PLT team and that the OPS command was not doing that? Do you remember having that discussion with him?

    08-098-19

  771. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you tell us more?

    08-098-27

  772. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Okay. So we’re still within this second phase, this second phase of ad hoc responses. We’ve heard from different witnesses about a meeting on February the 9th. This is the -- after the arrival of the Integrated Planning Group in Ottawa. Chief Pardy and his team came to meet with the OPS Command Team, and there were two meetings on the 8th and the 9th. I want to ask you about the meeting on the 9th. But before the Integrated Planning Group met with your team, you were involved in a morning meeting with the Chief and Deputy Chief Ferguson; right?

    08-099-09

  773. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I want to take you to page 17 of your summary about your recollection of that meeting. So the first paragraph: "After the briefing ended, Chief Sloly met with Interim Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, and OPS Chief Administrative Officer Blair Dunker at 9:15 a.m. During this meeting, Chief Sloly told the attendees that the Integrated Planning Team had come to judge OPS, to take control or command of the situation, and that they would base decisions on whether to send RCMP and OPP resources on whether [the] OPS had plans. Chief Sloly expressed the view that OPP and RCMP were not [t]here to help and were taking directions from their political masters." Does that accord with your recollection of what happened that morning?

    08-099-21

  774. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What do you understand to be the reason that the former Chief expressed those concerns?

    08-100-14

  775. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in terms of the timing, so this is February the 9th, and we've heard that a day or two days earlier, in the Ottawa City Council, there was a motion, I can't remember who was the councillor who brought forward the motion, but effectively to ask the RCMP to take over. Are you aware of a motion?

    08-100-24

  776. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you were there that morning when the former Chief expressed these comments. Did you understand his comments to have anything to connect with the events before, such as the motion in the Council?

    08-101-08

  777. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you mentioned that you did not share the same concerns as expressed by the former Chief, and in the next paragraph, you explain why. Now, I don't want to take too much time reading through your summary so I'm going to take you now to the afternoon meeting with the Integrated Planning Group. And if we could go to a different document, OPS00014454. I understand these to be minutes taken by the scribe at that meeting. If we could go to page 131, please.

    08-101-24

  778. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe these are scribes taking notes for the former Chief; right?

    08-102-10

  779. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    08-102-14

  780. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh ---

    08-102-17

  781. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- so these are notes taken by Ms. Huneault ---

    08-102-20

  782. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- the general counsel for OPS?

    08-102-23

  783. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you.

    08-102-26

  784. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thanks for clarifying.

    08-102-28

  785. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Counsel's notes. So let me try to look for the reference. Can we go down the page?

    08-103-02

  786. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. I'm not sure ---

    08-103-07

  787. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Moment's indulgence. Okay, so I need 131, not 130, please. Keep going down. Oh. Sorry, can we go up again? That's right. Okay. So do you see the comment: "Chief - 'last night was amateur hour. Hard for us to make our logistics there. We need to look professional. Our job is here, our logistics are here. They will be embedded in our plan and we are not embedded in their plan.'" Do you remember that being said?

    08-103-10

  788. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. So I think you're right, we need to know a bit of the context. So can we go up to find the time that may help determine. Okay, sorry. Yeah, down a bit.

    08-103-24

  789. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it appears that this is a meeting that started at around noon.

    08-104-03

  790. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right? And then if we go down a bit. You see the comment from Trish Ferguson, "I want us to limit politics!" We have heard from her that those were discussions at the meeting itself?

    08-104-06

  791. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The Chief said: "Last week we didn't have an incident command. Everyone was running around with confusion. Now we know our roles as of noon." Can we go down: Some of us did our jobs last week in what our teams needed. We need to stay focused and stick to the plan." "Trish - 'they are here to help - [not] sure why we are forcing them to arrive here.'" I believe that was a reference to their attending at the Headquarter location?

    08-104-13

  792. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So getting back to the question I wanted to ask you. What did you understand the former Chief to mean when he said, "our job is here, our logistics are here, they will be embedded in our plan, and we are not embedded in their plan"? What's our plan and what's their plan?

    08-104-28

  793. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you understand why that was important to the Former Chief?

    08-105-09

  794. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you share that concern that the team, the Integrated Planning Group, should be embedded in the OPS plan rather than the other way around?

    08-105-12

  795. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, if I go back to your summary -- so switch back to the summary, please, WTS00000029. We go to page 17. You see the paragraph at the very bottom, the very last line, you describe this meeting as “contentious and heated” ---

    08-105-17

  796. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- the very last line.

    08-105-23

  797. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, sorry, I thought there was a meeting within ---

    08-105-28

  798. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- the OPS team.

    08-106-03

  799. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, I’ll let you explain.

    08-106-05

  800. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    08-106-08

  801. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-106-11

  802. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see.

    08-106-16

  803. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So before the meeting with the Integrated Planning Group, there was a discussion to ensure that the plan was to meet with them and ensure that they will be embedded in the OPS plan?

    08-106-20

  804. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then the OPS Command Team met with the Integrated Planning Group and now here, in this paragraph that we read, you’re describing that meeting with the Integrated Planning Group as “contentious and heated”, right?

    08-106-25

  805. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand that we also put to Chief Pardy of the OPP, who was present during this 12:10 p.m. meeting, about the discussions that was had during this meeting, including asking -- the OPS asking the Integrated Planning Group whether they were willing to be embedded into the OPS plan and he responded yes, they were willing to do that. But tell us why you observed this meeting to be “contentious and heated”.

    08-107-02

  806. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Now, after this meeting with the integrated planning group, there was a kind of debrief within the OPS command team, right; do you remember that?

    08-107-20

  807. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. I’ll try. So this time, we go to OPS00014454. So this is again notes taken by Ms. Huneault, the OPS General Counsel. And I want to take you to -- let me find the right page. Let’s try 139. Do you see references to “OPS debrief from meeting with OPP/RCMP”?

    08-107-25

  808. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    08-108-03

  809. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And there’s a comment attributed to the Chief: "As far as I consider, keep going. Nothing has changed until I hear something different coming from RCMP/OPP." There’s a portion redacted but if we keep going, Chief said: "No, they aren’t part of the command. Just a pie-in-the-sky idea by him, nothing concrete/promises was made." So I want to ask you about just what was discussed at this debrief because we know that during the meeting there was a request that the Integrated Team be embedded under the OPS structure, and they agreed. But after the meeting was over, at this debrief, the Chief said, as far as he’s concerned, “Keep going. Nothing has changed.”

    08-108-05

  810. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah, just scroll up.

    08-108-24

  811. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    08-108-27

  812. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You’re not at the debrief?

    08-109-02

  813. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s right.

    08-109-07

  814. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    08-109-10

  815. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I’m sorry?

    08-109-13

  816. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, this is what we have.

    08-109-16

  817. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It doesn’t specify who was present at this debrief. I suppose it was an assumption my part that because you were there during the meeting that you were part of the debrief.

    08-109-18

  818. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s fine. That’s fine. Now, I understand also that, Interim Chief Bell, you were involved as part of the negotiation -- well, not as a negotiator but you facilitated the negotiation between the City and the protestors.

    08-109-24

  819. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s right.

    08-110-02

  820. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to take you back to the beginning of those events and ask you when -- what date were you first involved in that process?

    08-110-05

  821. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Well, tell us your best recollection as to what happened when.

    08-110-14

  822. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So those were the initial events on or around -- well, you asked if we could refresh -- help refresh your memory by taking you to your notes so let’s go to OPS0000 -- actually, sorry, 00014524. And I’m looking for February 7th but I’m not entirely sure what the page number is. So could we call up that document, please? Yes. It's OPS00014525. So my understanding is that -- can we scroll down to February 7, page 25? I believe it's in the evening. Keep going. All right. Maybe let's try another way. There's another -- I'll take you to an email, OPS00008464. Now, if we go down to the very bottom? So this chain began as a request from Mark Patterson to John Ferguson. First of all, who is John Ferguson?

    08-111-04

  823. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it started as a request from Superintendent Patterson to Staff Sergeant Ferguson, and then if we can go up and follow the chain?

    08-111-24

  824. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay? Go up. So this when you are added to the chain. So does this help refresh your memory as to the date?

    08-112-01

  825. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And the events are essentially as you relayed?

    08-112-08

  826. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, go back up.

    08-112-13

  827. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that’s the top?

    08-112-15

  828. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it came from Mark Patterson, as you said, on the 7th, and then you facilitated contact, and that happened on the 8th, right?

    08-112-18

  829. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So that was your first involvement. And then you had more involvement later; was it not the case, a few days later?

    08-112-24

  830. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I understand that on the 13th of February -- if we could go to your notes now -- it's OPS00014525. Let's go to page 64 of your notes. Yes, page 64.

    08-113-01

  831. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe the date is February 13.

    08-113-06

  832. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    08-113-09

  833. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's go to 12:00 p.m.

    08-113-11

  834. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it appears that there was a briefing and in which you were told of a deal to move the trucks. Do you recall that?

    08-113-13

  835. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What can you tell us about that?

    08-113-17

  836. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I want to ask you -- so in the previous page, page 65, there were some concerns noted around the logistics of moving trucks and that crowd filling -- of crowd filling the neighbourhood roads and so on, right?

    08-113-22

  837. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what was your role at this meeting?

    08-114-03

  838. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, by this time, Deputy Chief Ferguson would have been back, right?

    08-114-12

  839. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so how did you become involved in this?

    08-114-15

  840. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we understand that there will be evidence that later that day -- is it Inspector or Superintendent Drummond?

    08-114-28

  841. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Superintendent Drummond met with the City and protestors to work out some of the details of the deal. To what extent were you aware of those details?

    08-115-04

  842. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that was the first time we saw on this date that you were involved in any discussions. Can you tell us what came of this and what was your role, if any, in the subsequent events?

    08-115-13

  843. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let’s go to your summary.

    08-115-25

  844. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, it may be a good time now and we can come back and finish it.

    08-116-01

  845. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, it is.

    08-116-04

  846. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Interim Chief.

    08-117-17

  847. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So just before the lunch break, I took you to the events of February the 12th, I believe -- 13th. And I took you to your notes. Perhaps we could go there again, OPS00014525. So you may remember that I asked you about this meeting you had at 12 o’clock.

    08-117-19

  848. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And it was a meeting in which you and your command teams discuss this deal that the city was entering into with the protestors; right?

    08-117-26

  849. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, I apologize. It’s page 64.

    08-118-04

  850. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I think you mentioned that you were there in a listening capacity.

    08-118-07

  851. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-118-12

  852. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, given that it was on the 13th of February and we’ve heard some evidence that that was the date when the Integrated Planning Group was very close to finalizing a plan with the Superintendent Bernier, who was the Incident Commander at that time; right? Are you aware of that?

    08-118-17

  853. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You’re not aware that they were working towards an integrated plan.

    08-118-25

  854. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. So I guess one of my questions is whether at this meeting at 12 o’clock when people were expressing concerns -- and we’ve seen some concerns noted in the minutes earlier -- whether anyone brought -- raised any concerns about how this deal might affect the plan being worked on by the larger group, the integrated planning group? Any concerns raised about that?

    08-119-02

  855. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And to the extent that anyone raised any concerns -- and again, if we perhaps scroll down a little. You remember that you read through this and there were some concerns noted; right?

    08-119-14

  856. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you share those concerns raised by others?

    08-119-20

  857. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no. I mean to the extent there were concerns expressed, did you agree with those concerns?

    08-119-24

  858. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah, so if we scroll up a little, for example, "Feds are moving into stage of engagement." What does that mean?

    08-120-05

  859. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And if we go down? "Concern of logistics on how to move trucks." What was that about?

    08-120-14

  860. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now you may not have been aware of the details of the progress of the Integrated Plan, but you were stepping in on the 11th and the 12th for Deputy Ferguson, and in that capacity, you were involved with the planning part; right?

    08-120-22

  861. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would it have been important to understand how this deal fit in with the overall plan? We've heard from Chief Pardy about the importance of ingredients, you know, fitting into the overall plan.

    08-121-04

  862. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But you don't recall any discussions at this meeting about those concerns being expressed?

    08-121-11

  863. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now we know that on the 14th, the next day -- oh, by the way, maybe if I could take you to your summary, so, again, this is -- I think Mr. Clerk will know the number better than I now. So I want to take you to your summary at page 23, because this may also help refresh your memory. Page 23? So if we go down a little. So even though the meeting we just talked about was on the 13th, you learn about this plan to move forward with a kind of deal between the protesters and the City on the 12th. "On February 12[th], Chief Sloly told Interim Chief Bell that the City was involved in discussions with the Convoy leaders to have movement with the current situation and that the information was highly confidential." Does that help refresh your memory?

    08-121-15

  864. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you were aware of the situation on the 12th, and then on the 13th in the morning -- sorry, at around 12, we saw what we talked about. Now when did you notify Superintendent Bernier for the first time that these negotiations were going on?

    08-122-06

  865. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now I understand the sensitive nature of these discussions, but wouldn't you agree that if anyone needed to know, it would have been the one responsible and had the authority for the overall plan; right? And that would have been Superintendent Bernier at that time.

    08-122-17

  866. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when you became aware as the Strategic Commander on the 12th that this was going on, it would have been preferrable that Superintendent Bernier be notified at that time?

    08-122-25

  867. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now that didn't happen, and he found out later. Are you aware that Superintendent Bernier expressed concerns about this negotiation?

    08-123-03

  868. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now if I could take you to the interview summary of Superintendent Bernier, and the number would be OPS000000 and the last 2 digits would be either 30 or 40. I'm told the new internet is slow. Could we try 30 and see if -- I have one in 2 chance of guessing right. Oh, yes, WTS. So if we could go to page 17? So we see under the paragraph "Impact of Negotiations with the City", "On February [the] 13, Superintendent Bernier learned that Mayor Jim Watson planned to meet with protestors to negotiate an agreement whereby some protestors would remove their vehicles from side streets and relocate to Wellington [Street]. Neither the City nor the OPS executive had informed Superintendent Bernier of the negotiation. Superintendent Bernier was concerned. He told Inspector Springer that OPS should stay clear of the negotiation because political influence and political negotiation could adversely impact the police operation that OPS was preparing. He was also concerned that not all protest leaders would agree to move their trucks to Wellington [Steet]. [So] that not all protestors would comply with that agreement. He shared those concerns with the IECT..." Do you know what that is?

    08-123-10

  869. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What is it?

    08-124-16

  870. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    08-124-22

  871. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So Superintendent Bernier passed on those concerns to that group and to, "...Superintendent Drummond and [he] told [...] Drummond not to get involved. However, Chief Sloly ordered Superintendent Drummond to attend the negotiation as OPS's representative. Superintendent Drummond understood Chief Sloly to be directing that OPS attend the meeting and provide logistical support to the City in the negotiation." Those concerns that were expressed, do they ring a bell?

    08-124-25

  872. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you share that concern?

    08-125-13

  873. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right.

    08-125-16

  874. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why not?

    08-125-18

  875. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now perhaps you can help me understand in terms of understanding what is strategic and what is operational and what is tactical. Wouldn't it be equally arguable that negotiation is one component of operations?

    08-126-05

  876. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so why is it a strategic decision?

    08-126-10

  877. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what happened after the 13th was, on the 14th, the movement of the trucks began, and we expect that there will be evidence that the movement started at around 1:00 p.m. And then the movement of the trucks ended sometime that day and did not resume. Do you know why the OPS stopped facilitating the movement of the trucks from the residential areas to Wellington St. on the 14th?

    08-126-22

  878. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you ever made aware of concerns expressed by the PPS, the Parliamentary Protective Service, about this relocation of vehicles?

    08-127-02

  879. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we move forward to the next day, the 15th, and if I can take you to Document No. OPS00014455 -- now, these are the notes of Supt. Drummond. If we go to page 59, and let’s go to 11:20 a.m. Now, you see the reference: "Call from Steve Bell. Direction -- continue to provide safe…" Could you -- do -- I’m not sure I can read that: "…safe passage for truck to Wellington as per the City agreement with Freedom Convoy." So he’s suggesting here that he received a direction from you to continue to provide safe passage. Do you recall giving that direction to Supt. Drummond?

    08-127-07

  880. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the circumstances, why you gave this direction.

    08-127-21

  881. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 15th.

    08-128-08

  882. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    08-128-10

  883. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we heard from Chief Pardy who, as you know, was leading the Integrated Planning Group in Ottawa. We heard from Chief Pardy that he -- the group, the Integrated Planning Group, expressed concern on the 14th when they heard about these negotiations because, in fact, it raised concern for them that the -- that the unified command, or integrated command, was not truly integrated or unified because they were concerned that the OPS was still doing its own thing and not being part of the integrated plan. What do you say to those concerns?

    08-129-07

  884. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But you told us earlier about the need for autonomy of the operational commander, and that would be Supt. Bernier now, working in concert with the Integrated Planning Group. If there were to be changes in strategic direction, wouldn’t it have been important to convey those directions -- change of directions to the group so they could adjust and adapt their plan rather than having a plan and then being told that something now -- different -- altogether different now is happening?

    08-129-20

  885. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, so, on the 15th, when you gave this direction to Drummond to continue to provide safe passage, the fact that you need to direct something to continue implies that something was stopped. Did you not inquire as to the reason for why it stopped before you directed the continuance?

    08-130-09

  886. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And your direction to continue to provide safe passage, was that coming from you or was there any input from anyone else?

    08-130-19

  887. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 15th.

    08-130-24

  888. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    08-130-26

  889. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall any discussions with any officials at the City?

    08-130-28

  890. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    On this day or the day before.

    08-131-03

  891. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We expect that Supt. Drummond may say that he was under the impression that this could have come from the City.

    08-131-06

  892. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay, fair enough.

    08-131-10

  893. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, in my remaining time, which is not very much, there are a couple of small things I want to cover off. First of all, we’ve heard from some of the parties raising the issue as to why ticketing, as a tactic or a strategy, wasn’t employed more as a way to deter the protestors from continuing in their illegal activities. Now, ticketing is a bylaw function but we also understand from the evidence that the City Bylaw officers were listening to the OPS as the lead agency for what would or would not be appropriate under the OPS Incident Command. So what can you tell us about this strategy involving ticketing?

    08-131-15

  894. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I understand it’s not part of your responsibility but, as a member of the executive, did you have any situational awareness of why certain things were done or not done? And in this case, I’m interested particularly about ticketing.

    08-132-03

  895. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Next area -- well, actually, back to one of the areas that we had covered -- I believe you mentioned earlier when I asked you about intelligence that the OPS planning decision was based on intelligence you're familiar with that would suggest that it would be a two-day or a three-day event. Are you able to assist us with any specific document that would lead you to believe that it was a two-or- three-day event?

    08-132-17

  896. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, my understanding from reading those reports when they talked about intelligence gap -- and by the way, you can correct me if I'm wrong -- but intelligence gaps just means we don’t know about it, right?

    08-133-04

  897. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So I remember, for instance, reading the January 25th Hendon Report and it talks about intelligence gaps for those three dates, 29th, 30th, or 31st -- the 28th to the 30th, right -- that I got the impression that what it was talking about was we don’t really know much about what's going to happen on these dates, rather than that these are the only dates we can expect the event will last. Do you agree?

    08-133-11

  898. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So when you're pointing to these dates in the intelligence reports, I'm asking if -- I'm asking for your opinion, since you're the expert in this area -- when they talk about an intelligence gap or let's say these three dates, 28 to the 30th, what do we understand from the intelligence gap? Is it that we don’t really know much about what going on for these dates, or can we conclude from the fact that there's an intelligence gap for these dates that the event will not last beyond these three dates?

    08-133-21

  899. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, we also spoke earlier about planning and who might have had the experience to help the OPS at that time. But don’t you agree that Superintendent Bernier actually had a great deal of experience that he could offer, but he wasn’t really asked to assist at that time, the early -- during the early stages of the convoy events?

    08-134-19

  900. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. I'm not entirely sure how much time I have left, but I have one area left. So if I could take you to the witness summary again, and this time, we go to page 26. Now, I want to ask you about the impact of emergency declarations. So first of all, we know that the City declared emergency on the 6th. In your view, did that declaration of emergency have any impact on the way the police operated?

    08-135-09

  901. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the declaration of emergency by the province?

    08-135-28

  902. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And then if we scroll up -- or sorry, scroll down. So finally, any impact of the federal declaration of the emergency on the 14th of February?

    08-136-08

  903. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'm sorry, I thought you said there were four areas.

    08-137-07

  904. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, that was the fourth? Okay. And the time is up, so thank you very much, Interim Chief. Those are my questions.

    08-137-10

  905. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Just one or two questions, if I may.

    08-274-03

  906. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Chief Bell, counsel for ---

    08-274-06

  907. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's Frank Au for the Commission. Chief Bell, my friend, counsel for the City of Ottawa, put to you the document, OPS00008418. We're calling up the document. If we can go to the first page so we can look at the title. My first question will be to ask if you can help us with the nature of the meeting?

    08-274-09

  908. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it simply says: "Convoy Briefing #18, Tuesday, February [the] 8th, 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m."

    08-274-19

  909. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. If you could go to page 4. So scroll down a little bit. Do you see the comment attributed to you in the middle of the page, it says: "Bell - concerns that City has are political concerns not day to day - if City sits at table is concerned about sitting down as City, Feds will back down and leave it to the City." What does that mean?

    08-275-01

  910. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. Those are my questions.

    08-275-24

  911. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Commissioner. It’s Frank Au for the Commission. Our next witness is Supt. Bernier from the Ottawa Police Service.

    09-229-16

  912. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Superintendent Bernier.

    09-230-01

  913. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We met in August when you attended an interview with the Commission?

    09-230-04

  914. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And after the interview, we prepared a summary of your interview, which you reviewed and made some changes?

    09-230-07

  915. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'm showing you a copy of the finalized version, WTS00000030. It'll show up on the screen. So this is the document that you've reviewed and approved. If you like, we can scroll down a little for you to confirm.

    09-230-11

  916. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    09-230-18

  917. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is this the final version?

    09-230-24

  918. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you adopted the contents of this summary?

    09-230-26

  919. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now let's start with your policing background. I understand that you are a trained Incident Commander?

    09-231-01

  920. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You've attended training of various levels of the Incident Command System?

    09-231-05

  921. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Both in Canada and abroad?

    09-231-08

  922. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us more about your training.

    09-231-10

  923. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now you've served for over 28 years with the Ottawa Police?

    09-231-23

  924. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And during that time, you have been responsible for many large-scale events. Could you tell us about some of those?

    09-231-26

  925. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now I understand that your role during the Freedom Convoy event evolved over time in January and February; am I correct?

    09-232-22

  926. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in mid-January, you were the Inspector in charge of the Information Unit at the OPS?

    09-232-26

  927. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Was that part of the Information Directorate?

    09-233-02

  928. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then you became the Commander in the Service Command Centre?

    09-233-05

  929. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now I'll be taking you through those roles later on, but as an overview, I understand that on the 10th of February, you became the Event Commander with the responsibility and authority to oversee the operations that ended the protest or occupation in Ottawa; am I correct?

    09-233-12

  930. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's start with what you were doing as the Inspector in charge of the Communications Unit. What were your responsibilities back then?

    09-233-18

  931. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was it during that time around mid-January that you first came to know about Freedom Convoy?

    09-233-24

  932. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the circumstances in which you came to know about the convoy.

    09-233-28

  933. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to ask you about this meeting on the 18th of January. Who attended?

    09-234-11

  934. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we look at your summary at the bottom of page 1, which is ---

    09-234-19

  935. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- shown on the screen, there's some names there that you provided to us during the interview. Does that refresh your memory?

    09-234-22

  936. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So this morning we heard from Inspector Lucas. So was he there at this meeting?

    09-234-27

  937. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    09-235-03

  938. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    He was in attendance ---

    09-235-05

  939. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- remotely. There's also references to Staff Sergeant Kennedy, and we know from examining Deputy Chief Ferguson that he was in her planning team.

    09-235-07

  940. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if we go to the next page? Sean Kay, who was Sean Kay?

    09-235-11

  941. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Also reporting to Deputy Chief Ferguson?

    09-235-15

  942. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Through ---

    09-235-18

  943. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right. So was there anyone from the Intelligence Unit who attended that call?

    09-235-21

  944. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And do you know why?

    09-235-25

  945. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now at that meeting, as we know from this summary, at some point, you intervened, but perhaps you can give us more about the context. What was discussed during this meeting?

    09-235-27

  946. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you said that there was information that the truckers were coming to take over the Capital. I want to show you a document OPS00014928. I think we'll see that the title of this document says, "Command Centre Eight-Week DFSS Review." And I'm going to ask you what that means.

    09-236-14

  947. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh. Okay. Is there a way for us to rotate it? Okay. So that’s what this document is. If we go to page 5, please? So at the top of page 5 -- can we zoom in, please? Do you see the reference "Intel from Alberta Sherriff's Department"? Can we go -- make it bigger, the section under "background", so to the right? Sorry, scroll down. That’s right. So intel from Alberta Sherriff's Department. Some truckers planning to slow traffic on Canadian highways." Some of the messaging relates to attending Ottawa by January 31st to shut down the Capital, special events monitoring. Is that what you were referring to?

    09-236-23

  948. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what did you do as a result of listening to this information?

    09-237-11

  949. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we go back to the -- your summary, WTS00000030, did you talk to anyone else after this meeting?

    09-237-23

  950. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    09-237-27

  951. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let's take a look at the summary. During the meeting, you ---

    09-238-01

  952. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I could take you to this passage here, the second paragraph on page 2: "During the call, the presenter stated that the Freedom Convoy was travelling across Canada." And then if we go to the fourth line: "Bernier intervened and stressed that OPS needed to start preparing for the Freedom Convoy and making decisions now. He asked that the OPS Intelligence Directorate knew about the -- what the OPS Intelligence Directorate knew about the Freedom Convoy, stated that the Intelligence Directorate and a Special Events team needed to become engaged in planning for the Freedom Convoy." Does that refresh your memory?

    09-238-20

  953. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So now, we looked -- we saw from an earlier document that Sergeant Kennedy was at this meeting. Are you aware of any actions that Kennedy took after this meeting?

    09-239-11

  954. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, at some point, I understand that you came to learn about what's called "Hendon Reports".

    09-239-19

  955. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When did you first learn about the Hendon Reports?

    09-239-23

  956. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how did you come to know about them?

    09-239-26

  957. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you read the report dated January 27th?

    09-240-03

  958. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was your reaction upon reading that report?

    09-240-06

  959. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I want to take you to the Hendon Report now, the 27th, which you said you read, OPP00001331. Is that the report you read?

    09-240-15

  960. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in your summary -- in the interview you attended, you told us that you became concerned after reading this report, that the Freedom Convoy could cause serious disorder in the city. Specifically, you observed that the Hendon Reports indicated that protestors were planning to stay in Ottawa until their demands were met. Was there anything else in this report that caused you concern?

    09-240-19

  961. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If we go back now to the summary, WTS00000030, can we go to page 3, please? If we go down to the paragraph starting with, "Superintendent Bernier was not surprised." Now, you told us that when the convoy ultimately arrived, you were not surprised by the number, and that was not only because of what you read in the Hendon Report, but what you also knew about farmers clearing out massive tracts of parking space. Could you tell us more about that?

    09-241-07

  962. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, did you talk to Inspector Lucas on the 27th?

    09-241-27

  963. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let me show you a document, OPS00003410. So this is a chain of email. If we go to the bottom. Okay. So maybe up a bit to the text. So we start at -- as an email from Michael Cudrasov to Steven Williams. Who is Steven Williams?

    09-242-03

  964. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If we go up. Following a request -- so this is an email now from Steven Williams to Russ Lucas and you as well as replying to Louis Carvelho -- sorry, not replying, but included in the recipients: “Hi. Following a request to confirm that land was being cleared to allow trucks from the Freedom Trucks Convoy to park up near Ottawa, I asked Cst. Alden to check 37 zone for this and he sent the below information and photographs.” So when we were -- further down below, we saw some photographs. “I submit this for your information and detention as required.” If we go up -- oh, that’s the top. Okay. So can you tell us about this?

    09-242-12

  965. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so this was on -- this email’s dated January the 27th. Did you speak to anyone else about your concerns after reading the Hendon Report?

    09-243-06

  966. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No. I mean in addition to Lucas. Anyone else?

    09-243-14

  967. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When was that; do you remember?

    09-243-18

  968. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what his role at that time?

    09-243-21

  969. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the nature of your conversation with him?

    09-243-25

  970. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did he respond?

    09-244-04

  971. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, did you eventually receive the plan, any kind of operational plan or traffic plan before the arrival of the convoy?

    09-244-07

  972. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Yeah. So you received a plan on the 28th?

    09-244-14

  973. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me show you the document and see if that is the plan you received. OPP00004262. So that’s the title page. If we go down, you see that it was prepared by Sergeant Sean Key on the 28th of January. Was that the document you received?

    09-244-17

  974. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let me show you another one, then. But did you, at some point, receive this?

    09-244-25

  975. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember when?

    09-245-01

  976. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    so let me show you another document and see if that’s the first document you received. OPP00004261.

    09-245-10

  977. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So when did you receive this first plan?

    09-245-16

  978. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was your -- how did you react when you first saw this plan? Did you read it?

    09-245-20

  979. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And were you expecting a traffic plan at that time?

    09-245-26

  980. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So that was the first plan you received, and it was a traffic plan. Were you expecting something else?

    09-246-03

  981. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Then what happened?

    09-246-10

  982. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how did you come to receive the earlier document that we showed you?

    09-246-14

  983. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if I could take you to the second document that you received, the one that was dated January the 28th. The document number, again, is OPP00004262. If I could take you to the Threat Assessment section. So when you read the document -- which I believe you said was the next morning after it was sent to you?

    09-246-22

  984. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you have an opportunity to read this part?

    09-247-02

  985. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was your assessment of this?

    09-247-05

  986. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you have any concern?

    09-247-11

  987. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if I could take you back to your interview summary? By now, Mr. Clerk, we know the number well. And I want to take you to page 4 of your summary. So page 4, in the two paragraphs that we see here on the screen, you describe what you just told us about the sequence of events and how you came to receive these two plans; right?

    09-247-17

  988. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we scroll back up? And so there’s also reference to your conversation with Supt. Drummond on the 27th. I want to ask you something that you told us during the interview. On the 27th, when you spoke to Supt. Drummond, you told him that there seemed to be a bizarre disconnect between the intelligence contained in Project Hendon Reports and the OPS preparations. What did you mean by that? The bizarre disconnect?

    09-247-26

  989. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I -- we scroll down the page to the last paragraph on this page, around the middle there, do you see: “Superintendent Bernier was concerned that the plan appeared to be planning for a two-day event because the Project Hendon reports indicated that protestors were indenting to stay until their demands were met.”

    09-248-26

  990. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could you explain your concerns?

    09-249-08

  991. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When you read the plans, both documents that you’ve received on the 28th and that you read on the 29th, did you see any contingency planning?

    09-249-14

  992. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What were those indications?

    09-249-19

  993. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were they actually attached?

    09-249-22

  994. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when you said indications, do you mean, like, the index or the table of contents referring to the existence of those plans?

    09-249-24

  995. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let’s move on to -- well, so you got these on -- you read them on the 29th. And that would have been a Sunday; right? Sorry, a Saturday?

    09-249-28

  996. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you said you were looking at the documents with a view to determining whether there was any references to you or your role?

    09-250-04

  997. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why did you do that?

    09-250-08

  998. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was there a role for you?

    09-250-12

  999. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Then what did you do?

    09-250-14

  1000. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What were your plans?

    09-250-17

  1001. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Did you go skiing?

    09-250-19

  1002. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I wouldn’t ask you how the skiing went, but when did you come back?

    09-250-21

  1003. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what did you find when you came back on Monday?

    09-250-24

  1004. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So at this time when you were the inspector, who were you reporting to?

    09-251-02

  1005. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What, if anything, did you say to him when you came back on the 31st?

    09-251-05

  1006. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And?

    09-251-09

  1007. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So now on the 31st, did you ask again?

    09-251-12

  1008. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, sorry.

    09-251-16

  1009. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the first would have been -- was that a Tuesday?

    09-251-18

  1010. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So you came back on the 1st and you asked if there was a role for you and he said no?

    09-251-21

  1011. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you just carried on your regular work?

    09-251-24

  1012. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And did he give you the same answer both times?

    09-252-01

  1013. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you asked on the 31st and the 1st. what about the 2nd?

    09-252-04

  1014. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You asked again?

    09-252-07

  1015. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you got ---

    09-252-09

  1016. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    09-252-12

  1017. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you eventually asked to do something?

    09-252-15

  1018. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When was that?

    09-252-18

  1019. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the ask?

    09-252-20

  1020. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that’s your new role during this convoy period that you told us a little bit about. Let’s talk about the Service Command Centre. What is it?

    09-252-24

  1021. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what was your role going to be now that you’re assigned to the Service Command Centre?

    09-253-06

  1022. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, I understand through the interview we had with you before, that while you were at the Service Command Centre, you took a number of steps to try to improve the organizational response. And we can see those at the next page, but can you tell us what some of those steps were? So we can go back to the top of the page. Yeah. No, sorry, the top of page 6. Yeah. You can also tell us from your memory what you did.

    09-253-17

  1023. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. If we scroll down to the next paragraph, so the -- the end of the first sentence starts: “When he arrived, there were numerous plans in circulation, but many of them were not signed and it was unclear which had been approved. There were also delays in locating plans due to the lack of a filing system. Supt. Bernier observed that the Event Commanders were not aware of what plans the SCC...” Is that Service Command Centre, SCC?

    09-254-18

  1024. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Some lawyers would know that as the Supreme Court of Canada. “...Bernier was not aware of what plans SCC had prepared. He noted that during Supt. Patterson’s service as Event Commander, he was based at...” And then you went on and talked about the different locations. But let me ask you about these plans. When you referred to the numerous plans, what kind of plans were you talking about?

    09-255-04

  1025. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So since we’re talking about plans, I want to take you to the next page of the summary, the third paragraph where you said: “Supt. Bernier stated that he was not aware of any overall operational plan with various supporting plans between February 3rd and February 10th.” What did you mean by that? First of all, what’s the overall plan and what are the various supporting plans that you had in mind?

    09-256-05

  1026. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And you spoke earlier about the changing Event Commanders, so I want to take you to another document, OPS00007898. I believe these are scribe notes, your scribe notes, but you can confirm whether that is the case. Are these scribe notes?

    09-256-23

  1027. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What are scribe notes?

    09-257-02

  1028. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we’ll be referring a fair bit to these scribe notes. And just to understand the format, there are two columns reporting names and on the left is the -- is who gave the information; right?

    09-257-17

  1029. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If it’s a conversation, it’s the one speaking, I assume, and then the next column is who is receiving the information. So on this page, we see that the date is February 7th. By this time, who was the Event Commander?

    09-257-22

  1030. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we go to the next page. Do you see the reference at 10 o’clock, “Creating new command model”? What is that about?

    09-258-01

  1031. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And then if we go down further, there are references to “Strategic operational technical levels need to be managed”. Was there some discussion about the command structure employed previously and what the OPS wanted to move to?

    09-258-09

  1032. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. Okay. So -- now, we saw earlier your statement that between the period of February 3rd and February 10th, there was no overall operational plan. Were you aware of any attempt to create such a plan during this period between the 3rd and the 10th?

    09-258-20

  1033. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So do you recall what date that took place?

    09-259-01

  1034. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let me take you to a document and see if that refreshes your memory. OPS00008420. And I’m going to take you to page 6. So if we go down to 1530, is this -- okay. So do you see the reference: “D/C Ferguson expressed plans to create an 8 point plan and SMEAC based on Chief’s comments to media and command and present this SMEAC tonight to outside agencies.” So a couple of things. Sorry. Did we look at the date? Maybe we scroll back up a bit to ---

    09-259-05

  1035. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So now, when you refer to an attempt to create something like an overall plan, was this the date when the meeting took place?

    09-259-19

  1036. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Of course.

    09-259-24

  1037. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But before we do that ---

    09-259-26

  1038. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- we a notation that Incident Commander, I/C, stands for Bernier; right?

    09-259-28

  1039. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    09-260-04

  1040. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. But just so we understand, when we read the notation in these notes, when we read ---

    09-260-07

  1041. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- “I/C”, can we take that as a reference to things that you said?

    09-260-10

  1042. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we go back down to 1530, take a look at the contents.

    09-260-13

  1043. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that phone call.

    09-260-17

  1044. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Just to put this in context, we have heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that February 8th was also the day when the Integrated Planning Group arrived in Ottawa, and they had a meeting that day and the following day. And so here there’s a reference to an “eight-point plan”, right? Now, there’s also the work SMEAC; what does that mean?

    09-260-27

  1045. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So these notes suggest that Deputy Chief Ferguson wanted to create this eight-point plan and it was based on the Chief’s comments, right ---

    09-261-08

  1046. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- with a view to presenting it to the outside agencies. Why did you recommend something else?

    09-261-12

  1047. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So just so we understand, was she asking you to do something at this time?

    09-261-19

  1048. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you redirected her to the event commander, who was Patterson at the time?

    09-261-25

  1049. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why were you so concerned about who should be developing the plan? And I take it it’s your view that Patterson was -- the operational commander should be doing that?

    09-262-01

  1050. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    09-262-07

  1051. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that something you learned from all those incident command training, that this is what was supposed to happen?

    09-262-13

  1052. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did they teach you as to why would have been important?

    09-262-17

  1053. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Okay. Let’s go to the next document. Actually, staying at the same document, let’s go down a few pages to page 9. And if we go to the time, 19:03, do you see the notation: "Met with big 12 commanders. They’re asking for our plans, asking what the plan is to use these resources in Ottawa." And then we continue to the next page: "OPS Chief went public asking for 1790. Commanders need plan for Phase 3. Commanders asked why 1790. Where will they be deployed? What are they expected to do?" Tell us your understanding, what this was referring to.

    09-262-24

  1054. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    There are many questions here. Were these your questions or questions that others put to you? Like, “Where will they be deployed? What are they expected to do?”; who’s asking these questions?

    09-263-19

  1055. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So they’re asking for a plan. Was there a plan in existence at that time to show them?

    09-264-02

  1056. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    This is the eighth.

    09-264-06

  1057. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now I’m going to take you to another plan, OPP00001889. This is something that -- this is a document that we’ve shown to other witnesses and we’ve been calling it “The February 9th Plan.” Let’s zoom out and take a look at the cover. Sorry. Sorry, go back up to the title. It says, “Version 3.0”. Are you familiar with this document?

    09-264-10

  1058. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So tell us more about it.

    09-264-18

  1059. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. I want to take you to the Mission Statement, which is Section 2.1. I believe it’s page 6. Take a look at the mission statement: "To end the unlawful elements of the Ottawa Truck Demonstration and restore safe and open neighbourhoods and businesses." When you eventually became event commander on the 10th, I understand that you rewrote the mission statement; am I right?

    09-264-27

  1060. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what is your view about the adequacy of this Mission Statement?

    09-265-10

  1061. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why not?

    09-265-19

  1062. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. What -- apart from the Mission Statement, what else, if anything, in your view, was missing from this plan?

    09-265-23

  1063. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    09-265-28

  1064. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let’s go back up. The Table of Contents.

    09-266-05

  1065. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The Commander’s intent?

    09-266-09

  1066. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Can we go to the -- this witness’s summary, please? (SHORT PAUSE)

    09-266-16

  1067. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we go to page 8, that’s right, the second paragraph. Sorry; go back up. “Superintendent Bernier received a copy of this plan on February 9, which was titled ‘Phase 2.1, [version] 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo’ 22’ (the February 9 Plan) The February 9 Plan incorporated the organizational chart that Superintendent Bernier prepared.” Did you prepare an organizational chart that went into this plan?

    09-266-19

  1068. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay: “It also included tables listing the numbers required for maintenance staffing, enhanced staffing, and interdiction and enforcement staffing.” So are these things that you have provided input into as they were organizing this plan?

    09-267-04

  1069. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. It goes on: “Superintendent Bernier and his SCC team supplied these numbers in response to a request for how many officers OPS required to maintain its response to the Freedom Convoy on a 24-hour basis. Superintendent Bernier [maintained his response -- sorry] indicated that the tables in the February 9 Plan did not include a tactical support element, and that it was unclear to him whether there was a mass arrest and processing plan.” What’s a “Tactical support element”?

    09-267-18

  1070. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you told us earlier that between the 3rd and the 10th you were not aware of any overall plan, and since you received this on the 9th, did you consider this to be an adequate overall plan?

    09-268-11

  1071. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you not review this plan ---

    09-268-24

  1072. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- in preparation for this?

    09-268-26

  1073. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let’s do that. Mr. Clerk, do you still have the number? Thank you. (SHORT PAUSE)

    09-269-01

  1074. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let me ask you, then, if we go back to the witness summary, what is the impact on the OPS response to the convoy event, because these elements that you are now telling us were missing from this plan; what’s the consequences? If we go to page 7, during the interview you told us -- so, sorry; go up a little bit. So this paragraph that starts: “Superintendent Bernier also observed that, in the absence of an overall plan, OPS prioritized low-level enforcement activities such as ticketing and fuel seizures during this period.” First of all, just to be clear, “This period” does it refer to the earlier paragraph as between the 3rd and the 10th?

    09-269-23

  1075. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So here you said the OPS lacked an overall plan and was prioritizing these other things. Was that an accurate description of what happened during this period?

    09-270-13

  1076. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let me ask you first about ticketing, because there is at least -- there seems -- there is at least a perception that the OPS did not encourage ticketing because of concern about volatility and so on. So how much ticketing was actually going on during this period?

    09-270-20

  1077. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what other kinds of enforcement activities did you have in mind when you made that comment?

    09-271-03

  1078. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go down that paragraph: "He characterized OPS's focus on enforcement and messaging about enforcement as an emotional response to public sentiment that OPS was not doing enough to address community concerns. He noted that he felt the enforcement messaging was counter-productive because the public realized that enforcement efforts were not causing the protestors to leave." Can you explain what you meant?

    09-271-09

  1079. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. So if I can move now to a different document, OPS00008850? So can we go down -- I'm not sure if this is the right document. Let me check again. Let me preface this next line of questioning with this. In terms of enforcement efforts, we've heard from other witnesses including Deputy Chief Bell yesterday that some of the things that happened during this period included what was done at Coventry Road. Are you familiar with what happened at Coventry around this time?

    09-272-05

  1080. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I believe this is your notes or the scribe notes, OPS00007898. I believe the date is February 7, at page 1, if we go to line 41. That’s right. Do you see information from Bernier to Patterson, information from NCRCC, "POU are planning on attending Coventry." What was that about?

    09-272-18

  1081. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let's go down, I guess, to the next page. Can we go further down and see what's there at 11:05? Moments. Okay. Let's move to another area. Can we go to your summary at -- sorry? Okay. Let's try again. OPS00008858, okay. Page 2. Now, at 11:05, do you see a reference to "Patterson has decided that --- " Can we enlarge it? "Patterson has decided that Coventry is to be emptied out." And then if we go down to 11:16, "Patterson did not know that info, that OPS directed them to go to Coventry." Do you remember what this was about?

    09-273-02

  1082. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So 11:16.

    09-273-18

  1083. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then you go down, there was information from Patterson, right, that starts with, "Did not know that info."

    09-273-20

  1084. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Do you know something about the Rideau Sussex operation?

    09-273-24

  1085. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go the witness summary at page 10, please? So it says here: "On February the 7th, after 4:00 p.m., Superintendent Patterson informed Superintendent Bernier that OPS was planning to use POU officers to clear the Rideau Sussex intersection." Do you remember having that conversation?

    09-274-02

  1086. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was your involvement at that time, if any?

    09-274-12

  1087. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you involved in requesting a traffic plan?

    09-274-20

  1088. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let's go to OPS00008575. So if we go down -- I believe this is an email you sent to Denis Hull. Who is Denis Hull?

    09-274-23

  1089. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what was your request to Denis?

    09-274-28

  1090. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    09-275-17

  1091. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you think of the Rideau/Sussex operation at the time?

    09-275-21

  1092. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, in the witness summary you stated that the contemplated Rideau/Sussex operation was a typical example of the lack of proper structure, command and control that characterised OPS Operations up until February the 10th. Do you still -- are you still of that opinion?

    09-276-01

  1093. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Explain the totality to us, please.

    09-276-15

  1094. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'd like to talk to you next about the kind of communication within the OPS at the time, as well as communications between OPS and its external partners. Starting first with internal communications. What do you remember of the kind of communications challenges or successes around this time?

    09-277-02

  1095. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me take you to your summary and see if that's something that you said at the interview reflects what you just told us. If we go to page 12. The very last sentence: "He stated that they were demoralized because they were not informed..." Can we go -- carry on: "...they were not informed that there was an overall plan and were not provided clear instructions, such as instructions concerning their authority to seize fuel and what to do with seized fuel. He stated that members in the OPS had limited knowledge on what was going on, [and] what was happening next, or who was in charge or who was in charge." Is that accurate?

    09-277-25

  1096. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Does that relate to what you were just telling us?

    09-278-16

  1097. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you went on to say: "He had been informed that Chief Sloly confused members by going down to the OPS parade room and telling members to get out onto the streets to deal with problems. Superintendent Bernier observed that many of OPS officers were attempting to do the right thing and come up with solutions, but that they may not have had the proper background and training to do what was needed." Well first of all, you said you had been informed. Who informed you about what you said about Mr. Sloly?

    09-278-19

  1098. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You don't remember who was the person -- who was the ---

    09-279-07

  1099. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the context, do you remember, in which this -- like what's the parade room?

    09-279-10

  1100. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about communications between the OPS and its external partners?

    09-279-18

  1101. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go to page 6 of the interview summary? Do you see the paragraph under OPS Use of RCMP and OPP Officers? "Superintendent Bernier observed that between February 3 and 10, OPS was using RCMP and OPP officers to relieve OPS officers who were exhausted, and not as part of a plan to end the occupation. He stated that he was aware that OPP officers were often not receiving instructions or assignments from OPS during this period." Was that an example of a communication issue?

    09-279-24

  1102. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So up to now we've been talking about events before you were appointed Event Commander, and that happened on the 10th; am I right?

    09-280-25

  1103. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So ---

    09-281-01

  1104. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you told us during the interview that there was a condition to your acceptance of this appointment. Can you tell us about that?

    09-281-03

  1105. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why did you make that a condition of your acceptance of this appointment?

    09-281-10

  1106. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you referred to “observations and experiences”. Tell us more about those observations and experiences that caused you concern.

    09-281-21

  1107. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you give us any examples?

    09-282-03

  1108. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So with whom did you discuss your concerns?

    09-282-15

  1109. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was she the one who approached you to be the event commander?

    09-282-18

  1110. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When did that conversation took place?

    09-282-21

  1111. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So she came to you and asked you to be the event commander, and you said what?

    09-282-25

  1112. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when did you reply to her?

    09-283-06

  1113. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you get any assurances from her about your concerns?

    09-283-08

  1114. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What other request?

    09-283-12

  1115. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who was that?

    09-283-19

  1116. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why him?

    09-283-21

  1117. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did Deputy Chief Ferguson say?

    09-283-28

  1118. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Any other request from you?

    09-284-04

  1119. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did she say?

    09-284-09

  1120. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So there were quite a few conditions that you made. Any others?

    09-284-12

  1121. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. So before you were appointed event commander, I suppose you made these observations, and did you make any attempt to correct anything that you saw problematic during the earlier period?

    09-284-18

  1122. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    09-285-03

  1123. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you feel sufficiently assured by Deputy Chief Ferguson to take on the job?

    09-285-06

  1124. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when did you accept the appointment? Did you accept it on the same day?

    09-285-09

  1125. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what became your immediate priorities?

    09-285-13

  1126. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let me take you to the scribe notes again, OPS00010050. So we go first to page 3. Now, you see the part where it says: "Also expressed concern about taking on that role…" And then it goes on and talks about some of the concerns you just told us about, right? If we go further down to page 4, the next page, you advise her that you: "… would consider taking this on but would need to discuss rest period, assign a proper command/control model." So you told us about the command/control model. What about the rest period?

    09-285-22

  1127. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. And then further down: "…as well as building a proper team." Is that what you talked about?

    09-286-11

  1128. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    09-286-21

  1129. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I requested -- at this particular time, I requested that Deputy Chief Ferguson be the go-between.

    09-286-26

  1130. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that would be appropriate. If she’s the strategic commander, the Chief would be dealing with the strategic commander for any of his wishes or direction and it’s up to the strategic commander then to filter to the event command level, the operational level, as to what is needed to be done. And when I’m saying what, it’s a very high level. What are the high-level objectives.

    09-287-01

  1131. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so you started by saying “At this time” that she was the go-between.

    09-287-09

  1132. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did that change at some point?

    09-287-12

  1133. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And who was that person?

    09-287-22

  1134. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When did that happen?

    09-287-24

  1135. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let’s see if this will help refresh your memory. OPS00010371 at page 4. Actually let’s stay there. We’ll note the date. February 12th. And then we go to page 4. Do you see the first line?

    09-287-28

  1136. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “Drummond to keep the position of executive Liaison” Is that what you told us just now?

    09-288-07

  1137. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so he would become the new go- between, so to speak?

    09-288-12

  1138. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    09-288-17

  1139. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So you accepted the appointment, you had a good night of sleep, I hope, and then the next day, what happened?

    09-288-21

  1140. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I want to take you to your notes, where you set out a whole list of priorities. This can be found at OPS00010050. At page 7, please. So we see a list here: “we agreed that Command Post would be set up in The NCRCC objectives of today…” So I’ll let you take a look at the list. We can scroll down when you’re ready.

    09-289-03

  1141. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    09-289-14

  1142. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. I’d like you to take a look at the whole list, and then explain to us what they are and why they were important to you. Can we scroll down? I think there are six listed there. So there’s more than ---

    09-289-17

  1143. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So tell us about these objectives. Why -- and did they -- did the number suggest their importance?

    09-289-25

  1144. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    09-290-04

  1145. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was this an attempt to course correct when you said reset?

    09-290-09

  1146. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So why did you start with the mission statement, which was number one?

    09-290-12

  1147. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what about the second one? The new command control structure?

    09-290-20

  1148. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go back up to the number two? Yeah.

    09-290-23

  1149. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    09-290-26

  1150. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the third point?

    09-291-04

  1151. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We can scroll down.

    09-291-06

  1152. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let’s talk about some of these priorities. First, with respect to the mission statement, it may be the same document, if we go down to page 11, ---

    09-291-14

  1153. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Page 11. Fifteen oh one (1501) I think is the time I’m looking for. So is that what you decided upon as the mission statement?

    09-291-19

  1154. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could you read this to us?

    09-291-24

  1155. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we might have seen the same mission statement before on what we call the February 13th plan. Do you know the one I’m referring to?

    09-292-07

  1156. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we may look at that a bit later, but this statement, as currently phrased in your notebook, or your scribe notes, was it the same as what was put into the February 13th one?

    09-292-11

  1157. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So given the importance you attach to mission statements, let’s unpack this a little bit. If we go back up to the beginning of this statement. First you said: “Using an integrated response”. Why -- what is an integrated response and why was that important to you?

    09-292-21

  1158. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the next element I want to turn your attention to is the utmost respect to the individuals' Charter rights of protest, well, freedom of speech and freedom to assemble, and so on. Why is that important?

    09-293-06

  1159. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So and then the third element -- I think if we go -- scroll back up, there's a reference to enforce legislation, right?

    09-293-15

  1160. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But to do so in a way that ensure to keep the peace and safety and so on. Tell us the importance about that.

    09-293-19

  1161. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we know that you also developed a main action plan, right?

    09-294-01

  1162. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was that about?

    09-294-04

  1163. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in the interests of time, I won't take you to another document, but it's found in your witness summary and it basically say to de-escalate and negotiate a peaceful resolution and demobilization of the Ottawa truck demonstration. Am I correct?

    09-294-07

  1164. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you elaborate on that?

    09-294-13

  1165. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, so that was your priority number one, to develop the main -- the mission statement. You also mentioned the importance of verifying command and control structure. So I want to take you to OPP00002162. I believe this is an organizational chart. So if we go further to the right. Now, is this what you developed on the 11th?

    09-294-18

  1166. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So explain this to us. Why did you -- how did you come up with this structure, and why did it make sense to you then?

    09-294-27

  1167. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you want it bigger?

    09-295-04

  1168. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go to the very top? That’s right. So at the top, the OPS command team, who's that?

    09-295-08

  1169. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So he would be at the strategic level?

    09-295-13

  1170. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Between the former chief and the Deputy Chief Ferguson, there are these two boxes, the legal and the communications. What's the significance of putting them there?

    09-295-18

  1171. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, when you were working on this organizational chart on the 11th -- and this chart suggests that it is only the OPS command team at the top -- there's no reference to the OPP or the RCMP. So when we read earlier in your notes and your mission that it's supposed to be an integrated approach, did integration, to your mind then, refer to integration with external services such as the OPP or the RCMP?

    09-295-28

  1172. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Explain the difference to us, please.

    09-296-10

  1173. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, you told us that based on your observations and experiences in the earlier part of the convoy events, there were issues that you observed, and when you are now the event commander, did you make any attempt to -- like, when you said reset, what was that reset? Like, how were you correcting what you thought was not working before?

    09-296-21

  1174. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I apologize. I realize I wasn’t specific enough. So for example, taking the Coventry or the Rideau Sussex incident, how would this command structure be able to improve on what was problematic, as you've described before?

    09-297-08

  1175. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So for example, we see at your command table POU chief, right? Is that Public Order Unit?

    09-297-27

  1176. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And now, next to the POU, there's a small redaction.

    09-298-02

  1177. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So Wallace?

    09-298-06

  1178. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But Wallace was ---

    09-298-09

  1179. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, okay. And -- I see. And Walker was part of the OPP ---

    09-298-11

  1180. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- PLT team?

    09-298-14

  1181. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So -- and then we see further to the left, executive liaison, Acting Superintendent Drummond?

    09-298-16

  1182. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that speaks to your concern about keeping some distance with the former ---

    09-298-19

  1183. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the intelligence part is also represented at this table by Inspector Bryden.

    09-298-27

  1184. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now going back to the blue box near the top, how does putting the communication piece there help ensure or improve communications?

    09-299-02

  1185. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And then for both you and for your Deputy, there are scribes who record things while you are busy doing things?

    09-299-15

  1186. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now so this is what you achieved on the 11th of February. We've heard that this Integrated Planning Group has arrived in Ottawa since the 8th. And when did you first have a conversation with anyone in that group about your new plan?

    09-299-19

  1187. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Perhaps before we talk about your work with that group, let's first talk about what you did with this plan that you started to develop yourself on the 11th. What was your next step, once you had this command structure clarified, your mission statement and main action plan at least outlined, what else did you do?

    09-300-01

  1188. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So did you touch base with Deputy Chief Bell on the 11th?

    09-300-15

  1189. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you know what time?

    09-300-18

  1190. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you ---

    09-300-21

  1191. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    09-300-24

  1192. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you also meet or talk to the Chief?

    09-300-26

  1193. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let me take you to your notes. OPS00010050. I'm going to take you to page 17. If we go down to 18, looks like 1820 -- actually, go up a little bit. So 1814 reported information from you to the Chief just to point out -- can you read that to us, please?

    09-301-02

  1194. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you mean by that?

    09-301-09

  1195. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So during this discussion with the Chief, were you talking about this new plan that you're trying to develop?

    09-301-18

  1196. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you see at -- I'm not sure what time it is after 1814. What's the next entry?

    09-301-22

  1197. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    1815. And there's a notation that the Chief said to you, "I'm okay with everything you said/requested - with your email add org chart and mission." Tell us your best recollection about that conversation.

    09-301-25

  1198. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now when you call it a reset, how much of what you were doing was based on or derived from the February 9th plan, the 3.0 plan?

    09-302-08

  1199. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now let me take you to the next document, OPS00014454. I believe these are notes taken by legal counsel of the OPS, Ms. Huneault. If we can go to page 160, please? Can we go down a bit? So we see a reference to the Chief saying want LS. Is that legal services?

    09-302-25

  1200. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall having a discussion with the Chief about this, that the Chief expressed a desire to have legal services to look at the new proposed mission statement and whether we need to change the current one?

    09-303-05

  1201. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Can I take you to -- moments ---

    09-303-10

  1202. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That is true. It may make sense to break now and to carry on tomorrow.

    09-303-16

  1203. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As good as any.

    09-303-20

  1204. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you, Your Honour.

    09-304-01

  1205. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We are. Superintendent Bernier, please. (SHORT PAUSE)

    10-007-08

  1206. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Superintendent.

    10-007-13

  1207. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You recall that we ended yesterday by talking about your priorities on February 11th as you embarked on what you describe as a reset. And you've made a new mission statement to clarify the command and control structure, and you presented that plan to the Executive Team; right?

    10-007-16

  1208. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'd like to take you now to your efforts to further integrate that plan with the OPP and the RCMP. You explained to us yesterday that the chart, the then chart had OPS at the top because it was integrated but not fully unified, not -- it was not a unified command. Do you remember that?

    10-007-22

  1209. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And by "unified command", I took it that you were referring to unified with the OPP and the RCMP.

    10-008-01

  1210. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you talked to us about when they first came to Ottawa to assist the OPS back on the 8th of February?

    10-008-04

  1211. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let me take you to some notes that may refresh your memory. Could we go to OPS00008420, please? So stay at this page. You see that this is dated February the 8th. The Incident Commander is you. And then if we go to page 4, please. If we go down to 1329. Do you see an exchange recorded between Palmer and yourself? Who is Palmer?

    10-008-09

  1212. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So there is a notation from her to you that: "Outside agencies who are attending to assist or requesting to have OPS operational plans ahead of attending." And you spoke a little bit about your involvement in trying to gather all the various plans in order to assist in that process yesterday; right?

    10-008-22

  1213. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So were you aware that this group, these outside agencies were coming to Ottawa as of the 8th?

    10-009-05

  1214. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see. So if I take you now to your summary, the witness summary ---

    10-009-12

  1215. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at page 16, please? Okay. So this is the paragraph at which you describe how you first came to know of this particular group's existence. "On February 12th, OPP Chief Superintendent Carson Pardy and RCMP Superintendent Phil Lue phoned Superintendent Bernier and informed him that an OPP-RCMP Integrated Planning Team was in Ottawa to assist. Superintendent Bernier learned from them that the Integrated Planning Team had been in Ottawa since February 8, was based at RCMP's National Operation Centre [...], and was assisting OPS to develop operational plans. Superintendent Bernier was surprised to learn of the Integrated Planning Team's existence." So were you surprised because on the 8th you were aware only of some outside agencies coming to assist and you didn't connect that group with the Integrated Planning Team until you made contact with Pardy and Lue on the 12th?

    10-009-15

  1216. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. So if I could pick you now to another document, OPS00010371? So these are again scribe notes I take it, and you are now the event commander designated with EC. If we go to page 11, please? So this is dated February the 12th. If we go to 11:58, we see it on the screen, there was a call between you and RCMP Officer Lue said, "...slide up prepared by Darwin - understand NOC stood up. What you are proposing is what we are doing here. You would be able to give situational awareness - direct line of communication" Tell us about this conversation.

    10-010-11

  1217. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we've heard evidence from other witnesses that they were starting to work on a plan, and by now, you have also started working on one, including the main action plan and the mission statement as we heard yesterday. So is it fair to say that when you connected, you found some alignment?

    10-011-09

  1218. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that would be on the 12th. And on the same day, if we go to a different set of notes -- actually, same set of note, if we go to page 12, please, next page? At 12:33 we see a notation -- sorry, 12:35, the next page. Go down. So there is another conversation between you and Lue. This is from you to Lue, "Once I have legal approval will send it to you with main action plan and objectives. See how you can fit this into a plan." Tell us what this is all about.

    10-011-15

  1219. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Yes, it does. And I understand that later that day at around 3:10 p.m. there was a meeting between the OPS Command Team, including yourself and the former Chief, with other members of the Integrated Planning Group; am I right?

    10-012-08

  1220. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's talk about that meeting. If we go to your interview summary, at page 16, you see the paragraph starting with, "Following that call, Superintendent Bernier participated in a 3:09 p.m. call with Chief Sloly, Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, OPS general counsel Ms. Huneault, and RCMP and OPP members of the Integrated Planning Team. At the start of the call, Chief Sloly discussed the role of PLT. He demanded that OPP send its PLT program lead, Inspector Marcel Beaudin [-- who we heard from yesterday --] to sit on the IECT. Superintendent Bernier had already informed Chief Sloly that OPP PLT officer Giselle Walker would be serving as PLT representative on IECT, and Inspector Springer ultimately [appear] Chief Sloly by dialing..."

    10-012-14

  1221. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    10-013-08

  1222. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Appeased. I'm sorry. "...Inspector Spring ultimately appeased Chief Sloly by dialing Inspector Beaudin into the call. Chief Sloly next asked if OPS had integrated its PLT strategy with public order planning, and Superintendent Bernier reminded him that both POU and PLT were members of the IECT." Now is that accurate?

    10-013-10

  1223. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What is the IECT again?

    10-013-21

  1224. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    10-013-24

  1225. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The one that we saw on the screen yesterday?

    10-013-28

  1226. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the next paragraph, "As the meeting progressed, Superintendent Bernier repeatedly asserted his autonomy as Event Commander and attempted to limit Chief Sloly's interference with that role." What kind of interference were you getting?

    10-014-03

  1227. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now if we keep reading, "For instance, when Chief Sloly attempted to establish timelines for immediate action within the next 24 to 48 hours, Superintendent Bernier responded that he was working with Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue to develop a plan and that they would implement the plan once it was finalized.” Was that the nature -- general nature of the interference?

    10-014-20

  1228. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And the proper process was for the event commander to develop that plan and to ensure that everything worked well in the overall context.

    10-015-14

  1229. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we keep reading: “Later in the meeting, RCMP Sgt. Darwin Tetreault presented his thoughts on strategies to take to address the situation downtown. When Chief Sloly asked Sgt. Tetreault to send document on his proposal, Supt. Bernier interjected and informed Chief Sloly that he had created an IECT and had the people he needed to develop a plan.” Now, does that accurately reflect what went on at that meeting?

    10-015-18

  1230. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And it ended with the last paragraph: “Supt. Bernier also observed that Chief Sloly was tense with his OPS command team during the 3:09 p.m. call. He noted he had not observed this behaviour by previous OPS Chiefs.” Could you explain that, please?

    10-016-03

  1231. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you told us yesterday that you’ve served over 28 years with the Ottawa Police Service.

    10-017-02

  1232. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what you’re saying here is that you had not seen this behaviour under any previous Chiefs.

    10-017-05

  1233. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And by “this behaviour”, what were you referring to?

    10-017-09

  1234. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, this was a meeting attended by many, and there were different sets of notes made by different people. And in fairness, I want to put to you other - - another set of notes taken by someone else. This is OPS00010638. Do you know anyone by the name of Vicky Nelson?

    10-017-15

  1235. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who is Vicky?

    10-017-22

  1236. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So it appears that these may be her notes. So if we can call up this document and go to page 6, please. Can we make it larger? I’m looking for -- can we go down? Right. So you see that these are notes of that meeting, and do you see the part where it says -- talks about PLT? “PLT Team is here for you, 100% committed. Key messaging is going out to all members. Review of presentation - PLT.” And earlier, you see a reference to Sergeant Darwin Tetreault presenting, so it appears to be describing the same meeting. But then we have the notation: “Chief good with everything so far. Is unified command under OPS or OPP It is OPS.” Do you remember this part of the exchange?

    10-017-25

  1237. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. But what about the comment that “Chief good with everything so far”? It says -- I think there’s a typo, but I take it the word means “everything”?

    10-018-24

  1238. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. If we go further down to the next page, do you see the -- at the top: “Chief gave the approval 2 weeks ago. Need to get going on this. Tetreault it will work, we are doing this with the full confidence in your team. Let’s implement the plan.” Do you know what was being talked about here?

    10-019-04

  1239. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So do I understand your position is that this is not part of that meeting that you were -- you were at?

    10-019-20

  1240. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you’re not clear as to what approval was given “2 weeks ago”.

    10-020-02

  1241. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now, we’ve heard from Chief Pardy from the OPP that there was agreement on the 13th that the -- that the plan was now approved. And I want to take you to your notes, OPS00010635, at page 20. So at 1551, this seems to be a conversation between you and Chief Pardy, and you told him at around this time: “No issues with plan. Can find overall execution piece.” I’m not sure of the next word. Do you know?

    10-020-05

  1242. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “Heavy PLT negotiations reducing footprint.” So do you -- do I understand correctly that around this time you spoke to Chief Pardy and told him that no issue with the plan?

    10-020-17

  1243. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So we scroll down a little. After you said that to Pardy, he said: “this is coming next - commanders intent” And you said: “Good w approving plan w some minor changes”

    10-021-19

  1244. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So was that where it was left that afternoon?

    10-021-26

  1245. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just so we’re clear which plan we’re talking about, can we go to OPP00001851? So the title is “Convoy for Freedom Ottawa Integrated Mobilization Operational Plan”. Can we scroll down a little? Next page. So it’s stated “DOCUMENT VERSION” February 13, and “PLAN WRITTEN BY” and then there’s some -- here are the components of the group. It was signed by Chief Pardy, it appears, on the 12th. Is this the plan that we’re talking about?

    10-022-11

  1246. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. I want to ask you now about the former chief’s perspective on this plan as compared to the earlier plan that we saw yesterday, the one labeled 3.0, I believe, dated February the 9th. What -- how did you view these two plans? Or if they are different at all?

    10-022-22

  1247. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, you told us about the mission statement that you drafted on the 11th. Was that now reflected under this plan?

    10-023-07

  1248. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    There are other differences too that I -- we don’t have time to get into, but in terms of the former chief’s perspective, you told us the following during our interview. Can we go to page 20? Sorry, page 20 of the interview summary. You see the paragraph that starts with “On February 14th”? If we go down to about the sixth line? Sorry, no, I mean at the same paragraph. So do you see the part that starts with -- so about the third word in, a few lines from the top. “Superintendent Bernier also observed that Chief Sloly was happy with the February 9 Plan, and that it may have been challenging for him to accept the February 13 Plan because it through the February 9 Plan out the window.” What did you mean by that?

    10-023-11

  1249. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when we think of the February 9th plan and the February 13th plan, what’s the best way to describe them? Should we consider the February 13th plan as an evolved version of the February 9th plan or would you characterize them as different plans?

    10-024-14

  1250. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why?

    10-024-21

  1251. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, I think we saw, when we had the February 13th plan up on the screen, that on page 2, I believe, there were signatures -- signature lines on that page. And do you agree that this plan was signed off, approved, on the 13th?

    10-025-01

  1252. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And we’ve heard from Chief Pardy that on the 14th, notwithstanding the sign off and approval on the 13th, that they identified ongoing issues with the integration or the working of the unified command. And he identified three issues in particular. I want to ask you about each issue and get your perspective on it. The first one is that Chief Pardy told us that the key issues dealt with through the day on the 14th related to the OPS’ need to have their lawyer approve the plan. So we saw earlier an example of legal review that was on the 12th, but Chief Pardy is now speaking of a legal review issue on the 14th. Are you aware of that?

    10-025-07

  1253. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And to be clear, who was the one seeking the legal advice?

    10-026-19

  1254. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So I wanted to get some clarification on that because if we take a look at the summary on the screen, it says that: "On February 14, Superintendent Bernier learned that Chief Sloly wanted Ms. Huneault, the OPS general counsel, to review the February 13 Plan, and that Chief Sloly wanted to approve the plan after Ms. Huneault's review." Could you clarify that, please?

    10-026-22

  1255. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So there appears to be two parts to this, and just so we all understand, there was the Legal Review, and then there was what you referred to as the Chief's desire to approve the plan. The summary reads that you learned that Chief Sloly wanted Ms. Huneault to review. Is it more accurate to say that it was you who wanted the Legal Review to be conducted?

    10-027-14

  1256. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we're talking about different things here.

    10-027-26

  1257. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it was Mr. Sloly who wanted Legal Review related to the approval of the plan.

    10-028-01

  1258. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Whereas you were seeking legal advice on what you described earlier about the different legal authorities that may or may not be available as you developed the plan?

    10-028-04

  1259. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And it also spoke of the need for the former Chief to approve the plan. Is that accurate? Is that what you wanted at the time?

    10-028-09

  1260. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the second line: "...and that Chief Sloly wanted to approve the plan after Ms. Huneault's review."

    10-028-14

  1261. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if Mr. Sloly were to say that to the extent any approval was required, he already approved, he already had given those approval as of the 9th of February, what would you say to that?

    10-028-19

  1262. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you understood at the time that he wanted to approve this plan, to have the decision-making power about approval of this plan?

    10-028-26

  1263. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now -- so that was a first concern that Chief Pardy raised, the need for a Legal Review. The second concern he raised as of the 14th was that you were being pulled away continuously to brief your Chief, and that this was creating frustration within the Planning Group, especially as it related to the POU component. And he said he tactfully addressed this concern with the OPS. What is your perspective on that?

    10-029-02

  1264. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And the final concern he raised on the 14th was when the group learned that the Mayor of Ottawa had engaged with the protesters and negotiated them to all move to Wellington Street, and that the OPS was making some decisions on action. I understand that there was a briefing that you gave the group at around six -- just after six o'clock that day. Is that correct?

    10-029-27

  1265. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And -- so you brief them that due to the Mayor's decision it was a good time to take positive action on those who stayed outside of Wellington. Was that what happened at the briefing? That's what you told them?

    10-030-08

  1266. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And Chief Pardy told us that as a group they challenged you on the intelligence and the tactical advice received to allow them to pivot quickly and support it. Tell us about the issue.

    10-030-13

  1267. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    By the next day, do you mean the 15th?

    10-032-18

  1268. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the change?

    10-032-24

  1269. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let me take you back a day or two to the 13th because I started by asking you of the events on the 14th and you started giving us the context and how it developed over the next -- the next -- into the next day. But am I correct that it was on the 13th of February that you first came to know about these negotiations between the Mayor and the protestors?

    10-033-07

  1270. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If I could take you to the document OPS00010635. Do you recall a meeting at around 1 o’clock or 1:15 on the 13th regarding this issue? So if we could go to page 10, please. The date, as you see, is February 13, 1315. I’m looking for the reference where ---

    10-033-15

  1271. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah. Can we go there? So meeting -- city manager. Perhaps you -- you’re better at it than me.

    10-033-23

  1272. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could we keep going? I’m looking for the part where I think there was a comment from you that this actually accelerates what we wanted to do.

    10-034-02

  1273. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember that discussion?

    10-034-07

  1274. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    10-034-09

  1275. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in your interview summary, you explain that neither the city nor the OPS Executive had informed you of negotiations before this. Is that correct?

    10-035-07

  1276. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And you told Inspector Springer that OPS should stay clear of the negotiation because political influence and political negotiation could adversely impact the police operation that OPS was preparing.

    10-035-13

  1277. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in the interview summary, you went on and gave several other explanations as to why you were concerned about this, but in the interests of time, I won’t take you to all of those. Do you agree that those contents in your summary is accurate?

    10-035-20

  1278. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let’s move now to an area that I really want to ask you about, and it is -- the context is this. You’ve told us that the plan was signed off on the 13th. That’s before the federal government invoked the Emergency Act on the 14th. But when the final operation was launched, as I understand, on the 18th of February, that was after the invocation of the Emergencies Act. So I wanted to ask you about what -- to what extent the invocation of the Emergencies Act was considered in the process of planning and how it affected the way the operation was carried out. So let’s take it step by step. It may be that we can start with what you told us in your summary. Could we go to your summary to page 22? So you remember that during the interview, we asked you about your thoughts on both the provincial emergencies measures, the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act as well as the federal Emergencies Act. So if we look at this paragraph here: “Supt. Bernier stated that the February 13 plan did not rely on powers granted under the EMCPA...” That’s the provincial Act; right?

    10-035-27

  1279. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “...and that the federal emergency declaration did not significantly impact his planning process. Supt. Bernier did not know that the federal government was going to declare a Public Order Emergency on February 13.” I take that to mean that on February 13th, you did not know that the federal government was going to declare a Public Order Emergency, and you stated that you would have carried out the police operation whether or not the federal government declared a Public Order Emergency. Explain that to us.

    10-036-24

  1280. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in this paragraph, you actually refer to some of those authorities that existed apart from the emergency powers, such as you said authorities under common law, municipal by-laws and provincial and federal statutes. You also noted the Criminal Code and common law authorize police to control access to an area during an ongoing police operation and that the Highway Traffic Act permits police to seize and tow vehicles that are abandoned or obstructing roadways. So I wanted to ask you about, first of all, the so-called exclusion zones. We heard from Deputy Chief Bell that the emergency was -- the Emergency Act was helpful in allowing the police to establish exclusion zones. What's your view on that?

    10-037-22

  1281. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So is that why you would consider it helpful to have those measures under the Emergency Measures Regulations?

    10-038-17

  1282. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were those measures necessary for the ending this occupation or protest?

    10-038-22

  1283. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the other area I wanted to ask your thoughts on, related to the ability to tow trucks, if we go down the page a little bit? So this paragraph that starts with, "Superintendent Bernier stated that he did not need to rely on powers granted under the Emergencies Act to compel towing companies to supply trucks or drivers to the police. He stated that this was unnecessary because by February 13th OPP had assembled 34 tow trucks with willing drivers. He noted that police guaranteed the companies and drivers anonymity, and placed police crests on the trucks and covered company markings to ensure anonymity. He stated that he had no knowledge of whether the power granted under the Emergencies Act to compel towing companies to assist, protected those companies and their drivers from being blamed by protesters and protester sympathizers for assisting [the] police." Now is all that accurate?

    10-039-04

  1284. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now those 34 tow trucks that you refer to here, were they available for use by the police when the final operation was launched on the 18th of February?

    10-040-01

  1285. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in terms of the arrangement to secure those tow trucks, were those arrangements made before or after the 14th of February?

    10-040-05

  1286. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now going back to the exclusion zone, there was something I meant to ask you, but I forgot. Can you tell us whether under the Emergency Measures Regulations the -- like, Ottawa, was there any area in Ottawa that was designated a secure zone?

    10-040-15

  1287. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe it was the EMR, the Emergency Measures Regulations.

    10-040-22

  1288. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, it's the federal ---

    10-040-25

  1289. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the Emergencies Act was invoked on the 14th and then the Regulations.

    10-040-27

  1290. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So my understanding is that under section 6 of the EMR there was the ability to designate secure zone. Are you aware if such zones were created in Ottawa ---

    10-041-02

  1291. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- designated?

    10-041-07

  1292. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    They were. Let me put to you this document, PB.CAN00001209. So PB.CAN.00001209. So these appear to be speaking notes regarding the Emergency Measures Regulations. I believe it's -- there was a date at the top February the 25th. So if we go down to page 3, please? Under the headings "if pressed on why Ottawa was not designated a secure zone," there was a bullet, "A designation was not required in Ottawa because the assembly was already unlawful. As a result, the police were able to establish a perimeter relying on the Emergencies Measures Regulations and other existing legal authorities to secure and maintain control of the area." Does that refresh your memory?

    10-041-09

  1293. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that was, in fact, what happened.

    10-042-17

  1294. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we could go now to your summary on that point, page 22, the interview summary. We looked at the last paragraph on this page. "After the federal emergency declaration, Superintendent Bernier explored whether designating downtown Ottawa as a protected place under the Emergency Measures Regulations would be a better option than relying on common law authorities. Chief Superintendent Pardy informed him that the federal Minister of Public Safety, Marco Mendicino, was willing to approve a designated exclusion zone in downtown Ottawa. Superintendent Bernier conducted a tabletop exercise with Ministry of Public Safety staff to indicate that the exclusion area would look like -- what the exclusion area would look like. After the meeting, he was informed that Minister Mendicino decided that it was unnecessary to designate downtown Ottawa as a protected place and that the Minister did not want to designate a specific area in case police changed their plan.” Does that accord with what you just described to us?

    10-042-20

  1295. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And finally: “The Emergencies Act, in his interpretation, allowed for the police to determine the exclusion area on an as needed basis. Superintendent Bernier supported the Minister’s decision. He noted that powers granted under the Emergencies Act did cause police to be more willing to ask people entering the exclusion zone where they were going, but that police continued to permit people to enter the exclusion zone for lawful purposes.” Does that actually reflect the reality at the time?

    10-043-22

  1296. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now I want to turn finally to how the plan was executed. First of all, the February 13th plan continued to develop over the next few days until a final plan was signed off on or around the 17th; am I right?

    10-044-10

  1297. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just so we are all clear at what plan there was, I want to show you -- February 17th. So if I can take you to OPS00013798. So you see the date on this page says, “February 15th, till to be determined,” but if we go to the next page then there is the date, “February 18th, till to be determined,” and the document version says February the 21st. Can we scroll down a little? Can we keep going? So this is the only plan we got from the OPS, and we are -- we understand that this is the final plan. Can you take a look at the Table of Contents and confirm whether that is, in fact, the case?

    10-044-16

  1298. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right, okay. Thank you. So this plan describe the -- in four different phases, how the final operation will be carried out. Can you explain the four phases for us?

    10-045-02

  1299. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, in the interest of time, I guess we’ll rely on your description of those four phases in the witness summary and move directly to how that plan was carried out. When was this plan launched, in the final operation?

    10-045-11

  1300. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s very helpful, thank you. So I understand that all of the resources that would enable the OPS and the Integrative Planning Group, your help that you were getting from elsewhere were ready by the evening of the 17th, is that right?

    10-047-23

  1301. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so tell us what happened on the 18th; at what time did the action start?

    10-048-01

  1302. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What time did the action start?

    10-048-12

  1303. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    10-048-16

  1304. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And within this final period of the operation, there were also different phases, in terms of locations?

    10-048-19

  1305. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the first phase?

    10-048-23

  1306. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how long did it take to clear that first phase area, the Nicholas-Waller area?

    10-049-01

  1307. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when that area was cleared, what was the next area the officers were moving to?

    10-049-05

  1308. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how was the reaction of the people there at the time?

    10-049-09

  1309. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As the officers moved from Phase 1 to Phase 2, was there a sense that things were about the same, or was there an escalation; de-escalation? What was your sense?

    10-049-15

  1310. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The tension definitely increased; however, we adopted a -- I could use a philosophy of slow, methodical, lawful in our approach because we did not know what the cause and effect was going to be, and we had to be ready to adapt, pivot, and make decisions, and we did not want to rush through this, and we did not want to force a confrontation. Every phase that we went through, no different than the messaging that was taking place right from the start of our operation through the stabilization, telling them to leave; “If you don’t leave, you are going to be arrested.” Everyone who wanted to leave was free to leave; they were asked to leave. It was communicated through our -- what we call LRAD, long-range acoustic device, that aligned with messaging that was developed through our PLT, our Police Liaison Team, our corporate communications, and our investigations to ensure it’s a very clear, succinct message, and we did it in both English and French. So this was all slow and methodical. Anyone who wanted to leave, had the opportunity to leave; they could walk away. Anyone who choose to remain behind, as we slowly and methodically went through, that would mean they would either be passively resisting or actively resisting the lawful order to leave.

    10-049-18

  1311. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you mentioned an escalation in the reaction of the crowd as we move from Phase 1 to the Phase 2; how did the police react in response?

    10-050-13

  1312. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve seen some images where police were -- had batons, and there were horses. Could you tell us more about those -- the use of those?

    10-050-27

  1313. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When did the operation end that day on the 18th?

    10-051-15

  1314. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Paused?

    10-051-19

  1315. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you mentioned fencing, did -- was a decision made to hold the line and to secure the area with more fencing at some point that day?

    10-052-10

  1316. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And roughly what time on that day did that occur?

    10-052-26

  1317. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what happened during the night?

    10-053-12

  1318. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The execution of the mission continued the next morning?

    10-053-17

  1319. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    At about what time?

    10-053-20

  1320. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You refer to these POU units, the Public Order Units, in what direction are they moving now?

    10-053-28

  1321. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what area? Like, what street would they be on now?

    10-054-05

  1322. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Tell us what happened that morning.

    10-054-08

  1323. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How was the reaction of the people that morning?

    10-054-25

  1324. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did the police use any tools such as smoke grenades and gas at any time?

    10-055-05

  1325. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But to your knowledge, did they -- did the police ever use those tools during ---

    10-055-12

  1326. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And by the end of the day -- we’re speaking of the 19th now -- how did the downtown core look like?

    10-055-17

  1327. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve heard a fair bit about the Coventry area being used by the protestors as a kind of staging ground. When was that area demobilized?

    10-056-08

  1328. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 20th?

    10-056-13

  1329. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    10-056-16

  1330. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When did the OPS and its partners enter the third and fourth final phases, the maintenance and demobilization phases?

    10-057-06

  1331. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, we are quickly running out of time, so my final question to you is, if there’s anything else that you’d like to tell the Commissioner that we haven’t yet covered.

    10-058-05

  1332. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you, Commissioner.

    10-058-14

  1333. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I have a few, if I may.

    10-167-01

  1334. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Superintendent, my friend, counsel from the -- acting for Canada asked you about the availability of tow trucks after you made the initial arrangement on or around the 13th of February. There's a document I want to show you and ask if you can tell us what it is. It's OPS00014453. Could we go to page 59? So could you take a look at this document, and if we go -- first of all, if we go down to the bottom of the page? Do you see three signatures?

    10-167-04

  1335. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recognize these signatures?

    10-167-13

  1336. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go back to the top of the page? What is this document?

    10-167-15

  1337. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is this one of the towing sub-plan to the main plan on the 17th?

    10-167-20

  1338. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now if we go to page 65, please? So this appears to list some equipments. Can you tell us about this?

    10-167-23

  1339. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go further down?

    10-168-06

  1340. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What is ---

    10-168-16

  1341. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, go ahead.

    10-168-18

  1342. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What is your understanding of the availability of these equipments listed for the action starting on the 18th?

    10-168-20

  1343. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now did you understand those vehicles were drawn from the 34 vehicles that you told us about earlier?

    10-168-24

  1344. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Now in cross- examination by counsel for the former Chief, Mr. Curry asked you why, aside from your verbal conversations with Inspector Lucas and Superintendent Drummond that you did not take further steps to escalate your concerns about the bizarre disconnect. Remember being asked those questions?

    10-169-02

  1345. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, sorry. I'm moving onto a different topic.

    10-169-10

  1346. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let me ---

    10-169-13

  1347. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'm now asking you about questions put to you by counsel for the former Chief. Mr. Curry asked you why, apart from your conversations with Inspector Lucas and Superintendent Drummond, you did not take further steps to escalate your concerns about the bizarre disconnect between the intelligence and planning. You recall being asked those questions?

    10-169-16

  1348. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you said ---

    10-169-24

  1349. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- and you said that you didn't have complete access to intelligence, and you defer to those who did have access and were assigned to respond.

    10-169-26

  1350. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You also said that Deputies Ferguson and Bell were accountable to the former Chief. Now is that what you said?

    10-170-02

  1351. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right. So ---

    10-170-07

  1352. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- so I want to ask you, in the context of responding to a major event, why did you think it was appropriate for officers who were not assigned specific duties to defer to those who were assigned?

    10-170-09

  1353. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Let me try again. I understand your response to Mr. Curry's question to be that you defer to those who were assigned specific duties to respond, to those who had access to complete intelligence.

    10-170-15

  1354. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. Those are my questions.

    10-170-28

  1355. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning.

    12-007-07

  1356. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We are. The Commission calls the former Chief Peter Sloly.

    12-007-11

  1357. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Commissioner.

    12-007-26

  1358. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's Frank Au, Senior Counsel for the Commission.

    12-008-02

  1359. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Mr. Sloly. You were the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service between 2019 until February 2022.

    12-008-05

  1360. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You served also at the Toronto Police Service for 28 years.

    12-008-09

  1361. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You rose through the ranks from being a Constable in 1988 to Deputy Chief in 2009.

    12-008-13

  1362. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You left the service in 2016?

    12-008-16

  1363. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then you spent some time in the private sector.

    12-008-18

  1364. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand that when you first joined the Toronto Police Service there were relatively few members who had a university degree who were new recruits.

    12-008-21

  1365. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But you had a BA in Sociology from McMaster University?

    12-008-25

  1366. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And later, you got an MBA from York University.

    12-008-28

  1367. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you were trained in the Incident Command System?

    12-009-03

  1368. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And tell us more about your training.

    12-009-06

  1369. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you also had training and experience with the Public Order Units.

    12-009-22

  1370. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    12-009-25

  1371. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You also mentioned just earlier that you spent some time on a United Nations peacekeeping mission?

    12-010-05

  1372. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that?

    12-010-09

  1373. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When you attended an interview with us and my Commission colleagues, you described that experience as the best professional and personal experience you’ve ever had. Why was that?

    12-010-22

  1374. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    12-011-09

  1375. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, speaking of interviews, you attended four interviews with me and my Commission colleagues between August and early October. You were very generous with us, with your time. And after those interviews, we summarized the contents of those interviews, and you’ve had an opportunity to review the summary? Is that correct?

    12-011-21

  1376. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I want to show you a copy on the screen, the final version of the summary. It’s WTS00000040. Now, is this the version that you approved?

    12-011-28

  1377. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Is there any correction that you’d like to make to this summary?

    12-012-04

  1378. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So this will be adopted and will be an exhibit. Now, the reason that we’re here today are the events in January and February of this year, leading to the invocation of the Emergencies Act. As the Chief of Police in Ottawa at that time, you are uniquely positioned to give us your perspective and to help us understand. But to really understand, I think we need to go back further to when you started with the Ottawa Police Service.

    12-012-07

  1379. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the circumstances of the Ottawa Police Service in which you found yourself?

    12-012-17

  1380. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. If I could call up your CV? The document ID number is COM00000759. If we could go to page 2? Scroll down. So you see under “Ottawa Police Service, 2019 to 2022”, your talked about how you were given a major culture organization change mandate. And that’s something you just outlined for us.

    12-013-14

  1381. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about some of the challenges you faced once you took the post?

    12-013-22

  1382. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you identified a few challenges that are not unique to the Ottawa Police Service, such as the pandemic, such as the Defund movement, and so on. What about within the organization? You talked about earlier, challenges involving the command team. Tell us more about that?

    12-015-19

  1383. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, did that happen in 2021, you said?

    12-016-28

  1384. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So at the most senior executive level, you were having rotating staff, so to speak. What impact did that have on the rest of the organization at that time?

    12-017-11

  1385. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We’ve heard from other witnesses that notwithstanding the OPS excellent reputation in the past for planning for and responding to large-scale events, the pandemic itself has caused a lot of changeover and depletion of expertise. Tell us more about that situation.

    12-018-28

  1386. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you told us earlier that you came in to the Ottawa Police Service and you were given a change mandate. How was that mandate perceived when you were about two years into your job?

    12-019-26

  1387. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I take your mind back to January -- early January of 2022 before the Freedom Convoy event arrives in mid-January, how would you summarize the state that the Ottawa Police Service was in?

    12-020-28

  1388. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the level of trust among the different members within the service and their trust for the leadership?

    12-021-07

  1389. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, with that context, let’s talk about the beginning of the Freedom Convoy events. When did you first learn about the Freedom Convoy?

    12-021-23

  1390. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    February?

    12-022-01

  1391. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve heard from the evidence of your Deputies that after you became the Chief of the Ottawa police Service, one of your priorities was to ensure that operations were intelligence led. Can you tell us more about why that was important to you?

    12-022-23

  1392. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. And my next question is to what extent were you satisfied that that was in fact the case in -- at the OPS on or about January?

    12-024-01

  1393. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, you mentioned that the first Hendon report you read about the Freedom Convoy was on January 13th?

    12-025-12

  1394. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And -- so I take it that you read it?

    12-025-16

  1395. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was your reaction upon reading it?

    12-025-21

  1396. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that why you forwarded it to the deputies?

    12-025-27

  1397. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you expected the two of them to coordinate the information or intelligence that the Intelligence Unit received and incorporate that intelligence in the planning process?

    12-026-12

  1398. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you receive regular updates from your deputies?

    12-026-17

  1399. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How often?

    12-026-20

  1400. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When you refer to "that week", were you referring to the week before the weekend arrival of the convoy?

    12-027-08

  1401. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And what did you learn as a result of these regular briefings about the nature of the convoy that was about to arrive?

    12-027-14

  1402. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry, whether it was going to?

    12-027-20

  1403. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in that week leading up to the arrival of the convoy, what was your understanding as to the duration of the event?

    12-028-19

  1404. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, during that period, did you continue to receive regular Hendon reports?

    12-029-09

  1405. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you continue to read the Hendon reports when they landed in your inbox?

    12-029-19

  1406. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you spoke about your understanding during that period that it was going to be a two- day or weekend event. Was that understanding based on the Executive briefings that you got, or a combination of that as well as other sources, including the Hendon reports that you did receive or read?

    12-030-04

  1407. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the totality of information or intelligence that you got did not change your view at the time that it was going to be a two-day or weekend event?

    12-030-13

  1408. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the nature of your role as the Chief at that time, as compared to the two Deputies who were assisting you?

    12-030-17

  1409. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let me be more specific; in terms of the collection of, or the analysis or the dissemination of, the intelligence within the OPS for the purpose of planning a response, what were the respective roles of you, as Chief, as compared to the two Deputy Chiefs who were assisting you?

    12-030-21

  1410. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would it be appropriate for you to ask questions, for instance, when you received additional information?

    12-031-05

  1411. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you direct Deputy Chief Bell to conduct, or have someone conduct the threat risk assessment?

    12-031-15

  1412. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that something ordinarily done in response to this kind of event, or was that something particular to this situation?

    12-031-20

  1413. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But was it an ordinary process for a threat risk assessment to be conducted in response to any major event?

    12-032-01

  1414. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve heard from Deputy Chief Bell that in this case a threat risk assessment was in fact conducted. So if I could take you to the document, OPS00003073. Actually, this is not the threat assessment, but this is an email you wrote after reading the threat assessment. Do you recall having read the threat assessment that was prepared?

    12-032-12

  1415. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So now this one -- this email chain, the part that was sent by you, was dated January 26, so -- and if we go -- so you see that -- actually, if we go down further to see the origin of the chain. So -- not so -- not so far. Do you remember receiving an email from a concerned citizen about the potential violence of the upcoming event? And if we scroll up, you forwarded this email to your Deputies, and you outlined a concern. If we scroll down to the next page, you describe what the concern was and then you said: “Yet our briefing note as of last night says that there is no intelligence to indicate that this demo straying will be violent?”

    12-032-24

  1416. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you issue this guidance: “Please review all available information/intel/incidents and ensure we have the most accurate threat assessment, and the most appropriate operations plan for the event.”

    12-033-11

  1417. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, it’s not entirely clear from this email whether or not you’ve read a threat assessment, but you were certainly aware that there was one, or ---

    12-033-17

  1418. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    12-033-22

  1419. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I see.

    12-034-03

  1420. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now -- so this is dated January 26. I want to show you an Intelligence Assessment, conducted by Sgt. Chris Kiez, on January 25th, and perhaps you can take a look and let us know if you have reviewed that document. The document number is OPS00003086. In the production we receive, we’ve seen a couple of different versions. I assume that this -- the assessment was updated as the week unfolded, but this is Version 1. Does this ring any bell, this ---

    12-034-13

  1421. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If I could take you to page 5. So the third bullet, the author says that: “In 6 years of working large demonstration events from the intelligence point of view, the writer has never seen such widespread community action, which means three things for planners. [First, in the event] -- the event is likely going to be bigger in crowd size than any demo in recent history, possibly on par with Canada Day events, but more destructive. [Second] There is significant popular support for this event on a scale of not seen in recent years. This means the protest groups have access to larger protesters pools than they have ever had access to, which means there will be likely widespread disorganisation and confusion. [Third] Local area bandwidth for cellular/mobile devices will be impacted significantly, causing communications issues for both the police and the event organizers. Planners should be ready to have police radios on hand to avoid clogged cellular networks.” This is an example of the intelligence unit providing relevant intelligence to guide the planning of the events, right?

    12-034-24

  1422. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it’s a -- it’s an example of how it’s supposed to be done. But there are suggestions here that this event is unlike some of the other recent events. There are signals here; do you agree that it may be unprecedented?

    12-036-01

  1423. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's a warning for ---

    12-037-03

  1424. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- trouble ---

    12-037-05

  1425. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the last line that was bolded in the last paragraph, "As a result, law enforcement is being met with numbers of people beyond the norm." That's what you're saying, a larger crowd size. What would you expect your deputies to do with this kind of warning?

    12-037-07

  1426. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would you expect your deputies to brief up and give you the warning?

    12-038-01

  1427. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let's go to another document. Now, first of all, let me ask you, the -- since you were reading the Hendon report, do you recall if there is any Hendon report that you could identify that would suggest that it was a weekend event as opposed to prolonged events involving a week or month?

    12-038-05

  1428. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me show you one example from the January 25th Hendon report and see how you may interpret this report. OPP00001108. We go to page 3, please? Go down. So do you see the section that starts with "intelligence gaps"? First of all, what do you understand intelligence gaps to mean?

    12-039-05

  1429. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we look at the first few bullets, first of all, "Participant numbers - online indicators are unreliable." So this is a known unknown. They knew that they needed the number, but they knew that they didn't have the number; is that right?

    12-039-17

  1430. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then the next two bullets have references to specific dates. "Nature of activities in Ottawa by advance convoy participants. ([January 28th, January 29th])" So when these days are referenced in these reports, what do you take them to mean?

    12-039-23

  1431. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right. They don't know what may happen on those days. Could we infer from this bullet that things were only going to happen on these two days?

    12-040-05

  1432. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the third bullet? "Events possibly scheduled at Parliament Hill on [the 30th of January]" The same; right?

    12-040-09

  1433. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we know from this that the police didn't really know what would happen on that date, but we cannot infer from this bullet that these are the only dates when things would happen.

    12-040-15

  1434. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Twenty-fifth (25th) of January.

    12-040-22

  1435. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So this is January 25th. And then on the 27th, as we get closer to the first weekend arrival, you attended a meeting with your Command Team, as well as the Legal Services. If I could take you to document number OPS00014559 and page 1, please? So if we scroll down slightly, do you see the last bullet? So first of all, a bullet that says "Chief questions." It sounds like at this meeting you asked some questions in the four sub-bullet, "Interdict tow truck equipment prior to it being used against us. Heavy equipment within convoy to take down barriers - a level of preplanning we don't normally see. Concern they have this for something that is supposed to be lawful." Is it fair to say that, by this date, you had some concern for, given the presence or anticipated presence of the heavy equipment when it was supposed to be something lawful, you were questioning why are these equipments there?

    12-041-06

  1436. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So as the Chief, you had the strategic oversight, so to speak, and you were asking appropriate questions to ensure that those deputies who were reporting to you were doing their job when this kind of concerns arise; am I correct?

    12-042-11

  1437. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now we also understand from the testimony of Inspector Lucas that there was a potential that the OPS would be overwhelmed during the weekend of January 29th and 30th. I can take you to the transcript, but it was in evidence. So I guess my question to you is this. If there are these warning signs and as we progressed towards the weekend, these warning signals get stronger and stronger. Shouldn’t the OPS have known what was coming?

    12-042-24

  1438. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we heard from Superintendent Bernier when he testified at the Commission that after he read the January 27th Hendon Report, he told Superintendent Drummond about this bizarre disconnect between the Hendon intelligence and the OPS preparation. Do you -- do you think that there was a bizarre disconnect?

    12-044-08

  1439. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And do you think your Deputies were doing the best they could?

    12-044-26

  1440. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And knowing what we know now and reflecting back on the way that the OPS handled or applied the intelligence they got, what lessons, if any, should we learn from that?

    12-045-01

  1441. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in your view, was there anything that the OPS could have done differently to better handle the intelligence they did have?

    12-046-17

  1442. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But specifically about how it handled intelligence, anything you can teach us from your experience?

    12-047-04

  1443. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, a moment ago, in answering my question, you referenced the need to respect Charter rights. That brings me to my next topic. You’ll recall that one of the topics we discussed during our interviews was your understanding of how the Charter might have limited police options in responding to the arrival of the convoy. Do you remember those discussions?

    12-048-11

  1444. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if I could take you now to the interview summary at page 15. If we go to the second paragraph -- sorry. Scroll down, please. That’s right. The paragraph that starts with “Chief Sloly”: “Chief Sloly was advised that based on the known intelligence reports, OPS did not have the legal authority to deny the Freedom Convoy access to downtown Ottawa simply because some people disagreed with the views of some participants. He understood that OPS did have authority to close roads and restrict traffic if there were public safety concerns, but closures and restrictions had to be commensurate to actual threats or reasonably predictable threats. Highway Traffic Act or bylaw violations alone would not be sufficient to justify restricting access to the city for all protestors.” So that was the view you expressed at the time. Is that the view you still hold now?

    12-048-20

  1445. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And some of us regret to be lawyers. Now, since our interview, we’ve received a legal opinion provided to the OPS on this issue. So if I may take you to that opinion. Let me find the document number. It is OPS00003692. (SHORT PAUSE)

    12-049-18

  1446. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Scroll down, please. Now, you see there’s the paragraph that starts with, “While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa...” -- by the way, this memo, I believe is dated January the 28th. Deputy Chief Bell requested the opinion on the 27th and got it the next day. So this paragraph says: “While the convoy has not yet reached the City of Ottawa, various considerations will need to be assessed, and reassessed, to determine the appropriate response, including: • the balancing of competing Charter rights; • impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility; • impacts to health and safety; • impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles; and • impacts to public safety generally.” Do you remember if you had access to this legal opinion at the time?

    12-049-25

  1447. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in terms of these bullet points, they mention the “Impacts to public enjoyment and the right to mobility.” Do I understand that to apply to the right of the residents to move around freely in the downtown core and not be impeded unduly by the trucks and commercial vehicles? Your answer ---

    12-050-21

  1448. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And then, “Impacts on obstructing emergency vehicles”; that’s obviously important for reasons we all understand. And the “Impacts to public safety generally.” So in assessing the options available to the OPS to respond, including closing roads and, you know, setting up barriers to the downtown core, these considerations were applied at the time?

    12-051-01

  1449. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, by the 27th of January, am I correct -- and I believe this evidence came from Supt. Abrams -- that the OPS was expecting somewhere in the range of 3,000 trucks to come to Ottawa, downtown.

    12-052-15

  1450. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So with that in mind, I we go to page 4 of the same opinion; if we scroll down to page 4, please.

    12-052-21

  1451. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-052-24

  1452. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I guess my next question, after I take you to the passage I want you to have a chance to consider, is, what it would be reasonable to anticipate, in light of this guidance from the lawyer. So this paragraph starting with “Therefore”: “Therefore, while the case law indicates that those who wish to protest have a Charter-protected right in doing so, it is not without limits. These limits, as the courts have recognized, prevent threats of violence, acts of violence, and unlawful conduct. Moreover, these limits also prevent demonstrators from obstructing travel on roadways. It is worth noting, however, that there has been at least one decision where it was found that a blockade for a very brief period only constituted a minor inconvenience and was therefore permissible.” So this paragraph referenced the need to be preserve travel on roadways as a way to limit whatever other competing rights the protesters may have for free assembly and free expression and so on. So having this in mind, can you help me understand why when upward of 3,000 commercial vehicles and trucks are expected to arrive in downtown Ottawa, that this wouldn’t put some limits on where those trucks could access in downtown Ottawa?

    12-053-18

  1453. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you pointed out that this became the reality as of the 28th. It materialized, in your words, on ---

    12-057-08

  1454. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, the 29th. But isn’t it fair to ask that by the 27th, when OPS knew that 3,000 vehicles were coming to Ottawa and much of the online messaging suggests that the protests had an intent to stay for as long as the mandates were not lifted, why isn’t it predictable and why shouldn’t the OPS be acting on this advice to take active steps to mitigate access to the downtown core?

    12-057-12

  1455. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me ask you now, from your perspective, how did that weekend unfold?

    12-058-20

  1456. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the events.

    12-058-23

  1457. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-058-25

  1458. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. What happened by 11:00?

    12-059-24

  1459. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So are you describing the events of the 29th?

    12-060-19

  1460. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So at some point on the 29th, you realized that you’re confronting something unprecedented?

    12-060-26

  1461. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe Insp. Lucas described it as drinking from the firehose?

    12-061-01

  1462. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How would you describe it?

    12-061-05

  1463. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    At the height of the day’s events, how many trucks would you estimate were there?

    12-061-16

  1464. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that’s just in the downtown core?

    12-061-25

  1465. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the emergency lanes? Were they kept open?

    12-061-28

  1466. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As the members of the Ottawa Police Service began to focus on responding to these events downtown, what is -- what was the impact on the rest of the city?

    12-062-10

  1467. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And we've heard evidence, from some of the residences and business owners affected, during the first week of hearing, that from that time on they started feeling abandoned by the police, by other leaders, and they felt hopeless, that was one of the adjectives they used, and they started seeing a kind of general chaos and lawlessness. How would you describe what was happening? Were those adjectives accurate?

    12-063-14

  1468. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in addition ---

    12-065-02

  1469. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    In addition to the perspectives of the residents and business owners, et cetera, since you were the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, can you tell us how was the -- how were the members of the Ottawa Police Service holding up? Because this was only the beginning. It continued for another three weeks or so.

    12-065-04

  1470. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you feel that they were misunderstood?

    12-065-21

  1471. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could you elaborate on that?

    12-065-24

  1472. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you spoke of how the officers were misunderstood. Let's hope that this Inquiry will be the beginning of that understanding. Commissioner, could we -- would this be a good time to take a recess?

    12-066-23

  1473. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Commissioner.

    12-067-11

  1474. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So before the break, Chief Sloly, you were telling us about the events of that first weekend and how it hit everyone really hard. I'd like to take you now to January the 31st, which I believe is the Monday after?

    12-067-15

  1475. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We've heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that that was when the Executive Team realized that a lawful protest has now turned into an illegal occupation. That was her evidence, and I'm interested in your view on that.

    12-067-20

  1476. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that pivot. What did the Executive Team decide to do?

    12-068-10

  1477. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Deputy Bell described that first week as a period of orientational reorientation. Do you agree with that description?

    12-069-03

  1478. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So before the convoy arrived, we've seen an initial plan dated January the 28th?

    12-069-11

  1479. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the understanding now in terms of going forward in terms of the need for a new plan?

    12-069-14

  1480. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what was the understanding then about this -- the need for this new evolved plan?

    12-069-22

  1481. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-069-25

  1482. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how did you go about achieving that?

    12-069-28

  1483. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So around that period, January 31st and the next few days, did the OPS start reaching out to other external agencies for help?

    12-070-18

  1484. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what steps you or the other members of the second team did?

    12-070-22

  1485. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And now I want to get a better understanding of the options that were open while the OPS were reaching out for external help. So I want to take you to a document, OPS00005631. So just looking at the top, it says "Public Order Truck Convoy De-escalation Planning Meeting February 1st, 2022." Do you have -- perhaps we can scroll down a little, so you can familiarize yourself. It says that there's a meeting with the Chief. Can we go down further? There are a number of discussion points. So, for example, the third bullet, there's a notation that, "Every single option to be explored and is open to discussion. He is happy to come back and further discuss anything that we need him to." He, I take it, refers to you?

    12-071-12

  1486. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go down further, "PLT would like one more attempt to speak with every convoy to get them on the same page." We scroll down further, "Every POU we ask for will not be released to come to Ottawa as protests happening now everywhere. We might not get the staffing numbers we ask for." So there are a couple of things I wanted to ask you to comment on. First of all, there's a reference to things happening elsewhere. What can you tell us about that?

    12-072-02

  1487. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    12-072-21

  1488. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So by this time, which I believe was February the 2nd or the 1st -- February the 1st, I believe, things are happening elsewhere. And if we go back to the top, one of the discussion points, do you see the third bullet from the bottom, it says, "POU units across the province needed." What does that refer to?

    12-072-28

  1489. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Please.

    12-073-08

  1490. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What does ESU stand for?

    12-074-01

  1491. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's synonymous with POU, Public Order Unit?

    12-074-05

  1492. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, because I'm interested in this notation that POU units across the province ---

    12-075-08

  1493. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- needed.

    12-075-11

  1494. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    12-076-02

  1495. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that recognition came as early as February 1st?

    12-076-13

  1496. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if we go down a little, in the first box under discussion point, I read a bit from it earlier, "PLT would like one more attempt to speak with every convoy to get them on the same page. Truckers need to clear all the roads and stop honking in exchange for fuel and a place to park. Have zero room to negotiate. If they don't deal with it in this way, they will be removed." Why is it that there was zero room to negotiate?

    12-076-16

  1497. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I was just curious because it appears that the PLT would like more time, more opportunity to speak to the convoy and then perhaps there was another view expressed, no room to negotiate. I was just wondering if you could enlighten us on what this discussion was about.

    12-077-06

  1498. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. If I could take you now to the next document, the next day, OPS00014484. So if we go to page 22. Now, Chief Sloly, do you have a practise of making notes to yourself, sending yourself emails as reminders or things like that?

    12-077-15

  1499. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And would this be one of those examples?

    12-077-22

  1500. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So here, we read, “Advise that all options on the table needs to consider” ---

    12-077-25

  1501. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-078-01

  1502. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And we see a name on the top left, Maria?

    12-078-05

  1503. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who’s that?

    12-078-08

  1504. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the content of the email, which is, I guess, note to yourself, says: “Advised that all options on the table needs to consider the ‘political option’ - what role(s) can Premier and PM play in diffusing the demonstration. It is not my legal responsibility to end a demonstration - it is my legal responsibility to provide adequate and effective policing to serve and protect the city/citizens.” What was the purpose of this note to yourself?

    12-078-11

  1505. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And since the subject at the top says “Call with Mayor” ---

    12-079-02

  1506. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- “re Demonstration”, does that capture some of the contents of the call?

    12-079-05

  1507. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    On the 2nd of February.

    12-079-08

  1508. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, on that same day, you made a public announcement that turned out to be somewhat controversial. Do you know what I’m talking about?

    12-079-10

  1509. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Give me your guess.

    12-079-15

  1510. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why did you say that?

    12-079-18

  1511. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was the context in which you made this statement?

    12-080-15

  1512. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how was your comment received?

    12-080-22

  1513. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you feel that you were understood?

    12-080-25

  1514. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And have you had a chance to reflect on the statement you made since the time you made it?

    12-081-01

  1515. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what conclusions have you come to?

    12-081-04

  1516. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. What did you need to be more clear on?

    12-081-07

  1517. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, there are those who may say that your statement fostered a perception among the public and the protestors that the OPS was vulnerable and unable to police the convoy. What do you say to that?

    12-082-15

  1518. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you think that the lack of clarity of the statement might have risked contributing to a loss of public trust in the ability of the police to respond?

    12-083-20

  1519. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve also heard from other police leaders who disagreed with the statement from their perspective, in the way that they interpreted the statement, and they felt that there was, in fact, a policing solution. And the way that the occupation was ultimately dismantled proved that there was a policing solution. What do you say to that?

    12-084-06

  1520. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    12-085-14

  1521. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Okay. So this was on the 2nd; right? That you made the statement?

    12-085-26

  1522. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let’s move forward by a few days.

    12-086-01

  1523. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So let’s move forward by a few days. And we’ve heard from other witnesses that the weekends are always the worst. Is that right? In terms of the surge of numbers.

    12-086-04

  1524. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So I want to show you an email dated February the 5th at 6:33 a.m. The document number is OPS0007355. I expect it will show an email from you to Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson. And by this point, on around the 5th, what was the state of any evolving plan that the OPS had?

    12-086-11

  1525. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well that context is helpful as we take a look at this document. Can we scroll down a bit? So in this email, you said you have directed Insp. D’Aoust to convene a full incident command briefing at 8:00 a.m. If we go down further, there’s a recap situational awareness, and then below that, we see some -- two sets of priorities. First of all, the general priorities has a couple of points: “Surge, contain and enforce”. That’s the first point. Second: “Demonstration - fully implement plan - BUT - close everything (roads, bridges highway off ramps, etc.) as early and as long as possible” Third: “Shut down/secure enablers for unlawful and unsafe protest; funds […], fuel […], fun…” I won’t read the contents in brackets. Is there a fourth point? Can we go down? Okay. So that’s it. the first priority -- general priorities. Explain to us what this is all about?

    12-087-13

  1526. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Now, let me focus for the moment on the third -- well, the second and third point. The directive to close roads and so on, as well as shutting things down, like fuel seizure and so on. In earlier testimony from Deputy Chief Ferguson, and I believe Deputy Bell as well, they expressed the view that this is an example of a strategic level executive going down, crossing the boundary into the Operational or even possibly technical level of Command, and there was some question about the propriety of a Strategic Level Commander doing that. What's your view on this?

    12-090-07

  1527. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Just so I understand, you're acknowledging that you were in fact stepping into the Operational/Tactical levels, but you are saying this is justified under the circumstances?

    12-091-09

  1528. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, at this time, on the 5th, who was the Event Commander in charge?

    12-091-16

  1529. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when you made these directives you weren't aware yet that it was Dunlop, Superintendent Dunlop?

    12-091-22

  1530. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, some may say that the proper way to do this is not for the Strategic Commander to step into the Operational level, but to have a discussion with the Operational Commander and provide strategic direction, or if the Strategic Commander did not have enough confidence in the Operational Commander, to replace that person, rather than to start directing Operations him or herself. What do you say to that?

    12-091-25

  1531. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe it's 11:33 on Saturday, February the 5th.

    12-092-08

  1532. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, I'm told that this may be Greenwich Mean Time, and so -- is this six hours difference?

    12-092-11

  1533. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Five hours.

    12-092-14

  1534. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Would you agree, then, that these priorities set out in this email were conceived by you and directed by you?

    12-094-14

  1535. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But then we also heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson, or what we confirm through her testimony the notes that she wrote, that you expressed the sentiment that this plan was not to be changed. "Not changing the Operational Plan, needed to implement the hell out of that plan for the next 72 hours. The plan we have is excellent." So I believe we asked Deputy Chief Ferguson whether that was what you said, and she confirmed it. Do you remember?

    12-094-20

  1536. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Perhaps it would help if we go back to OPS00014479. Those are Deputy Chief Ferguson's notes. If necessary, we can also go to her transcript from last Thursday's testimony. So if we go to page 43. Can we go down? We need to go back up a little. Sorry, go up. Further up: "Need to turn the corner on this today. I am not changing the Op Plan. Need to implement the hell out of the plan for the next 72 hours." So does that refresh your memory?

    12-095-04

  1537. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you said that?

    12-095-16

  1538. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you consider this an excellent plan, and it was not to be changed?

    12-095-18

  1539. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-095-22

  1540. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Ah. Could you clarify that?

    12-095-25

  1541. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. That's helpful introduction to my next question because there was a public announcement the day before on the 4th; right? What's your best recollection as to what was said at that press event in terms of what was contemplated?

    12-097-10

  1542. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But would you agree that the purpose of the meeting on the 5th was to establish the resources required in order to carry out these priorities?

    12-097-19

  1543. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So we could have misunderstood, but let's see if we could clarify this. If I could take you to your interview summary, WTS00000040 at page 27. If we go down further?

    12-097-25

  1544. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, no, that -- I agree with you on that, but that's the announcement, but I'm asking you about the purpose of the meeting on the 5th, the morning meeting. So if we go to this paragraph that says, "Chief Sloly saw the situation report early on the morning of February 5[th]. In response, he held several early morning meetings to ensure that OPS's surge and enforcement strategy and efforts to harden the downtown core were proceeding properly. He wanted to ensure that OPS had the staffing to implement what it had announced on February 4[th]. Specifically, he spent Inspector D'Aoust an email with a list of meeting topics and asked him to organize a meeting with the members of the IC..." I believe that's Incident Command? "...and the command team." So and so it goes. So am I correct that on the 5th this meeting was arranged in part to ensure that the OPS had the staffing to implement what he had already announced the day before?

    12-098-08

  1545. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As a best practice, would it not be preferrable to first ensure that OPS had the resources before announcing these plans publicly?

    12-099-17

  1546. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. But do you agree with me that it would be -- it might be problematic to make announcements when it turns out that the resources are not there, or for other reasons the actions cannot be carried out, because it might contribute to a loss of public confidence?

    12-099-22

  1547. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we've covered the events on the 4th and on the 5th. Now the general priorities, and if we go back to the email on the 5th? We've looked at the general priorities. Mr. Clerk, do you need the document number? OPS0007355. So I've already asked you, Chief Sloly, about the general priorities. I want to ask you now about the location priorities, which is further down. There we go. So there are four locations listed: Confederation Park, Rideau -- I take it that this refers to the intersection Rideau and Sussex?

    12-100-03

  1548. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Third is Wellington and then fourth is SJAM. Who set these priorities, the general and the location priorities?

    12-100-14

  1549. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Are you speaking now of just the location priorities or does that apply as well to the general priorities?

    12-101-03

  1550. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The previous list, if we just scroll up? It's three points.

    12-101-08

  1551. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, I -- perhaps I'm not clear, but I -- my question is, who set these priorities -- or is your position that shutting down fuel funds and fund, these are priorities known to everyone?

    12-101-18

  1552. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about “Close everything”?

    12-102-10

  1553. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    With the -- with the ---

    12-102-13

  1554. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But who set that priority; the direction to close roads, interprovincial bridges and so on?

    12-102-17

  1555. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Then I don’t -- what I don’t understand is, I thought a moment earlier you said you did step -- you did cross from strategic level to operational level but for a good reason.

    12-102-20

  1556. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So, just if I understand, your position is that whoever developed the plan, the plan that kept evolving, they decided the priorities. You didn’t set anything new except for the third point, the fun part, and ---

    12-103-12

  1557. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. And another point to clarify, because you told us earlier that this is not the plan, that this is not -- this email, these priorities are not the plan that you thought was excellent; there was another plan, the one that has evolved.

    12-104-02

  1558. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I want to take you ---

    12-104-08

  1559. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The one plan that kept evolving. I want to take you to a document and see if you can confirm that was the plan as of this time. Could we go to OPS00006941? So it says, “Freedom Convoy - Canada Unity - Phase 2 Operational Plan.” There’s a date that’s partially cut off; February 4th, it looks like? If we scroll down to the Table of Contents, perhaps? Does this look familiar?

    12-104-10

  1560. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We go down further, maybe we can just scroll through so the former Chief can familiarize himself with this document. Let us know if you’re ready to scroll down.

    12-104-22

  1561. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So would those priorities be reflected -- well, assuming that this is the plan -- because this is this -- the cover says February the 4th, and we have the email saying February the 5th; it should be approximate in time?

    12-104-28

  1562. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So when you said, “We had an excellent plan”; could -- were you referring to this plan?

    12-105-05

  1563. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Or another iteration very close ---

    12-105-09

  1564. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And should those priorities, general or location-wise, be reflected in this plan?

    12-105-15

  1565. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But you had read a version of the plan that you called excellent?

    12-105-20

  1566. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So just to be clear, the initial plan, the one dated January 28th, that one you did read?

    12-106-09

  1567. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And any subsequent evolvement of that plan, you learn about those developments through briefings but not through your reading them?

    12-106-13

  1568. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So as of the 5th, when you describe an excellent plan, is an excellent plan that you haven’t read?

    12-106-18

  1569. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So if we move on to the next topic, which is something that you’ve alluded to; the Event Commander’s -- there was some switching of Commanders, and at the beginning of the events you weren’t always apprised of those changes in a timely manner. So I’d like to ask you about that. Let me find the page reference; OPS00004771. (SHORT PAUSE)

    12-106-24

  1570. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you see that this is dated January the 30th. It’s an email from you to Deputy Chief Ferguson, Deputy Chief Bell; who’s John Steinbach?

    12-107-03

  1571. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then it was also sent to Russ Lucas and Chris Rheaume. So I assume that that was because Supt. Rheaume was the Event Commander at the time?

    12-107-09

  1572. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now according to Supt. Rheaume’s notes, he was removed as the Event Commander on or around February the 1st because Trish Ferguson, the Deputy Chief Ferguson received direction from you to remove him; is that correct?

    12-107-13

  1573. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So that’s what I wanted to clarify because we actually heard from Deputy Chief Ferguson that he was removed for other reasons. But we do have these notations in Supt. Rheaume’s notes, that’s what I want to bring those to your attention. If we could go to document ---

    12-107-19

  1574. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    12-108-04

  1575. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But I gave no direction whatsoever at any time for Supt. Rheaume to be removed from his role as Event Commander.

    12-108-05

  1576. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. But we do have notes from Supt. Rheaume. So first I want to take you to two sets of notes.

    12-108-08

  1577. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. That’s where I’m taking you to. So OPS00014537. I believe it’s page 5. So 19:30 ---

    12-108-12

  1578. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It would be the 1st, I believe, because the next -- the date after the line is February the 2nd. We can go back and check. The date might have been on the first page, actually. So can we go back to the first page to establish the date, or the second page, I guess. Oh, no. Okay, so keep going down. Okay, so this is page 2 of 7, it's February 1st. Now we scroll down. That's right. It's the next page: "I was informed by [Deputy Chief] Trish Ferguson to report to duty tomorrow at Greenbank and to take care of my teams. No reason why I was removed from NCRCC and that I am no longer the Event Commander." So the notation on this date suggests that he was removed and he didn't understand why. Now, if we go to page 6. Go down a bit. Okay, so now we have his notes on February the 10th, and the notation says: "Advised by [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson that Chief Sloly had me removed by her on Feb 1." So it appears from these notes that he was removed on the 1st, not told why, and then there is a notation on the 10th that -- giving him the reason, that he was in fact removed by her -- well, through her by you. So I just wanted to get your position on what happened.

    12-108-18

  1579. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    12-109-21

  1580. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in fact, you were not aware that he was removed?

    12-109-23

  1581. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-110-08

  1582. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, if we could go back to ---

    12-110-10

  1583. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, that's why I want to bring these to your attention so you have a chance to respond. OPS00014484. And if we can go to page 10, please. So these are notes to yourself again? Yes?

    12-110-14

  1584. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It's dated February the 5th. Title is Meet With Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and DC Bell: "I advised that I had only just officially heard that Supt Dunlop had replaced Insp Lucas as the Incident Commander at the previous briefing." So you just learned on the 5th that Dunlop is now the Commander, and ---

    12-110-20

  1585. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. I'm not challenging your version, I'm just trying to understand from your perspective just what happened because it was pretty confusing when we're trying to go through the record, as you can imagine. The next paragraph: "DC Bell advised that he was the new Incident Commander installed this week..." Referring to Dunlop: "...and was leading the implementation of the preferred POU option. I asked why I was not advised of the change in the Incident Commander from Insp Lucas to Supt Dunlop. [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson took ownership of that failure to communicate and DC Bell admitted it was based on his recommendation. I counselled [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson that she was accountable for all Incident Command decisions so I hold responsible for this change and for not advising me of the change. I counselled that DC Bell that he is to stop interfering in [Acting Deputy Chief] Ferguson's role as Major Incident Commander. I counselled both that such major changes in the leadership of the [Incident Command] was to come to me for final approval outside of Operational exigencies. I advised both that I did not have confidence in Supt Dunlop as the Incident Commander based on his performance in the Panda Game..." And so on. So I just want to clarify a number of things. First, when Superintendent Rheaume, as the Event Commander, was replaced by Jamie Dunlop on or around the 1st of February, you had no knowledge of that until on or around the 5th?

    12-111-10

  1586. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. But you did not understand that the Event Commander is now Dunlop, you did not know that until the 5th?

    12-112-23

  1587. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that was concerning for you?

    12-112-27

  1588. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You addressed the situation with both Ferguson and Bell, and that is because as the Chief Executive you needed to know?

    12-113-01

  1589. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what effect, if any, did that incident have on your trust of your team, your Command Team?

    12-113-06

  1590. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    12-113-09

  1591. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did your level of trust in your two Deputies change from that point on?

    12-115-16

  1592. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did they regain your trust afterwards?

    12-115-19

  1593. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And to support some of the other things that you’ve said, can we go to OPS00014479?

    12-115-23

  1594. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe my friend is correct. I think she simply said the reason she believed that he was removed but she wasn’t given this document.

    12-116-07

  1595. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we can go to page 67. You see the notation, “The Chief began by saying we floundered last week and because we switched riders partway” -- I can’t read the next word.

    12-116-13

  1596. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Through -- perhaps you’re better at reading this. Can you help me out?

    12-116-18

  1597. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Indicating.

    12-116-27

  1598. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, that comment was supposed to be attributed to you.

    12-117-07

  1599. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But apart from that phrase on the last line, do you agree that this was the message communicated on this day, which I believe is February the 9th?

    12-117-12

  1600. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, no. But I’m asking for your recollection if anything was said of that nature on February the 9th.

    12-117-17

  1601. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. You expressed the view that things were delayed because of this unfortunate miscommunication or, for whatever reason, the lack of communication of the change to you or to seek your approval first.

    12-118-03

  1602. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So do you remember saying something about floundering the week before because of a switch in Commanders?

    12-119-02

  1603. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. That’s helpful. And you talk also about the discussions around -- -

    12-119-07

  1604. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Precisely. And you mentioned PLT was discussed around this time, too. Let me take you to where I want to go. I want to talk to you about the use of PLT. In fact, I think we may be going back in time because this is -- these notes were made on the 8th or 9th, and this is a discussion about the week before, whether things were delayed the week before. So I’m going back to the week before. We’ve all heard about the Coventry incident. I believe you know what I’m referring to.

    12-119-13

  1605. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So specifically, the PLT was involved with some successes and challenges during the first week. Do you agree? So for example, we’ve heard about Coventry. We’ve also heard Confederation Park. And would you consider the PLT’s involvement at the Confederation Park -- the clearing of the Confederation Park to be a success?

    12-119-26

  1606. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to get your perspective on the role of the PLT within the operational system because we’ve heard from different witnesses about these diverging approaches, emphasis being put on enforcement as opposed to engagement, so to speak. And we’ve heard evidence that you and perhaps Mark Patterson, Superintendent Patterson, at the time during that week of what one witness has described as ad hoc enforcement periods, that the two of you were favouring more enforcement in contrast to Deputies Ferguson and Bell, who were more in favour of PLT. I’m sorry. That’s a long preamble, but do you get what I was trying to ---

    12-120-07

  1607. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Perhaps you can explain that better.

    12-120-21

  1608. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is it fair to say then that the view attributed to you as less inclined to allow the PLT team to do its work and to prefer quick win, as one witness has described it, by enforcement methods, that is inaccurate?

    12-122-12

  1609. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And just to clarify your attitude on the role of the PLT, so let’s go to the next document and see if you can enlighten us. OPS0004568. Now, just to give you the context, I believe these are the notes of S/Sgt. Ferguson. Not Deputy Chief Ferguson. S/Sgt. Ferguson, who was the lead of the PLT team at the OPS.

    12-123-02

  1610. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-123-13

  1611. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-123-16

  1612. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes. And if we can go to page 15, please? Can we enlarge? So I believe the date is February 5th, but we can confirm if we need to. So do you see, Chief Sloly, here the notation that says: “CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE PLT DOING A GREAT JOB NEED MORE OF THEM TRAINED” So maybe we should scroll up just to give the witness some context.

    12-123-18

  1613. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We can scroll further up.

    12-124-02

  1614. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it’s February 5th. So it says: “CONFERENCE CALL CRITICAL INCIDENT COMMAND” Go further down. Go down. I thought there was a reference to chief briefing.

    12-124-04

  1615. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That it was the Chief ---

    12-124-10

  1616. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, okay. So I just missed it.

    12-124-13

  1617. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So, Chief Sloly, do you remember congratulating or encouraging the team?

    12-124-15

  1618. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If they were doing a good job?

    12-124-18

  1619. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-124-25

  1620. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But there are other occasions when we see notations in other people’s notes, not with regard to this incident, but PLT or negotiation more generally when the comments are a little more ambiguous. So I want to get your help in illuminating that. I want to take you to another document, OPS00014454. If we go to page 55? So we’re now on February 5th. If we go down? H’m. Can we go back up, please? It appears I may have the wrong reference. A moment’s indulgence. Okay. I don’t want to waste anyone’s time. Let’s move on to another document. Can we go to page 32 of the same document? So here, there’s a notation, “What is our trajectory?” And then there are two branches: “enforced…” “enforced end” or “negotiated occupation end”. “Need to [take] a decision today.” February the 3rd, ---

    12-124-27

  1621. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe these are notes taken by the legal services.

    12-125-18

  1622. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So ---

    12-125-21

  1623. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I’m not sure we have the time. We just have the date, which is February 3rd. If you want to scroll up, we can see if we can find out more, but that’s redacted, so that’s not helpful. So we’re left with these notes. It may be that you cannot help us with more information, but I thought I’d try. Do you recall anything discussed along these lines on the 3rd?

    12-125-24

  1624. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Unfortunately, the context, we don’t have much to guide us on these pages. So I’ll just leave this and move on to the Coventry incident. Oh, so I have a new note. Let’s try page 59. Same document, page 59. If we go to the bottom, please? Right. Here. So here there’s a notation. This is again on February the 5th. The notation that says: “Negotiation gives us legitimacy to use force if negotiation fails.” (As read) I take N-E-G to refer to negotiation. You can -- -

    12-126-07

  1625. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, these are the ---

    12-126-21

  1626. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- notes from the legal services. But “PS”, I take it, refers to your initials?

    12-126-23

  1627. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall any discussions around the use of negotiation as a way to give the police legitimacy to use force should it fail?

    12-126-26

  1628. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if anyone suggests otherwise, they would have misunderstood your view on the matter?

    12-127-14

  1629. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we spoke earlier about the success at the confederation Park, the involvement of the PLT. Now we -- I want to take you to the event involving Coventry. That is -- that didn't go so well; did it, for the PLT?

    12-127-19

  1630. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    12-127-27

  1631. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What good thing occurred in your view?

    12-128-06

  1632. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As I understand it, the issue was not so much whether it was legitimate to seize fuel or to prevent people from taking fuel downtown, as Superintendent Beaudin explained, that wasn't the issue. The issue was for the PLT team to tell the protesters that something's okay, that -- but then to turn around and arrest people when they take the fuel away. That's the problem that's leading to mistrust between the PLT and the protesters; do you agree?

    12-128-28

  1633. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Just so we are on the same page, it may be helpful if I take you to the interview summary of Staff Sergeant Ferguson. If we can go to WTS00000027, please, at page 8. So he provided a description of what happened that day. I'd like to read that to you and then get your thoughts on it. So, "At 4:40 p.m. on February the 6[th], Superintendent Patterson advised Staff Sergeant Ferguson that POU was going to Coventry Road and would be seizing fuel for evidentiary purposes. At that time, PLT had been at Coventry Road for at least two hours, engaging with protesters. Staff Sergeant Ferguson informed Superintendent Patterson that PLT was negotiating with the protesters and that they were compliant, but Superintendent Patterson indicated that he intended to proceed with the public order operation. Staff Sergeant Ferguson attempted unsuccessfully to convince others in OPS not to proceed with the public order operation at Coventry Road. At 5:00 p.m., Inspector Marin reiterated Superintendent Patterson's direction to Staff Sergeant Ferguson that they did not want the fuel from Coventry Road to be displaced and that they were proceeding without warrant. At 5:10 p.m., Staff Sergeant Ferguson contacted Deputy Chief Bell and advised him that the enforcement operation would undermine PLT's negotiations, which had been proceeding for at least two hours. Staff Sergeant Ferguson informed Deputy Chief Bell that protestors were compliant. Shortly after the call ended, at 5:18 p.m., Deputy Chief Bell contacted Staff Sergeant Ferguson and informed him that he agreed with Superintendent Patterson's decision. Later that evening, Staff Sergeant Ferguson learned that Deputy Chief Bell supported Superintendent Patter's decision because three convoy vehicles had left [the] Coventry Road site and were transporting fuel to supply protestors downtown." In a nutshell, that's what happened. Do you have any view on what transpired there and any thoughts on how these kind of problems or troubles could have been avoided?

    12-129-28

  1634. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm ---

    12-131-28

  1635. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry?

    12-132-03

  1636. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why is that?

    12-132-06

  1637. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So problem number one. Keep going.

    12-132-13

  1638. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Which one ---

    12-133-16

  1639. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- are you're talking about, yeah?

    12-133-18

  1640. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, no, which one -- who wasn't trained on PLT?

    12-133-21

  1641. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-133-25

  1642. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So to summarize, we have confusion regarding the command structure, who should be reporting to whom about what. You were giving us the example of Staff Sergeant John Ferguson seeking direction from Bell.

    12-134-01

  1643. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-134-09

  1644. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And there were a lot of movement from one unit to another for a lot of people during those periods; right?

    12-134-14

  1645. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the fact that the event commanders has changed a few times, Patterson being the third commander, also didn't help. What about the fact that the PLT and the enforcement arm, which we learn were the two sides of a -- the Command Triangle, what about the fact that they didn't seem to be coordinating their actions in carrying out their respective responsibilities? Is that a big concern?

    12-134-18

  1646. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So without any unrealistic expectation of flicking a switch, what are your thoughts on what we can do better in terms of avoiding these kind of troubles? What can we learn from all of this?

    12-135-15

  1647. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. Commissioner, I note the time. We're past one o'clock. Would this be an appropriate time to break?

    12-137-15

  1648. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Commissioner, before I continue with the examination, just to clarify for the record, when I put the notes of Superintendent Rheaume to the former Chief Sloly, Mr. Champ correctly pointed out that those notes were not put to Deputy Chief Ferguson in our examination, but she did, in fairness to her, say both in her interview summary as well as in her evidence that Superintendent Rheaume was removed for personal reasons. He needed a rest or some rest days, so she did not say anything about his removal being connected to the former Chief. I just wanted that to be clarified on the record.

    12-138-18

  1649. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, Chief Sloly, just before the lunch break, we spoke about a number of issues that I also wanted to clarify so that there's no misunderstanding. First of all, I asked you about the date when you found out that Superintendent Rheaume was replaced by Superintendent Dunlop, and I believe you said that was on the 5th of February. Now if I could take you to a document, I want to see if that would refresh your memory. OPS00014484. So if we go to page 2. So it appears that on the 3rd of February, these are, again, notes to yourself. On the 3rd of February at around -- well, in the morning, you attended a meeting with both deputies on Teams with Superintendent Dunlop. What was your understanding as of the 3rd about Superintendent Dunlop's role if he was not the event commander?

    12-139-03

  1650. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. The other thing that we spoke about was with respect to the Coventry incident, and we were attempting to draw some lessons from that event. One of the issues you identified was the fact that Staff Sergeant John Ferguson went outside the Incident Command System when he sought guidance from Deputy Chief Bell. Now, if Staff Sergeant Ferguson were -- if he had concerns about the direction that he was getting from Event Commander Mark Patterson, Superintendent Patterson at that time, who should he have gone to?

    12-140-17

  1651. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But just so we understand, Superintendent Patterson was Inspector Lucas's superior. If he was challenging a decision by Superintendent Patterson, wouldn't it be problematic for him to go to somebody who reported to Superintendent Patterson?

    12-141-11

  1652. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand from Inspector Lucas's interview summary that he thought by that time, around 5th or 6th of February, he had -- his role had diminished to more akin to an Operations Chief at the tactical level. So if Staff Sergeant John Ferguson had issues about the Operations, is it not arguable that he shouldn't have gone to Inspector Lucas?

    12-141-25

  1653. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I appreciate that you are doing the best you can. We're also trying to understand what lessons to draw from it. We just don't want to draw the wrong lessons. So the other option that you identified was for Staff Sergeant John Ferguson to perhaps approach Deputy Chief Ferguson because she was by then the Major Incident Commander. But wasn't that also problematic because they are married?

    12-142-15

  1654. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So because there are some uncertainties about the circumstances, we shouldn't be too quick perhaps to ---

    12-143-18

  1655. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. So let's move to a new topic. You've told us earlier that the Ottawa Police Service was badly in need of external help. It needed more resources to resolve the situation on the ground. I want to take you to a document. This is OPS00014454. So you see that the document is dated January 31st, so this is the first Monday after the arrival of the convoy, and it looks like it's a meeting with the RCMP and the OPP. You were there. If we go down the page. You see the notation: "Can't safely remove them unless we have hundreds of officers to maintain risk." And then if we go down further, "No way we can come-by", not sure. What's that word? "4 more days w/out" something "help", "lots of help".

    12-144-03

  1656. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that the -- and then the next line says, "Now transitioned into an occupation." Does this reflect the thinking at the time on or about the 31st, that the OPS will need hundreds of officers in order to safely remove the protesters?

    12-144-23

  1657. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if we go to the next page. "We need..." Sorry, go down a bit. Oh, sorry, go down. Oh, go up, sorry: "We need resources and…" What is that next word?

    12-145-01

  1658. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    "…(saying together) Joint together at 3:00 p.m.?" Do you recall these discussions at that meeting?

    12-145-09

  1659. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And if we go down the page a little, there’s a comment from Trish. Maybe go to the next page, here: "Looking for boots on the ground." What did you understand her to mean?

    12-145-17

  1660. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So do you understand the request at that time was for general duty officers from the RCMP and the OPP?

    12-145-26

  1661. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the other ---

    12-146-02

  1662. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how did the Commissioners Carrique and Lucki answer?

    12-146-07

  1663. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I can -- we can scroll down.

    12-146-10

  1664. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    From Commissioner Carrique: "We will facilitate all of your requests and get embedded in the command structure."

    12-146-12

  1665. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you had a commitment from Commissioner Carrique as of the 31st that they would do all they could to assist and they were willing to embed in the OPS command structure. And then Commissioner Lucki from the RCMP: "Why did negotiations fall through last night at 8:00 p.m.?" What was that about; what negotiations?

    12-146-17

  1666. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then, if we go further down, there’s a comment attributed to you: "Reach out to…" Do you see?

    12-146-26

  1667. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So you extended the ask to Gatineau and Sûreté as well?

    12-147-04

  1668. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you know what kind of help at this time the OPP and the RCMP were offering? We know what you asked for but do you remember they were committed to providing?

    12-147-07

  1669. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If I could take you to the next document, which is an email that you sent to Commissioner Carrique dated February 2nd. The document number is OPP00001576. So this was sent February the 2nd? On the first line, you see that you wrote: "I’m seeking your assistance in providing resources to assist the Ottawa Police with our operational plan." The subsequent bullets mention 50 to 60 uniform officers, PLT and POU supports, as well as incident command supports. And then the next line talks about a tactical dispatcher. So were these the nature of the request?

    12-148-03

  1670. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in testimony yesterday from Commissioner Carrique, he was asked about a formal request and the implications of a formal request under the Police Services Act, Section 9(6). Just to be clear, your request here, was that the kind of formal request under the Police Services Act?

    12-148-21

  1671. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it may help if we take you to the Act, COM00000819. You’re familiar with the provision I’m referring to, right?

    12-148-28

  1672. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay, so let’s go to the Act and look at it together. So this is the Police Services Act, if we could go to page 12. So under “Request of chief of police in emergency” -- this is Section 9(6): " A municipal chief of police who is…"

    12-149-04

  1673. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Oh, at the top. Do you see ---

    12-149-11

  1674. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you see the heading ---

    12-149-14

  1675. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- “Request of chief of police in emergency” in bold?

    12-149-16

  1676. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Maybe it’s the screen.

    12-149-19

  1677. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, that’s my question. When you wrote the letter, you were not having in mind this section - --

    12-149-23

  1678. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- under the Police Services Act?

    12-149-27

  1679. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What do you understand to be the difference of requests formally under Subsection 9(6) or the kind of informal request that you appear to have sent?

    12-150-03

  1680. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, that is -- that is where I’m going because perhaps it is open to interpretation but certainly one interpretation is that the OPP had the ability to step in and take the lead.

    12-150-17

  1681. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And that’s why I’m asking you, if a request is made under this section, would you have been comfortable to let the OPP take more of a lead role under this section?

    12-150-24

  1682. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You were not making that request. And I guess my question is, given the situation that you found the OPS to be in shortly after the -- what you call “the paradigm shift”, after the first weekend ---

    12-151-06

  1683. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- isn’t that something that should have been done, logically?

    12-151-11

  1684. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why not?

    12-151-14

  1685. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did the situation in Ottawa escalate at some point to a stage where you would have considered that appropriate?

    12-151-27

  1686. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in your view, up until mid- February -- February the 15th was your last day as the chief -- the situation was not desperate enough in Ottawa to -- for the chief to be requesting that kind of assistance from the OPP?

    12-152-03

  1687. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What would be the downside to the OPP stepping in when they had the resources and if they were willing to help?

    12-152-08

  1688. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, they alone might not have been enough, as we know. During the final days, both the OPP and the RCMP stepped in. But certainly, the OPP had more resources than the OPS had at the time.

    12-152-16

  1689. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But in addition to quantity, they also seem to have the right expertise such as the -- as we'll come to talk about it, the group led by Chief Pardy, the Integrated Planning Group. They had the expertise, they had the capacity, they were willing to help, they were offering help; why not?

    12-152-26

  1690. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So this is the letter -- sorry, if we can take this off, the Police Services Act. You'll remember we were -- we looked at an email, this one, that was your request. I want to take you to another email that you sent on the 4th. So this request was sent on the 2nd. On the 4th of February, we have another email, OPP00001582. That’s right. This is the part I want to take you to. You address this email to Commissioner ---

    12-153-12

  1691. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 4th of February.

    12-153-23

  1692. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you address this email to Commissioner Carrique. You said: "Once again, let me express my appreciation for the significant and ongoing support that you and your OPP team have provided to the OPS over the course of the demonstrations." It would appear from this reply that you received the additional resources that you requested?

    12-153-25

  1693. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. On the 2nd of February when you send the request to the OPP, I believe you also sent a request to the RCMP. Let's take a look at PB.NSC.CAN.00001743. So this is a -- actually, this is your reply. February 2nd, "Thank you, Commissioner Lucki." If we go further down -- that’s right -- we see an email from her to you, and at the bottom paragraph -- sorry, go up a bit, the paragraph that starts with, "At present". "At present, all of our Public Order Units are actively deployed and I'm not in a position to be able to redirect any teams to Ottawa." Do you have a memory of what you were asking for and what this response was meant to address?

    12-154-16

  1694. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The 2nd.

    12-155-04

  1695. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So these are examples of the kind of early requests following the paradigm shift and the kind of responses you got?

    12-155-20

  1696. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    On the 6th of February, I understand that you told the mayor and Chair Deans that you needed 1,800 additional resources; am I correct?

    12-155-24

  1697. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Let's go to an OPS document, 00014454, page 98. So there's a reference here, 1,800 additional members that came from other services.

    12-156-02

  1698. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we scroll up? February 6th -- -

    12-156-07

  1699. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- 5:10 p.m. So am I correct that the number 1,800 was communicated as early as the 6th of February?

    12-156-10

  1700. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did you derive the 1,800 number from?

    12-157-05

  1701. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand that later that day, on the 6th of February, there was a command team meeting where you asked your team about the resource needs.

    12-158-13

  1702. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    On the 6th. Does that accord with your recollection?

    12-158-17

  1703. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right.

    12-158-21

  1704. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the Commission has heard evidence from Supt. Abrams that he was present and overheard some of the things that you said to your team -- or not overheard, he was there. He was invited to attend. And the next day, he wrote to his superiors, including Chris Harkins, among others, about what he observed on the 6th. So can we go to that email? If only I had the document number. OPP00001546.

    12-158-24

  1705. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I could be off on the dates. I -- but the date of the email is not in question. The date of the email is the 7th, as you can see on the screen. And it was on the 7th that Supt. Abrams wrote to his superiors, including Deputy Commissioner Harkins, and this is what he wrote: “Deputy, I did not want to mention this on the call with the group but [I] feel it important for you to have this information. On my call with OPS Command last night Chief Sloly asked his people to send him their resource needs. They told him that they need 250 members a day to run things. Chief Sloly told them that if they need 100 he will ask for 200, if they need 200 he will ask for 400. He seemed very comfortable asking for twice what he really needed. He looks at it that it [sic] the other partner police agencies can’t meet the ask number then Ottawa may still get more than they really need.. Was a very strange call to be a part of. Hearing the Commissioner say that he may ask for a thousand members I felt you should be aware of the above.” So that’s what he wrote about his observation the night before when he attended the meeting with the OPS command. What do you have to say to this?

    12-159-19

  1706. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, we’ve heard from other witnesses, we’ve asked other witnesses the question what should go first, the plan or the request. Is it the number that drives the resources, or sorry, the plan, or the other way around? What’s your view on that?

    12-161-20

  1707. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Now, a moment earlier, I think you clarify that it was on the evening of the 5th that your team started working on the numbers?

    12-163-10

  1708. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I don’t know which dates may or may not be off. I just want to bring to your attention what is in your summary and give you a chance to correct anything if necessary. Can we go to the former Chief’s summary at page 31, please? So ---

    12-163-15

  1709. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, go ahead.

    12-163-24

  1710. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well, here’s the thing. The reference is in the previous page, on this page to the 6th and the 7th. I don’t think there’s a reference to the 5th. But you saw an earlier email dated the 6th where you had he 1,800 number; right?

    12-164-02

  1711. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I’m just trying to get some clarification in terms of when your team worked on the number in order for it to be available on the 6h.

    12-164-08

  1712. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So depending your best recollection, it could be that the date in the summary is in error, in which case I wanted to give you an opportunity to correct it if necessary.

    12-164-22

  1713. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    A moment’s indulgence. (SHORT PAUSE)

    12-165-06

  1714. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, this number, the 1,800 number, was publicly announced at some point, was it not?

    12-165-08

  1715. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you remember the date or should we go by the summary?

    12-165-11

  1716. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So if we go to page 32 of the summary. “Chief Sloly publicly announced the request for 1,800 police resources during a special City Council meeting on February 7.” Is that what you remember?

    12-165-15

  1717. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    This was not his normal course of action, but the Freedom Convoy was unprecedented. Specifically, Ms. Deans asked Chief Sloly in a public OPSB -- that’s Ottawa Police Services Board -- “meeting to provide a detailed report on the level of resources required.” Could you explain the circumstances in which you made the public announcement?

    12-165-23

  1718. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in the ordinary course, would it be the practice for the request to go from Chief to Chief? From one police service to another and not through these political channels?

    12-166-12

  1719. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was that not sufficient in these circumstances?

    12-166-17

  1720. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, there are those who are concerned about the public announcement of this large a number of request. For example, there are -- there may be legitimate concerns that this announcement exposed the OPS’s vulnerability to the convoy participants.

    12-167-23

  1721. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And to those who hold the view that this announcement was made outside the proper channels and invited inappropriate political influence into the intra-police resourcing discussions, what do you have to say in addition to what you’ve already said about the context of these?

    12-168-15

  1722. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, another criticism that could be leveled against this public announcement is, especially in light of what we’ve heard from other police administrators about the lack of an adequate plan at the time this announcement was made, was it really appropriate to make this kind of public announcement when OPS didn’t seem to have the kind of plan sufficient to deploy this large number of resources even if it were given them?

    12-169-01

  1723. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now this Commission has heard evidence from both Superintendent Bernier of the OPS and Superintendent Abrams from the OPP that officers from the OPP already in Ottawa were not receiving adequate instructions for them to be properly integrated or deployed in Ottawa. If there were officers in Ottawa who were not being effectively used, then one may ask, what's the point of sending more?

    12-170-10

  1724. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now the last criticism that could have been made, that I can think of, and that we've heard from some witnesses, is that between the 3rd and the 10th of February, the OPS was using RCMP and OPP officers simply to relieve OPS officers who were exhausted and not as part of a plan to end the occupation. What do you have to say to that?

    12-171-09

  1725. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now I'd like to take you to a new topic. We've been talking about your request for resources. But before we leave that topic, actually, now that it's clear to you as of the 6th or the 7th that Ottawa would need at least 1800 officers in order to effectively resolve the convoy events, why is it still not a good time to resort to Sections 9(6) of the Police Services Act?

    12-171-24

  1726. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Perhaps this raises a more general question of how should we deal with multi-jurisdictional event that requires external support? You've mentioned that Ottawa is the police of jurisdiction, but the reality is that you're asking these external agencies, the OPP or RCMP, to supply tremendous resources that, at the time, Ottawa did not seem capable of effectively deploying. You've acknowledged that there were issues with officers already present, but for different reasons.

    12-173-05

  1727. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    12-173-26

  1728. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I do not wish to exaggerate the problem in Ottawa, but surely, you won't deny that OPS was struggling. That's what we've heard from the ---

    12-174-03

  1729. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- all of the other witnesses.

    12-174-07

  1730. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And OPS was struggling on many different levels. It needed to develop a plan, but it was struggling to the point where it was finding it difficult to have the expert planners to make that plan. Is that fair to say?

    12-174-10

  1731. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the OPS officers were tired, exhausted. They needed external agency's help just to maintain a regular level of policing. That's the reality at the time ---

    12-174-16

  1732. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And ---

    12-174-23

  1733. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So, again, I think my question is, wouldn't it be very simple to let a bigger organization like the OPP or RCMP to be -- to have a greater capacity to help? They wanted to help.

    12-174-26

  1734. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. Well, let's go back to what happened on or around the time that Chief Pardy led his group, the Integrated Planning Group, to Ottawa. He arrived on the 8th, and he had a meeting with your Command Team on both the 8th and the 9th. I want to get your best recollection of the meeting you had with them in the afternoon on the 9th.

    12-176-19

  1735. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I'm glad you paused there because before we get to the actual meeting with the Integrated Planning Group, do I understand correctly that that morning, the morning of the 9th, you had another meeting with your -- the OPS Command Team.

    12-178-07

  1736. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you tell us more about that meeting first?

    12-178-13

  1737. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let me take you to some notes. These are notes written by Deputy Chief Ferguson, I believe. OPS00014479. And I want to take you to page 66. So you see from the top there that is Wednesday, February the 9th. If we go to... What time did you say the meeting was? I don't remember.

    12-178-24

  1738. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So this is the day after the group arrived, and your attendance was delayed the day before, and then the next morning we have this meeting. Do you remember Mission Hydra?

    12-179-08

  1739. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about the name?

    12-179-13

  1740. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was there a reason why it's -- this is called Mission Hydra?

    12-179-17

  1741. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, I understand from the testimony of Deputy Chief Ferguson that the day before, on the 8th, when your Command Team met with the Integrated Planning Group, she presented a Strategic Concept of Operations Plan with eight points with a mission statement that included elements of engagement by the PLT and so on. And part of the discussion at this morning meeting, on the 9th, is a new version with a different mission statement, and there's a reference here that this was a "very aggressive posture": "...language throughout the whole briefing & mission statement..." I'm not sure of that next word: "Asked if anyone needed clarification. Chief laid out his plan, omitted negotiation and when I brought it up he reacted angrily saying 'we are not negotiating', then said 'it's implicit'. I advised..." Is it "all CIC mission statements are": "...our mission statements always has explicitly stated in the mission statement." And then the next comment I believe is attributed to you: "If it doesn't reduce the size of the footprint that is not a good negotiation." Do you remember this exchange?

    12-180-04

  1742. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's hear it from your perspective. You've told us about this as well, I believe, during our interviews. If I could take you to your interview summary at page 36. So if we go to the section under Discussions: "Chief Sloly recalled that on February [the 9th] he held a special meeting with Deputy Chief Bell, Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, OPS general counsel Christiane Huneault, CAO Dunker, and Insp. Kevin Maloney. This meeting took place after an internal OPS planning meeting but before the February 9 12:10 p.m. meeting with Chief Superintendent Pardy and Superintendent Lue. His intent was to emphasize that the entire command team was signed off on the February 9 plan. At the meeting, he stated that he would ‘crush’ anyone who undermined the plan - Chief Sloly recognizes that it was an unfortunate choice of words but public safety, member health, wellness and safety, and the successful conclusion of the local Convoy event were all at a critical juncture and this required absolute command commitment to supporting the implementation of the updated plan. He restated the need for unity within the command to support the updated plan including the level of integration and the acquisition of the needed resources to safely and successfully end the events in Ottawa. There were to be no major changes to the plan, the concept of operations, the elevated integration and the senior ICS assignments without discussion about the need for such a change.” Does this reflect your recollection of what happened?

    12-181-13

  1743. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So there appears to be an emphasis of committing to this plan, unless there was -- there were significant changes that would have justified a different course. Why this emphasis?

    12-182-27

  1744. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you acknowledged that the word choice “Crush” was unfortunate?

    12-183-24

  1745. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But you meant to convey an emphasis that no-one should deviate from the plan lightly.

    12-183-27

  1746. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Is this consistent with the Incident Command system where the Operational Level Commander required a certain degree to adapt and to respond to quickly changing circumstances?

    12-184-10

  1747. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So would your colleagues have some away from this meeting understanding that if there were to be changes, that it would require some kind of an approval from the Chief?

    12-184-17

  1748. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we’ll come back to this very shortly, but just to clarify this point I may take you to the notes taken at this meeting by the Legal Services, by Ms. Huneault. If we go to OPS00014454, please, page 130. So this is -- this appears to be the same meeting? Do you want to scroll up and look at the date?

    12-185-04

  1749. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we go back to page 130. The point I want to draw your attention to is the second arrow from the top: “No changes to plan unless Chief approves.”

    12-185-14

  1750. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that was the question I put to you. Would someone walk away from this meeting thinking that there were to be no changes to the plan unless the Chief approves?

    12-185-20

  1751. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, it was at this meeting as well that we’ve heard from other witnesses that you discussed politics. If I could take you to page -- maybe later on in this page, actually, or maybe the next page; I’m not sure. Go down a little more. Do you see the comment from Trish: “I want us to limit politics!”

    12-186-10

  1752. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the comment just before that I suppose was attributed to you, “Tom C.”; Tom Carrique, probably?

    12-186-18

  1753. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “...is assessing if we are worthy of getting the additional ask resources”

    12-186-21

  1754. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What is your recollection of the discussion?

    12-186-25

  1755. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now -- so there was a reference to Deputy Chief Ferguson asking to limit the discussion of politics. Her own notes -- now, these are notes taken by the Legal Services. Her own notes are more explicit. If we could go to OPS00014479, at page 67? Go down. Okay. “Talked about the plan...” So keep going. See the dash? “Talked about the plan...” I’m not sure. “Talked about the plan for...”

    12-187-06

  1756. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    “...briefing the embedded cell of planners & commanders and he spoke of a type of conspiracy that is happening at Provincial & Federal levels and this team is being handled by their political masters and promoted the idea that they are not really here to help.” Can you help us understand who are these political masters and what was the conspiracy theory?

    12-187-16

  1757. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were you concerned that these officers coming from the OPP or RCMP may not come with a pure motive to help but rather were acting on behalf of whoever was sending them or other politically-related reasons?

    12-189-09

  1758. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you were the one who was asking for help. And when they came, were you -- did you have any -- was there any reluctance on your part to share the information within the OPS in order to help them help you?

    12-189-22

  1759. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you have any issues of trust in relation to working with them cooperatively to resolve the situation in Ottawa?

    12-189-27

  1760. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Your command team has told us that they perceived an issue on your part of not willing to let go of control to -- a concern to hold onto -- by way of this “police of jurisdiction” concept, to hold onto some kind of control; do you agree with that?

    12-190-15

  1761. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you know what they’re talking about?

    12-190-21

  1762. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What was it that was so important -- why is it so important to you that Ottawa remain the police of jurisdiction; what’s the significance of that? What does that mean?

    12-190-24

  1763. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But don’t different police services often work cooperatively to figure out how to solve a problem? Isn’t that what ---

    12-191-02

  1764. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But if it makes sense for, like, a major case investigation for -- let’s say a crime is committed in Toronto but the expertise required to successfully solve the case necessitates a combination of expertise from Toronto Police, Peel Police, and York Regional Police, isn’t there some protocol that the lead would not necessarily be the police of jurisdiction? It would depend on the circumstances what makes the most sense?

    12-191-14

  1765. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But why would it be a matter of someone else doing it for us? Wouldn’t it be a true matter of collaboration? It would still count on the local expertise but -- maybe this is a question for the policy round discussions. I don’t know.

    12-192-12

  1766. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But in any event, at this meeting on February the 9th, if I take you to the notes, OPS00014454 -- so we’re returning to the Legal Services notes, if we go to page 136 and we go down -- so this is still the 9th, I believe: "Yesterday provided them the org chart of command. What more do you need to implement/build into our plan? Need to know what resources we will get here in Ottawa." That was attributed to you. And the OPP responded: "Strategic decision because of rest of provinces." Do you remember what this was about?

    12-192-18

  1767. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Explain to us, please.

    12-193-05

  1768. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Could we go -- scroll further down? OPP said ”We stated 1,200 OPP staff over” -- it's hard to read -- sorry, it's actually there at the below quote that I'm interested in, "Can't build a plan without a plan." And the chief said, "Fine, build a plan and get us the people."

    12-193-25

  1769. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, but tell us what you remember.

    12-194-09

  1770. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, you do recognize these notes are from the OPS council, Ms. ---

    12-195-05

  1771. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Because didn’t you ask her -- if we go to page 43 -- so I'm going back in time -- page 43 is her notes on February the 3rd, as you can see here. Do you see the bullet where she notated that she asked, "He asked if I've been taking notes. I told him I'm acting like a scribe and capturing everything." So it appears that you've asked her to take notes, and she's been doing her best to take notes, almost like a scribe in trying to capture everything. But you don’t believe that these notes are -- or at least the part that we've referenced?

    12-195-09

  1772. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    12-196-05

  1773. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in the interest of time, I think I'm going to skip ahead, but the last point I need -- I do want to put to you because in fairness to you, Chief Pardy, in his will-say, has said that the tone, the overall tone of this meeting was somewhat unprofessional and disrespectful. "Chief Sloly was very clearly under tremendous pressure to act and was very suspicious of levels of commitment from police agencies. He went as far as to advise us that he had sources in the Ministry office that his requests were not being supported, and essentially, they wanted him to fail. There was disagreement on this point from our team." I just want to give you the opportunity to respond to those comments.

    12-196-08

  1774. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You can -- if -- would it help if I ---

    12-196-26

  1775. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes.

    12-197-02

  1776. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Of course.

    12-197-05

  1777. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let's go to OPP00000792, and if we can go to page 4, please? So do you see the bullet that starts with, "The overall tone"?

    12-197-07

  1778. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Well ---

    12-197-27

  1779. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, that’s fine.

    12-198-17

  1780. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, I -- there are so many things I would like to get your thoughts on, but we do not have all the time that we want.

    12-198-19

  1781. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. Now, if I could take you to a different topic, and this relates to the invocation of the Emergencies Act, I want to ask you, before the 14th of February, did you ever form the view that additional powers that could be granted under the Emergencies Act could help OPS resolve the convoy events?

    12-198-25

  1782. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So the Emergencies Act was invoked on the 14th of February?

    12-199-05

  1783. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Before that date, did you ever think about whether the powers under the Emergencies Act might be helpful for the OPS to resolve the convoy events?

    12-199-08

  1784. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. If I could take you to the OPS document 00014566? It appears that these are notes of a meeting that occurred on February the 14th at around 10:00 a.m. So if we go to page 2. If we go to the section under the redaction, do you see a note that, "Lucki did not get prime minister briefed [...] on the plan. Prime minister will be enacting [...] Emergencies Measures Act." And then if we go to the very bottom of the page, there's a notation that, "CHIEF grateful for every tool we get in the toolbelt but need the resources." Do you remember this discussion about ---

    12-199-28

  1785. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    12-200-18

  1786. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So was Commissioner Lucki the first to inform you that the federal government would be declaring an emergency?

    12-200-22

  1787. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    12-200-28

  1788. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now later that day, I understand that you spoke with Chair Deans about the Emergencies Act. Do you remember that?

    12-201-04

  1789. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah, I'll take you to OPS00014566, at page 6. Sorry, if we go back up a little? Trying to see. Go -- okay. So the last bullet. "You have a municipal state of emergency, then a provincial and now a federal. I have already said that we need more than just the OPS." Was that something you said during that meeting?

    12-201-09

  1790. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now you said also in your interview summary that you participated in several phone calls with Federal Deputy Minister of Public Safety Rob Stewart and Commissioner Lucki before the Federal Government declared an emergency, and that you made it clear on these calls that number one thing that the OPS needed were more police officers.

    12-201-22

  1791. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did the federal declaration of emergency help OPS obtain more resources?

    12-202-02

  1792. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I'd like to show you an email exchange between Commissioner Lucki and Mr. Mike Jones, who was Chief of Staff to Minister Mendocino. The document number is PB.NSC.CAN.00003256. So the context in this email, Commissioner Lucki enumerates a few emergency measures that she believes would be useful, but then added that she's of the view that -- well, I'll let you read it. If we go down -- she gave a few examples of additional tools. But then if we go further down, she said, "[That] said, I am of the view that we have not yet exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation." Do you agree with that assessment?

    12-202-06

  1793. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The available tools, if you want to -- well, she explains in this paragraph, "There are instances where charges could be laid under existing authorities for various Criminal Code offences occurring right now in the context of the protest. The Ontario Provincial Emergencies Act just enacted will also help in providing additional deterrent tools to our existing toolbox."

    12-202-22

  1794. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    At that time, did you have a view on whether we have exhausted all available tools that are already available through the existing legislation?

    12-203-21

  1795. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That's right.

    12-203-26

  1796. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now let's go back and talk a bit about we began today's discussion ---

    12-204-05

  1797. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yeah.

    12-204-08

  1798. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now we began our discussions today with questions about the Ottawa Police Service at the time the convoy arrived. And now we're into -- well into February. I want to come back to the question of your confidence in the OPS team. On the day before your resignation on the 14th of February, we have this communication -- your communication with Chair Deans. If I could find the reference, could we go to OPS00014566, page 6? So this is a call on February the 14th. So if we scroll down a little, "When asked by Chair if any of my orders were disobeyed during the demonstration, Chief advised there have been major issues with senior leadership team members but he has not had time to do an investigation on what has been going on here. The best and the worst of us have been strained - [that] is why there has been tense meetings and why some have not demonstrated their best [efforts]. Like everyone, I have been at my best and I have not been at my best" Can you explain what you meant there?

    12-204-28

  1799. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did that lack of trust affect the leadership of the OPS during the convoy events in the sense did it make you more likely to step in and provide directions because you could not trust others to lead at the Strategic or Operational levels?

    12-206-16

  1800. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, there are two other events I want to cover. So you had this conversation with Chair Deans on the 14th. I want to ask you about the 13th, as well as on the 15th. So let's start with the 13th. I'm skipping ahead. I jump a few things because in the interest of time. We've heard from the other witnesses, including Chief Pardy and Superintendent Bernier that Superintendent Bernier was working closely with the Integrated Planning Group as of the 12th, and by the 13th they have signed off on a plan, and we've seen the plan. There was an email that was exchanged on or around the 13th that I'd like to take you to so as to clarify what your understanding was as to the evolving plan that you described. Can I take you to OPP00001547. So if we go to the very bottom of the chain, this email chain originated from you to Deputy Chief Ferguson, you ask her to please send you the latest version of the Operations Plan that you approved on Wednesday, February 9th. That was the day when you met with the Integrated Planning Group that we talked about, and then you also ask: "...to please advise if the plan has received official approvals/signatures/etc as there seems to be some concerns about this from the RCMP." If we go up one level. So Deputy Chief Ferguson replied to you, saying: "In checking with Rob Bernier, he finally had a chance to review the plan from the Integrated Planning team and has sent it back with his comments. He would prefer that it be completed and signed off and will then share the plan, as he is the final approver of it. As for version 3.0, Ottawa Truck Demo '22 [9th of February]..." I think she attached ---

    12-208-06

  1801. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- that as a -- as per your request. So we've heard from both Deputy Ferguson and from Superintendent Bernier. Superintendent Bernier was very clear that to him the 3.0 and the February 13th plan were very different plans. So I just want to get your comment on that.

    12-209-18

  1802. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go one level up the email chain, you reply to Deputy Ferguson: "Thank you for the clarification. I was not aware of this delay as I had approved the plan last Wednesday." By "last Wednesday", that would've been the 9th. And I put this question to both Chief Pardy and Superintendent Bernier, I believe, and they disagree that you had approved any plan the previous Wednesday, in part because there was no plan to approve the previous Wednesday.

    12-210-01

  1803. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Finally, I’d like to take you to the events of the 15th of February. That was the day you resigned. At the time of your resignation, did you think that the OPS was well positioned to end the occupation?

    12-212-03

  1804. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We’ve heard from other witnesses that after your resignation, things appeared to move quicker. Do you have any idea why that might be the case?

    12-213-04

  1805. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    When you attended your interview with us, you told us that the primary reason for your resignation was consideration of public safety.

    12-213-20

  1806. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what you meant.

    12-213-24

  1807. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, when we began our examination this morning, I took you to your CV. Can we bring up the CV again? It’s Document No. COM00000759. So at the top of your CV, there’s a motto: " Others before self. Compassion for all." What is that on your CV?

    12-214-19

  1808. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you. Commissioner, those are my questions. My colleague, Mr. Rodriguez, will have more after the break, if you see this as an appropriate time.

    12-214-28

  1809. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, please.

    13-285-02

  1810. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good afternoon, Chief Sloly.

    13-285-05

  1811. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    This morning counsel for the Ottawa Police Service asked you about the circumstances in which Superintendent Rheaume was removed.

    13-285-07

  1812. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you recall those questions? Setting aside any dispute as to why he was removed, help us understand how the Incident Command Structure works normally. Isn't there someone predesignated to step in and -- for contingencies such as when the Event Commander becomes unavailable or to simply cover 24/7 when the Event Commander needs to go to sleep?

    13-285-11

  1813. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now you also said this morning in response to questions from my friend, counsel for the OPS, that Superintendent Dunlop attended a meeting on February the 3rd in the morning. Do you recall if you asked the deputies that afternoon as to why Superintendent Dunlop was at that earlier meeting?

    13-286-23

  1814. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now in relation to these events, I'd like to take you to a document and see if it refreshes your memory. OPS00014454. Mr. Clerk, if we go to page 3 and 4, please? Oh, sorry, 14484. So this appears to be some notes to yourself dated February the 3rd, page 3. The time is 1 o'clock to 1:30, and the title says, "Meeting with Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson and Deputy Chief Bell with POU Briefings." So this would be the afternoon after Superintendent Dunlop attended the morning meeting at 10; right?

    13-289-10

  1815. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go down to page 4, so scroll down a bit? Do you see the paragraph that starts with, "I asked why [Superintendent] Dunlop was doing the POU briefing and not [Staff Sergeant] Stoll." Was that a question you asked at this meeting?

    13-289-21

  1816. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What answer did you get?

    13-289-28

  1817. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now in relation to Staff Sergeant Mike Stoll, who the person who you expected a POU briefing from, what was his role within the POU at that time?

    13-290-11

  1818. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And do you know if he continued in this role into February?

    13-290-16

  1819. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We’ve seen references in some documents that he resigned his position on February the 7th. Now, are you aware of why he left his position with the POU or anything that was expressed, either in writing or otherwise?

    13-290-27

  1820. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Counsel for the OPS also asked you about your meeting on February the 9th at 9:15 a.m.

    13-291-09

  1821. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he put to you some questions based on the notes of Deputy Chief Ferguson, and you commented on the quality of her notes. Now, we also happen to have notes taken by Ms. Huneault; she’s the general counsel for the OPS, and I want to take you to those notes, please. OPS00014454. (SHORT PAUSE)

    13-291-12

  1822. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So can we go to page 130, please? Go down, please. So do you see the notation that starts with: “Very little political support to get us supports [or] resources. If we don’t change that dynamic we’ll get nothing. Now they’ve sent their team to support us over 30 days - their political masters don’t think OPS did their jobs and we won’t bail out. They don’t have a plan. They then will go publicly that...” I guess that’s an equal sign with a slash, so: “...that [doesn’t equal] leadership and they will take it from us.” That’s the best I can make from the handwritten notes. Now, I want to ask you to comment on the quality or the accuracy of these notes.

    13-291-19

  1823. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, just because these are notes of the same meeting that counsel for the OPS had asked you, and your answer to Mr. Migicovsky’s questions were based on your questioning of Deputy Chief Ferguson’s notes. So I want to take you to different sets of notes and ask you to comment on what happened at that meeting. Do these notes accurately reflect what happened at that meeting, as things that were said?

    13-292-16

  1824. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Those are my questions. My colleague, Ms. Rodriguez, will have more. (SHORT PAUSE)

    13-292-26

  1825. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, I took you to this passage because I believe that was the context in which counsel for the OPS asked these questions this morning.

    13-293-05

  1826. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The Former Chief Sloly is the last witness we intend to call from the OPS, but I do want to note for the record that the Commission had hoped and intended to call Supt. Mark Patterson as a witness in these proceedings. His counsel advised the Commission that he's unable -- Supt. Patterson is unable to testify for medical reasons. The Commission did its due diligence to ascertain whether he could testify with our without accommodation in these proceedings. That due diligence included seeking and reviewing the opinions of two medical experts' bearing on his health. The Commission is satisfied, in the circumstances, that it would not be appropriate to call him as a witness.

    13-316-26

  1827. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We do.

    19-007-10

  1828. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Commissioner.

    19-007-12

  1829. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It’s Frank Au for the Commission, and our next witness is Superintendent Dana Earley from the OPP. (SHORT PAUSE)

    19-007-14

  1830. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Good morning, Superintendent Earley.

    19-007-24

  1831. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It’s good to see you again.

    19-007-27

  1832. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you attended an interview with me and my Commission colleagues back on the 9th of September?

    19-008-01

  1833. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And a summary of that interview was prepared afterwards. I understand that you recently had an opportunity to review that summary, and there's some corrections you’d like to make.

    19-008-04

  1834. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we can bring up that document; it’s WTS00000022. (SHORT PAUSE)

    19-008-09

  1835. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go to page 13. So I understand there are two corrections you’d like to make on this page, and the first correction is at the first paragraph; am I right?

    19-008-12

  1836. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. The third paragraph that starts with, “Following this call,” right?

    19-008-20

  1837. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So tell us what exactly you want changed.

    19-008-23

  1838. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So that sentence that starts with, “She informed them that the change in direction came from Commissioner Carrique and Deputy Commissions Harkins.” Should be deleted, right?

    19-009-01

  1839. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I understand that the first sentence that reads currently, “Following this call, at 7:06 p.m., Superintendent Earley advised her command table that they should proceed,” you want that revised as, “advised her command table that she had decided that they would proceed”; am I right?

    19-009-06

  1840. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I thought there was another change you wanted to make to the first paragraph; no?

    19-009-12

  1841. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. All right.

    19-009-15

  1842. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So is there any other corrections you’d like to make?

    19-009-17

  1843. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So we’ll have those corrections made and this will be entered into evidence. Now, you’re a Superintendent with the Ontario Provincial Police?

    19-009-20

  1844. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how many years have you served with the OPP?

    19-009-25

  1845. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you start your policing career with the OPP?

    19-009-28

  1846. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And back in January when the Freedom Convoy events began, you were a Strategic Commander for the West Region.

    19-010-03

  1847. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What areas were covered by the West Region?

    19-010-07

  1848. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how many superintendents were there for that region?

    19-010-13

  1849. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who are the other two?

    19-010-17

  1850. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And do all three of you report to a Chief Superintendent?

    19-010-20

  1851. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who was that in January?

    19-010-23

  1852. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And as a Superintendent of the West Region, what were your responsibilities back in January of this year?

    19-010-25

  1853. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And at that time were you based in London?

    19-011-04

  1854. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I understand that on the 9th of February, you assumed a new role when D/Comm. Harkins appointed you as the Critical Incident Commander in Windsor.

    19-011-07

  1855. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And we heard from D/Chief Crowley yesterday from the Windsor Police Service that you established the joint or unified command with the Windsor Police Service that oversaw all the successful resolution of the blockade in Windsor.

    19-011-12

  1856. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we’ll come to those events a bit later.

    19-011-18

  1857. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But I want to start by asking you about your training and experience that qualified you to take on those roles in January and February. Let’s begin with your background with the Incident Command system. What kind of training have you received?

    19-011-21

  1858. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in terms of the courses that you had to attend before you assumed those roles, tell us about that, too.

    19-012-04

  1859. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And which institution offer that course?

    19-012-22

  1860. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what year did you complete those ---

    19-012-25

  1861. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Were there different levels of training for an Incident Commander or Critical Incident Commander?

    19-013-01

  1862. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    19-013-07

  1863. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I understand you met some colleagues that you worked with ultimately when you were deployed to Windsor in February.

    19-013-09

  1864. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And now you also took on some leadership training more recently. Tell us about that, too.

    19-013-15

  1865. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you met another colleague who was to work in the Windsor Incident Command; right?

    19-013-21

  1866. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who was that?

    19-013-24

  1867. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And isn’t it true that you not only attended those courses and you had experience as an Incident Commander and Critical Incident Commander, you also taught courses in that regard?

    19-013-27

  1868. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, there are two frameworks that we’ve heard a little about that, as I understand from our interview, kind of guided you when you approached the situation in Windsor. One was the OPP framework for police preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents. For those of us who are not familiar with that framework, can you tell us -- give us a quick overview of what that is?

    19-014-06

  1869. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. We’ll come to a little bit more about that. And the other framework is the CACP, or Canadian Association of Chief of Police, national framework. And you mentioned in our interview that that was consistent with the OPP critical policy. Tell us more about that.

    19-014-22

  1870. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So were you familiar with both frameworks when you took on the role of Critical Incident Commander in February?

    19-015-03

  1871. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    All right. Let’s turn now to -- before we get to your role as the Critical Incident Commander in February, I want to start with your role as the Strategic Commander for the West Region in January. So that was when you were still working out of London, Ontario.

    19-015-07

  1872. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what -- you talked to us a little bit about your responsibilities as the Strategic Commander, but what, specifically, were your involvement with respect to the Freedom Convoy or the protests travelling through the west?

    19-015-14

  1873. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, when Commissioner Carrique testified at the hearing, he told us about a blockade on Highway 402 on or around February the 6th. Were you familiar with that incident?

    19-015-26

  1874. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about your involvement.

    19-016-04

  1875. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So first with respect to the incident on the Blue Water Bridge, how long did it take to resolve that event?

    19-016-26

  1876. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it was really short.

    19-017-04

  1877. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was Highway 402 the highway that led to Sarnia, the Blue Water Bridge?

    19-017-06

  1878. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And would that be within the OPP jurisdiction of the police?

    19-017-09

  1879. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Now, you spoke about other slow roll events and we heard a little bit about that yesterday from Deputy Chief Crowley. What other protests or slow rolls were happening in the West Region around that time?

    19-017-12

  1880. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And as the Strategic Commander at that time responsible for these events, what steps did you take to monitor the situation or to prepare for any further escalation of the events?

    19-017-22

  1881. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, were you a recipient of the OPP Hendon Reports?

    19-018-05

  1882. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you read them regularly?

    19-018-08

  1883. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So turning now -- turning our attention now to Windsor, we heard yesterday that there was a Hendon Report on February the 4th that deals specifically with the potential blockade. So I could take you to that report. The document number is OPP00000825. If we go to page 6, please. If we go down -- so you see the second bullet says: “Commercial truck drivers and supporters may conduct slow rolls on roadways near the Ambassador Bridge over the next three days and may attempt to block bridge on February 7.” So this seems to be -- compared to the earlier reports, this seems to be more specific warning particular to the bridge and with a date. Do you remember if you received this report or read it at around that time?

    19-018-11

  1884. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And do you know what actions, if any, were taken by the OPP to mitigate that risk?

    19-019-01

  1885. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I think I know the one you’re referring to. Did you say February the 7th?

    19-019-11

  1886. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But before we get to that, I think there was another email earlier that you were copied on, so if I could take you to that earlier email?

    19-019-14

  1887. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe it’s dated February the 4th, and the document number is WPS000001880. So for context, I believe this is an email from Chief Superintendent Thib to ---

    19-019-18

  1888. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- Deputy Chief Crowley, and you were copied on that. So you see the headings, “Windsor Slow Roll” ---

    19-019-23

  1889. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- “Bridge Protest”. So you weren’t the direct recipient but you were copied on this.

    19-019-27

  1890. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so in this email, Chief Thib talked about the prospect. So if we go to the second line, he said, "Should intel be received or actioned by demonstrators thinking to shut down the Ambassador Bridge, don't hesitate to reach out for joint systems." (As read)

    19-020-03

  1891. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then you were copied because you were overseeing the Emergency Response Team for the region. First of all, what were the responsibilities as -- for oversight over the Emergency Response Team? What's the Emergency Response Team?

    19-020-12

  1892. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in this email, it seems like the OPP was taking a kind of wait and see approach; is that fair?

    19-020-22

  1893. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And beyond waiting for a further request from Windsor, was there anything that in your view the OPP could do proactively to mitigate the risk at this point before the blockade materialized?

    19-021-01

  1894. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Well, let's go then to February the 7th. Now you mention an email from Deputy Chief Crowley?

    19-021-06

  1895. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I believe that email is actually dated February the 8th, if we're thinking about the same email, so I'll call up that document, WPS00000 -- or 6 0s, WPS000000374. Now is this the email you had in mind or was there another one?

    19-021-10

  1896. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So tell us about that earlier exchange.

    19-021-18

  1897. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. So is this email a follow- up to that earlier exchange?

    19-022-01

  1898. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And so when he was asking you, "I know your people are very spread out but my ask at this point is if we were to need to POU or PLT down here, what would availability be?" So it seems like he's ascertaining the potential availability of OPP resources.

    19-022-04

  1899. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you'd mentioned earlier that you were sending some PLT members to Windsor.

    19-022-13

  1900. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that before or after this email?

    19-022-16

  1901. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the sending of the two PLT members was a response to this request?

    19-022-22

  1902. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about POU? He asked about POU here as well.

    19-022-25

  1903. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So this is February the 8th. Now we heard yesterday that Chief Mizuno from the Windsor Police Service sent a letter on February the 9th, the following day, to Minister Jones. I won't -- I don't think I need to call up that document, but for reference, the document ID is WIN00001648. And in that letter, Chief Mizuno requested a minimum of 100 officers. Now was that request before or after you were appointed as the Critical Incident Commander to Windsor?

    19-023-01

  1904. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    19-023-11

  1905. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So probably before.

    19-023-13

  1906. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And we saw also on February 9th a document prepared by Deputy Chief Crowley. Before I take you to that document, I want to take you first to something you said in your interview about the relationship between resource request and planning. So if we go to your summary at page 9, please?

    19-023-15

  1907. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Yes, it's WTS00000022. And, Mr. Clerk, I'll be making frequent references to this summary, so it may assist to have that document.

    19-023-22

  1908. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go to page 9? So, Superintendent, you see under the heading "Relationship between Resource Requests and Planning", you told us that, "...when [you] took command on February [the] 9[th], [Windsor Police Service] did not know the specific numbers and types of officers it required and that the on-the-ground situation on February 9[th] dictated bringing in additional frontline and traffic officers to ensure public and officer safety. OPP accordingly sent as many officers as possible. After Superintendent Earley arrived in Windsor on the morning of February [the] 10[th] and began to develop a plan, she was able to develop more specific numbers and types of resources required to ensure that police had options to respond to various contingencies." So I want to show you a document that Deputy Chief Crowley prepared as of the 9th and ask you if that reflects the kind of lack of specific types that you mentioned in the summary. And that document is WPS000000610. So we heard from Deputy Crowley yesterday that he prepared this on the 9th when Windsor made the request for a hundred officers. If we scroll down a bit, so it talks about different shifts and so on, and then there's more about the situation at that time.

    19-023-26

  1909. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Does this reflect your understanding of the nature of the request that was sent on the 9th?

    19-024-28

  1910. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    19-025-06

  1911. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I guess what I'm wondering is, how is this kind of request in terms of what was needed different from the kind of request that you would have made to the different POU units across the province, for instance, after you arrived and started developing a plan?

    19-025-11

  1912. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    19-025-19

  1913. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. If we go back to your interview summary, to that page that we were on before, you see the last sentence of that paragraph, "She explained that developing an operational plan was essential to ensure that the deployment of resources would be impactful and resolve the blockade." Why was it essential? Why was an operational plan essential?

    19-025-26

  1914. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So these are the initial steps before you became the Critical Incident Commander. So let's turn our attention now to February the 9th when you got a call from Deputy Commissioner Harkins ---

    19-026-14

  1915. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- appointing you as the Critical Incident Commander. Tell us about that initial call?

    19-026-19

  1916. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So there was an urgency that he impressed on you. And just to understand the nature of the role of a Critical Incident Commander, ---

    19-026-28

  1917. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- we’ve heard evidence before about the different tiers of command. There’s the strategic command, there’s the operational command, and there’s the tactical command. Now, you were operating as a strategic commander ---

    19-027-04

  1918. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- before this appointment.

    19-027-10

  1919. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what is the role of a Critical Incident Commander? Is it operating at a strategic or operational level?

    19-027-12

  1920. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what was the objective of your appointment as the Critical Incident Commander? Or for short, I’ll just call it the operational commander.

    19-027-17

  1921. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I understand that you went to Windsor the next day?

    19-027-24

  1922. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    But on the 9th, you were still in London?

    19-027-27

  1923. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What time did you get that call from Deputy Harkins?

    19-028-02

  1924. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you got the call in the evening and you started to make some other calls?

    19-028-07

  1925. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about those other calls, the initial call that you made.

    19-028-10

  1926. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What are the POU hubs?

    19-028-17

  1927. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And when you said services, are these OPP detachments or are these municipal services as well?

    19-028-22

  1928. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How many POU units are there across Ontario? Can you say?

    19-028-25

  1929. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you reached out to the POU units in these municipalities that evening?

    19-029-03

  1930. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you find out from the teleconference about the availability of these POU teams?

    19-029-10

  1931. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was there a request to deploy those units on that evening?

    19-029-17

  1932. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What did you ask for?

    19-029-20

  1933. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, at this stage, you didn’t have a plan yet; right?

    19-029-24

  1934. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go back to what we talked about earlier, about the need for a plan to inform the asking of resources, what did you ask for and what could reasonably be expected at this stage?

    19-029-27

  1935. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about numbers?

    19-030-06

  1936. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So you talked about how you spoke to the Chief. I believe that’s Chief Thib?

    19-030-11

  1937. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You spoke to -- you had -- you engaged in these teleconferences about the POU availability. Who else did you call?

    19-030-14

  1938. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about -- did you make contact with Windsor Police Service at all?

    19-030-20

  1939. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And tell us about that conversation?

    19-030-24

  1940. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm. Now, if I could take you to another OPP document? It’s OPP00004540. I understand that that night, the last thing you did that night, at 11:59 p.m., you sent an email to your superiors summarizing the situation in Windsor as you’ve gathered. So I’m taking you to that email. Could we go to page 14, please? Go down. So February 9th, -- I was wrong on the time. It’s at 23:58. So two minutes before midnight.

    19-031-03

  1941. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You sent an email to Harkins and DiMarco. Who is DiMarco?

    19-031-13

  1942. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. How many Deputy Commissioners are there?

    19-031-17

  1943. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So you sent an email to these two deputies and you summarize the situation as you found them in Windsor. Can we scroll down further? There are many bullet points. I want you to help us unpack the situation a bit based on these points. What did you learn was the situation on the ground in Windsor?

    19-031-21

  1944. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M’hm.

    19-032-09

  1945. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that’s what you did that first night?

    19-032-27

  1946. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go back to your summary, I want to take you to page 3, because you spoke to us about this email. And then at the end of that paragraph, ---

    19-033-02

  1947. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- you said: “Superintendent Earley nonetheless believed that a policing solution to the demonstration was possible…” What did you mean by that? The policing solution, in your mind?

    19-033-06

  1948. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that an approach informed by the two frameworks that you told us about?

    19-033-16

  1949. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, before we go to the next day, earlier that day, before you got the call from Deputy Harkins, I think you told us in the interview that you watched a morning press conference where the Mayor, the Mayor of Windsor, Mayor Dilkens, requested resources without specifying the numbers. Do you remember that?

    19-033-19

  1950. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So -- and during our interview, you shared your perspectives on making public announcements of this nature. Tell us about your view on this.

    19-033-28

  1951. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No. About making public announcements. I think we’ve heard some evidence that, normally, the requests for resources go from one Chief to another, from Chief to Chief.

    19-034-06

  1952. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And it’s not typical that public announcements by politicians were made and you shared your perspective on this kind of public announcement, so I’m just hoping that you could enlighten us.

    19-034-12

  1953. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And after you became the Critical Incident Commander, did you take any steps to change the approach or any kind of media strategy that you adopted?

    19-034-24

  1954. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was any further public announcements made for resources after you assumed the role of Critical Incident Commander?

    19-035-04

  1955. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, in this case the announcement on the 9th did not specify a particular number, how many officers were needed. Do you have any view on whether those numbers should be made publicly in a request?

    19-035-08

  1956. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why not?

    19-035-14

  1957. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So let’s go now to the next day, February 10th. I understand that you had an early morning call with Deputy Harkins, right ---

    19-035-21

  1958. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at 8:30?

    19-035-25

  1959. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And Deputy DiMarco. So tell us what was said in that morning call.

    19-035-27

  1960. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was anything said about Windsor being a priority?

    19-036-07

  1961. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    19-036-10

  1962. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did they explain why Windsor was a priority?

    19-036-15

  1963. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, if I could take you to page 2 of the summary. So if we go to the third paragraph near the middle of the paragraph, do you see the sentence that starts with, “During a February 10th 8:30 a.m. call”?

    19-036-18

  1964. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So it says: “...Deputy Commissioners Harkins and DiMarco again advised Supt. Earley that Windsor was the priority and that it was urgent to resolve the blockade. Supt. Earley understood that the resolution was urgent because the bridge closure was having massive economic impacts, including job layoffs, on Windsor, Ontario and Canada, that the crowd of protestors at the blockade was increasing in size and that the public and officer safety risks were escalating.” Now, you understood that to be the case. Was that -- where did that understanding come from?

    19-036-24

  1965. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you had this call at 8:30 and I believe by 9:00 a.m. you had your mission statement written.

    19-037-17

  1966. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go to the summary at page 5, we excerpted your mission statement, I believe, from your nots.

    19-037-20

  1967. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And it reads: “The OPP and our policing partners will keep the peace, enforce legislation, establish and maintain the safe flow of traffic and respecting individuals’ Charter rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech, with public and officer safety being paramount.” Why was the mission statement or the drafting of the mission statement such a priority for you?

    19-037-24

  1968. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did this version of the statement continue to be the mission as events unfolded?

    19-038-10

  1969. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I understand that the plan was finalized by the end of the day on the 11th and the plan was implemented on the 12th. Was this the same statement that appeared in that ultimate plan?

    19-038-13

  1970. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did you come up with this plan? How did you draft it?

    19-038-19

  1971. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And there are references to respecting individuals’ Charter rights. How did you intend to do that?

    19-038-27

  1972. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that was 9:00 a.m. What time did you arrive in Windsor?

    19-039-07

  1973. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what was the scribe supposed to do when you’re the Critical Incident Commander?

    19-039-13

  1974. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So the different volumes of notes that we ---

    19-039-19

  1975. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- received in disclosure, those were the scribe notes, not your notes.

    19-039-22

  1976. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay.

    19-039-25

  1977. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you went to Windsor and you met with the command team from the Windsor Police Service.

    19-039-27

  1978. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that meeting. What kind of reception did you receive?

    19-040-02

  1979. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was any decision made at that initial meeting about how the WPS and the OPP would be working together?

    19-040-13

  1980. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So yesterday we heard from Deputy Crowley. I think he described the relationship as -- I’m trying to look for his description. He described the integration as seamless and he talked about how the OPP and WPS commands would at times be stepping forward and back. Were you here when he testified?

    19-040-22

  1981. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You watched it.

    19-041-01

  1982. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Do you agree with that description?

    19-041-03

  1983. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in your interview with us at page 3 of your summary, you refer to this high degree of trust and confidence. Tell us more about that?

    19-041-07

  1984. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, I think Deputy Crowley referred to this command structure as, “Unified command” and in your interview with us you referred to it as “Joint command”; are they the same thing?

    19-041-19

  1985. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We’ve heard other terms in Ottawa; “Integrated command”; like, what’s your understanding if there are any differences between integrated, joint, or unified?

    19-041-24

  1986. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. And in terms of the expertise that the OPP was bringing, I think yesterday Deputy Crowley referred specifically to maybe planning, and specifically to POU planning.

    19-042-01

  1987. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can you elaborate on that?

    19-042-06

  1988. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Sorry; name again?

    19-042-11

  1989. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Well, that’s -- let’s talk about the command team, then. Because after you arrived in Windsor, I guess one of the first things you did was to assemble a command table.

    19-042-13

  1990. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And during our interview you said that you wanted broad representation at the command table, and subject matter experts in all the essential areas to ensure that those areas are covered. What are the major areas that you had to cover?

    19-042-18

  1991. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about Intelligence?

    19-042-28

  1992. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And how as Intelligence represented at this command table?

    19-043-03

  1993. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So you had subject matter experts from both OPP and Windsor Police Service represented at the table?

    19-043-14

  1994. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And they included Intelligence; I think you mentioned PLT?

    19-043-18

  1995. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    POU; you mentioned Insp. Younan.

    19-043-21

  1996. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who was responsible for logistics?

    19-043-23

  1997. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about other agencies, such as the CBSA?

    19-043-26

  1998. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why was it important for these other agencies to be included at the command table?

    19-044-04

  1999. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I understand you also set up a system where you had alternates so that you can go to sleep.

    19-044-16

  2000. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Who was your alternate?

    19-044-19

  2001. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And was there a similar system for the Windsor Incident Command?

    19-044-21

  2002. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And who are those two?

    19-044-24

  2003. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why is it important to have these alternates?

    19-044-27

  2004. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So, so far, we’ve talked about the team at the operational level, the command table that we just talked about. I want to ask you now about the relationship between the operational level functioning and the strategic leadership.

    19-045-03

  2005. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So on the Windsor side, who was the Strategic Commander?

    19-045-09

  2006. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. And would the Chief of the Windsor Police Service also be at the strategic leadership level?

    19-045-13

  2007. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the OPP, who were the strategic leaders?

    19-045-17

  2008. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So Comm. Carrique?

    19-045-23

  2009. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And Deputy Harkins.

    19-045-25

  2010. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, during the interview, you spoke to us about the importance for the strategic leadership to give the Operational Commanders autonomy.

    19-045-27

  2011. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us more about that.

    19-046-03

  2012. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Help us understand why is autonomy connected to timeliness of decision-making?

    19-046-13

  2013. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why was it the CIC who had the best situational awareness?

    19-046-22

  2014. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    During your time in Windsor as the Critical Incident Commander, did you enjoy the kind of autonomy that you expected from this strategic leadership?

    19-046-28

  2015. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How was your relationship with the Windsor strategic leadership?

    19-047-04

  2016. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Did you experience any interference at all, improper interference, with your decision- making as the Operational Commander?

    19-047-08

  2017. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the City of Windsor or the Mayor’s Office, did you experience -- what was your relationship with those entities?

    19-047-12

  2018. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. Okay, so we’ve now covered the command team and the relationship with the strategic leadership. I want to talk to you now about the plan. We talked a bit about the plan, and I understand that you came to Windsor on the 10th but by the end of the day on the 11th, you had a plan finalized and ready for action; am I right?

    19-047-17

  2019. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    How did that come about?

    19-047-24

  2020. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, let’s talk about the different elements of that overall plan. During the interview you mentioned many subplans.

    19-048-02

  2021. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And you said those are necessary as part of the contingency planning.

    19-048-06

  2022. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And they involve areas like traffic, towing, mass arrest, prisoner transport, and some of the other areas that we talked about; intelligence, PLT, POU, and so on. I want to ask you specifically about three of those areas.

    19-048-09

  2023. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I would start -- I want to start by asking you about the PLT element.

    19-048-15

  2024. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So through the PLT planning, I understand that you came to learn something about the protester's group, about the leadership, as well as about potential counterprotests.

    19-048-18

  2025. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So let's talk first about your understanding of the leadership. What did you learn through the PLT planning during those two days?

    19-048-23

  2026. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm.

    19-049-05

  2027. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If I could take you to your summary, because I wanted to ask you about that incident.

    19-049-14

  2028. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go to page 11? So this is - - you talked about this incident involving the president of the local autoworkers union chapter. You see in the middle of the paragraph?

    19-049-17

  2029. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    "...PLT informed Superintendent Earley that David Cassidy, the president of the local autoworkers' union chapter, UNIFOR Local 444, claimed that he had spoken to Ontario Premier Doug Ford and that he was willing to bring autoworkers to the blockade site to forcibly clear out protestors by Monday, February [the] 14[th] if police had not cleared the blockade by that date." What kind of danger does this pose to your team as you were planning for action, the weekend?

    19-049-22

  2030. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So was this an example of how you incorporated PLT in planning for contingencies?

    19-050-13

  2031. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Let me ask you now about the POU planning. So you mentioned earlier that Inspector Younan was in charge of that aspect?

    19-050-16

  2032. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And I understand that on -- was it the 10th or the 11th that you had a number of meetings with him and he advised you. So let's go to your summary, maybe that ---

    19-050-20

  2033. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- would help us both.

    19-050-24

  2034. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Page 6 of your summary. So you see that at 4:21 p.m. ---

    19-050-26

  2035. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- you had a meeting with Inspector Younan and he advised you that, "...a mass removal of protestors would be neither safe nor sustainable..." Tell us more about that discussion.

    19-051-01

  2036. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And did you agree with his assessment?

    19-051-14

  2037. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was this an example of how you as the operational commander defer to your subject matter experts?

    19-051-17

  2038. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    The third area I want to ask you about in terms of planning is the involvement of the intelligence experts.

    19-051-20

  2039. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was it your objective to have your operation be intelligence led?

    19-051-24

  2040. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in terms of the tools available to your team, as I understand it, in addition to open source, which you've mentioned, you also was getting some help from the U.S. partners?

    19-052-05

  2041. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    19-052-10

  2042. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in terms of other resources available to you, I understand that there was a drone that was made available?

    19-052-14

  2043. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    As well as pull cameras from the CBSA?

    19-052-18

  2044. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And even a helicopter on the day of the operation?

    19-052-21

  2045. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us about that.

    19-052-24

  2046. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    We've also heard yesterday about the presence of children ---

    19-053-01

  2047. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- during the blockade. And how did intelligence inform your planning about this aspect?

    19-053-04

  2048. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Was that the plan to have the action begin early in the morning?

    19-053-17

  2049. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And what considerations led you to that decision?

    19-053-20

  2050. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What about the size of the crowd?

    19-053-25

  2051. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    M'hm. So we've now talked about the different elements or sub-plans within the overall plan.

    19-054-07

  2052. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Turning our attention now to the overall plan. If we go to your summary at page 6, and we go down, that's right, to the section "Approval of Plans", the second paragraph. So, "On February [the] 11[th], Superintendent Earley also approved an overall operational plan titled "Operations Plan: Freedom Convoy, Windsor Ambassador Bridge." The plan stated that it contemplated "an escalation in police response that is a considered and measured approach," and that "[e]vents associated with Ambassador Bridge blockade/convoys shall be addressed at the lowest competent level in an effort to affect a peaceful resolution." " So earlier, you mentioned in the context of discussing the frameworks, I think you talked about the measured approach, the use of PLT to engage and all of that. I want to ask you specifically to explain about this concept of addressing events at the lowest competent level in the context of a kind of ladder or escalation. What does that mean, the lowest competent level?

    19-054-10

  2053. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So that's what you would try first?

    19-055-11

  2054. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if that did not meet with success, then you escalate?

    19-055-14

  2055. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What would be the next ladder or the next step up the ladder?

    19-055-17

  2056. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if that didn’t work?

    19-055-26

  2057. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What’s next step up?

    19-056-09

  2058. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So we heard yesterday that even during the enforcement phase, attempts were still being made to allow some protestors to continue to protest, perhaps on the sidewalk outside the exclusion zone. Can you tell us more about that?

    19-056-16

  2059. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So by the end of the day on February the 11th, I understand you approved this plan?

    19-057-03

  2060. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And were you satisfied that you’d received all of the necessary resources by then to implement the plan the next day?

    19-057-06

  2061. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And the plan then was to implement the action on the early morning on the 12th?

    19-057-10

  2062. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So I want to take you now to some specific events that unfolded on the 11th while you were making these plans.

    19-057-13

  2063. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    I understand that some time in the afternoon while you were working on your plan, things were happening on the ground, and specifically, there was a kind of perceived breakthrough with the PLT team; right?

    19-057-17

  2064. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Tell us what happened?

    19-057-22

  2065. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So in our interview, you described this as a kind of breakthrough because this was the first substantial request that the PLT team received from the protestors?

    19-058-03

  2066. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So if we go to your summary at page 12, so the second paragraph, at 4:25 p.m., that’s when you spoke to Commissioner Carrique about this request?

    19-058-08

  2067. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then by 5:29 p.m., a draft letter was already approved?

    19-058-12

  2068. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That’s remarkably quick. Within hours.

    19-058-15

  2069. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    What happened during those hours?

    19-058-18

  2070. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    You were still optimistic about the lowest competent level?

    19-058-25

  2071. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So at 5:30, you engaged -- you took part in a teleconference ---

    19-058-28

  2072. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- with some of the strategic leadership and you learned that -- so if we go down further the page. So near the middle of that paragraph, starting “At 5:30…”, do you see the reference to: “Superintendent Alakas informed call participants that PLT would be providing a letter to the Ottawa protestors that was similar to the letter from the provincial government to the Windsor protestors…” Right?

    19-059-03

  2073. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So now Superintendent -- Acting Superintendent Beaudin has testified at this hearing a week or so earlier.

    19-059-14

  2074. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And he told us -- perhaps the best way to summarize his evidence is if I take you to his summary.

    19-059-18

  2075. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Can we go to WTS00000037, please? So this is the interview summary of Insp. Beaudin.

    19-059-21

  2076. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    If we go to page 4? Go down. So you’ll see that on February the 11th, the same day you were dealing with this break through in Windsor: “On February 11[th], 2022, Inspector Beaudin met virtually with Mr. Stewart and Mr. Hutchinson again. The plan at that point was to offer a meeting in exchange for demonstration leaders demanding that the trucks exit downtown Ottawa and denounce any criminal activity. Inspector Beaudin then briefed Acting Deputy Chief Ferguson, who was in agreement with the plan. Later that day, Inspector Beaudin also exchanged emails with OPP Superintendent Alakas about the actions being taken in Windsor and what kind of reaction that might create among the demonstrators in Ottawa.” So things were happening in Ottawa and you were dealing with rapidly developing situations in Windsor.

    19-059-25

  2077. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So going back to your summary, this call at 5:30, when you were informed by Alakas, Supt. Alakas about this development in Ottawa. Remember the middle of the paragraph?

    19-060-18

  2078. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So what -- the evidence given by Insp. Beaudin, does that accord with your understanding on the 11th at around 5:30?

    19-060-23

  2079. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then if we go down the page, a serious of meetings continuing to about if we go to the next page, continuing to about 7:06 p.m., a series of meetings between you and your command team, as well as between you and your strategic leadership ---

    19-060-27

  2080. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- at the OPP took place. Can you take us through those series of meetings?

    19-061-05

  2081. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So going back to your initial concern when you were reconsidering implementing the plan the next day, what implications did you think the action in Windsor may have in Ottawa? What were those concerns?

    19-061-22

  2082. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And then after you spoke to your command team, you had discussions with the strategic leadership, and that included Commissioner Carrique; right?

    19-062-03

  2083. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And Deputy Commissioner Harkins?

    19-062-07

  2084. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And in that discussion, that discussion between the strategic leadership and your role as an operational commander, ---

    19-062-09

  2085. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- help us understand what was the strategic input and how that effected your decision, ultimately, as the operation commander?

    19-062-13

  2086. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Right. So by 7:06 p.m., what was your final decision?

    19-063-01

  2087. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Now, this is the paragraph that you made the correction when we began ---

    19-063-06

  2088. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- today's examination, and the correction you made was to the effect that it was your decision ---

    19-063-09

  2089. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- as opposed to a decision made by the strategic leadership.

    19-063-13

  2090. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Why is that important to you?

    19-063-16

  2091. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So after this decision was made, at 8:00 p.m., if we go down the page, at 8:00 p.m., the letter that was previously approved was now signed by ---

    19-063-20

  2092. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    --- Minister Jones and it was distributed to the protesters. What effect, if any, did it have that distribution of the letter?

    19-063-24

  2093. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And ---

    19-064-01

  2094. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    And tell us about the -- what was going on by then with the protesters?

    19-064-03

  2095. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It wasn't ---

    19-064-12

  2096. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    That wasn't what you were hoping for.

    19-064-15

  2097. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    So now was it time to escalate up the ladder?

    19-064-18

  2098. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Okay. So that takes us to the end of the day on the 11th. My colleague --- Mr. Commissioner, my colleague, Ms. Hedaraly, will continue examination with the events the following day.

    19-064-21

  2099. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    It would be.

    19-064-28

  2100. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    Thank you.

    19-065-03

  2101. Frank Au, Senior Counsel (POEC)

    No, thank you.

    19-145-12